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Abstract
This Article is the first of a two-part investigation into the Indian
law doctrine of reservation diminishment/disestablishment, examining
Supreme Court decisions in this area in light of insights gathered from the
collected papers of individual Justices archived at the Library of Congress
and various university libraries. The Article first addresses Seymour
v. Superintendent (1962) and Mattz v. Arnett (1973), observing that these
first two diminishment/disestablishment cases are modern applications
of basic, longstanding principles of Indian law which are highly protective of Indigenous people’s rights and tribal sovereignty. The Article then
examines in detail DeCoteau v. District County Court, the anomalous 1975
decision in which the Supreme Court held that an 1889 land-sale agreement between the United States and the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
Indians, which Congress ratified in 1891, had abolished the boundaries
of the Lake Traverse Reservation in South Dakota and North Dakota, a
reservation that had been established as the Indians’ “permanent reservation” home in an 1867 treaty. The Article critiques DeCoteau in view of
the historical context of the 1862 U.S.-Dakota War, an explosive conflict
that resulted in the forced removal of the Dakota people from their reservation and aboriginal homelands in Minnesota and the abrogation of
all U.S.-Dakota treaties, including treaty rights that guaranteed annual
payments essential for the Indians’ subsistence and survival. The Article
brings into view the full scope of the negotiations between the SissetonWahpeton people and U.S. commissioners in 1889, demonstrating that the
Dakota people never consented to any reduction or elimination of reservation boundaries when they agreed, under desperate circumstances, to
sell to the United States the unallotted lands within the reservation. The
Article further surveys additional evidence, unaddressed by the Supreme
Court, regarding the 1891 Act’s legislative history, including numerous
congressional debates and provisions of reports of the Senate and House
of Representatives, as well as evidence from Executive Branch sources,
which collectively show that the 1891 Act did not shrink or terminate
the reservation. The Article posits that DeCoteau, which scholars recognize as having initiated a “magic language” mode of analysis in the
reservation diminishment/disestablishment area, cannot be reconciled
with fundamental principles of Indian law. Finally, the Article inspects
and discusses documents from the archived papers of the Justices who
took part in DeCoteau, unraveling clues that may help account for the
Supreme Court’s aberrant decision.
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I.

Introduction

For the past several years the doctrine of reservation diminishment/
disestablishment has figured prominently as a hot-button topic in the
Indian law world. In spring 2020, two cases implicating the same legal question—whether the Muskogee (Creek) Indian Reservation in Oklahoma
has been “terminated” by Congress—were pending in the Supreme
Court;1 and on July 9, 2020 the high court issued its decision, concluding
in McGirt v. Oklahoma that the reservation has not been extinguished
but continues to exist.2 Arriving on the heels of the unanimously-decided
Nebraska v. Parker, which affirmed the continuing undiminished reservation status of the Omaha Indian Reservation,3 McGirt offers hope that
the Court might continue to provide clarifying guidance regarding the
reservation diminishment/disestablishment inquiry generally, and perhaps will even rectify some of the bewildering and troubling features of
previous decisions in this special doctrinal area.4
The then-pending cases were McGirt v. Oklahoma, PC-2018-1057
(Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 659 (2019), and Murphy v. Royal,
875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. 2017), cert granted, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018), argued sub. nom.
Carpenter v. Murphy (subsequently renamed Sharp v. Murphy), No. 17-1107 (U.S. Nov. 27,
2018). See Rebecca Nagle, Oklahoma’s Suspect Argument in Front of the Supreme
Court, The Atlantic, May 8, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/
oklahomas-suspect-argument-front-supreme-court/611284/. By granting certiorari in
McGirt, the Court managed to ensure that all nine Justices were able to participate. See
Ann E. Tweedy, Has Federal Indian Law Finally Arrived at “The Far End of the Trail of
Tears”?, 37 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 739, 741 (2021) (footnotes omitted) (“In a highly unusual
turn of events, a predecessor case, Sharp v. Murphy, from which Justice Gorsuch recused
himself, was argued in November 2018. After additional briefing was ordered, the case
was held over for reargument in the following term. The order for additional briefing
and the subsequent holding over of the case spurred speculation that the Justices were
split 4-4 in Sharp.”); see also Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Will Rule on Whether Much
of Oklahoma is an Indian Reservation, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 2019, https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/12/13/us/supreme-court-oklahoma-indian-reservation.html.
2
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
3
Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481 (2016).
4
See Tweedy, supra note 1, at 743 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he McGirt decision is
unusual in contemporary federal Indian law because it is a Supreme Court decision
that hews closely to both traditional federal Indian law principles and general statutory
1
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In this environment of heightened interest, the time is ripe for
examining precedents in this particular arena of Indian law jurisprudence
through the lens of a unique set of documentary resources, namely, the
Indian law case files within the collected papers of individual Supreme
Court Justices archived at the Library of Congress and various universities across the country.5 These files afford a fascinating, behind-the-scenes
glimpse into the cloistered debates, machinations, supplications, and
alliances—involving the Justices as well as their law clerks—that have
precipitated, for better or for worse, the high court’s Indian law decisions.
The present focus on the reservation diminishment/disestablishment
doctrine offers an initial tapping into this rich reservoir of judicial insight
and intrigue, an investigation that can only enhance the field’s collective
knowledge base while we continue predicting and anticipating the trajectory of Supreme Court decision-making in this area going forward.
This Article is the first of a two-part deep-dive investigation into
what the “Indian Law Justice Files” have to teach us concerning the
development and unfolding of the doctrine of reservation diminishment/
disestablishment. The precise focus is the Supreme Court’s initial forays into this thicket, manifested in the cases Seymour v. Superintendent
(1962),6 Mattz v. Arnett (1973),7 and DeCoteau v. District County Court
(1975).8 The Article examines DeCoteau in considerable depth, both
because it is the launching pad for some of the most disturbing changes
in the law of reservation diminishment/disestablishment and because
the Supreme Court failed to adequately investigate what the Court itself
identified as the dispositive question in the case, namely, whether the
U.S. government’s 1889 Agreement to purchase unallotted lands from
the Sisseton-Wahpeton bands of Dakota Indians entailed tribal understanding of, and consent to, the purported intent of Congress to abolish
the Indians’ homeland, the Lake Traverse Reservation.9 A follow-up
article will examine the other three diminishment/disestablishment cases
for which illuminating documents from the Justices’ archived papers
interpretation principles, eschewing the approach that many Supreme Court cases
have taken from the Rehnquist Court onwards of trying to shut down the exercise
of tribal sovereignty wherever possible, no matter how flimsy or novel the proffered
justification for doing so.”). See generally Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely & Stacy L. Leeds,
A Familiar Crossroads: McGirt v. Oklahoma and the Future of the Federal Indian Law
Canon, 51 N.M. L. Rev. 300 (2021).
5
For a discussion of the Supreme Court Justices’ papers and “questions of access,
the public’s interest in understanding the Court and its decisions, and the effect of
the Justices’ papers on scholarship and popular research,” see Susan David deMaine,
Access to the Justices’ Papers: A Better Balance, 110 L. Libr. J. 185, 185 (2018).
Professor deMaine’s article includes a useful appendix listing “Donations and Access
Restrictions on Most Significant Collection[s] of Papers for Justices Serving on the
Court During and Since 1900.” See id. at 213-20.
6
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
7
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
8
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
9
See infra notes 100-705 and accompanying text.
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are available—Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip (1977),10 Solem v. Bartlett
(1984),11 and Hagen v. Utah (1994).12 Together, these two articles are envisioned as comprising the first in a series of “episodes” examining various
lines of doctrine and jurisprudence from the eye-opening vantage point
of the “Indian Law Justice Files.”

II.

The Supreme Court’s Reservation Diminishment/
Disestablishment Cases

A.

Seymour v. Superintendent (1962)

The Indian reservation diminishment/disestablishment doctrine originated with Seymour v. Superintendent of Washington State
Penitentiary,13 decided by the Supreme Court in 1962.14 The case arose
when Paul Seymour, a member of the Colville Indian Tribe, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Washington after
having been convicted of attempted burglary and sentenced to prison.15
Seymour argued that because the crime for which he had been convicted
occurred on the Colville Indian Reservation, and thus within “Indian
country” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151,16 it was “an offense ‘within the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
12
Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994).
13
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
14
For an excellent summary of Seymour and other reservation diminishment/
disestablishment cases, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Federal Indian Law § 7.2,
at 294-308 (2016).
15
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 352.
16
The 1948 “Indian country” definition, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1151, represents a
recasting of the term relative to its meaning in the nineteenth century. Very early
in the nation’s history the term “meant everything west of the original 13 states,”
Fletcher § 7.1, supra note 14, at 291; and in 1834 Congress defined “Indian country”
as consisting of (1) “all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and
not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana or the territory of Arkansas,” and
(2) “that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river not within any state,
to which the Indian title has not been extinguished.” Act of June 8, 1834, 4 Stat.
729. By the time the General Allotment Act of 1887 was enacted, however, “Indian
country” had become a largely obsolete notion, having been effectively displaced by
reliance on, and implementation of, the more recently emerging concept “reservation”
in federal Indian policy. See S. Lyman Tyler, A History of Indian Policy 73 (1973)
(“In the mid-1850s . . . reservations were successfully established . . . . As the
westward movement eventually carried whites into all regions of the United States,
whites and Indians . . . became intermixed . . . , and the reservation system became
the accepted policy to satisfactorily meet the immediate problem.”); see also
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 268-69 (1913) (citations omitted) (noting that
“the Indian Intercourse Act of June 30, 1834 . . . defined the ‘Indian country’ for the
purposes of that act,” but that “this section was not reenacted in the Revised Statutes
[of 1874], and it was therefore repealed”); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 561
(1883) (observing that “the section of the act of 1834 containing the [Indian country]
definition of that date has been repealed”); Marc Slonim, Indian Country, Indian
Reservations, and the Importance of History in Indian Law, 45 Gonz. L. Rev. 517,
524 (2009/2010) (explaining that Congress’s passing the Major Crimes Act of 1885,
10
11
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Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385, represented “a departure from
prior Indian legislation” as it “may have been the first time Congress enacted Indian
legislation applicable within the limits of any Indian reservation, as opposed to within
Indian country”); cf. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (emphasis
added) (subjecting to federal jurisdiction Indians committing certain listed crimes
“within the boundaries of any State of the United States, and within the limits of any
Indian reservation”); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 377-78 (1886) (emphasis
added) (observing that the provision of the Major Crimes Act “which applies solely to
offenses by Indians which are committed within the limits of a state and the limits of a
reservation” “is a still further advance” beyond earlier provisions of federal legislation
that “ha[d] heretofore only undertaken to punish an Indian who sustains the usual
relation to his tribe, and the offense [was] committed in the Indian country, or on an
Indian reservation, in exceptional cases”).
In a groundbreaking essay, attorney Marc Slonim explains the rise of the concept
“reservation” in mid-to-late nineteenth-century Indian policy and the implications of
the Supreme Court’s “historical error” in “us[ing] the terms Indian country, Indian
reservations, and Indian lands interchangeably,” id. at 527, in modern reservation
diminishment/disestablishment cases:
By extending the 1885 Major Crimes Act . . . to crimes within the limits of any
Indian reservation, Congress covered all crimes within the limits of the reservations, not just those that happened to occur on lands to which the Indians still
retained title.
....
The [Supreme] Court has . . . said that this issue is complicated by the fact
that, in opening Indian lands to non-Indian settlement in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, Congress “seldom detail[ed] whether opened lands retained
reservation status or were divested of all Indian interests.” According to the
Court—and this is where we come to the historical error—the primary reason
for this was the “notion that reservation status of Indian lands might not be
coextensive with the tribal ownership was unfamiliar at the turn of the century.”
. . . The Court went on to say that it was not until 1948 that Congress statutorily defined “Indian country” to include lands held in fee by non-Indians within
reservation boundaries, thereby “uncoupl[ing] reservation status from Indian
ownership.”
. . . I don’t believe this historical account is quite right. . . .
....
. . . Congress and federal officials understood that reservations could include
non-Indian lands during the allotment era. . . . [W]hile Indian country status
was tied to tribal ownership of the land in question, reservation status was not.
. . . The failure to appreciate the historic distinctions between Indian country and Indian reservations has affected the outcome of particular cases and
threatens to undermine the basic framework for ongoing and future reservation
boundary litigation. . . .
....
[T]he assertion that reservation status was believed to be coextensive with
Indian ownership during the allotment era, so that any transfer of lands out
of Indian hands would have been understood to terminate reservation status,
threatens to undermine the basic framework in which reservation boundary
cases are decided.
Slonim, supra, at 527, 528, 529 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984)); see also Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law
§ 3.04[3], at 202 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
“Cohen’s Handbook”] (“[S]everal statutes from the allotment era employed the
term ‘reservation’ rather than ‘Indian country,’ and those statutes were understood
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exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.’”17 The Washington Supreme
Court initially referred the matter to a state trial court, which held that,
although Seymour was a member of the Colville Tribe, the offense had
not occurred within Indian country. The state supreme court subsequently
affirmed the trial court’s ruling, quoting from a previous Washington
Supreme Court decision in “holding . . . that ‘What is still known as the
south half of the diminished Colville Indian reservation is no longer an
Indian reservation.’”18
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. “Since the burglary with which
the petitioner was charged occurred on property plainly located within
the limits of [the Colville] reservation,” Justice Hugo Black concluded for
a unanimous Court, “the courts of Washington had no jurisdiction to try
him for that offense.”19 As a matter of statutory construction the Court’s
reasoning was straightforward. First, the Court noted that although the
Colville Reservation had been expressly diminished by an 1892 Act of
Congress which provided that an area “commonly referred to as the
‘North Half ’ should be ‘vacated and restored to the public domain,’” the
same statute “expressly reaffirmed that this South Half ”—i.e., the place
where the crime had occurred—“was ‘still reserved by the Government
for their [the Colville Indians’] use and occupancy.’”20 The Court then
addressed the argument of the superintendent of the Washington State
Penitentiary that a 1906 Act of Congress, as implemented by a 1916
Presidential Proclamation, had “completely wip[ed] out the South Half
of the Colville Reservation in precisely the same manner as the 1892
Act had ‘vacated and restored’ the North Half of the reservation ‘to the
public domain.’”21
Turning to the text of the 1906 Act, the Supreme Court observed
that the statute “repeatedly refers to the Colville Reservation in a
manner that makes it clear that the intention of Congress was that the
reservation should continue to exist as such.”22 Further evincing this
intent was the statute’s specifying “that the proceeds from the disposition of lands affected by its provisions shall be ‘deposited in the Treasury
of the United States to the credit of the Colville and confederated tribes
and interpreted to include fee lands owned by non-Indians. Thus, the idea that a
reservation might incorporate non-Indian lands was salient to the federal government
at the time that laws providing for allotment and sale of ‘surplus’ lands were passed.”).
See generally Fletcher § 7.1, supra note 14, at 291-94 (discussing “‘Indian Country’
Before the 1948 Codification”).
17
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 352 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151).
18
Id. at 353 (quoting State ex rel. Best v. Super. Ct. for Okanogan Cty., 181 P. 688, 689
(Wash. 1919)).
19
Id. at 359.
20
Id. at 354 (quoting 27 Stat. 62, 63, 64 (1892)).
21
Id. at 355.
22
Id. (citing §§ 2, 3, 6, 12, 34 Stat. 80-82 (1906)). In each of the four sections cited
by the Court, the 1906 Act refers to the “surplus or unallotted lands” that are thereby
subjected to “sale and disposition” as existing within “the diminished Colville Indian
Reservation.” See §§ 2, 3, 6, 12, 34 Stat. 80-82 (1906).
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of Indians belonging and having tribal rights on the Colville Indian
Reservation, in the State of Washington.’”23 In light of these textual signposts, the Court wrote,
it seems clear that the purpose of the 1906 Act was neither to destroy
the existence of the diminished Colville Indian Reservation nor to
lessen federal responsibility for and jurisdiction over the Indians
having tribal rights on the reservation. The Act did no more than
open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation
in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and
trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of
its wards.24

Supplementing its analysis of the statutory text, the Seymour Court
next addressed “subsequent congressional treatment of the reservation”
as “support” for its conclusion “[t]hat this is the proper construction
of the 1906 Act.”25 The Court pointed to intervening statutes in which
“Congress has explicitly recognized the continued existence as a federal Indian reservation of this South Half of the diminished Colville
Indian Reservation.”26 Adding that “[t]his same construction . . . has been
adopted by the Department of Interior, the agency of government h
 aving
primary responsibility for Indian affairs,” the Court concluded “that
the Washington courts erred in holding that the 1906 Act dissolved the
Colville Indian Reservation because it seems clear that this reservation
is still in existence.”27
While Seymour’s construction of the 1906 Act seems conventional
in its primary consideration of statutory text and its secondary consideration of supportive language in subsequent federal statutes referencing
the same subject (i.e., the status of the Colville Reservation), the case
tacitly adheres to the special interpretive canons that the Supreme Court
has developed and employed historically for construing congressional
acts and provisions of treaties and agreements affecting Indian rights
and U.S.-tribal relations. For instance, the Court’s observation that the
case “raises issues of importance pertaining to this country’s relationship to its Indian wards”28 and the Court’s recognition of unique “federal
responsibilities for and jurisdiction over the Indians having tribal rights
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 355 (quoting § 6, 34 Stat. 80, 81 (1906)).
Id. at 356.
25
Id.
26
Id. (citing 39 Stat. 123, 154-55; 39 Stat. 672; 40 Stat. 449; 41 Stat. 535; 43 Stat. 21;
54 Stat. 703; 69 Stat. 141, 143; 70 Stat. 626-27). Six of these eight intervening statutory
provisions refer to “the diminished Colville Indian Reservation,” “the Colville
Indian Reservation,” or “the existing reservation”; the remaining two provisions, as
the Court noted, refer to “the ‘former Colville Indian Reservation, Washington,’”
a countervailing designation that “illustrate[s] that there may have been some
congressional confusion on this issue during that short period of time,” i.e., between
1918 and 1920. Id. at 356 n.12 (emphasis added) (quoting 41 Stat. 535; 43 Stat. 21).
27
Id. at 357 (citing 54 I. D. 559; 59 I. D. 247; 60 I. D. 318).
28
Id. at 353-54.
23
24
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on [the Colville] reservation”29 manifest an interpretive posture that
embraces the principle that “tribal property rights and sovereignty are to
be preserved unless Congress’s intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.”30 Moreover, the Court’s resolution of contrasting references in
subsequent statutes which discuss the status of the Colville Reservation
signifies acceptance of the “basic Indian law canons of construction [that]
require that treaties, agreements, statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and that all ambiguities are to
be resolved in their favor.”31 It is thus apparent that at its inception, the
doctrine of reservation diminishment/disestablishment was a special
instance of the Supreme Court’s historical solicitude for protecting
Indian rights and tribal sovereignty, as effectuated through use of the
Indian law canons, in the absence of clear and unambiguous indicators of
intentional deleterious action by Congress.
The archived papers of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who took
part in the 1962 Seymour ruling, reflect discourse and activity among
the Justices that are consonant with this historical solicitude. Justice
Brennan’s copy of a vote table in the Seymour case shows that, in conference, eight Justices voted initially to reverse the Washington Supreme
Court’s decision denying the reservation status of the South Half of
the Colville Reservation, with only Justice Charles E. Whittaker voting
to affirm.32 Justice Brennan’s handwritten comment on a conference
note-taking sheet summarizes the position of Chief Justice Earl Warren
as follows: “No dispute this fellow is an Indian. Thinks Fed Govt retained
lower ½ as an Indian reservation.”33 Ultimately, of course, the author
of the Supreme Court opinion in Seymour, Justice Black, succeeded in
obtaining the agreement of all nine Justices, including Justice Whittaker,
that the state supreme court’s decision ought to be reversed.34
Id. at 356.
Cohen’s Handbook § 2.02[1], supra note 16, at 114.
31
Id. at 113; see also Hedden-Nicely & Leeds, supra note 4, at 348 (“First and foremost,
Indian law canons of construction require federal courts to limit their inquiry to the
plain language of the documents at issue. If an ambiguity exists in the plain language
of a treaty or statute, that ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the tribe. Indian law
canons were established, in part, to address the balance of power already significantly
skewed toward non-Indian rule of small Indian populations that never consented to
be governed by a colonial power.”).
32
William J. Brennan Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box I:69, Folder 61-62
(Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary), retrieved from the Library of
Congress.
33
Id.
34
Justice Whittaker sent his “join memo” to Justice Black on January 9, 1962, stating
simply “I agree.” See Hugo LaFayette Black Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material,
Box 366 (Seymour v. Superintendent), retrieved from the Library of Congress. In
a memo dated January 11 Justice John Marshall Harlan II suggested two changes,
including that the name of the case be updated from its original “Seymour v.
Schneckloth”: “Since Schneckloth is no longer in office, might it not be better to
substitute in the title, ‘Superintendent of Washington State Penitentiary,’ the caption
which the parties have used in their briefs to describe the respondent pursuant to
29
30
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Mattz v. Arnett (1973)

The high court’s next reservation diminishment/disestablishment
case likewise produced a unanimous decision rejecting the argument
that an act of Congress facilitating the sale and purchase of so-called
“surplus lands”35 had eliminated the boundaries of an Indian reservation.
Mattz v. Arnett arose when a California game warden confiscated five
gill nets used by Raymond Mattz, a Yurok Indian, to fish on the Klamath
River in northern California.36 Mattz was accused of violating provisions
of state law that prohibited the use of gill nets.37 He challenged the statecourt forfeiture proceedings initiated by G. Raymond Arnett, director of
the California Department of Fish and Game, arguing that the state-law
provisions did not apply to him because the place where he had been
fishing was on the Klamath Indian Reservation, which was beyond the
reach of state law by virtue of being within federally defined Indian
country.38 The state trial court held that “the area where the nets were
amended Rule 48.” See id. In curious phrasing Black penciled instructions to his own
law clerk in the left margin of the memo from Harlan: “George—There is no reason
for failing to follow these suggestions in fact the first seems necessary HLB.” See id.
35
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973) (stating that the congressional act at issue
“permitted the President to make allotments of reservation lands to resident Indians
and, with tribal consent, to sell surplus lands”); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S.
351, 354-55 (1962) (stating that the congressional act at issue “provided . . . for the
settlement and entry under the homestead laws of . . . surplus lands”).
36
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 484.
37
Id.
38
Id.; see also Jessica Cejnar, Raymond Mattz, Whose U.S. Supreme Court Win
Reaffirmed Yurok Rights to the Klamath River, Dies At 79, Wild Rivers Outpost,
Sept. 10, 2021, https://wildrivers.lostcoastoutpost.com/2021/sep/10/raymond-mattzwhose-us-supreme-court-win-reaffirme/ (“In 1969, Mattz was fishing at Brooks
Riffle when a California game warden confiscated his gill nets and gave him
a citation . . . . Mattz went to state court and demanded his nets back, telling the
judge ‘these are my Indian rights, you can’t keep me from fishing’ . . . . According to
[Mattz’s niece Amy] Cordalis, [general counsel for the Yurok Tribe,] the judge told
Mattz to pay him $1, said he’d return his nets and would drop the charges. That wasn’t
good enough . . . . ‘Uncle Ray said, “No. I am pushing this legal issue through the
courts because this is my right,”’ Cordalis said. ‘He pushed the case. And the issue
of whether the Yurok Reservation was still Indian Country such that Indian people,
Yuroks, still had the right to fish under federal law and under aboriginal rights—their
Indian rights—went all the way to the Supreme Court.’”); Anna V. Smith, How the
Yurok Tribe is reclaiming the Klamath River, High Country News, June 11, 2018,
https://www.hcn.org/issues/50.10/tribal-affairs-how-the-yurok-tribe-is-reclaimingthe-klamath-river (“[I]n September 1969, [Mattz] was fishing the fall run of chinook
salmon at the family’s fishing hole, called Brooks Riffle—named for his great-greatgreat grandfather. When a state game warden caught Mattz and a group of friends with
five gill nets, Mattz claimed all five nets were his and was arrested. He then sued the
state of California to return the nets, but the state refused to return them, claiming that
Mattz could not legally gillnet in the state of California. . . . At its core, Mattz vs. Arnett
was a challenge to tribal sovereignty, the ability of tribes to govern themselves. . . . The
[Supreme Court] affirmed, in 1973, the Yurok Tribe’s treaty rights to fish by traditional
means, including gillnetting, and declared that the Yurok Reservation was indeed a
part of Indian Country . . . . Mattz’s stand on Brooks Riffle is not only part of Cordalis’
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seized was not Indian country” and a state appellate court affirmed this
ruling, opining that “inasmuch as the area in question had been opened
for unrestricted homestead entry in 1892, the earlier reservation status of
the land had terminated.”39
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California courts, holding
“that the Klamath River Reservation was not terminated by the Act of
June 17, 1892, and that the land within the boundaries of the reservation
is still Indian country.”40 The Court noted that “the current status of the
Klamath River Reservation turns primarily upon the effect of [the] 1892
Act of Congress which opened the reservation land for settlement.”41 The
Court then focused on provisions of the 1892 Act—titled “An Act to provide for the disposition and sale of lands known as the Klamath River
Indian Reservation”—specifying (1) “That all of the lands embraced
within what was the Klamath River Reservation . . . are hereby declared to
be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase” by non-Indian homesteaders; (2) “That any Indian now located upon said reservation may . . . apply
to the Secretary of the Interior for an allotment . . . .”; and (3) “That the
proceeds arising from the sale of said lands shall constitute a fund to be
used under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior for the maintenance and education of the Indians now residing on said lands and their
children.”42 Summarizing the structure and sequencing of its ensuing reservation diminishment/disestablishment analysis, the Court stated: “It is
our task, in light of the language and purpose of the Act, as well as of the
[Act’s] historical background, . . . to determine the proper meaning of the
Act and, consequently, the current status of the reservation.”43
In assessing “language and purpose,” the Court contextualized the
1892 Act as “but one example of ” special legislation enacted by Congress
in the wake of the 1887 General Allotment Act—which had given the
President discretion “to open reservation land for allotment”—in order
to “assure that [the] particular reservation was in fact opened to allotment.”44 By corralling the 1887 General Allotment Act into its analysis in
this way,45 the Mattz Court in effect subjected the 1892 special Klamath
allotment statute to a limiting construction comparable to the one
family lore but is also recorded in federal Indian law.”).
39
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 484-85; see also id. at 485 (citation omitted) (noting that “[t]he
Supreme Court of California, one judge dissenting, denied a petition for hearing”).
40
Id. at 506.
41
Id. at 485.
42
Act of June 17, 1892, 27 Stat. 52, quoted in Mattz, 412 U.S. at 495.
43
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 495.
44
Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
45
See also id. (observing that the allotment provisions of the 1892 Act at issue in
Mattz “do not differ materially from those of the General Allotment Act of 1887,
and . . . in fact refer to the earlier Act”); cf. Fletcher § 7.2, supra note 14, at 297
(footnote omitted) (“The [Mattz] Court held that the 1892 Act was merely a local
implementation of the 1887 General Allotment Act, which authorized the President
to allot Indian reservations to individual Indians, but left the sale of surplus lands to
the President’s discretion.”).
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intimated in United States v. Celestine, a 1909 case repeatedly cited in
Mattz, in which the Court opined that the General Allotment Act “clearly
does not . . . abolish the reservations” for which allotment had been prescribed as a general policy.46 By the same token, the Mattz Court thus was
able to align its interpretation of the 1892 Act with its similar construction
of the special allotment legislation at issue in Seymour v. Superintendent:
“This Court unanimously observed, in an analogous setting, ‘The Act did
no more [in this respect] than open the way for non-Indian settlers to
own land on the reservation in a manner which the Federal Government,
acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to
the development of its wards.’”47 Accordingly, the Mattz Court rejected
the state fish and game department director’s insistence that the text of
the 1892 Act “militates against a continuation of . . . reservation status” by
force of the statute’s express provision that “the lands were to be opened
up for settlement and sale by homesteaders.”48
In like manner, the Court rejected the director’s additional argument that the Act’s textual reference to “what was [the] Klamath River
Reservation” compelled “the conclusion that Congress intended to terminate the reservation in 1892.”49 The Court explained that this past-tense
reference “is not to be read as a clear indication of congressional purpose
to terminate” in light of the legislative history of the Act, which disclosed
the need to distinguish the particular lands subjected to allotment by the
1892 Act from other lands that likewise had been incorporated into an
extension of the Hoopa Valley Reservation by an 1891 executive order.50
The past-tense reference thus could not be read as signaling that the reservation had been terminated; rather, it “seems . . . merely to have been
a natural, convenient, and short-hand way of identifying the land subject
to allotment under the 1892 Act.”51
Bolstering its construction of the Act’s language, the Mattz Court
rejected the state fish and game department director’s further efforts to
portray “numerous statements in the legislative history” as “indicat[ing]
that the reservation was to be terminated.”52 The director’s references to
United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 287 (1909) (quoting with approval
Eells v. Ross, 64 F. 417, 420 (9th Cir. 1894)); see Mattz, 412 U.S. at 497, 504-05 (citing
and quoting Celestine, 215 U.S. at 285).
47
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 497 (alteration in original) (quoting Seymour v. Superintendent,
368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962)).
48
Id. at 496 (quoting Brief for Respondent at 3, Arnett v. 5 Gill Nets [Mattz v. Arnett],
412 U.S. 481 (1973) (No. 71-1182), 1973 WL 172526, at *3).
49
Id. at 497-98 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
50
Id. at 498; see also id. at 493-94 (explaining that through the 1891 Executive Order
“[t]he Klamath River Reservation . . . was made part of the Hoopa Valley Reservation,
as extended” and that President Benjamin Harrison thus “enlarged the Hoopa Valley
Reservation to include what had been the Klamath River Reservation as well as an
intervening riparian strip connecting the two tracts”).
51
Id. at 498.
52
Id. at 499.
46
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language in precursor House bills that were “generally hostile to continued reservation status of the land in question” were unavailing, the Court
reasoned, because the Senate succeeded in substituting its own, contrary
version of the proposed legislation instead.53 This final version, which was
ultimately enacted in 1892, “compels the conclusion that efforts [reflected
in the superseded House bills] to terminate the reservation by denying
allotments to the Indians failed completely.”54
The reservation diminishment/disestablishment analysis as actually
implemented in Mattz reflected and reinforced the Court’s similar approach
in the 1962 Seymour case.55 In both cases, the Court appeared to adhere,
implicitly, to traditional Indian law canons by requiring clear, unambiguous
textual language before concluding Congress had intended to denigrate
Indian rights by diminishing or abolishing a tribe’s reservation.56 Likewise,
in both cases, the Court regarded with due skepticism arguments adverse
to the preservation of Indian rights that litigation opponents attempted
to extract from legislative history, explaining why these efforts failed to
persuade the Justices to alter their reading of statutory language properly
viewed through the lens of historical Indian law principles.57
However, dicta arising at the end of the 1973 Mattz opinion may be
viewed in retrospect as giving subtle warning of potentially detrimental
future changes to the reservation diminishment/disestablishment doctrine. Thus, in summarizing its decision the Mattz Court properly noted
Id. at 499-503; cf. Fletcher § 7.2, supra note 14, at 297-98 (footnote omitted) (“The
1892 Act came about when Congress selected the Senate version [of the proposed
legislation], providing for the allotment of the reservation, over the House version,
which would have expressly disestablished the reservation.”).
54
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504.
55
See Allison M. Dussias, Heeding the Demands of Justice: Justice Blackmun’s Indian Law
Opinions, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 41, 58 (1995) (“Mattz was important to the continued existence
of reservations and tribal governments because it reaffirmed the principle that opening
a reservation to settlement does not itself terminate the reservation. The reservation
remains Indian country, in which state authority has historically been limited.”).
56
See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 30 (1995) (“The
early reservation disestablishment cases appeared to establish a relatively workable test
based largely on the language and intent of the particular surplus lands act.”). During
oral argument in Mattz, the petitioner’s attorney summed up his advocating for the
application of Indian law principles as follows: “In conclusion, . . . to say that the 1892
Act terminated this reservation would go contrary to the requirement . . . that there be
a clear intent to terminate, it would be contrary to the decisions of this Court . . . that
laws that are ambiguous are to be construed in the Indians’ favor. . . . And it would
work a great injustice on the Yurok Indians whose life is centered here and who
received a very small reservation to begin with.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 12,
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973) (No. 71-1182).
57
Cf. Richard W. Hughes, Indian Law, 18 N.M. L. Rev. 403, 456-57 (1988) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505) (reasoning that the no-disestablishment
outcomes of both Seymour and Mattz, and in particular Mattz’s statement that “a
determination to terminate ‘must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear
from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history,’” are “consistent with the
general rule of construction that Indian legislation must be interpreted, where possible,
favorably to the preservation of Indian rights, including tribal governmental power”).
53
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that “clear termination language was not employed in the 1892 Act,” but
inexplicably added: “This being so, we are not inclined to infer an intent
to terminate the reservation.”58 Compounding this apparent tension with
Indian law principles, the Court further opined: “A congressional determination to terminate [an Indian reservation] must be expressed on the face
of the Act or be clear from the surrounding circumstances and legislative
history.”59 These statements could be read as intimating that, absent any
basis in the language of a statute, the Supreme Court nevertheless could
effectuate its own “inclin[ation] to infer” diminishment/disestablishment
based exclusively on “surrounding circumstances and legislative history.”
To some extent, this implication is tempered by the accompanying footnotes and citations to authority.60 For instance, the Court properly noted
that “Congress has used clear language of express termination when that
result is desired”—providing as examples statutes stating “the . . . reservation is hereby discontinued” and “the reservation lines . . . are hereby
abolished”—and elaborated that, with respect to the 1892 Act at issue in
Mattz, “Congress was fully aware of the means by which termination could
be effected.”61 Likewise, in support of its assertion that diminishment or
disestablishment could result from “[a] congressional determination to
terminate” that either is “expressed on the face of [an] Act or [is] clear
from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history,” the only
Supreme Court authorities cited are Seymour v. Superintendent 62 and
United States v. Nice,63 each of which intimated that express congressional
action would be required before a court could conclude that Congress had
diminished or invaded p
 reexisting Indian rights.64 Still, the Mattz dicta were
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added).
Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
60
Cf. A.J. Taylor, A Lack of Trust: South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe and
the Abandonment of the Trust Doctrine in Reservation Diminishment Cases,
73 Wash. L. Rev. 1163, 1171 (1998) (noting that in Mattz “the Court expanded its
approach to include legislative history as an indicator of congressional intent” but
that “in deference to Seymour, the Court based its decision on the absence of express
statutory language”).
61
Mattz, 412 U.S. at 504 & n.22 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
62
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
63
United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
64
See supra text accompanying notes 19-24 (discussing Seymour, 368 U.S. 351 (1962));
see also Nice, 241 U.S. at 599, 601 (declining to infer from the General Allotment Act’s
provisions which authorize “the making of the allotments and the issue of the trust
patents” congressional intent to simultaneously extinguish the “national guardianship”
of Indian allottees, and instead applying the “familiar rule” that “legislation affecting the
Indians is to be construed in their interest, and a purpose to make a radical departure
is not lightly to be inferred”). In a footnote the Mattz Court also cited an appellate
court decision, United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973),
as “a case presenting issues not unlike those before us,” Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505 n.23,
and quoted Condon’s statement that “a holding favoring federal jurisdiction is required
unless Congress has expressly or by clear implication diminished the boundaries of
the reservation opened to settlement,” Condon, 478 F.2d at 689 (emphasis in original),
quoted in Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505 n.23. See also infra notes 690-692 and accompanying
text. In Condon, however, the Eighth Circuit did not suggest that congressional intent
58
59
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somewhat foreboding; and, as discussed below, subsequent case-law developments have validated these concerns, as well as further, related ones,
about the direction in which the Court’s reservation diminishment/disestablishment methodology might be heading.65
The available papers of the individual Justices who took part in the
Mattz decision contain a number of illuminating documents. Among the
papers of William H. Rehnquist, who had been sworn in as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court the year before Mattz was decided,66 is a
vote table and notes sheet with handwritten comments indicating that
in the initial conference vote, six of the Justices (Chief Justice Warren
Burger and Justices Lewis Powell, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall,
William Brennan, and William Douglas) were inclined to reverse the
state courts’ decision that the Klamath River Reservation had been
terminated, while two Justices (Potter Stewart and Byron White) were
inclined to affirm. Justice Rehnquist’s own position was that he “would
DIG [dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted] or affirm.” A note by
Rehnquist regarding the position of Justice Blackmun—the author of the
unanimous Mattz opinion—states: “Seymour requires reversal.” And in
the “Memo” section at the bottom of the notes sheet is a significant handwritten note by Rehnquist: “Can’t vacate Ind Res by implication.”67
The papers of Justice Blackmun, archived at the Library of
Congress, also contain a conference notes sheet for the Mattz case.
Justice Blackmun wrote “Cd DIG” in the notation boxes for each of five
members of the Court—Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White,
Powell, and Rehnquist—suggesting that the Court might have come close
to diminish an Indian reservation could be ascertained through “clear implication”
arising from surrounding circumstances and legislative history despite the lack of
textual language supporting such an implication. Indeed, the Condon court’s conclusion
that a 1908 Act of Congress did not diminish the Cheyenne River Indian Reservation
followed from the court’s reliance on traditional Indian law interpretive principles.
See, e.g., Condon, 478 F.2d at 689 (quoting Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945),
and citing, inter alia, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832)) (alteration in original)
(incorporating into the court’s analysis “the long standing ‘policy of leaving Indians free
from state jurisdiction and control [which] is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history’”).
65
See infra notes 100-705 and accompanying text (discussing DeCoteau v. Dist.
Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975)); cf. Lauren King, The Indian Treaty Canon and
McGirt v. Oklahoma: Righting the Ship, 56 Tulsa L. Rev. 401, 406 (2021) (footnote
omitted) (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505 (emphasis added)) (“The [Mattz] Court
reiterated that clear congressional intent is required to effect disestablishment,
but introduced unfortunate language that would serve to distort the focus of the
disestablishment inquiry in subsequent cases: ‘congressional determination to
terminate must be expressed on the face of the Act or be clear from the surrounding
circumstances and legislative history.’”).
66
See John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: The Life of William Rehnquist 272 (2012)
(noting that Rehnquist took the oath of office as Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court on January 7, 1972).
67
William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box/Docket No. 38: 711182 (Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and Game), retrieved from the
Hoover Institution, Stanford University; see App. Exhibit 1, infra p. 345.
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to dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted in Mattz.68 On a separate sheet of tablet paper, dated “3-24-73,” Justice Blackmun wrote: “It
seems to me th[at] a reversal & remand is indic[ated] here for sev[eral]
reasons.” On Blackmun’s list appear the following enumerated reasons:
• “Seymour . . . I feel is controlling”
• “The U.S. as T[rust]ee aspect smells o[f] reservation”
• “Do n[ot] like term[ination] of Ind rts by implication & inference.
Cong knows how to terminate”
• “Cong[ression]al acti[on] since 1892 seems to favor Inds.”

Illuminating too is what appears to be a one-page memorandum, dated
“3/23/73,” written by Justice Blackmun’s law clerk:
I think reversal is pretty clearly required. While the legislative history is not entirely free from doubt, I would even conclude, from that
history alone, that the reservation was not terminated. However, the
teaching of Seymour—and wise it was—was that one ought not get too
involved in such legislative history. Many Senators and Congressmen
had strong feelings each way; the motives which supported the passage
of the 1892 Act were, I imagine, as varied as the persons who voted for
it. The legislative history clearly provides no clear cut answer in this
case. Seymour wisely, I think, counseled against difficult ventures into
this history, and opted for a rather fixed rule which can be stated about
as follows: Unless legislative intent is very clear and not subject to dispute, the burden is on Congress to terminate a reservation by the use
of clear language to that effect in the Act itself—such as “terminate”,
“discontinue”, “restore to the public domain”, and the like. Applying
this test, which I would not alter, reversal is clearly required.69

Ultimately, of course, Justice Blackmun succeeded in persuading
all of his fellow Justices to join what became his opinion for a unanimous Court. In a one-page memorandum dated May 31, 1973, Justice
William Brennan typed “I agree” in the main body of the document and
included the following handwritten note in the bottom margin: “Harry:
I found the history fascinating & a splendid support for the result you
reach. I’m grateful that you took the time to research it.”70 Among the
other Justices who supported reversal of the state courts’ decision from
the outset, Justice Douglas wrote in a June 5 memorandum to Justice
Blackmun: “You have written a fine opinion for the Court in 71-1182,
Mattz v. Arnett. Please join me.”71 And on the same day, Justice Powell
wrote to Blackmun: “Please join me in your fine opinion.”72
For evidence of Chief Justice Burger’s pressuring Justice Blackmun during oral
argument in Mattz to vote to dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted, see infra note 98.
69
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 160, Folder 71-1182
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
70
Id.
71
Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, MS 1367, Box No. 272,
Folder No. 3249 (Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and Game, No. 711182), retrieved from Yale University Library.
72
Byron R. White Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box I:247, Folder 71-1182
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
68
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As for the Justices who originally had indicated that they were leaning toward affirming the state courts’ decision, Justice Stewart wrote to
Justice Blackmun on June 1: “Your opinion for the Court is a very thorough and convincing one. I expressed a contrary view at the Conference,
but I do not propose to write a dissent. Unless, therefore, someone else
writes a dissenting opinion, I shall cheerfully acquiesce in your opinion.”73 Similarly, Justice White wrote to Blackmun on June 7: “Although
my tentative vote was the other way at conference, I join your present
circulation.”74 And, striking a whimsical note, Justice Rehnquist wrote to
Blackmun on June 1: “Your quotation in the opinion from Martin Luther
has persuaded me to change the view I expressed at Conference, and join
your excellent opinion.”75
Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, MS 1367, Box No. 272,
Folder No. 3249 (Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and Game, No. 711182), retrieved from Yale University Library. Summarizing Justice Stewart’s position
as stated in conference, Justice Rehnquist wrote: “only q[uestion] now before us is
whether this is ‘Indian country’[.] Calif has worked it out satisfactorily, giving Yuroks
rts to fish for subsistence—accepts Calif det[ermination] that this is not [Indian
country.]” William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box/Docket
No. 38: 71-1182 (Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and Game), retrieved
from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University; see App. Exhibit 1, infra p. 345; see
also infra notes 84-92 and accompanying text (showing questions about Indian fishing
rights that were posed during oral argument in Mattz).
74
Byron R. White Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box I:247, Folder 71-1182
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
75
William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box/Docket No. 38: 711182 (Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and Game), retrieved from the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University. The reference is to a long footnote in Mattz, in which
Justice Blackmun elaborated on a U.S. Department of the Interior official’s questioning
of anthropologist Stephen Powers’ estimates of the population of Yurok Indians on the
Klamath River Reservation in the 1860s. In a retort to the official’s request “that he
modify his estimates,” Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 488 n.7 (1973), Powers responded:
“If any critic, sitting in his comfortable parlor in New York, and reading about
the sparse aboriginal populations of the cold forests of the Atlantic States, can
overthrow any of my conclusions with a dash of his pen, what is the use of the
book at all? As Luther said, at the Diet of Worms, ‘Here I stand; I cannot do
otherwise.’”
3 Contributions to N. Am. Ethnology 2-3 (J.W. Powell ed., 1877) (letter of transmittal
from editor John Wesley Powell to Secretary of the Interior) (quoting “private letter”
from anthropologist Stephen Powers to editor J.W. Powell), quoted in Mattz, 412 U.S.
at 488 n.7. In Powers’ preface, dated August 25, 1874, to his comprehensive study of the
diverse cultures of California Indians, the anthropologist adverted to the reason for
his indignation at the federal official’s request for a “modification of his statements”
“concerning the former Indian population,” notwithstanding the official’s own
“opinion” conceding “that more Indians were destroyed in this part of the country
than in the remaining portion of the United States,” id. at 1 (letter of transmittal from
editor John Wesley Powell to Secretary of the Interior). Powers wrote:
Perhaps it is too much to ask any one to believe that there are regions of
California which supported more Indians than they ever will of white men. But
if those who honor this book with a perusal shall lay it aside with the conviction
that the cause of his extinction does not “lie within the savage himself,” and that
the white man does not come to “take the place which the savage has practically
73
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vacated,” I shall be content. Civilization is a great deal better than savagery;
but in order to demonstrate that fact it is not necessary to assert, as Wood does
in his work, that savagery was accommodatingly destroying itself while yet the
white man was afar off. Ranker heresy never was uttered, at least so far as the
California Indians are concerned. It is not well to seek to shift upon the shoulders of the Almighty (through the savages whom He made) the burden of the
responsibility which attaches to the vices of our own race.
Stephen Powers, Preface to 3 Contributions to N. Am. Ethnology, supra, at 5-6.
The language quoted by Powers is from the concluding paragraph of a chapter titled
“Australia” in the 1870 book The Natural History of Man by English writer John
George Wood:
The means were offered to [the aborigines] of infinitely bettering their s ocial
condition, and the opportunity given them, by substituting peaceful labour for
perpetual feuds, and of turning professional murderers into food-producers, of
replenishing the land which their everlasting quarrels, irregular mode of existence, and carelessness of human life had well-nigh depopulated. These means
they could not appreciate, and, as a natural consequence, had to make way for
those who could. The inferior must always make way for the superior, and such
has ever been the case with the savage. I am persuaded that the coming of the
white man is not the sole, nor even the chief, cause of the decadence of savage
tribes. I have already shown that we can introduce no vice in which the savage
is not profoundly versed, and feel sure that the cause of extinction lies within
the savage himself, and ought not to be attributed to the white man, who comes
to take the place which the savage has practically vacated.
J.G. Wood, The Natural History of Man: Being an Account of the Manners
and Customs of the Uncivilized Races of Men 105 (1870). On the depopulation
of California Indians during the nineteenth century, see generally Benjamin
Madley, An American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian
Catastrophe, 1846-1873 (2016); The Destruction of California Indians: A
Collection of Documents From the Period 1847 to 1865 in Which are Described
Some of the Things That Happened to Some of the Indians of California
(Robert F. Heizer ed., Bison Books 1993) (1974); Erin Blakemore, California’s LittleKnown Genocide, Hist., Nov. 16, 2017 (updated Dec. 4, 2019), https://history.com/
news/californias-little-known-genocide; Chris Clarke, Untold History: The Survival of
California’s Indians, KCET, Sept. 26, 2016, https://www.kcet.org/shows/tending-thewild/untold-history-the-survival-of-californias-indians.
Powers’ apparent resistance to concealing evidence of the scope of the population
decimation suffered by California Indians at the time of the California Gold Rush
is noteworthy in view of the contemporaneous policy positions and practices of
U.S. military officers and other government leaders advocating or countenancing
the extermination of Indigenous peoples. See, e.g., S. Exec. Doc. No. 13, 40th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 27 (1867) (letter dated Dec. 28, 1866 from Lt. Gen. William T. Sherman to
Ulysses S. Grant, Commanding Gen. of the U.S. Army) (“We must act with vindictive
earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children.
Nothing less will reach the root of this case.”); id. at 46 (letter dated Jan. 24, 1867 from
Col. Ely S. Parker to Ulysses S. Grant, Commanding Gen. of the U.S. Army) (“[I]t has
of late years become somewhat common, not only for the press, but in the speeches of
men of intelligence, and some occupying high and responsible positions, to advocate
the policy of [the Indians’] immediate and absolute extermination.”); George W.
Manypenny, Our Indian Wards 187 (1880) (alterations in original) (emphases
omitted) (quoting Brig. Gen. E.O.C. Ord, Commander of the Dep’t of Texas, U.S. Sec’y
of War Ann. Rep. 121-22 (1869)) (“I have encouraged the troops to capture and root
out the Apaches by every means in my power, and to hunt them as they would wild
animals. This they have done with unrelenting vigor. Since my last report over two
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The papers of Justice Blackmun disclose, however, that coaxing
Justice Byron White to join Blackmun’s Mattz opinion had been no easy
task. At oral argument, which was split across two consecutive days,
Justice White broadsided the attorneys for both sides with a series of
questions pertaining to an issue that was not in dispute and upon which
no one had briefed the Court, namely, whether the river where the
hundred have been killed, generally by parties who have trailed them, for days and
weeks, into the mountain recesses, over snows, among gorges and precipices; laying in
wait for them by day and following them by night. Many villages have been burned,
large quantities of supplies, and arms and ammunition, clothing, and provisions have
been destroyed, a large number of horses and mules have been captured, and two
men, twenty-eight women, and thirty-four children taken prisoners. . . . Many of the
border men, especially those who have been hunted, or lost friends or relations by
them, regard all Indians as vermin, to be killed wherever met. . . . The Apaches have
but few friends, and, I believe, no agent. Even the officers, when applied to by them
for information, can not tell them what to do. There seems to be no settled policy,
but a general idea to kill them wherever found. I am a believer in that, if we go for
extermination.”); Robert Winston Mardock, The Reformers and the American
Indian 94 (1971) (footnote omitted) (final alteration in original) (“[In 1870 Montana
Territory] Governor [James] Ashley wrote . . . : ‘The Indian race on this continent has
never been anything but an unmitigated curse to civilization, while the intercourse
between the Indian and the white man has been only evil, and that continually, to
both races, and must so remain until the last savage is translated to that celestial
hunting ground for which they all believe themselves so well fitted, and to which every
settler on our frontier wishes them individually and collectively a safe and speedy
transit. . . . In Montana, we want no more Chinamen or Indians or barbarians of any
race;—we already have enough and to spare.’”); Exec. Order No. B 2021 002, Office
of Colorado Governor Jared Polis (Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/
sites/default/files/inline-files/B%202021%20002%20Rescind%201984%20Proc.pdf
(rescinding 1864 proclamations issued by Colorado Territory Governor John Evans
that, inter alia, “ordered citizens to ‘kill and destroy . . . hostile Indians’ and urged the
citizens to ‘take captive, and hold to their own private use and benefit, all property of
said hostile Indians that they may capture, and receive all stolen property recovered
from said Indians such reward as may be deemed proper and just therefor’”); see also
Cong. Globe, 32d Cong., 1st Sess. 2175 (1852) (remarks of U.S. Sen. John B. Weller of
California) (“The fate of the Indian is irrevocably sealed. He must soon be crushed
by the encroaching tide of emigration. The hand of destiny has marked him, and soon
he must fade away. The reflection to every humane heart is a melancholy one, but it
is unavoidable. In the providence of God they must soon disappear before the onward
march of our countrymen. Humanity may forbid, but the interest of the white man
demands their extinction.”); Peter Burnett, State of the State Address, The Governors’
Gallery, California State Library (reprinting 1851 address by California Governor
Peter Burnett to the California Senate and Assembly), https://governors.library.
ca.gov/addresses/s_01-Burnett2.html (“That a war of extermination will continue to
be waged between the races until the Indian race becomes extinct must be expected.
While we cannot anticipate this result but with painful regret, the inevitable destiny
of the race is beyond the power or wisdom of man to avert.”); cf. Madley, supra,
at 186 (endnote omitted) (“By invoking the inevitable extinction myth, on one hand,
while supporting Indian killing, on the other, Burnett leveraged his authority as
California’s first civilian US governor to endorse further ranger militia operations
against California Indians. In this way, he pushed his successor, lieutenant governor
and fellow Democrat John McDougal, as well as state legislators, to institutionalize
the state-sponsored hunting and killing of California Indians.”).
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Yurok Indian petitioner, Raymond Mattz, had been fishing with his traditional gill nets was navigable or not and, relatedly, whether the State of
California owned the riverbed. In a colloquy with U.S. Solicitor General
Harry R. Sachse, who argued in an amicus curiae capacity in support of
petitioner Mattz, Justice White began by posing a hypothetical question,
asking what the status of the area would be if it no longer contained any
living Indians nor encompassed any Indians lands:
QUESTION: Would you take the same position even if some
[land] was allotted, some was homesteaded and the people and all
the restrictions on the allotments had expired and the allotted lands
had been sold to whites?
MR. SACHSE: Unless Congress had in some—we don’t reach
that issue here because there still is allotted restricted land in this
reservation.
QUESTION: Well, let me ask you. In an Indian reservation that’s
along a river who owns the bed of the river?76

The solicitor general explained that in a previous case the Supreme Court
had “already held that the Indians own the bed of the river. It has never
been taken from them.”77 Justice White then probed further, intimating
the true impetus for his line of questioning:
QUESTION: Whether the reservation exists or whether it doesn’t
and regardless who owns the river bed, is there some treaty or some
law defining Indian fishing rights? Or is it just ancestral fishing rights
that have been—
MR. SACHSE: It’s somewhere between the two. There were
ancestral fishing rights, but this Court in Donnelly held specifically
that the 1891 [Hoopa Valley] Extension that ran snaking 40 miles
down the river was done specifically to preserve the fishing rights
that the Indians had.
QUESTION: Which were what?
MR. SACHSE: I think the exclusive right to fish in that river.
QUESTION: The exclusive right to fish there?
MR. SACHSE: Since it was made an Indian reservation, the purpose of which is that this area is to be reserved for the Indians, and
since surplus lands were sold but nothing was done—
QUESTION: You would say, then, I suppose, that since the
Indians owned then and still own the bed of the river, that even if all
of the riparian land was in other ownership, the Indians would have
the exclusive right to fish in that river?
MR. SACHSE: I would say—yes, I would say that. But I don’t
think this case requires us—
QUESTION: Don’t you have to hold that? Because there is some
riparian land that is not owned by the Indians.78

Solicitor General Sachse endeavored to explain how reservation
status entailed the right of the Yurok Indians to fish within their own
76
77
78

Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 16 (No. 71-1182).
Id. (citing Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913)).
Id. at 16-17.
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reservation, pointing out that in Donnelly v. United States79 the Supreme
Court “held that one of the primary purposes of establishing that reservation was to secure to the Indians fishing rights of that river. That
reservation has never been abolished. The 1892 Act which let other p
 eople
than Indians settle in this area while preserving also Indian settlement,
simply did not abolish the reservation.”80 Justice White pressed further:
QUESTION: That still leaves the question of what—you said
“exclusive.”
MR. SACHSE: No. Let me say this. The issue was not argued
below as to exactly the consequences of this being held to be an
Indian reservation. The court went up on the question it was not a
reservation.
QUESTION: The scope of the Indian rights and whether or not
the kind of fishing the Indians now want to do is the kind of fishing
that was historically exercised81 has not been settled[?]
MR. SACHSE: That is correct. And we have only asked this Court
to determine the question of whether this remains Indian country,
whether this remains an Indian reservation, with a remand after that
has been determined to the California courts.
QUESTION: You think it may be irrelevant whether the reservation exists or not if it’s true that the Indians still own the bed of
the river?
MR. SACHSE: I don’t think it would be irrelevant. I think it would
matter from the standpoint of criminal and civil jurisdiction. . . .
I would like to get back to the specific point that the Court is
faced with, and that is has this allotment process terminated the
reservation.82

When oral argument resumed the next morning, Justice White
continued with his intensive questioning about navigability, riverbed
ownership, and Indian fishing rights. This time the target of his interrogation was Roderick Walston, deputy attorney general of California, who
argued for respondent G. Raymond Arnett, director of the California
Department of Fish and Game:
QUESTION: Do you concede that the tribe owns the bed of this
river in the area that’s at issue here?
MR. WALSTON: We haven’t raised that question, Mr. Justice
White. . . .
....
QUESTION: Is it a navigable river?
MR. WALSTON: I believe that the river is navigable.
QUESTION: So normally the State at admission would have
taken title to the river bed.
MR. WALSTON: That’s correct, your Honor. In fact, I was prepared to submit an argument to that effect to the Court, but I didn’t
because I felt there were sufficient other grounds to dispose of
79
80
81
82

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 18 (No. 71-1182).
See infra note 86.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 18-19 (No. 71-1182).
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the case. I didn’t want to raise what I considered to be a technical
argument. Based on your question yesterday, I—
QUESTION: Would it make any difference to the resolution of
this case?
MR. WALSTON: Yes, it might. If the reservation includes all of
the area—
QUESTION: Whatever it is we are supposed to set aside here
might not decide the case at all?
MR. WALSTON: That’s possible. If the Court concludes that the
river that runs through the old reservation is not part of the reservation itself and that title to the river is vested in the State of California,
the previous question is not before the Court.83

Apparently encouraged by the possibility of disposing of the Mattz
case on riverbed ownership grounds, Justice White shifted the focus of his
questioning to the matter of Indian fishing rights:
QUESTION: If there is a reservation here, do you concede that
the Indians have a right that the State of California may not regulate
or interfere with?
MR. WALSTON: Yes. That’s correct. We concede that, your Honor.
....
QUESTION: Why do you concede that?
MR. WALSTON: Pardon me?
QUESTION: Why do you concede that?
MR. WALSTON: That if there is an Indian reservation, we are
not allowed to—
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. WALSTON: Well, I frankly don’t recall, your Honor.84

Justice White then asked several pointed questions about gill net
fishing by the Indians, zeroing in on whether a gill net “can . . . be used
as a commercial fishing device.” The deputy attorney general responded
“Yes, it commonly is,” but conceded that he didn’t know whether that
was what it was being used for in the Mattz litigation.85 The interrogation
continued:
QUESTION: Well, don’t you think that makes some difference in
terms of whether or not the Indians have a fishing right that you can’t
interfere with, or not?
MR. WALSTON: I’m not sure, your Honor. I think that if the
Indians have a right to fish on the reservation for their own purposes,
they would also have the right to fish on the reservation for commercial purposes.
QUESTION: You mean by that that even though perhaps in
ancient times all they could use was a little hand net to catch a fish at
a time, now they could use something that stretches across the whole
river under new technology and take every fish in the river?
MR. WALSTON: That’s my understanding now.
QUESTION: And California could do nothing about it?
83
84
85

Id. at 26-28.
Id. at 37-38.
Id. at 38-39.
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MR. WALSTON: California can’t do a thing about it. Now, the
BIA, if we—
QUESTION: Where is the law—where are you finding a law
like that?
MR. WALSTON: You’ve got me on that question, your Honor. I
can probably research the question and submit an answer. I just don’t
recall, frankly, the source of that proposition.86

Justice White then inquired whether Worcester v. Georgia,87 the
foundational Indian law case, might be considered the source of such
Indian fishing rights exclusive of state law, since that case held “that the
State has no jurisdiction, regulatory jurisdiction inside a reservation.”88
The exchange continued:
MR. WALSTON: I think that’s right, your Honor. I think that’s the
source of the authority. I looked into this some time ago, Mr. Justice
White, and I just frankly don’t recall the source of—
QUESTION: Even if the State owns the bed of the river?
MR. WALSTON: But the Indians can’t fish without restriction on
the river and California can regulate—
QUESTION: Again I ask you, do you know whether this river is
navigable or not?
MR. WALSTON: It’s my understanding this river is navigable. . . . I’m not sure.89

Justice White pressed the California deputy attorney general to
explain why, “[i]f this was a reservation,” he would “concede that the
State has no jurisdiction,” since “the only question we have here is the
preliminary question of whether or not this is or is not Indian country.”90
The conversation continued:
QUESTION: . . . [I]f we find that it is Indian country, then at
least the [U.S.] Government says the respective right of the State to
enforce its fish and game laws and its conservation laws in this Indian
country is an unresolved issue and the case should be remanded to
the state court for resolution of that issue.
MR. WALSTON: That’s correct, your Honor.
Id. at 39. Justice White’s interrogation concerning the nature of Raymond
Mattz’s gill net fishing activity suggests a related but somewhat different answer to
the question “Of what necessity is it to the [Mattz] opinion that the petitioner had
fished the river ‘as his grandfather did before him,’ a fact completely irrelevant to
the disposition of the case, if not to portray this as a part of the Court’s protection
of the traditional Indian way of life?” Samuel E. Ennis, Implicit Divestiture and the
Supreme Court’s (Re)Construction of the Indian Canons, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 623, 663
(2011) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 484 (1973)). While the Court could
be seen as endeavoring “to preserve the reservation and ‘Indianness’ by refusing to
abrogate Indian fishing rights,” id., the thrust of this questioning implies an insistence
that any Indian exemption from state fishing regulations in Indian country must be
harnessed to a narrow, judicially policed definition of what qualifies as “traditional
[Indian] fishing activities,” id.
87
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
88
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 56, at 39-40 (No. 71-1182).
89
Id. at 40.
90
Id. at 40-41.
86
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QUESTION: Am I incorrect about that?
MR. WALSTON: No, you are absolutely correct. In other words,
if the area is a reservation, there is a basis for California still regulating the Indian fishing on the area if there was no Federal treaty
agreement or statute.
QUESTION: And that’s a question that the State court did not
reach, that is not here. All we have here is the threshold question of
whether or not this is Indian country.
MR. WALSTON: Uh-huh. That’s correct, your Honor. That’s
absolutely correct.91

When it came time for the petitioner’s rebuttal, Raymond Mattz’s
lawyer, Lee J. Sclar of California Indian Legal Services, had only a few
minutes left to respond to the dizzying array of tangential issues and concerns that Justice White had put into play through his questioning of the
other two attorneys. While Sclar was in the process of accomplishing that
daunting task, a different Justice interrupted Sclar:
QUESTION: . . . Here before us isn’t the only question this is
Indian country? Isn’t that all that the Court—
MR. SCLAR: Yes, your Honor. I was answering Justice White’s
question merely because he inquired. It is not before the Court.
QUESTION: Those questions are simply not before us.
MR. SCLAR: That is correct, your Honor.92

It is clear from documents found among the Justices’ archived
papers that Justice White’s intensive questioning during oral argument
about matters that were not in controversy in the litigation had an
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 49. Mattz v. Arnett is not the only Supreme Court Indian law case in
which Justice White conducted intensive, even harsh, questioning during oral
argument with regard to the exercise of Indian fishing rights and the regulation of
fishing within reservation boundaries. In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981), where the Crow Tribe’s regulatory authority over fishing by nonmembers
on the Crow Reservation was at issue, Justice White similarly grilled the attorneys
who supported the tribe’s position, with much of White’s ire aimed at the lawyers’
assertion that the United States retained ownership of the bed of the Big Horn
River, holding it in trust for the tribe’s exclusive beneficial use. See, e.g., Transcript
of Oral Argument 38-40, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (No. 791128) (colloquy with United States Deputy Solicitor General Louis F. Claiborne).
Further investigation has disclosed that Justice White, “an avid fly-fisherman whose
love for the sport was legendary among his friends and associates,” was accustomed
to embarking on fishing excursions as a favorite pastime, including on the Big Horn
River within the Crow Reservation around the time Montana was decided. John P.
LaVelle, Beating a Path of Retreat from Treaty Rights and Tribal Sovereignty: The Story
of Montana v. United States, in Indian Law Stories 535, 569-72 (Carole Goldberg,
Kevin K. Washburn & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011). Justice White’s host and
companion for these excursions was Jack D. Shanstrom, who later served as judge for
the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana and “hosted other Supreme Court
Justices for fly-fishing ventures on the Big Horn River,” including Justice Antonin
Scalia and Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, id. at 569-70 & nn.141-43, each of whom, as
a non-Indian, would have been exempted from the Crow Tribe’s fishing regulations
because of the Montana ruling.
91
92
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arresting impact on discussions in chambers. A letter from the California
attorney general’s office, dated March 28, 1973, the very day oral argument had ended, co-authored by Attorney General Evelle J. Younger and
Deputy Attorney General Roderick Walston, laid out the state’s views
on the navigability question, with Walston stating that he “was unable to
respond [to inquiries during oral argument] on the basis of my existing
knowledge.”93 Justice Blackmun’s law clerk in turn drafted a three-page
memorandum, dated “5/28/73” and titled “Re: Post-argument memo
from the state,” summarizing and commenting on the California attorney
general office’s letter. The law clerk’s memo begins:
Whether the Klamath River is, or was at the time of Cal’s statehood, navigable in fact, was raised in oral argument, and is addressed
in the [State’s] memo. Your opinion does not reach the question,
leaving its resolution, perhaps, for the courts on remand. In my view
this is proper . . . .94

After providing analysis of the navigability issue, the law clerk concluded
the memo with the following advice:
[T]he issues are difficult, even if the State is correct in asserting that
the river is navigable and the State owns it. It would be asking too
much, in my view, for this Court, without benefit of briefing and argument, to resolve the issue, an issue which has not yet been raised by
either party. . . .
My conclusion from this is that you are quite correct in not reaching the navigability question. I suggest, as I did at lunch today, that
you might explain in a letter attached to the Mattz draft why the
issue was not reached in the opinion. I doubt if you would find any
opposition.95

In accordance with the law clerk’s advice, Justice Blackmun wrote
the following “Memorandum to the Conference,” dated May 31, 1973:
Herewith is a draft of a proposed opinion for this case. At the
oral argument one of us, I think it was Byron, asked a number of
questions directed to the navigability of the Klamath River. Counsel
were rather indefinite in their answers. After argument the Deputy
California Attorney General sent in a letter dated March 28 commenting upon the issue of navigability.
....
I have concluded that the resolution of navigability of the Klamath
River is not necessary for purposes of the present review and that
the issue, if it is pertinent at all, may be taken up on the remand. The
determination of navigability should not be difficult, but the consequences of the determination may well entail some work. Certainly,
it seems to me, this is not anything for us to undertake without the
benefit of briefing and argument.96
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 160, Folder 71-1182
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
William J. Brennan Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box I:295, Folder 71-1182
93
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In the papers of Justice William Brennan97 there appears a typewritten
note added at the bottom margin of Brennan’s copy of this May 31 memorandum from Justice Blackmun:
(To Mr. Justice Brennan only)
P.S. Dear Bill:
Forgive me for being somewhat expansive in this opinion. It
seems to be my annual Indian case,98 and this one proved historically
fascinating. As a consequence, I inserted some material that normally would have been omitted. I rationalize by saying that I have to
have a little fun in at least one case a year.99
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress. Justice White may have
been further mollified by the Mattz Court’s remand order. See Dussias, supra note 55,
at 49 n.37 (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 485 (1973); Arnett v. Five Gill Nets,
48 Cal. App. 3d 454, 463-64 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976)) (“The Court
remanded the case for determination of issues relating to the existence of Mattz’s
fishing rights and the applicability of state law despite reservation status. On remand,
the California Court of Appeals expressed doubt that California could regulate
on-reservation fishing, but did not decide the issue because the Indians’ fishing was
determined not to be a sufficient threat to state conservation efforts to justify state
regulation.”).
97
Justice Blackmun retained a copy of his personalized memorandum to Justice
Brennan in his own Mattz folder. See Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed
Material, Box 160, Folder 71-1182 (Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of
Congress.
98
The disdain of some Supreme Court Justices for being assigned the task of
writing majority opinions in Indian law cases has been notoriously reported. See,
e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism,
and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 382-83 & nn.9 &
10 (1993) (citing Bob Woodward & Scott Armstrong, The Brethren: Inside the
Supreme Court 62, 425 (1979)) (noting investigative journalists’ accounts purporting
to quote the use of demeaning and offensive epithets by Justice John Marshall
Harlan II and Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. disparaging Indian law cases); Woodward
& Armstrong, supra, at 490 (“Rehnquist had nothing but contempt for Indian cases.”).
A note found among the Blackmun Papers further confirms this disdain. Bearing the
date “3-27, 1973”—the first day of oral argument in Mattz—the note appears to be in
Chief Justice Warren Burger’s handwriting. Scrawled vertically in the left margin is a
play on words, equating “Dismiss as Improvidently Granted” with “Difficulty Inherent
in Grant of Cert,” while the rest of the note reads: “Harry If you don’t vote to DIG I’ll
assign all Indian cases to you along with the FPC case!! Schwarze-poste B.” Harry A.
Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 116 (“Notes exchanged between
justices during court proceedings, 1970-1993”), retrieved from the Library of Congress;
see App. Exhibit 2, infra p. 346; see also supra note 68 and accompanying text.
99
William J. Brennan Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box I:295, Folder 711182 (Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress; cf. Dussias, supra
note 55, at 49 (footnote omitted) (“The fact that much of the . . . material included by
Justice Blackmun [in Mattz] was largely irrelevant to resolving the legal issue seems
to indicate Justice Blackmun’s own interest in the Yurok Indians and their history—
apparently he found the material to be very interesting, and felt compelled to include
it in his opinion.”).
In a memorandum dated “5/8/73” Justice Blackmun’s law clerk wrote:
Here is the draft of Mattz v. Arnett (5 Gill Nets). I have had a great deal of
fun researching and writing this opinion, and I am sure you will enjoy looking
through some of the very old and interesting books which I have used and cited,
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DeCoteau v. District County Court (1975)
1.

Advent of “Magic Language” for Terminating Reservations

As discussed previously, Seymour v. Superintendent 100 and
Mattz v. Arnett 101 are unanimous Supreme Court decisions that employ
interpretive approaches which conform to fundamental and longstanding principles of Indian law and reject, accordingly, the arguments of
state officials that federal statutes authorizing the sale of unallotted
lands had terminated or diminished Indian reservations.102 However,
starting with the next reservation diminishment/disestablishment case,
DeCoteau v. District County Court for the Tenth Judicial District Court,103
the high court began crafting and deploying a different, controversial
interpretive approach, one that is at war with Indian law principles and
that had the immediate effect of fracturing the previous unanimity of the
Justices’ decision-making in this doctrinal area.
DeCoteau was actually a consolidation of two cases that “raise[d]
the single question whether the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in
South Dakota, created by an 1867 treaty between the United States and
the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Sioux Indians, was terminated and
returned to the public domain by the Act of March 3, 1891.”104 In one of the
cases, which implicated a question of the civil jurisdiction of state courts over
particularly Powers and the Annual Reports of the Comm/r of Indian Affairs.
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 160, Folder 71-1182
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
100
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
101
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
102
See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text; supra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text.
103
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
104
Id. at 426-27 (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035). Professor
Angelique EagleWoman, an enrolled member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate
(the Dakota word “Oyate” translates as “Nation” in the English language), provides
a concise breakdown of the traditional cultural/political divisions and bands of the
Dakota, Lakota, and Nakota (i.e., Sioux) peoples:
The Sisseton and Wahpeton are part of the Oceti Sakowin, or Seven C
 ouncil
Fires. The Seven Council Fires are composed of the Dakota-, L
 akota-, and
Nakota-speaking peoples. The Council Fires are formed from four that are
Dakota—Sissetonwan [Sisseton], Wahpetonwan [Wahpeton], Wahpekute,
and Mdewakantonwan [Mdewakanton]; two that are Nakota—Ihanktonwan
(Yankton) and Ihanktowana (Little Yankton); and one that is Lakota—
Tetonwan [Teton]. . . . Collectively, the Dakota peoples are known as the
Isanyati, or dwellers at Knife Lake, which was further shortened to simply
Santee in most historical records. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate is the joining
of two Dakota council fires into one government, eventually located on the
Lake Traverse Reservation in present-day northeastern South Dakota and
extending partially into present-day North Dakota.
Angelique Townsend EagleWoman (Wamdi A. WasteWin), U.S.-Dakota War of 1862:
Wintertime for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate: Over One Hundred Fifty Years of Human
Rights Violations by the United States and the Need for a Reconciliation Involving
International Indigenous Human Rights Norms, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 486, 488-89
(2013) (citations omitted).
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a family-law matter involving tribal-member parties,105 the South Dakota
Although “in the [DeCoteau] decision” the Supreme Court asserted that petitioner
Cheryl Spider DeCoteau “voluntarily gave up one of her sons for adoption,”
Patrice H. Kunesh, Borders Beyond Borders—Protecting Essential Tribal Relations
Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 42 New Eng. L. Rev. 15, 31 n.79
(2007) (citing DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428); see DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428 (“The petitioner
gave Robert up for adoption in March of 1971 . . . .”), at a 1974 Senate subcommittee
hearing “DeCoteau testified that she . . . did not knowingly or intentionally relinquish
her child,” Kunesh, supra. The report on the hearing—at which Senator James
Abourezk, chairman of the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the Senate Committee
on Interior and Insular Affairs, elicited testimony from DeCoteau and her attorney,
Bertram Hirsch of the Association on American Indian Affairs—vividly recounts
South Dakota’s mistreatment of the petitioner:
Senator Abourezk. . . .
....
First, it might be good to give your name, your age, and exactly where you
live, and so on.
Mrs. DeCoteau. Cheryl Spider DeCoteau. I’m 23.
Senator Abourezk. From where?
Mrs. DeCoteau. I’m not originally from Sisseton, but from Minnesota.
Senator Abourezk. You are in Minnesota now?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
Herbert John Spider is 5, and Robert Lee is 3, and Joseph there, is 10 months.
. . . I’ll start with my oldest boy, John. I had a babysitter watching him and I
went to get him, and they wouldn’t give him back to me. So I went to my social
worker and I asked him if he would come with me up there.
....
That was in December 1970, and I asked him—
Senator Abourezk. You asked the social worker?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes. Asked him to meet me at the store. He didn’t come. So,
I left, and I called from that store, and I said that they already went and they
took John, and they took him to a foster home and that I couldn’t get him back.
Senator Abourezk. They had taken John without your permission or without your knowledge?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
They took him, and I went back up there, and I tried to get him back, and
they said “No”, that they couldn’t. I don’t know if they had a court hearing or
something. I didn’t get any papers or nothing.
Senator Abourezk. Did you go to the court hearing?
Mrs. DeCoteau. No, I didn’t. I didn’t know they had a court hearing.
Senator Abourezk. They had a court hearing without your knowledge?
Mrs. DeCoteau. They had a petition or something.
I didn’t know anything about it, and when I did go they had to appoint me
a lawyer. The welfare appointed me a lawyer so I went to see him. The judge
appointed me a lawyer.
I went to see him, and he didn’t try to help me or anything. All he did was
just ask me my age, name and address, and the name of my first boy and my
other one. Then he asked me how old they were, and that was all. Then he said
he was going to go talk to the judge and the welfare workers. He didn’t do anything because I didn’t know anything that happened until July of 1971.
Senator Abourezk. Did they keep John all that time?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes. They had John all that time in a foster home.
Senator Abourezk. Did you know where he was?
Mrs. DeCoteau. No; I didn’t know where he was. I kept asking, but they
105
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wouldn’t tell me where he was or anything.
Senator Abourezk. I’d like to ask you to back up just a minute. Did this
happen in South Dakota or Minnesota?
Mrs. DeCoteau. It was in Sisseton.
Senator Abourezk. Did the welfare department ever, to your knowledge,
prove that you weren’t being the best mother for that child at all, and perhaps
your lawyer, Mr. Hirsch, can answer if you’re unable to?
Mrs. DeCoteau. The man said that I wasn’t a very good mother and everything, and that my children were better off being in a white home where they
were adopted out, or in this home, wherever they were. They could buy all this
stuff that I couldn’t give them and give them all the love that I couldn’t give
them.
Senator Abourezk. They said that, but did they really prove that in court, or
did they give any specific examples of why you weren’t a good mother?
Mr. Hirsch. The answer to that is “No.”
....
Senator Abourezk. Is it true that you found out about the original hearing
accidentally and that she was given no notice of the hearing?
Mr. Hirsch. The original hearing was one of the grossest violations of due
process that I have ever encountered. Unfortunately, I find it is quite commonplace when you’re dealing with Indian parents and Indian children.
Senator Abourezk. Did you get notice?
Mr. Hirsch. She did not get notice of either the first hearing or the second
hearing.
The first hearing was a hearing on the petition of the social worker stating
that there was a need for emergency custody in the department of welfare over
Mrs. DeCoteau’s children.
The judge issued an order placing that child in the custody of the department of public welfare without informing Mrs. DeCoteau that such a hearing
was taking place, and without allowing her an opportunity to come before the
court and submit testimony that such an order should not be issued.
So, the child was placed in a foster home and the judge appointed an attorney for Mrs. DeCoteau and set a hearing date on the issue of dependency and
neglect. Pending the hearing the child was to remain in a foster home.
In other words, you were talking about the burden of proof. They already
took the child away from her prior to having any hearing on unfitness and the
burden of proof was very clearly shifted on Mrs. DeCoteau to prove that she
was fit, rather than the state proving that she was unfit.
Then the hearing was scheduled for about 7 months after the child was originally taken from her.
Then the hearing was scheduled. They notified Mrs. DeCoteau by publication in the local Sisseton paper, despite the fact that her social worker knew
exactly where to find her. This is another problem where the State quite frequently uses publication notice when, in fact, they know very clearly where the
person can be found and how to serve that person directly. They use publication
notices instead.
Needless to say, these people don’t usually make a habit of reading the local
paper. She found out entirely by accident that there was a hearing on the merits
because another tribal member happened to pick up the paper the day before
the hearing and noticed that the hearing was scheduled for the next day.
Senator Abourezk. All right.
Cheryl, then, did you have a subsequent experience with the welfare people
with regard to your second son, Bobby?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
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Senator Abourezk. I wonder if you could tell us what happened there?
Mrs. DeCoteau. I was pregnant with Bobby and the welfare came there and
asked me if I would give him up for adoption.
Senator Abourezk. While you were pregnant with him?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
Senator Abourezk. Before he was even born?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
They just kept coming over to the house. They came every week. On a certain day they come and they kept talking to me and asking if I would give him
up for adoption and said that it would be better.
They kept coming and coming and finally when I did have him, he came
to the hospital. After I came home with the baby, he would come over to the
house. He asked me if I would give him up for adoption and I said no.
He let me alone for a while until I moved into Sisseton and moved in town.
He kept coming over and asking if I would give him up for adoption. Then
he called me one afternoon and said if I wanted to give him up and I said no;
and the next morning, real early he came pounding on the door and I let him
in and he asked me if I’d come up to the office. He had something to talk to
me about.
So, I went up to the office and there were a whole bunch of papers there. I
was kind of sick then too and I didn’t know what I was signing. He asked me
if I would sign my name on this top paper, and I signed it and he sealed it or
something. I signed it and he signed it, and sealed it or something.
Senator Abourezk. Do you know what that paper was?
Mrs. DeCoteau. No; I didn’t know what that paper was. But, then they took
the baby and I asked him what he was doing, and he said it was too late now,
that I gave him up for adoption. I signed the papers.
Then, they took him. They told me to wait a week. Before all this happened,
when I did sign the paper, he told me to come back and see him in a week and
he would tell me if I could have him back or not. When I did go back in 1 week,
that’s when he told me it was too late, that I had signed the papers for adoption
and I couldn’t get him back.
Senator Abourezk. How old was the baby when they took him?
Mrs. DeCoteau. He was 4 months.
Senator Abourezk. Can you describe how they came and took him, or how
that happened?
Mrs. DeCoteau. When they came to the house there, I just had the baby with
me. My grandmother took John home the day before. I had the baby with me
and then I took him with me when I went up there. Before I signed the paper,
one of the social workers came there and took him to the next room. When they
did that, I signed the papers and stuff and they wouldn’t give him back to me.
They wouldn’t let me take him home and all that. They told me that they’d give
me 1 week and to come back and see him in 1 week.
Senator Abourezk. You mean you took the baby with you when you signed
the papers and they kept the baby right there?
Mrs. DeCoteau. When they took me in the office there, the social worker
went and called another lady in to watch the baby in the next room until I got
done. When he got through talking with me, when they took the baby and I
signed the papers, they just took him right out the doors and they took him right
to the foster home the same day.
Afterwards, I went to see an attorney and he said that he would help me, and
that was in March 1970. . . . [T]his all happened in March 1970.
I went to this lawyer and he said that he would help me and I filled out all
kinds of papers and answered all the questions he wanted to know and then he
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Supreme Court held that “since some of the incidents [alleged in the
lawsuit] . . . occurred on nontrust [i.e., non-Indian] land within the [Lake
Traverse] reservation, they happened on land in ‘non-Indian country’”
where state jurisdiction existed.106 The other case involved habeas corpus
said he’d let me know. I didn’t hear nothing from him for awhile and I think it
was in August he called me and I went to see him. He said that a date was set in
September 1970, to have a court hearing.
We went to that, but I lost that. This was before John was taken away, because they took Robert and then John was taken away. My grandfather notified
me and said that I had to go to court for both kids. They were going to give them
up for adoption and that’s when Bert here, he was my lawyer.
Senator Abourezk. Did you eventually get Bobby back?
Mrs. DeCoteau. I got him back last April.
Senator Abourezk. How long did you and your lawyer have to fight that in
court before you got him back?
Mrs. DeCoteau. About 10 months, 7 months for Johnny and 10 for Robert.
Senator Abourezk. It was almost a year and a half for both kids?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
Senator Abourezk. Do you have custody now of all three of the children?
Mrs. DeCoteau. Yes.
Mr. Hirsch. That was 10 months, Senator, after I became involved in the
case. She had been trying for quite some time before that to get the kids back.
Senator Abourezk. Yes.
Indian Child Welfare Program: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs
of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs on Problems that American
Indian Families Face in Raising Their Children and How These Problems Are Affected
by Federal Action or Inaction, 93d Cong. 65-69 (1974); see also Kunesh, supra, at 46
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 11 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530)
(noting that a 1978 report of the House of Representatives “recited Cheryl DeCoteau’s
story as the rationale for including specific procedural due process requirements in the
bill [that Congress subsequently enacted as the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1901-1923]: ‘In a recent South Dakota entrapment case, an Indian parent in a time
of trouble was persuaded to sign a waiver granting temporary custody to the State,
only to find that this is now being advanced as evidence of neglect and grounds for
the permanent termination of parental rights. It is an unfortunate fact of life for many
Indian parents that the primary service agency to which they must turn for financial
help also exercises police powers over their family life and is, most frequently, the
agency that initiates custody proceedings.’”); cf. Leanne Gale & Kelly McClure,
Commandeering Confrontation: A Novel Threat to the Indian Child Welfare Act and
Tribal Sovereignty, 39 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 292, 301 (2020) (footnote omitted) (“In a
series of historic congressional hearings, Native people shared the devastating impact
of forced child removals. Cheryl DeCoteau, a member of the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Sioux Tribe, testified that a South Dakota child welfare worker had removed her
children to foster care without any process.”); Fletcher § 7.2, supra note 14, at 298
(footnotes omitted) (“Importantly, [DeCoteau v. District County Court] involved the
termination of parental rights by the state of a tribal member. South Dakota tribes
cited the state as a terrible offender in terminating Indian parental rights without
due process, with South Dakota’s example helping to persuade Congress to pass the
Indian Child Welfare Act in 1978, largely stripping state courts of jurisdiction over
these matters.”).
106
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 460 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty.
Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 211 N.W. 2d 843, 846 (S.D. Sup. Ct. 1973) (decision below));
cf. Robert L. Pirtle, To Right the Unrightable Wrong: An Autobiography of
Robert L. Pirtle, Tribal Lawyer 445 (2007) (“Throughout the [DeCoteau] court
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petitions brought by tribal-member inmates of a South Dakota penitentiary, asserting that their detention was illegal because the state-law crimes
for which they had been convicted occurred on non-Indian lands within
the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation, where the state had
no jurisdiction over them.107 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the Indian petitioners, holding that the “scene of the alleged crimes”
was “within Indian country” and that, consequently, “South Dakota had
no jurisdiction to try [them].”108 In so ruling, the Eighth Circuit overruled
one of its own precedents from a decade earlier which held that the Lake
Traverse Reservation had been “terminated” by Congress.109
proceedings, South Dakota was represented by Tom Tobin, a lawyer from Winner,
South Dakota, who seemed to hate Indians, and had done a great deal of legal research
in an effort to find ways of destroying reservations. Tobin succeeded in convincing the
State Supreme Court, not surprisingly, that Article I [of the Agreement of 1889, ratified
by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, 1036,] terminated the Reservation
and that all nontrust land inside the boundaries of the former Reservation was subject
to state law.”); Lance Morgan, The Politics of Fear and Racism, Indian Country
Today, Mar. 31, 2004 (updated Sept. 12, 2018), https://indiancountrytoday.com/
archive/the-politics-of-fear-and-racism (discussing Tobin’s highly paid involvement
in other racially charged legal controversies regarding Indian country in Nebraska
and Minnesota); Michael Wickline, Controversy swirls around attorney representing
Kamiah School District, Lewiston Tribune, Nov. 26, 1996, https://lmtribune.com/
education/controversy-swirls-around-attorney-representing-kamiah-school-districttom-tobin-has-a-bad-record-and/article_f7814512-143a-5227-9641-97669509fece.html
(reporting on Indian Education Parents Committee’s protests against the retaining
of Tobin to represent the school board of Kamiah, Idaho, on the Nez Perce Indian
Reservation, at a time when he “was suspended from practicing law in his home state”
and in view of Tobin’s role as “an outspoken activist in the Interstate Congress [for]
Equal Rights and Responsibilities, a group . . . dedicated to eliminating Indian treaty
rights”). Tobin apparently founded the anti-Indian organization called the Interstate
Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities the year DeCoteau was decided:
The recent spate of Indian assertiveness has triggered substantial opposition
in white communities. In 1975 a group called the Interstate Congress for Equal
Rights and Responsibilities was set up in Winner, S.D., near the Rosebud
Sioux reservation, to coordinate opposition to Indian legal victories. Today
ICERR claims to have 10,000 members in 17 states who say they are victims
of reverse discrimination. They complain that Indians vote and have a voice in
local affairs but are not required to pay taxes. Moreover, they say that treaties
setting out hunting and fishing rights give Indians a disproportionate share of
the fish and game in their areas. The organization is supporting countersuits
in 20 states contesting Indian claims to land, water and fishing rights, and its
members are lobbying for passage of so-called “backlash” bills in Congress. The
most extreme of these—H.R. 9054, introduced by Rep. John E. Cunningham
(R Wash.)—would “abrogate all treaties entered into by the United States with
Indian tribes.”
Sandra Stencel, The Rights Revolution, CQ Researcher, June 23, 1978, at 441-60, http://
library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1978062300; see also infra note 699 (noting
Tobin’s participation as co-counsel for South Dakota in litigation that diminished the
Rosebud Sioux Reservation).
107
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 430 (majority opinion of Stewart, J.).
108
Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 103 (8th Cir. 1973)
(decision below), rev’d, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425 (1975)).
109
Id. (citing DeMarrias v. South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1963)). The Eighth
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Ruling on the consolidated cases, in DeCoteau a six-Justice majority
of the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Lake Traverse Reservation
was “terminated,”110 while three Justices vigorously dissented.111 As summarized in Justice William Douglas’s dissenting opinion, in 1867 the
United States ratified a treaty that “granted [the Sisseton and Wahpeton
Sioux] Indians a permanent reservation with defined boundaries and the
right to make their own laws and be governed by them subject to federal supervision.”112 Two decades later, the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands
were induced by federal Indian commissioners to open some of their reservation lands to settlement by non-Indians; the resulting Agreement of
1889 was then passed into law by the Act of 1891, which specified that the
Indians agreed “to sell all their claim ‘to all the unallotted lands within
the limits of the reservation.’”113 Despite the fact that the face of the 1891
Act contains “not a word to suggest that the boundaries of the reservation
Circuit Court of Appeals’ termination-era DeMarrias decision consisted primarily
of the appellate court’s simply praising what it called the trial court’s “carefully
considered” and “well reasoned opinion,” an opinion that, in the Eighth Circuit’s
view, “clearly demonstrated that the effect of the [1889 Agreement with the SissetonWahpeton Dakota and the 1891 Act ratifying the Agreement] was to restore the
unallotted lands which the Indians ceded to the public domain and to remove such
unallotted lands from the category of Indian country.” DeMarrias, 319 F.2d at 846-47.
The trial court, however, had issued a similarly perfunctory decision, relying primarily
on Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877). The trial court wrote:
Equally well manifested by those Acts [i.e., the 1889 Agreement and the
1891 Act], though only implicitedly [sic] inscribed, is a congressional intent
to diminish the original area limits of the reservation, to separate jurisdiction
and in the process and as an overall product of the entire arrangement to end
“Indian country” and the reservation status. . . . As to Indian country, it is said
in Bates v. Clark:
“The simple criterion is that as to all the lands thus described it was Indian
country whenever the Indian title had not been extinguished, and it continued
to be Indian country so long as the Indians had title to it, and no longer. As soon
as they parted with the title, it ceased to be Indian country, without any further
act of Congress, unless by the treaty by which the Indians parted with their title,
or by some act of Congress, a different rule was made applicable to the case.”
DeMarrias v. South Dakota, 206 F. Supp. 549, 551-52 (D.S.D. 1962) (citation omitted)
(quoting Bates, 95 U.S. at 208). But see, e.g., United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson,
478 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Bates, 95 U.S. 204
(1877); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1962)) (“It was originally
held that Indian Country ceased to be such whenever Indians lost title to the land.
This view has been laid to rest by the present definition of ‘Indian Country’ which
includes all land within an Indian reservation notwithstanding the issuance of any
patent.”), cited with approval in Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.23 (1973); see also
supra note 16.
110
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 426-49 (majority opinion of Stewart, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and White, JJ.).
111
See id. at 460-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.).
112
Id. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, 15 Stat. 505, as
amended, 15 Stat. 509, reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449-55).
113
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Agreement of 1889, art. I, ratified by Act of
Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, 1036).
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were altered,”114 the majority of Justices in DeCoteau ruled that the Act
“terminated” the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation.115
The departure from Indian law principles in DeCoteau is marked by
the emergence of what scholars have called “magic language” judicially
deemed to signal Congress’s intent to shrink or “terminate” the boundaries of an Indian reservation.116 The textual language that is said to denote
such intent in DeCoteau consists of (1) the provision that the Indians
“hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their
claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within
the limits of the reservation”117 and (2) the provision that “[i]n consideration . . . the United States stipulates and agrees to pay to the Sisseton
and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, parties hereto, the sum
of two dollars and fifty cents per acre for each and every acre . . . .”118
Thus, from the DeCoteau decision onward, the Supreme Court began
treating such language of “cession” and “sum-certain” payment as a kind
of talisman for resolving the question whether the use of particular landsale language in allotment legislation constitutes congressional action
that intentionally “wiped out”119 an Indian reservation.120
Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 427-28 (majority opinion of Stewart, J.) (“We hold . . . that the 1891 Act
terminated the Lake Traverse Reservation, and that consequently the state courts have
jurisdiction over conduct on non-Indian lands within the 1867 reservation borders.”).
116
See, e.g., Robert T. Anderson, Sarah A. Krakoff & Bethany Berger, American
Indian Law: Cases and Commentary 286 (4th ed. 2020) (noting that in the reservation
diminishment case Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399 (1994), “the Court has arguably
expanded the list of ‘magic language’ so that returning land to the public domain also
counts as an ‘intent’ to diminish”); cf. Tweedy, supra note 1, at 749 (footnote omitted)
(noting that in reservation diminishment/disestablishment cases the Supreme Court
“sometimes appears to expand the universe of qualifying magic language in an
outcome-determinative manner”).
117
Agreement of 1889, art I, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1036, quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 439 n.22; see Sarah Krakoff,
Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty,
50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1177, 1212 & n.261 (2001) (citation omitted) (observing that in
DeCoteau “the Court incorporated into its diminishment approach the search for
‘magic language’ in the statute” and that “[t]he ‘magic language’ . . . was that the tribe
agreed to ‘cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all . . . claim, right, title
and interest’”).
118
Agreement of 1889, art. II, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 35, 36,
reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 456; see DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448 (“The 1891
Act . . . appropriates and vests in the tribe a sum certain—$2.50 per acre—in payment
for the express cession and relinquishment of ‘all’ of the tribe’s ‘claim, right, title, and
interest’ in the unallotted lands.”).
119
Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975)
(No. 73-1148) (statement of William F. Day, Jr., Esq., on behalf of Respondents)
(arguing that the 1891 Act “wiped out the boundaries of [the Lake Traverse]
reservation”); cf. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 355 (1962) (addressing
the Washington courts’ interpretation of an Act of Congress and a Presidential
proclamation “as completely wiping out the South Half of the Colville Reservation”).
120
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446 (citation omitted) (opining that the landsale language at issue in DeCoteau “is virtually indistinguishable from that used
114
115
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2.

Tribal Understanding of the 1889 U.S. Agreement with the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota in DeCoteau—A Long-Overdue
Examination
a. May 21, 1889—Meeting with Dakota Territory Citizens
at Big Coulee, as Reported in the Minneapolis Tribune
Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that this “‘magic language’
approach to statutory interpretation”121 originated in a context that
demanded judicial ascertainment of the Indians’ own understanding of
the “agreement” they signed and that Congress then enacted into law. As
the DeCoteau majority observed, the 1891 Act that the Supreme Court
construed as having “terminated the Lake Traverse Reservation”122
was passed pursuant to the policy of the 1887 General Allotment Act,
which “empowered the President to allot portions of reservation land
to tribal members and, with tribal consent, to sell the surplus lands to
white settlers, with the proceeds of these sales being dedicated to the
Indians’ benefit.”123 Tellingly, as its leading evidence of tribal consent,
the DeCoteau Court pointed to a newspaper story, published in the
Minneapolis Tribune in May of 1889, which purported to quote statements by “[s]pokesmen for the tribe” in response to the efforts of “a
South Dakota banker, D.W. Diggs, . . . on behalf of the local white
community,” to acquire the lands “for commerce, farming, and railroad
development.”124 According to the newspaper story, Diggs was part
of a “committee appointed by the convention at Watertown[, Dakota
Territory] to go to Washington to urge the completion of the arrangements for opening the Sisseton reservation.”125 Diggs himself served “as
in the other sum-certain, cession agreements ratified by Congress in the same
1891 Act”); infra note 651 (noting the threat to other Indian nations posed by
DeCoteau’s weaponizing of land-sale terms commonly found in U.S. agreements
with tribes); see also, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1984) (citing
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447-48) (“When such language of cession is buttressed by an
unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian tribe for its
opened land, there is an almost insurmountable presumption that Congress meant
for the tribe’s reservation to be diminished.”); cf. Judith V. Royster, Of Surplus
Lands and Landfills: The Case of the Yankton Sioux, 43 S.D. L. Rev. 283, 305 n.169
(1998) (“Prior to DeCoteau, . . . the Court required explicit language of termination
before it would find the surplus land disestablished from the reservation.”); Philip P.
Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of
Indian Tribal Authority over Nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1, 18 (1999) (“[S]urely even
a modest application of the [Indian law] canon would treat ‘cede, sell, relinquish,
and convey’ for a specified amount as ambiguous concerning whether the tribe
had simply agreed to convey land title or had also taken the extraordinary act of
ceding away whatever sovereignty it had then or might be recognized as having in
the future.”).
121
Frickey, supra note 120, at 19.
122
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428.
123
Id. at 432 (emphasis added) (citing Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496-97 (1973));
see also infra notes 644-645 and accompanying text.
124
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433 (footnote omitted).
125
A Large Pow-Wow: A Council at Big Brule to Urge the Opening of the Sisseton
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stenographer to report proceedings” when the “committee” of white
Dakota Territory citizens “held a council with Chief Gabriel Renville
and nine of his head men at the Big Coulee” on May 21, 1889 “to ascertain [the Indians’] views in regard to opening the reservation.”126 As
truncated by the DeCoteau Court, Diggs ascribed the following words
to the Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives:
“We never thought to keep this reservation for our lifetime.
....
“. . . Now that South Dakota has come in as a state we have
some one to go to, to right our wrongs. The Indians have taken their
land in severalty. They are waiting for patents. The Indians are anxious to get patents. We are willing the surplus land should be sold. We
don’t expect to keep reservation. We want to get the benefit of the
sale. If the government will pay what they owe, we will be pleased
with the opening. There will be left over allotments 880,000 acres.
If the government pays what they owe, and pay what they agree
per acre, we will be pleased with the opening. When the government
asks me to do anything, I am always willing to do it. I hope you will
try to get the government to do what is right.
“If the government will do this, it will benefit both the Indians
and the whites [and illustrates by holding up half a dozen keys [in a]
perpendicular position, separately], we all stand this way [and then,
pressing them against each other], we will be as one key. When the
reservation is open127 we meet as one body. We be as one.
....
“. . . If we get the money we will open up. Your committee needn’t
be discouraged, we will open up.
“. . . We are anxious to become citizens and vote. We have laid
before you all we have to say from our hearts. . . .”128

Reservation, Minneapolis Tribune, May 22, 1889 [hereinafter “A Large Pow-Wow”],
https://newspapers.mnhs.org/jsp/viewer.jsp?doc_id=mnhi0005/1DFC5F58/89052201
&page_name=1.
126
Id.; see Angelique EagleWoman, Permanent Homelands Through Treaties with
the United States: Restoring Faith in the Tribal Nation-U.S. Relationship in Light of
the McGirt Decision, 47 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 640, 666 (2021) (observing that
in DeCoteau “the Court drew on local officials’ accounts” which “included accounts
from those who pressured tribal leadership to open the reservation, and a heavily
excerpted, unattributed newspaper article”); cf. Fletcher § 7.2, supra note 14, at 299
(noting commentators’ observation that “the [DeCoteau] Court’s reliance on likely
self-interested contemporaries is shoddy history at best”).
127
In the newspaper story the word that is actually used here is not “open” but
“opened.” See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
128
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433-34 (bracketed alterations in original newspaper story,
except “[in a]”, which is an alteration added by the DeCoteau Court) (footnote
omitted) (all other omissions added by the DeCoteau Court) (quoting A Large PowWow, supra note 125). The comma in the middle of the phrase “to go to, to right
our wrongs” does not appear in the newspaper story, but was silently added by the
DeCoteau Court. Cf. infra note 136 and accompanying text; infra note 148.
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While the DeCoteau Court opined that these excerpts from the 1889
Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story show that Chief Gabriel Renville
and the other Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives “spoke clearly” in favor
of terminating their reservation,129 a fuller examination of the story in the
context of the U.S. government’s relations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota people demonstrates the falsity of that conclusion.130
First, DeCoteau’s excerpts from the newspaper story are a classic
example of “cherry-picked statements”131 that create an illusion of intent
to terminate or shrink reservation boundaries.132 An examination of the
entire newspaper story reveals that all of the Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives133 who met with the group of white citizens of Dakota Territory
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449.
As for DeCoteau’s prefacing its excerpts from the newspaper story with the
misleading statement that “[i]n May [1889], Diggs met with a council of tribal
leaders, who told him that the tribe would consider selling the reserved lands if the
Government would first pay a ‘loyal scout claim’ which the tribe believed was owing
as part of the 1867 Treaty,” id. at 433, see infra note 178 and accompanying text; infra
note 403 and accompanying text.
131
Cf. Nebraska v. Parker, 577 U.S. 481, 490-91 (2016) (rejecting reliance on “cherrypicked statements by individual legislators” as credible “evidence of diminishment”).
132
The respondent’s brief in the DeCoteau case, submitted to the Supreme Court by
the attorney general of South Dakota, likewise deploys decontextualized “cherrypicked statements” from the 1889 newspaper story, at the beginning of the brief’s
argument, to establish at the outset an illusion of tribal consent to the Lake Traverse
Reservation’s termination. The state attorney general wrote: “In early 1889 certain
members of the tribe were approached and indicated they would sell their reservation:
‘We never thought to keep this reservation for our lifetime. . . . We don’t expect to
keep reservation. We want to get the benefit of the sale . . . .’” Brief for Respondent
at 6-7, DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 731148), 1974 WL 187535, at *10 (citation omitted). In their reply brief, attorneys for
the Sisseton-Wahpeton petitioner, Cheryl Spider DeCoteau, called attention to this
misleading use of the 1889 newspaper story:
Respondent cites these materials as dispositive of Congressional intent to disestablish the Reservation two years later in 1891. The materials have nothing
to do with Congressional intent. The [Minneapolis] Tribune story excerpts are
completely out of context; patching parts of statements of several people in a
misleading way. The negotiation proceedings read in their entirety do not at
all support Respondent’s disestablishment conclusion. Both documents were
prepared by non-Indians and the reliability of the translations from Sioux must
also be questioned.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 14 n.15, DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist.,
420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 73-1148), 1974 WL 186005, at *9 n.15 (citations omitted).
133
DeCoteau amalgamates the views of the five Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives
quoted in the newspaper story—Chief Gabriel Renville, Michael Renville, John B.
Renville, Major Amos, and Solomon Two Stars—into a single column of edited,
rearranged, and strung-together excerpts without individual attribution, see DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 433-34, compounding the “cherry-picked statements” problem by creating
the false appearance of a univocal tribal narrative allegedly conveying “clear
expressions of tribal . . . intent,” id. at 447, to accept the reservation’s termination. The
Supreme Court thus appears to have emulated the technique used by the attorney
general of South Dakota and flagged as “misleading” in the reply brief of petitioner
Cheryl Spider DeCoteau. See supra note 132.
129
130
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were focused on a single overarching imperative: requiring the U.S. government to fulfill its existing obligations before the tribe would agree to
terms regarding potential future sales of land within the Lake Traverse
Reservation. Thus, the newspaper story contains extensive comments by
Chief Gabriel Renville:
[“]I don’t feel that I made friends with the white man today. At
the time of the massacre in 1862 our people made friends with the
whites and protected them from the hostiles with all heart. We stand
between the hostiles. We suffered a great deal. After that the government took our annuities and we have suffered from it. Many years
we had worked hard to get what belonged to us, and when the bill
was made out the government had taken out two years. That is not
right. We never thought to keep this reservation for our lifetime. If
your customer owe[s] you and ask[s] for more credit, you won[’]t
trust him till he pays up what he owes. If the government pay[s] back
annuity and ask[s] us to sell our land, the question will be what price
you shall pay for it.[”]
In answer to the question, “what do you think the government
ought to pay for the land?” he replied:
“I can’t say. When commission and Indians get together they talk
it over.”
Being asked what the Indians claimed, he formulated it as follows:
First, they want their patents issued, securing to them their land
in severalty.
Second, they claim that under the treaty of 1851 there is due them
in annuities cut off in 1862 the amount as adjusted and admitted by
the interior department of $305,987.37 and for the two years left out
of the account of $36,800, making a total of $342,787.37.
Third—According to the treaty of 1851 the survey of their land
is wrong. The amount of land taken from them by this is about
48,000 acres.134

See Valerie Sherer Mathes, Charles C. Painter’s “How We Punish Our Allies”:
Advocating for Gabriel Renville and the Sisseton and Wahpeton Dakota Scouts,
S.D. Hist., Summer 2021, at 139, 143 (footnote omitted) (“Although the loyal scouts
had finally gained a permanent home, they continued to face corruption . . . . During
his investigation in 1888, [Indian Rights Association agent Charles C.] Painter
learned that the surveyors who set the reservation boundaries had deliberately taken
‘46,000 acres off from the border’ and charged the Indians ‘$45,000 for running the
lines.’”). For a thorough discussion of the Indian Rights Association’s prominent
role in “championing a policy of dispossession and assimilation in the 1880s” while
contending with strong and determined resistance from a reform organization called
the National Indian Defense Association and its founder Thomas A. Bland, see
C. Joseph Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked Paths to Allotment: The Fight over Federal
Indian Policy after the Civil War 112-55 (2012) (book chapters titled “Thomas
Bland’s Moment, 1875-1886” and “The Allotment Controversy, 1882-1889”). Professor
Genetin-Pilawa explains that the Indian Rights Association adopted the “institutional
innovation” of “employing a lobbyist at the capital” and “tapped Charles C. Painter,
an experienced activist for African American rights, . . . for this position,” a full-time
advocacy appointment Painter held until his death in 1895. Id. at 137-38 (endnote
omitted).
134
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These are the specific demands they make of the government.
They also claim that there is due from the government as pay for
Chief Renville and 12 of his scouts for five month’s service and
the same chief and 23 scouts for 14 month’s service performed by
directions of Gen. Sibley in 1863 and 1864. Gabriel also modestly
suggested that he thought that all the Indians who are 21 when the
final settlement is made should receive 160 acres of land. The bill
gives this amount to all 21 or over at the date of the bill’s passage,
with 80 acres to those between 18 and 21, and 40 acres to all under 18.
He added, in conclusion, that when the claim is settled they want the
money paid in cash and not in shoe pegs and overalls.
....
[“]If the government don’t settle up there is no use to send a commission here.
....
[“]If you can’t get what we want, and the government don’t give
back what they owe, then what. The money we ask for we worked for
by protecting the frontier—at the massacre of 1862. We didn’t run off,
but guarded 500 prisoners with Gen. Sibley. We are tired of asking
for what is due us for many years. If this money is not paid us, and we
are citizens and have to pay taxes, what will we pay taxes with? You
will take our ponies. We are anxious to become citizens and vote. We
have laid before you all we have to say from our hearts. We believe
what you say. We hope in South Dakota we will be one and help each
other. We thank you and depend on you to help us.[”]135

The newspaper story also conveys statements by another SissetonWahpeton representative, Michael Renville:
[“]You have heard about the mistake of the survey. I will not
speak further of the survey. When you come here and make friends
with us we are pleased. The Indian suffers from mistakes; he don’t
know how to correct them. Now that South Dakota has come in as
a state we have some one to go to to right our wrongs. The Indians
have taken their land in severalty. They are anxious to get patents. We
are willing the surplus land should be sold. We don’t expect to keep
reservation. We want to get the benefit of the sale. If the government
will pay what they owe, we will be pleased with the opening. There
will be left over allotments 880,000 acres. If the government pays
what they owe, and pay what they agree per acre, we will be pleased
with the opening. When the government asks me to do anything, I
am always willing to do it. I hope you will try to get the government
to do what is right.
[“]If the government will do this, it will benefit both the Indians
and the whites [and illustrates by holding up half a dozen keys a in
[sic] perpendicular position, separately,], we all stand this way [and
then, pressing them against each other,], we will be as one key. When
the reservation is opened we meet as one body. We be as one.[”]
....
A Large Pow-Wow, supra note 125 (conveying statements of Sisseton-Wahpeton
Chief Gabriel Renville).
135
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[“]I forgot to say when we went to see the great father at
Washington, the whites said: ‘If you get the money it won’t last long.’
But we want money as well as white men. He say if you get money
won[’]t open reservation. If we get the money we will open up. Your
committee needn’t be discouraged, we will open up.[”]136

The words of two additional tribal representatives, Major Amos137
and John B. Renville,138 are reported briefly in the newspaper story.
John B. Renville said: “I think the most important thing is that we own
patents. Other things will come afterwards. We want you to push that so
that the old people will get the benefit. Some are old and need the money
from the annuities.”139 And Major Amos said: “All the points have been
mentioned. We depend on you to help us all you can.”140
Finally, the 1889 newspaper story purports to impart the views of
Solomon Two Stars, another Sisseton-Wahpeton representative, in the
following terms:
[“]Other speakers, you have heard what they say. I will mention,
if you are going to help us, some things they have not spoken of.
After severalty law passed man came to make allotments. The babies
got no land. It is not right. Sixteen and seventeen year old they got
40 acres. Not right. When babies grow up they have nothing. It is
not right. You speak friendly to us. We are friends to you. We lost
two years. Don’t got any crops. We are suffering, no telling about
this season. We may all starve if Cook don’t take in wood.[”] (Cook
is the Wilmot[, Dakota Territory] merchant who buys their wood,
which is their most reliable source of revenue.) [“]We have heard
good words. My heart is happy. We are friends to you. We show it in
time of massacre.[”]141

Far from exhibiting any wish to facilitate or accept the Lake Traverse
Reservation’s termination, the unedited statements of the five SissetonWahpeton representatives in the 1889 Minneapolis Tribune newspaper
story show that those leaders were united in insisting the United States
Id. (conveying statements of Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Michael Renville).
In the Executive Branch report on U.S. negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota at Sisseton Agency in November and December, 1889, Major Amos is referred
to as “Big Amos.” See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, infra note 157, at 18 (report of councils with
Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs) (mentioning “Big Amos”
as one of the Indians who met earlier in 1889 with Diggs and others “at Big Cooley
to hold council”); see also Elijah Black Thunder et al., Ehanna Woyakapi: History
and Culture of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota 45 (photo.
reprt. 2017) (1975) (identifying “Big Amos” as one of the “men serving as head scouts
or scouts,” with Gabriel Renville serving “as Chief of Scouts,” during the period
immediately following the U.S.-Dakota War).
138
The newspaper story describes John B. Renville as “a preacher in the Presbyterian
Church, under the shadow of which the party was sitting, a man of 56, in whose veins a
large proportion of white blood flows, and who has a white wife.” A Large Pow-Wow,
supra note 125.
139
Id. (conveying statement of Sisseton-Wahpeton representative John B. Renville).
140
Id. (conveying statement of Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Major Amos).
141
Id. (conveying statement of Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Solomon
Two Stars).
136
137

180

IPJLCR

2022:139

redress past transgressions and broken promises before the tribe would
agree to any future land sales. In particular, the five Sisseton-Wahpeton
leaders demanded that the U.S. government satisfy the following articulated grievances:
• The government’s failure to complete the process of securing
allotments to tribal members as prescribed by the 1867 SissetonWahpeton Treaty,142 a process that the leaders now insisted be
modified to guarantee equalized land assignments in severalty
to women and minors, in addition to adult male heads of families.
• The government’s wrongful withholding of “back annuities,”
which the tribal leaders insisted be “paid in cash” rather than be
doled out piecemeal in the form of future purchases of farming
provisions and supplies (derided as “shoe pegs143 and overalls”
by Chief Gabriel Renville).
• The government’s erroneous surveying of the Lake Traverse
Reservation’s boundaries, which resulted in 48,000 acres being
wrongfully excluded from the eastern portion of the reservation.
• The government’s failure to pay salaries and expenses for the
service of a number of Sisseton-Wahpeton scouts, including
Chief Renville himself, who accompanied and assisted Brigadier
General Henry Hastings Sibley of the U.S. Military District of
Minnesota144 in retaliatory/punitive military expeditions in 1863
and 1864 against Dakota people who had fled from Minnesota
after the conclusion of the U.S.-Dakota War.145
See Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. V, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509,
reprinted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 452-53 (1975).
143
It is unclear whether the intended words were “shoe pegs” or “shoe pacs.”
Compare supra note 135 and accompanying text (“shoe pegs”), with infra note 227
and accompanying text (“shoe pacs”), and infra note 393 and accompanying text
(“shoe pacs”).
144
See Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military
Injustice, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 13, 19 (1990) (noting that during the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862
“[t]he American forces were led by Colonel Henry H. Sibley, appointed on August 19
by Minnesota Governor [Alexander] Ramsey to be commander of the volunteer
forces and named on September 29 by President Lincoln to be Brigadier General of
United States Volunteers in charge of the U.S. Military District of Minnesota”).
145
Chief Renville’s grievance regarding the U.S. government’s failure to compensate
the Dakota scouts, see supra text accompanying note 135 (showing newspaper story’s
statement that the Indians “also claim that there is due from the government as pay
for Chief Renville and 12 of his scouts for five month’s service and the same chief and
23 scouts for 14 month’s service performed by directions of Gen. Sibley in 1863 and
1864”), appears to have been a projection of his disappointment over the Senate’s
having stricken certain articles of the 1867 Treaty, as originally drafted and agreedto by Renville and other Sisseton-Wahpeton signatories, prior to final ratification.
The omitted articles would have provided such compensation. See infra note 488
and accompanying text. The topic of the unpaid scouts likely had been instigated,
moreover, by D.W. Diggs, who had maneuvered the Indians into attending the
May 1889 meeting with white citizens of Dakota Territory and who seemed intent on
ingratiating himself with Chief Renville, the former leader of the scouts, in the course
of Diggs’s lobbying the federal government to open the Lake Traverse Reservation for
142
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In the context of their airing these core grievances in the 1889
newspaper story, the statements of the Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives, as conveyed by the Dakota Territory citizen/banker/stenographer
D.W. Diggs, do not evince tribal consent to any alteration of the boundaries of the Lake Traverse reservation, nor to the elimination of the
reservation altogether. Rather, in context, the statement attributed to
Chief Gabriel Renville that “We never thought to keep this reservation
for our lifetime”146 signifies only that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians
remained willing to sell land within their reservation notwithstanding
their insistence that “the government pay [the] back annuity”147 it owed
the tribe first. Likewise, in context, the statement ascribed to Michael
Renville that “We don’t expect to keep reservation” means only that the
tribal representatives remained “willing the surplus land” within their
reservation “should be sold,” provided that past “mistakes” were first
redressed, and that Diggs’s “committee needn’t be discouraged” about
this.148 In addition, Michael Renville’s use of the words “open,” “opened,”
and “opening” with regard to the reservation’s potential future149 signifies nothing more than a willingness to allow “white settlers onto the
reservation whose habits of work and leanings toward education would
invigorate life on the reservation.”150 None of these statements nor any
others from the 1889 newspaper story151 reasonably could be construed
railway development. See infra note 153 and accompanying text; infra note 401 and
accompanying text; infra note 488.
146
Supra text accompanying note 135.
147
Supra text accompanying note 135.
148
Supra text accompanying note 136.
149
Supra text accompanying note 136.
150
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 462 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
151
Thus, the statement “Now that South Dakota has come in as a state we have
some one to go to, to right our wrongs,” and the metaphor of the “half a dozen
keys . . . press[ed] . . . against each other” to make “one key,” id. at 433-34 (citation
omitted) (quoting in silently altered form A Large Pow-Wow, supra note 125
(conveying statements of Michael Renville)), extracted and decontextualized by the
DeCoteau Court, likewise do not intimate tribal consent to abolishing the reservation.
Rather, those quotes, attributed to Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Michael
Renville, appear in the midst of his referring to “the mistake of the [reservation]
survey” and his hope that, with South Dakota’s imminent entry into the Union, a new
forum or mechanism might arise that could help “correct” such “mistakes,” see supra
note 136 and accompanying text, by reconciling the survey with the reservation’s actual
boundaries as established by the 1867 Treaty. In other words, those quoted passages, in
their original context, were uttered in the spirit of welcoming the prospect of support
from the incoming government of South Dakota, as well as from the white citizens/
neighbors who would be purchasing the surplus lands, in rectifying and validating, not
eliminating, the Lake Traverse Reservation’s boundaries.
It also must be noted that when DeCoteau was decided the Supreme Court
was fully aware that state court systems, like the one that would develop once
South Dakota became a state on November 2, 1889, see infra note 161, were important
forums for allowing Indians as plaintiffs to seek relief against wrongdoing by nonIndian defendants, including wrongdoing that occurred on reservations. See, e.g.,
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as telegraphing tribal consent to the U.S. government’s annihilation of
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people’s “permanent” treaty-guaranteed
homeland, the Lake Traverse Reservation.152
b. November 30, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
A newspaper story, moreover, is not a legally operative document;
and the Supreme Court’s primary reliance in DeCoteau on statements that
white settlers, motivated by prospects of self-enrichment through Indian
land acquisitions,153 purported to be the translated words of non-English
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) (citing, inter alia, Felix v. Patrick,
145 U.S. 317, 332 (1892)) (observing that on-reservation state-court “suits by Indians
against outsiders have been sanctioned”); see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the
Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984) (citations omitted)
(“This Court . . . repeatedly has approved the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts
over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when those claims arose in Indian
country.”). Accordingly, the fact that a Sisseton-Wahpeton leader purportedly was
quoted in an 1889 newspaper story as having expressed the hope that South Dakota’s
courts might become a place “to go to, to right our wrongs” does not imply that the
Indians expected, or consented to, the elimination of the Lake Traverse Reservation.
152
Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (setting
apart “a permanent reservation” for the Sisseton-Wahpeton bands of the Santee Sioux
Indians), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 451-52.
153
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 431 n.8 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (“On
April 22, 1889, a banker from Milbank, S. Dak., D.W. Diggs, wrote to the Secretary of
the Interior: ‘[The Lake Traverse Reservation] is a great detriment to our interests,
as it blocks the progress of two or three lines of railroad that we are anxious to see
completed. We need these roads badly, and the opening of the reservation would give
new impetus to immigration which has been attracted by government lands further
west. Any information that will enable the citizens of this section to render any service
that may be needed in hastening the opening will be appreciated.’”); see also Brief for
Petitioner at 18, DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct. for Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975)
(No. 73-1148), 1974 WL 186007, at *15 (citations omitted) (“One of the most insistent
supporters of the reservation opening was D.W. Diggs, Banker, Bank of Milbank,
South Dakota, who ultimately became one of the commissioners sent to negotiate the
opening with the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands. Diggs’ main concern was the barrier
that the reservation was posing to the development of local resources, in particular the
completion of two or three railroad lines. Diggs’ local interests suggest the possibility
of an allegiance extraneous to the mandated goals of the commission.”).
In his April 22, 1889 letter—typewritten under the masthead “Sargent & Diggs,
Bankers” for “The Bank of Milbank” in “Milbank, Dakota”—Diggs promoted
himself as a potential member of the commission for negotiating with the SissetonWahpeton Indians: “If any need should exist for a special agent here, in the opening, or
a commission to be appointed, I trust you will remember Yours truly.” Nat’l Archives
Recs. of the Bureau of Indian Aff. Rec. Grp. 75, Spec. Case 147 (Sisseton), Letter
No. 26163-1889, encl. 5 (Apr. 2, 1889 letter from banker D.W. Diggs to John W. Noble,
Secretary of the Interior) (on file with author), cited in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 43132 n.8. Diggs pressured the Secretary further less than a month later, writing: “My
Dear Gen’l I presume you are annoyed by my frequent communications, but the
matter of opening the Sisseton Reservation is one of sufficient importance to all our
people to warrant the utmost effort to secure it. Hoping to hear from you soon. I am
Yours Sincerely D.W. Diggs.” Id., encl. 2 (May. 13, 1889 handwritten note from banker
D.W. Diggs to John W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior) (on file with author), cited in
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speaking Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives in that 1889 newspaper
story is a telltale sign of the actual lack of evidence of tribal consent to
the Lake Traverse Reservation’s termination via legally operative federal
sources, i.e., the 1891 Act of Congress and its associated legislative history.154 In this regard, the 1891 Act contains “not a word to suggest that the
boundaries of the reservation were altered.”155 Likewise, the legislative
history is devoid of any indication that Congress intended to destroy the
reservation when it passed legislation enacting the tribe’s agreement to
the sale of unallotted lands within the reservation’s boundaries.156
Indeed, the most significant document comprising the 1891 Act’s legislative history—an 1890 Executive Branch report transmitted by President
Benjamin Harrison to the Senate and House of Representatives—contains several pages of detailed, painstakingly transcribed negotiations
with leaders of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Dakota Indians,
including the translated words of Chief Gabriel Renville; yet, nothing in
the 29-page report evidences tribal consent to shrinking or abolishing the
Lake Traverse Reservation.157 The document is titled “A report relative to
the purchase and release of the surplus lands in the Lake Traverse Indian
Reservation,”158 and throughout the report statements of U.S. officials refer
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 431-32 n.8.
154
In his engaging autobiography, tribal attorney Robert Pirtle writes:
[A]s if to add insult to injury, the Supreme Court stooped to including in its 1975
DeCoteau decision a newspaper article from May 1889, in which a tribal spokesman
was quoted as having stated that the Tribe never hoped to keep the Reservation,
that it was grateful to the federal government for paying its “loyal scout claim”
payments for not joining in the Great Sioux Uprising of 1862 but acting as scouts
for federal troops instead, that tribal members were anxious to get payments for the
unallotted lands and would be glad to open up the Reservation for settlement by
non-Indians. Such a newspaper article has no business being included in a Supreme
Court opinion as it is not evidence, nor is it legislative history either of the 1889
agreement or the Congressional Act ratifying it. And we all know how newspaper
reporters change our statements and twist stories all around to fit their predisposed
beliefs. How do you think a white newspaper reporter in South Dakota in 1889
regarded Indians? Besides, the tribal spokesman spoke no English, had no idea
what tribal sovereignty meant as a legal matter or how it fit in the complex matrix
with state and federal law, and most certainly did not intend to represent that the
Tribe wished to give up its sovereignty in the 1891 Act.
Pirtle, supra note 106, at 446.
155
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting); cf. King, supra note 65, at 406
(footnote omitted) (“In dissent [in DeCoteau], Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall accused the majority of manufacturing congressional intent.”).
156
See infra notes 157-620 and accompanying text (thoroughly examining DeCoteau’s
legislative history).
157
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, 51st Cong., 1st Sess. (1890) (report of councils with
Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians). The DeCoteau Court relegated discussion of selected
excerpts from this crucial document to a single footnote, see DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 43537 n.16, subordinating this official government report to the Court’s primary focus
on the 1889 Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story. See also infra notes 373-451 and
accompanying text.
158
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 1 (emphasis added). The phrase “purchase and
release of the surplus lands” in the title of the Executive Branch report, as well as in the
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to the developing agreement as entailing the Indians’ potential consent to
the sale of lands within the reservation’s boundaries.159 This federal objective, to elicit tribal consent to the sale of lands within the reservation, was
explained by General Eliphalet Whittlesey, chairman of the U.S. commission, when he and the other appointed negotiators160 first met with an

opening sentence of the House of Representatives’ report on the 1889 Agreement and
the bill for ratifying it, see infra text accompanying note 467, evidences the Agreement’s
alignment with, and amplification of, the policy of the General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8,
1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate
with Indian tribes “for the purchase and release” of surplus lands within reservations),
a policy that “clearly does not . . . abolish the reservations,” United States v. Celestine,
215 U.S. 278, 287 (1909) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also S. Exec.
Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 1 (letter from President Benjamin Harrison to the Senate
and House of Representatives) (referring to the 1889 negotiations with the Sisseton and
Wahpeton bands “for the purchase and release of the surplus lands in the Lake Traverse
Indian Reservation” as “having been conducted under the authority contained in the
fifth section of the general allotment act of February 8, 1887”); supra notes 46-47 and
accompanying text; infra note 378; infra notes 644-647 and accompanying text.
159
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 1 (letter from President Benjamin
Harrison to the Senate and House of Representatives) (“surplus lands in the Lake
Traverse Indian Reservation”); id. at 2 (letter from Interior Secretary John W. Noble
to President Harrison) (“unallotted lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation”);
id. at 3 (letter from Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan to Interior Secretary
John W. Noble) (“surplus lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation”, “unallotted
land within the reservation”); id. at 5 (letter from appointed negotiators Eliphalet
Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs Commissioner
T.J. Morgan) (“surplus lands within their (the Lake Traverse) reservation”).
160
Just prior to General Whittlesey’s opening remarks on November 30, 1889,
William McKusick, the U.S. Indian agent at Sisseton Agency, introduced all three
members of the commission:
Members of the Sisseton and Wahpeton tribe and now fellow-citizens, I
have called you together to meet a Commission sent here by the United States
Government. That Commission is now before you. On my left is General
Whittlesey. He has been for many years secretary of the Board of Indian
Commissioners. His duties have been to inspect all goods bought for your
schools; he inspects all goods before they are sent. If there is a man in the world
entitled to your confidence, it is General Whittlesey.
Next on the Commission is Mr. Maxwell. He knows all about the lands at
the agencies and knows about your lands here, and is particularly fitted for the
place. Next on the Commission is Mr. Diggs, of Milbank. We all agree that he is
a far-seeing man and will work for your interests. I congratulate you on meeting
a Board of Commissioners so competent and favorably disposed in your behalf.
General Whittlesey will now explain to you their business with you, and for
what purpose you are called together.
Id. at 15-16 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
U.S. Indian Agent William McKusick); see also Gary Clayton Anderson, Gabriel
Renville: From the Dakota War to the Creation of the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Reservation, 1825-1892, at 143 (2018) (noting that “[D.W.] Diggs joined Eliphalet
Whittlesey, former secretary of the Board of Indian Commissioners, and Charles W.
Maxwell from the Government Land Office in opening negotiations with Renville
at Sisseton Agency”); cf. infra note 513 (noting Whittlesey’s service on the Board of
Indian Commissioners from 1875 to 1899).
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assembled portion of Sisseton and Wahpeton tribal members at Sisseton
Agency, South Dakota,161 on November 30, 1889:
You have a tract of land which is unoccupied and of no use to you,
and you have been reported in Washington as wishing to dispose
of some of those lands; they are yours and no one wishes to take
them from you. There is this difference between you and other land-
owners, you can sell only to the Government of the United States. . . .

....

[Y]ou see we are not sent here to force anything on you. We do
not intend to say one word to deceive you or to do one thing that is
to wrong you. We want to do, and have you do, what is best for you
and your children. We want to know what your proposition is. We
wish you to say if you wish to sell any of this land, and if any, how
much, and then we would like to have you agree on a price. . . . Now,
if any of you are willing to talk in regard to this matter, we will l isten,
or if you do not care to talk now we will wait patiently to hear you
when you are ready. There is a map of your reservation; the red marks
show the allotted lands. This is from Washington, and is correct. We
are ready to hear you if you are ready to talk.162

To this, Chief Gabriel Renville responded: “There are not one-half of our
people here, for that reason we would like to take the matter into consideration and set a day to talk with you.”163 Referring to Whittlesey’s having
read aloud detailed “instructions and letters” from the Secretary of the
Interior,164 Chief Renville said: “We would like a translation of the letter
South Dakota was proclaimed a state, along with North Dakota, on November 2,
1889, thereby displacing the former Dakota Territory. See Presidents Cleveland and
Harrison contribute to North and South Dakota statehood, Rapid City J., Oct. 13, 2014,
https://rapidcityjournal.com/presidents-cleveland-and-harrison-contribute-to-northand-south-dakota-statehood/article_64dd45cb-a559-5aba-be90-f5f86d73a645.html
(“At 3:40 p.m. EST on Nov. 2, 1889, President Benjamin Harrison signed almost
identical statehood proclamations that created North Dakota and South Dakota. No
one will ever know which state was the 39th or the 40th to enter the Union because
Harrison covered and shuffled the documents before and after signing them. He
proudly declared, ‘They were born together—they are one and I will make them
twins.’”).
162
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 16 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
163
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville).
164
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen.
Whittlesey). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs had obtained approval from the
Secretary of the Interior after having transmitted to the Secretary, on August 13,
1889, a proposed “draught of instructions . . . for the guidance of a Commission (to
be appointed) to negotiate with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians for the sale of
their surplus lands under provision of the Act of February 8, 1887,” i.e., the General
Allotment Act. Nat’l Archives Recs. of the Bureau of Indian Aff. Rec. Grp. 75, Land
Div., Letters Received: Spec. Case 147 (Sisseton), Entry 96, Letter Book 188, at 198
(citation omitted) (on file with author) (Aug. 13, 1889 letter from T.J. Morgan,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to John W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior), cited in
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 434 n.13 (1975). In its entirety, the Secretary’s
letter of instructions states as follows:
161

186

IPJLCR

2022:139

Gentlemen:
Upon receipt hereof, you will proceed to the Sisseton Agency, Dakota, for
the purpose of negotiating with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians for the relinquishment of such portions of the Lake Traverse Reservation, not allotted, as
said Indians may consent to release.
Such negotiations are authorized by the 5th Section of the Act of February 7
[sic], 1887, which provides: “That any time after lands have been allotted to all
the Indians of any tribe as herein provided, or sooner if in the opinion of the
President it shall be for the best interests of said tribe, it shall be lawful for the
Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with such Indian tribe for the purchase
and release by said tribe, in conformity with the treaty or statute under which
such reservation is held, of such portions of its reservation not allotted as such
tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell, on such terms and conditions as
shall be considered just and equitable, between the United States and said tribe,
which purchase shall not be complete until ratified by Congress, and the form
and manner of executing such release shall also be prescribed by Congress.”
The Lake Traverse Reservation was created by the 3rd Article of the t reaty
between the United States and the Sisseton and Warpeton [sic] Bands of
Dakota or Sioux Indians, concluded February 19, 1867 (15 Stats., 506).
It contains 918,780 acres, of which some 127,887 acres have been allotted
in severalty, and 1,417 acres reserved for church and other purposes, leaving a
surplus of some 789,476 acres.
The allotments have virtually been completed, although it is possible that
some few individuals who were not on the reservation when allotments were
made in 1887, are entitled to allotments.
The treaty makes no provision regarding the cession or relinquishment of
the reservation or any portion thereof.
It is understood that the Indians desire to sell a portion at least, of their
surplus lands.
You will call a full council of the bands and submit the subject for their consideration. If a majority of such council determine to sell any portion of the reservation, you will then agree upon the quantity of land to be sold, and its location,
which should be described by sections, or other legal subdivisions of townships.
It is not considered advisable that the cession at this time should embrace
all these surplus lands. A sufficient quantity should be reserved for future contingencies.
The terms and conditions of the sale should then be agreed upon, which
should be just and equitable to the Indians, as well as to the United States.
You will explain to the Indians that under the Act of February 8, 1887, the
sums agreed to be paid as purchase money will be held in the Treasury of the
United States for their sole use, the same with interest thereon at 3 per cent
per annum, to be at all times subject to appropriation by Congress for the education and civilization of said Indians.
The terms and conditions agreed upon in Council, with the description of
the lands to be relinquished, should be reduced to writing and incorporated
in the accompanying form of agreement, which should be signed by at least a
majority of the male adults of the bands.
All such adults should be given the opportunity to sign.
When freely and properly signed, your certificates and the certificate of the
Official Interpreter, should be attached to the instrument.
The proceedings of the Council should be reduced to writing and attested by
your signatures and that of the Official Interpreter.
The Indians should be informed that the negotiations will not be valid or
binding until ratified by Congress.
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read, as it is long and we do not remember it all. We are now men and we
want to talk to you as men and understand each other.”165
c. December 3, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
Negotiations resumed three days later, on December 3, 1889. At the
outset the commission’s chairman, General Whittlesey, said to the assembled Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians: “We hope you will speak freely and
state your wishes, and remember that you are all equal, and no one has
supremacy over you in any way.”166 A tribal member, Magaiyahe, then
informed the negotiators that the Indians’ “wishes will be presented by
Gabriel Renville, who has been chosen as spokesman for the Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians.”167 Other Indians echoed this choice; one stated: “We
have been with him since the happenings of 1862. . . . [H]e has led us in
everything since then, and we are satisfied with him. We know that through
his efforts we have made a home here, have an agency and schools.”168
With his tribe’s endorsement thus declared, Chief Gabriel Renville
informed the U.S. negotiators that the Sisseton-Wahpeton people were
“not ready to speak of the surplus lands at present” because “[t]here
were three things in the way.” He continued:
The first is that the Government owes us. We have tried to get it, but
can not. The second is that an error was made in the survey of this
reservation, and we claim a piece which we ask be connected in with
the surplus lands. We have received our patents since the meeting at
Big Cooley,169 which at that time was the third thing. . . . The feeling
among the people is not that they do not intend to sell at all, but what
we want is that our claim be allowed first. After that, if a commission
comes, we will sell to them if we can agree on terms. We claim that
our back annuities should be allowed from 1862 and not from 1864
as suggested by Indian Office. The error in the survey is shown by
this map.170

General Whittlesey then proceeded to dispute the matter of the survey,
saying, “If the survey left off a little on one side, it took in more on the
Id. at 199-201 (letter from T.J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, as approved
by John W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior, to members of commission tasked with
conducting U.S. negotiations with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (on file with
author) [hereinafter “Letter of Instructions”], cited in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct.,
420 U.S. 425, 434 n.13 (1975).
165
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 16 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
166
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
167
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Magaiyahe, or Star).
168
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Wicaurpinoupa [Wicanhpinonpa], or [Solomon] Two Stars).
169
See supra notes 126-152 and accompanying text.
170
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 17 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
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other side.”171 After further debate, Chief Renville firmly asserted: “This
error is one reason why we will not dispose of our surplus lands.”172
The chief continued: “The other [reason] is our claim for back annuities. If you will first see that we get these and then come for our surplus
lands we will let you have them.”173 On this crucial issue—whether “back
annuities” would have to be paid before the Indians would agree to the
sale of unallotted lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation—intensive
argumentation transpired for the remainder of the December 3 meeting
and over the course of several additional days of the negotiations, until
the final, culminating day of December 13.174 In his message to the Senate
and House of Representatives, President Benjamin Harrison summarized the protracted discussions regarding this aspect of the negotiations:
Perhaps the question of the payment by the United States of
the annuities which were forfeited by the act of February 16, 1863,
should not have been considered in connection with this negotiation
for the cession of these lands. But it appears that a refusal to consider
this claim would have terminated the negotiation, and if the claim is
just its allowance has already been too long delayed. The forfeiture
declared by the act of 1863 unjustly included the annuities of certain
Indians of these bands who were not only guilty of no fault, but who
rendered meritorious services in the armies of the United States in
suppression of the Sioux outbreak, and in the war of rebellion.
The agreement submitted, I understand, provides for the payment
of the annuities justly due to these friendly Indians to all the members of the two bands per capita. This is said to be the unanimous wish
of the Indians, and a distribution to the friendly Indians and their
descendants only, would now be very difficult if not impossible.175

President Harrison’s letter and the extensive negotiations with the
Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives, memorialized in the 1890 Executive
Branch report, make clear that the “back annuities” the Indians insisted
be paid before terms could be finalized regarding land sales within the
Lake Traverse Reservation were treaty entitlements176 wrongly confisId. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
172
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville); see also Anderson, supra note 160 at 143 (“The original boundary line for
the eastern edge of the reservation, [Chief Renville] complained, had been moved
too far west, leaving lands that had become Roberts County, Dakota Territory, in the
east, in the hands of the whites. Whittlesey countered by saying that the government
had compensated the Indians for this by adding lands in the west. More importantly,
Whittlesey believed such an issue could only be rectified in the courts and was
irrelevant to the discussion of this proposal.”); supra note 134 and accompanying text.
173
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 17 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
174
See id. at 18-29 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
175
Id. at 1-2 (letter from President Benjamin Harrison to the Senate and House of
Representatives).
176
See Gustav Niebuhr, Lincoln’s Bishop: A President, A Priest, and the Fate
of 300 Dakota Sioux Warriors 17 (2014) (“The federal government promised in
171
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cated and cut off by Congress in February 1863 in retaliation against the
Dakota Indians after the conclusion of the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862.177
Thus, essential to ascertaining the Indians’ understanding of the 1889
Agreement, ratified and enacted by Congress in 1891, is careful consideration of this postwar retaliatory backdrop and its implications. By largely
disregarding this crucial context for the 1889 Sisseton-Wahpeton negotiations—and by dismissively and misleadingly labeling the Indians’ demand
for back annuities as a “loyal scout claim”178—the Supreme Court posited
an 1851 treaty to pay the Dakotas a sum of money—in gold—each June. With the
annuity, Dakota families were to buy food and clothing, and receive whatever else—
such as schools and farming implements—they might need to wean themselves from
a traditional hunting economy.”); see also infra note 439 and accompanying text
(discussing 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux). See generally Jonathon C. Horn, Indian
Annuities, Colo. Encyclopedia, https://coloradoencyclopedia.org/article/indianannuities (“Annuities were a fixed sum of money or goods that the U.S. government
paid to Indigenous people on a regular basis for the sale of their lands. Treaties with
Indigenous nations typically specified payments in dollar amounts over a period
of years in return for land cessions.”); Cohen’s Handbook § 1.03[1], supra note 16,
at 27 (footnote omitted) (“Treaties frequently called for the United States to deliver
goods and services to the tribes as part of an exchange for vast amounts of Indian
land. . . . Many treaties contained clauses calling for the payment of annuities or other
monies.”).
177
Act of Feb. 16, 1863, 12 Stat. 652 (“Be it enacted . . . That all treaties heretofore
made and entered into by the Sisseton, Wahpaton [Wahpeton], Medawakanton
[Mdewakanton], and Wahpakoota [Wahpekute] bands of Sioux or Dakota Indians, or
any of them, with the United States, are hereby declared to be abrogated and annulled,
so far as said treaties or any of them purport to impose any future obligation on the
United States, and all lands and rights of occupancy within the State of Minnesota,
and all annuities and claims heretofore accorded to said Indians, or any of them, to
be forfeited to the United States.”); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1953, 50th Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 5 (1888) (“Indians Who Served in the Army of the United States”) (letter from
J.D.C. Atkins, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to William F. Vilas, Secretary of the
Interior) (“By act of Congress, February 16, 1863, in which the outraged feelings of
the country, as well as its indiscriminating wrath, found expression, all treaties with
the four bands [of Dakota Indians] were abrogated, their lands in Minnesota and their
funds were confiscated, although part of the Sisseton and Wahpeton band remained
loyal and enlisted in the Army.”). See generally Howard J. Vogel, Rethinking the Effect
of the Abrogation of the Dakota Treaties and the Authority for the Removal of the
Dakota People from Their Homeland, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 538 (2013) (discussing
the question of the legality of Congress’s 1863 retaliatory actions against the Santee
Dakota).
178
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 433 (1975) (“In May [1889], Diggs met
with a council of tribal leaders, who told him that the tribe would consider selling
the reserved lands if the Government would first pay a ‘loyal scout claim’ which the
tribe believed was owing as part of the 1867 Treaty.”); see also id. at 435 (footnote
omitted) (stating that the negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians in late
1889 “show that the Indians wished to sell outright all of their unallotted lands, on
three conditions,” including “that Congress appropriate moneys to make good on the
tribe’s outstanding ‘loyal scout claim’”). The term “loyal scout claim,” although placed
in quotation marks by the Supreme Court in DeCoteau, appears nowhere in the 1889
Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story, A Large Pow-Wow, supra note 125, to which
the Court adverted in its first use of that term on page 433 of the DeCoteau majority
opinion, see DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433, nor anywhere in the 1890 Executive Branch
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a false historical narrative concerning “expressions of tribal . . . intent,”179
expressions that are crucial for analyzing the reservation disestablishment issue in DeCoteau.180
3.

Interlude and Reflection—Ancestral Connections to the
U.S. Government’s Betrayal of the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota People in DeCoteau

For me, as an enrolled member of the Santee Sioux Nation and a
descendant of grandparents and other ancestors who personally suffered
the trauma of the 1862 U.S.-Dakota War and its aftermath, the DeCoteau
Court’s disregard of this historical backdrop is especially galling. The
war itself was an explosive uprising of the Santee Dakota Indians of
Minnesota who rebelled against conditions of starvation, destitution, and
despair brought about by decades of corruption, deceit, aggression, and
betrayal by U.S. negotiators, federal Indian agents, territorial and state
officials, local traders and storekeepers, and frontier settlers whose common aim was to enrich themselves by dispossessing the Indians of their
lands and resources.181 Two of my great-great-grandfathers, Ehnamani
report containing, inter alia, the transcribed 1889 negotiations with the SissetonWahpeton Indians, cited multiple times in connection with the Court’s second use of
that term on page 435 of the DeCoteau majority opinion, see id. at 435 & n.16 (citing
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 1, 4-5, 7, 19-20, 21, 22, 25). Nor does the term
appear in § 27 of the 1891 Act, the third and final purported authority cited by the
Court when invoking the term on page 441 of the majority opinion. See id. at 441 (citing
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 27, 26 Stat. 1035, 1038) (“As passed by the Congress, the
1891 Act recited and ratified the 1889 Agreement with the tribe and appropriated
$2,203,000 to pay the tribe for the ceded land and to make good the tribe’s ‘loyal
scout’ claim.”). Rather, the DeCoteau Court apparently invented that label, using it
to deflect from the true significance of the Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders’ demand for
back annuities when negotiating over the potential sale of unallotted lands within the
Lake Traverse Reservation. See also infra notes 368-372 and accompanying text; infra
notes 398-406 and accompanying text; infra notes 473-499 and accompanying text.
179
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447.
180
See id. at 448 (observing that the “the 1891 Act before us” is “not a unilateral
action by Congress but the ratification of a previously negotiated agreement, to which
a tribal majority consented”); cf. Hughes, supra note 57, at 457 (“On the strength of the
agreement with the Tribe, the [DeCoteau] Court held that Congress had intended to
disestablish totally the Lake Traverse Reservation in South Dakota.”).
181
Many historians’ accounts provide valuable summaries of the causes of the
U.S.-Dakota War—or “Great Sioux Uprising”—of 1862. See, e.g., Roy W. Meyer,
History of the Santee Sioux: United States Indian Policy on Trial 115 (1967)
(“Most of [the Sioux Indians’] grievances have already been mentioned: bitterness
over the treaties of 1851; the non-fulfillment or tardy fulfillment by the government
of obligations incurred under the terms of those treaties; the treaty of 1858 and the
deception (as the Indians saw it) practiced upon them in turning over the proceeds
from the ceded lands to the traders; . . . the advantage which the Indians believed,
with reason, was being taken of them by the traders; the increasing pressure of white
settlement near and even on the reservation, which, coupled with the uncertainty of
the Indians’ tenure, seemed to foreshadow a time when they would again be bullied
into signing a treaty and be forced to move once more.”); see also, e.g., Gary Clayton
Anderson, Massacre in Minnesota: The Dakota War of 1862, the Most Violent
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Ethnic Conflict in American History 77-79 (2019) (footnote omitted) (“[T]rouble
erupted on August 4 [at the Upper Agency], as several desperate warriors broke
into the warehouse. They took twenty sacks of flour. . . . [Days later, after a standoff
between the Indians and American soldiers,] Agent [Thomas J.] Galbraith agreed to
come out and council [with the Indians] . . . . As the council came together, Sissetons
Standing Buffalo and Red Iron immediately demanded that food be distributed. The
agent had little to offer and finally turned to the traders. They then huddled with
their spokesman, Andrew Myrick. Once back at the council, Galbraith demanded an
answer. Myrick rose slowly, as if to exit, and then turned and said, ‘as far as I am
concerned let them eat grass.’ [Mdewakanton Dakota Chief] Little Crow sat stunned,
as young [Presbyterian missionary] John Williamson translated the message. A general
cry came up from the group as they left in a huff.”); Linda M. Clemmons, Conflicted
Missions: Faith, Disputes, and Deception on the Dakota Frontier 182 (2014)
(endnote omitted) (“Although the distribution [of treaty annuities] traditionally
occurred in June, the money had not arrived by early August. The tension was
compounded by the fact that the Sissetons’ crops had been destroyed by draught and
cutworms, which meant that no reserve was available to feed the large group as they
waited for their annuities.”); David A. Nichols, Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War
Policy and Politics 76-77 (1978) (“The Indian System in Minnesota had always been
extraordinarily corrupt, and it was making life more difficult for the Indians every
year. More immediate factors entered into the situation that resulted in war. . . . [T]he
Sioux were virtually starving due to a crop failure and a delay in the arrival of [treaty]
annuities made matters worse. The hungry Sioux waited at their agencies for nearly
two months. The money arrived the day after the war began.”); Kenneth Carley,
The Dakota War of 1862: Minnesota’s Other Civil War 6 (2d ed. 1976) (“At the
Lower Agency, . . . the [Mdewakanton and Wahpekute] Sioux had received some
supplies early in June [1862] and had returned to their villages to await the annuity
payment. Early in August [Chief] Little Crow obtained the agent’s pledge that more
provisions would be issued to his people. The promise was not kept, and the chief
then demanded that the traders extend further credit. This they refused to do . . . .”);
Ralph K. Andrist, The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indians 27-29
(1964) (“In 1862, the Sioux in Minnesota had two things to show for a little more than
a half century of treaty-making with the United States: a reservation 10 miles wide
and 150 miles long on the Minnesota River, and a deep and smoldering resentment
over years of having been swindled. . . . In all land cession dealings, the white men
were able to avoid any temptation to be honest and honorable, and carefully arranged
that the Sioux came out the small end of the funnel each time with nothing left but
resentment.”); Winifred W. Barton, John P. Williamson: A Brother to the Sioux 5556 (1919) (“[According to the Rev. John P. Williamson, Presbyterian missionary among
the Dakota Indians in Minnesota in 1862,] [i]t was . . . the desperation of hunger and
impending starvation which drove [the Indians’] leaders to seize the only available
supplies, and to put the storekeepers out of the way as a means of accomplishing
their purpose. After blood had been shed, one thing followed another.”); Doane
Robinson, A History of the Dakota or Sioux Indians 256 (Ross & Haines, Inc. 1956)
(1904) (“[I]n a large measure [the causes which made this massacre possible] may be
attributed to dissatisfaction growing out of sale of the lands of the Santees under the
treaties of Mendota and Traverse des Sioux and the application of the moneys due the
Indians under those treaties; but there were many other contributing causes.”); Helen
Jackson, A Century of Dishonor: A Sketch of the United States Government’s
Dealings with Some of the Indian Tribes 163 (1880) (“Early in August [1862] some
bands of the Upper Sioux [i.e., Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota Indians], who
had been waiting at their agency nearly two months for their annuity payments, and
had been suffering greatly for food during that time—so much so that ‘they dug up
roots to appease their hunger, and when corn was turned out to them they devoured
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(“Walks Among”) and Iyasamani (“Yelling Walker”),182 were among
the 303 Dakota Indians convicted and sentenced to death by a U.S. military commission for allegedly participating in the war.183 Both escaped
it uncooked, like wild animals’—became desperate, and broke into the Government
warehouse, and took some of the provisions stored there. This was the real beginning
of the outbreak . . . .”).
182
An indispensable resource for researching genealogical information—including
U.S. census rolls, probate records, marriage licenses, birth and death certificates, and
church registries—for Santee Dakota people is a Facebook community website,
“Santee Sioux Genealogy,” administered by genealogist Vicky Valenta. See Santee
Sioux Genealogy, Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/Santee.Sioux.Genealogy.
Facsimiles of documents available at this website have been especially helpful in
enabling me to trace and confirm my own Dakota ancestry farther back than my
grandparents’ and great-grandparents’ generations.
183
See Chomsky, supra note 144, at 28 (“Of the 392 men tried, the Commission
convicted 323. Of those convicted, the Commission sentenced 303 to be hanged;
only 20 were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The Commission acquitted
the remaining 69 prisoners.”); see also John Isch, The Dakota Trials: The 18621864 Military Commission Trials 134-35 (2013) (trial record of “E-a-sha-mane
[Iyasamani],” Case #99); id. at 301-02 (trial record of “Chan-o-mane [Ehnamani],”
Case #293). Professor Isch’s book is an invaluable, meticulously documented and
annotated compilation of the unedited transcripts of the 1862-1864 trials of Dakota
and Winnebago Indians in Minnesota; and in the book’s “Introductory Notes to
the Transcriptions,” id. at 21-27, the author elaborates on the intrinsic difficulties
encountered by researchers, past and present, in attempting to accurately determine
the names of many of the Indian defendants who were prosecuted at the trials, including
“legibility issues and variant spellings” as well as the fact that “it was not unusual
for a Dakota to have several names or even to change his or her name over time,”
id. at 24. Fortunately, information in a table titled “Dakota Prisoners Pardoned in 1866
at Davenport,” id. at 581, is crucial in establishing the true identity of “Chan-o-mane,”
Case #293, as Ehnamani. See id. at 583, 585 (citing a 1908 Court of Claims document
as showing “Chnamane” to be a variant spelling, or erroneous transcription, of
“Ehnamane” [“Ehnamani”], the name of pardoned prisoner no. 117); see also Nat’l
Archives Microfilm Publications, Microcopy No. 234, Letters Received by the Off. of
Indian Aff., St. Peter’s Agency, 1866-1867, Roll 765 (“Copy–List of Indian Prisoners
confined at Camp Kearney, Davenport[,] Iowa, January 20th, 1866”) (on file with
author) (list attested by Assistant Adjutant General William Atwood accompanying
Mar. 15, 1866 letter from Assistant Adjutant General Edward D. Townsend to James
Harlan, Secretary of the Interior, showing “Ehnamani,” age 40, as prisoner no. 117, with
“To be hung” stated to be the “Term of imprisonment”). Accordingly, the speculation
that Case #99 (“E-a-sha-mane”) may refer to Artemas Ehnamani, see Isch, supra,
at 135, is mistaken, since Case #293 (“Chan-o-mane”), see id. at 301-02, is Ehnamani’s
trial record instead. Moreover, while the biographical details regarding Ehnamani,
see id. at 135, are mostly accurate (albeit associated with a different defendant and
trial record), it was not Ehnamani (“Walks Among”) but a different convicted and
incarcerated Dakota Indian, Iyasamani (“Yelling Walker”), who “was pardoned by
Lincoln in April 1864,” id.; see also id. at 449 (showing “Iyasamani” as one of the
names listed in President Lincoln’s pardon order of April 30, 1864); infra note 192
and accompanying text. The irony of this inadvertent conflating of the identities of
Ehnamani and Iyasamani is that each of them is a great-great-grandfather of mine—
Ehnamani being the maternal grandfather, and Iyasamani the paternal grandfather,
of my own maternal grandmother Cora Mitchell Trudell, who is properly mentioned
as being one of the grandchildren of Artemas Ehnamani and his wife Rebecca Frazier
(Winyanhiyayewin, or “Passing-By Woman”), my great-great-grandmother, see Isch,
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execution by virtue of their names not being included on the list of 39
Dakota Indians whose death sentences were confirmed by President
Abraham Lincoln.184 One of the 39 received a last-minute reprieve,185 but
on December 26, 1862, the remaining 38 condemned Dakota prisoners
on Lincoln’s list were hanged simultaneously on a massive scaffold in
Mankato, Minnesota, the largest mass execution in U.S. history.186
My two ancestors, then, were among the 265 condemned-but-not-
executed men who were sent to be incarcerated indefinitely187 in April
supra, at 135.
For a provocative and persuasive argument that the military commission that tried
and convicted the accused Dakota Indians was “not intend[ed] . . . as a replacement
for a court of law, but rather, as a proxy for the battlefield,” see Maeve Herbert
[Glass], Explaining the Sioux Military Commission of 1862, 40 Colum. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 743, 746 (2009). Professor Glass elaborates:
[Colonel Henry Hastings] Sibley convened the commission only after the
traditional means of military reprisals were found to be unavailable. In Sibley’s
view, had he simply had more cavalry when the Sioux attacked him in late
September, he could have lawfully killed two-thirds of the hostile Indians
without any process whatsoever. . . . By deploying a military commission, Sibley
estimated that he could kill roughly the same number of Sioux. And, indeed,
by November 5, 1862, a little over a month after he determined that continued
pursuit was impossible, the commission accomplished a feat that would have
been impossible on the battlefield: it had sentenced 303 prisoners to death.
....
. . . [President Lincoln’s] handling of the review process suggests that he, like
the commanders in the field, did not view the commission as an adjudicatory
forum intended to replicate a court-martial or a criminal tribunal.
Id. at 776-77, 778 (footnotes omitted); see also Michael S. Green, Lincoln and Native
Americans 86 (2021) (endnote omitted) (“Sibley . . . may have seen [the military
commission trials] as another step in defeating the Dakota because further attacks on
them were difficult, given such factors as manpower and weather.”).
184
See Carley, supra note 181, at 73 (“The names of the thirty-nine Sioux to be
executed at Mankato were carefully written by President Lincoln himself on executive
mansion stationery.”); see also Lincoln’s Execution List, The U.S.-Dakota War
of 1862, Minn. Hist. Soc’y, https://www.usdakotawar.org/history/multimedia/lincolnsexecution-list (facsimile of list of condemned Dakota prisoners). For a discussion of
President Lincoln’s handling of the question whether to allow the execution of all 303
of the condemned Santee Dakota Indians, see generally Paul Finkelman, “I Could Not
Afford to Hang Men for Votes”: Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the
Dakota Pardons, 39 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 405 (2013).
185
See Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 163-64 (endnote omitted) (“Thirty-eight men
would hang—after issuing his original order, Lincoln had lowered the number by one,
commuting a death sentence on the testimony of the missionary Thomas Williamson,
who personally investigated the man’s case and argued for his innocence of war
crimes.”).
186
See Anderson, supra note 181, at 258-62 (describing execution by hanging of 38
Santee Dakota prisoners and legal developments during the week preceding the mass
execution); Chomsky, supra note 144, at 33-37 (same).
187
See Mary Lethert Wingerd, North Country: The Making of Minnesota 332
(2010) (noting that President Lincoln “ordered the convicted men to indefinite prison
terms at Camp McClellan near Davenport, Iowa”); Nichols, supra note 181, at 127
(“[Lincoln] ordered the permanent incarceration of the pardoned in conditions that led
to more deaths than the hangings.”); see also Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 174 (“In April
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1863 at Camp Kearney, the Dakota war prisoners’ stockade adjacent
to Camp McClellan, the larger prison at Davenport, Iowa for captured
Confederate soldiers, a facility that also served as a Union Army hospital and training camp.188 While confined at Camp Kearney—located on
the west bank of the Mississippi River across from Rock Island (known
today as Arsenal Island), Illinois, and called Wiʹtawakaŋ, or “Sacred
Island,” by the Indians189—more than one hundred of the Dakota war
prisoners perished between 1863 and 1866.190 My great-great-grandfather
[1863], the Indians reprieved by Lincoln were removed from Mankato, shackled, and
put aboard a steamboat bound down the Minnesota River to Saint Paul. From there,
they were shipped down the Mississippi to a military camp in Davenport, Iowa.”). The
Indians who had been condemned to be executed but who had not been hanged at
Mankato remained “under the sentence of death” for the duration of their imprisonment
at Davenport. See infra note 192 (quoting from an annotation in volume 7 of the
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln); see also Linda M. Clemmons, Dakota in Exile:
The Untold Stories of Captives in the Aftermath of the U.S.-Dakota War 65 (2019)
(“Although these prisoners had been spared from hanging in December, they remained
worried that they would eventually suffer the same fate. General Sibley stoked their
fears, emphatically stating that the majority of prisoners should be hanged.”).
188
See Isch, supra note 183, at 444 (“New buildings were constructed [in an area
divided apart from Camp McClellan, a military base in Davenport, Iowa] and a
fence built around what became Camp Kearney. The name ‘Camp Kearney’ was used
infrequently in the press; most people continued to call it Camp McClellan. But after
[Major General John] Pope divided them, they were indeed two different camps.”).
For an extended discussion of Dakota people’s experience of incarceration at the
Davenport prison, see Clemmons, supra note 187, at 63-90.
189
See An Experiment of Faith: The Journey of the Mdewakanton Dakota Who Settled
on the Bend in the River—A Brief History of the Organization and Construction
of the First Presbyterian Church, Flandreau, South Dakota (2003) (section titled
“Exile, Reflection and Change”), https://fsst-nsn.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
fsst_experiment_of_faith_2015.pdf (“The four-day journey [in April 1863] down the
Mississippi, with periodic stops to take on wood, would take them to the location
known by the Dakota as Witawakan ‘sacred island or Rock Island.’”); cf. John P.
Williamson, An English-Dakota School Dictionary: Waṡicun ka Dakota Ieska
Wowapi 183 (1902) (translating “Rock Island” as “Wiʹtawakaŋ”).
190
See Stephen Return Riggs, Dakota Grammar, Texts, and Ethnography 217
(James Owen Dorsey ed., 1893), reprinted in 9 Contributions to N. Am.
Ethnology 217 (J.W. Powell ed., 1893) [hereinafter “Riggs, Dakota Grammar, Texts,
and Ethnography”] (“More than one hundred [Dakota prisoners at Davenport by
October 1865] had died since their first imprisonment. And the white doctor, who
was appointed to treat their sick, cared not whether they died or lived. Indeed, they
thought he would rather have them die. When a good many of them were sick and
dying with smallpox, he had been heard to say that his Dakota patients were doing
very well!”). Notably, this description of the neglect and abuse suffered by the Dakota
prisoners at Davenport appears in a chapter of the Presbyterian missionary Riggs’s
1893 book that is dedicated primarily to summarizing the life and Dakota ministry
of my great-great-grandfather, the Reverend Artemas Ehnamani, who had been one
of the prisoners. See id. at 214-18 (chapter titled “The Superhuman”); see also infra
note 191 and accompanying text. In his 1880 autobiography Riggs further described
conditions at the Davenport prison, where he twice visited the Dakota prisoners:
[W]ithin the stockade, where the prisoners were kept, the houses were of the
most temporary kind, through the innumerable crevices of which blew the
winter winds and storms. Only a limited amount of wood was furnished them,
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which, in the cold windy weather, was often consumed by noon. Then the
Indians were under the necessity of keeping warm, if they could, in the straw
and under their worn blankets.
In these circumstances, many would naturally fall sick, go into decline,—
pulmonary consumption, for which their scrofulous bodies had a liking,—and
die. The hospital was generally well filled with such cases. The death rate was
very large—more than ten per cent, each year, making about 120 deaths while
they were confined at that place.
Stephen R. Riggs, Mary and I: Forty Years with the Sioux 221-22 (1880) [hereinafter
“Riggs, Mary and I”]; see also Michael Simon, Translator’s Preface, in Clifford
Canku & Michael Simon, The Dakota Prisoner of War Letters: Dakota Kaŝkapi
Okicize Wowapi xiii (2013) (noting that Riggs’s estimate of 120 deaths “may have
included the deaths of others who were captured after the war and brought to camp”);
31 Cong. Rec. 1663 (1898) (reprinting Jan. 3, 1896 affidavit testimony of Santee Sioux
Indian Joseph Kitto, Sr.) (“Affiant further states that he is one of the men who was
sentenced to be imprisoned at Davenport, Iowa, for a term of four years, and while
there there were over 100 deaths [that] occurred among the prisoners on account
of hard usage and improper diet.”). Another Presbyterian missionary among the
Indians, Thomas Williamson, “stayed with the Dakota” during the early months of
their imprisonment at Camp Kearney and
was allowed to view the prisoners from above the enclosure. He noticed that
they “looked very badly. . . . The confinement and hot weather was very detrimental to their health, which pleases [the commander] who wishes them to die
of sickness seeing he cannot hang them.” . . . The sick received little assistance
from the camp doctor, who, according to Williamson, also wished their deaths.
....
[In] autumn of 1864 . . . the soldiers played a cruel trick on the prisoners. The
soldiers told the prisoners that new stoves would soon arrive, so they ought to
remove the old ones. But as the cold settled on Davenport, the prisoners were
still without the new stoves. Upon realizing that the soldiers had duped them
into a scheme that presaged their freezing to death, the prisoners sought and
recovered their old stoves. The incident was a cruel reminder that many would
soon die or fall sick from the cold.
Sarah-Eva E. Carlson, They Tell Their Story: The Dakota Internment at Camp McClellan
in Davenport, 1862-1866, 63 Annals of Iowa 251, 262-63, 269 (2004) (footnotes
omitted), https://doi.org/10.17077/0003-4827.10819; see also Canku & Simon, supra, at
72-73 (Dakota-to-English translation of letter from Dakota prisoner Robert Hopkins,
Oct. 24, 1864) (“Then this winter some of us will probably freeze to death, we are
thinking. Throw those iron stoves outside, they said. And the Dakotas said, ‘Probably
they will give us different ones,’ and they threw out all the stoves, but it got cold and once
again they took the stoves back inside.”). Professor Isch offers yet another perspective
on the hardship imposed on the Dakota prisoners at Davenport, a “picture . . . given by
a former soldier who described how the camp was cleaned and supplied with firewood.”
Isch, supra note 183, at 445. According to the soldier, the U.S. government
“compelled [the Indian prisoners] under strong guard to perform all the drudgery that could be invented in and about Camp McClellan where our drafted
men had their barracks. It was the duty of the redskins to sweep the camp of the
boys in blue with brooms made out of hazelbrush or twigs, or whatever would
make a clumsy broom, and the order of sweeping must be done in military
style. The redskins were placed with their rude brooms in a straight line, and
then in regular order, compelled to sweep till the whole camp was gone over,
and the sweepings carried to a dump outside the camp. This was not all that
was required of them. The camp must be supplied with wood for cooking purposes. Back of the camp on the river bank was a woodyard about 80 rods [440
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Ehnamani—the maternal grandfather of my grandmother Cora Mitchell
Trudell—remained imprisoned there until April 1866, when all of the surviving Dakota prisoners were granted remission of their death sentences
and released by order of President Andrew Johnson.191
My grandmother’s paternal grandfather Iyasamani—my other
great-great-grandfather—was released from prison earlier, when President
Lincoln issued an order on April 30, 1864, listing 25 Dakota “Indian prisoners
yards] distant. A steep hill was between camp and woodyard, and up the hill the
Indians were compelled to carry the wood to supply the entire camp which at
this time was occupied by several thousand of the boys in blue. This pack train
reminded this writer of the pack trains that we read of in ancient Asia, the only
difference is in the latter being carried by mules and camels while the former
named carried the wood under the supposed name of men.”
Id. (quoting Levi Wagoner, Camp McClellan and the Redskins, 5 Annals of Jackson
Cty. Iowa 19, 20 (1907-1908)); see also Linda M. Clemmons, “The young folks [want]
to go in and see the Indians”: Davenport Citizens, Protestant Missionaries, and Dakota
Prisoners of War, 1863-1866, 77 Annals of Iowa 121, 133 (2018) (footnotes omitted),
https://pubs.lib.uiowa.edu/annals-of-iowa/article/id/8539/ (“The trauma and indignities
associated with the ‘Indian prison’ continued even after death. Soldiers buried the
deceased men in unmarked graves just outside the Indian prison. . . . [M]embers of the
public—including a prominent dentist—dug up the Dakota graves looking for ‘relics,’
just as their relatives’ bodies had been exhumed following the hangings at Mankato. The
grave robbers, however, were disappointed to find that most of the Dakota prisoners
‘had been buried without anything,’ so they ‘found nothing but bones.’”).
191
See Chomsky, supra note 144, at 40 (citation omitted) (“Finally, on March 22, 1866,
President Johnson ordered remission of the sentences of death and release of the 177
remaining prisoners.”). My great-great-grandfather’s name is included in the list of
“Indians Pardoned at Davenport, Iowa,” in Marion P. Satterlee, A Detailed Account
of the Massacre by the Dakota Indians of Minnesota in 1862, at 97, 101 (1923) (listing
“Ehna-mani” or “Walks amongst,” age 40, as pardoned Dakota prisoner no. 117). See also
Isch, supra note 183, at 581, 583 (listing “Ehnamani” in table of “Dakota Prisoners
Pardoned in 1866 at Davenport”). While incarcerated at Mankato in the winter of 18621863, awaiting his fate, Ehnamani underwent a Christian religious conversion that he
“explained . . . in terms of a vision experience,” an event that he “concluded . . . was a
supernatural visitation.” Bonnie Sue Lewis, Creating Christian Indians: Native Clergy
in the Presbyterian Church 34 (2003); cf. Anderson, supra note 181, at 270 (“[T]he
revival at the Mankato prison swelled to include three quarters of the Dakota men who
were incarcerated. The population included 326 men, 257 of whom were still condemned
to death.”). Professor Bonnie Sue Lewis writes: “When the [Davenport] prisoners were
released in 1866 to rejoin their families on the Santee Reservation on the Niobrara River
in Nebraska, Ehnamani and Titus Ichaduze, another Dakota who had been imprisoned
with Ehnamani, were licensed to preach.” Lewis, supra, at 44. As the founding pastor
of Santee’s “Pilgrim [Presbyterian] Church, made up of nearly 300 former prisoners
and their families,” the Reverend Artemas Ehnamani “found that Christianity offered
a means of transforming his life. He accepted the challenge and remained pastor . . . [for
35 years] until his death in [1902].” Id.; see also Stephen R. Riggs, Tah′-koo Wah-kan′:
The Gospel Among the Dakotas 424-25 (1869) (describing the election of Ehnamani in
the summer of 1867 to serve as Pilgrim Church’s pastor and spiritual guide); Pardoned
by Lincoln: Life Work of an Indian—How a Sioux Fighting Man Condemned to Death
by the Whites, Became a Powerful Teacher Among His People—Extraordinary Career
of Artemas Ehnamani in Minnesota, South Dakota and Nebraska, Minneapolis J.,
Sept. 19, 1903, https://newspapers.mnhs.org/jsp/PsImageViewer.jsp?doc_id=4b0d4236188b-40ad-be89-7fd727b9dc91%2Fmnhi0031%2F1DFY7Q5A%2F03091901.
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now in confinement at Camp McClellan near Davenport” and directing, in
Lincoln’s handwriting and above his signature: “The persons named on this
list are pardoned and ordered to be sent to their families or relatives.”192
Iyasamani, who was of the Wahpeton band of Santee Dakota Indians,
eventually settled with his second wife among other Sisseton-Wahpeton
people in Dakota Territory, joining in the work of the Dakota scouts and
serving as a presbyter in the Dakota Indian ministry of the Mayasan

See Order for Pardon of Sioux Indians, Apr. 30, 1864 (“List of Indian prisoners
now in confinement at Camp McClellan near Davenport Iowa pardoned and to be
liberated and sent to their families”), reprinted in 7 Collected Works of Abraham
Lincoln 325-26 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), https://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/
lincoln7/1:722?rgn=div1;view=fulltext; see also List of Sioux Indians pardoned by
Lincoln; endorsed by Abraham Lincoln, Apr. 30, 1864 (facsimile), Abraham Lincoln
papers: Series 1, General Correspondence, 1833 to 1916, https://www.loc.gov/item/
mal3271200 (manuscript/mixed material). An annotation in the Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln recounts the instrumental role of Presbyterian missionary Thomas
Williamson in facilitating the presidential pardons:
Reverend Thomas S. Williamson, missionary to the Sioux, had written to Lincoln
on April 27, assigning reasons for pardoning the Sioux imprisoned at Davenport,
Iowa, since November, 1862, under sentence of death. Lincoln submitted the letter
to [Commissioner of Indian Affairs] William P. Dole, who answered on April 28:
“I have read the letter of the Rev. Mr Williamson to you asking the pardon
of certain Indians now under the sentence of death at Davenport and wish to
say . . . that I do not believe any injury will accrue to the white people if you should
exercise the pardoning power in favour of a portion of these people and I have so
much confidence in . . . Mr. Williamson that I have no hesitancy in uniting in his
recommendation in favor of the particular persons named by him. . . .”
7 Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, supra, at 326 n.1 (omissions in original),
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/l/lincoln/lincoln7/1:722?rgn=div1;view=fulltext.
Professor Carol Chomsky notes the continuing hardship suffered by the pardoned
prisoners after their release from incarceration:
Despite the official pardons, these and other pardoned Dakota had difficulty returning to their families. Once released, the men apparently were not eligible to
receive further supplies from the Army and had no way to support themselves
locally or to travel to reunite with their families. If they could somehow provision themselves for that journey, they were then in danger of being killed on
the trip. Three prisoners were held as long as eight months after being pardoned
because no provision was made for them once released.
Chomsky, supra note 144, at 40 n.158 (citations omitted). For a news story about
my research regarding Iyasamani’s imprisonment at Camp Kearney and President
Lincoln’s pardon order, see Alma Gaul, Sioux descendant visits area of Davenport prison,
Quad City Times, July 23, 2017, https://qctimes.com/news/opinion/editorial/columnists/
alma-gaul/sioux-descendant-visits-area-of-davenport-prison/article_6192abf4-7959500d-9495-dee627512cbe.html.
192
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Presbyterian Church at Sisseton193 until his death in August 1889.194 Thus,
my great-great-grandfather Iyasamani, whom President Lincoln expressly
pardoned, was among the original recipients of Indian land allotments
from within the Lake Traverse Reservation, established by treaty in 1867
as the permanent homeland for the Sisseton-Wahpeton people.195
An additional ancestral connection that deepens my appreciation
of the true historical events crucial to the DeCoteau case is the parental
guardianship role, in my family’s history, undertaken by a Mdewakanton
Dakota Indian scout named Mahpiyawakonze (“Influences the
Clouds”)196 who helped raise my great-grandfather Vines Mitchell in
In his 1880 autobiography the missionary Stephen R. Riggs noted the relationship
between communities of Indian scouts and the Christian churches that began
flourishing among the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota following the U.S.-Dakota War:
The families of these Sioux scouts were sent out to the frontier, and maintained
by the government, not only during that summer [of 1863], but for several years.
This was known as the “Scout’s Camp,” and the church among them was called by
the same name, until 1869, when several churches were formed out of this one, as
they began to scatter and settle down on the new Sisseton Reservation.
Riggs, Mary and I, supra note 190, at 198; see also Black Thunder et al., supra
note 137, at 25 (noting that during the summers of 1866 through 1868 missionaries
Stephen R. Riggs and Thomas S. Williamson “visited new Indian churches, known
as the Scout Camps, located throughout the territory that would soon become the
Sisseton Reservation”).
194
Details regarding my ancestors’ involvement in events of the U.S.-Dakota War are
derived from documents available at the Santee Sioux Genealogy website, see supra
note 182, as well as probate records, depositions, and trial testimony, on file with
the author, in early-twentieth-century litigation pursued by my great-grandfather
Vines Pisyedan Mitchell in the matter of the estate of his father, Iyasamani, my
great-great-grandfather. The name transcribed as “Pisyedan” in litigation documents
referring to Vines P. Mitchell appears to be a contracted form of “piś-piʹ-źe-daŋ,” a
Dakota word meaning “wrinkled.” See Stephen Return Riggs, A Dakota-English
Dictionary 423 (James Owen Dorsey ed., 1890), reprinted in 7 Contributions to N. Am.
Ethnology 423 (J.W. Powell ed., 1890) (translating and defining “piś-piʹ-źe-daŋ” as
“adj. wrinkled or shrivelled, as one’s hands from being long in water”).
195
See supra note 194; see also H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 42, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., at 22 (1875)
(schedule of allotments of land in severalty assigned to members of the Sisseton and
Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians residing on the Lake Traverse Indian reservation)
(showing “I-ya-xa-ma-ni [Iyasamani]” as name of allottee for allotment no. 185); 1867
Census of Lake Traverse Indians (Sisseton), Taken by Charles Crawford and Samuel J.
Brown, Oct. 3, 1867, Joseph and Samuel Brown Papers, Minn. Hist. Soc’y, Microfilm Roll 5
(on file with author) [hereinafter “1867 Lake Traverse Census”] (showing “Iyasamani”
on 4th unnumbered page of handwritten census list of Lake Traverse Indians); see also
Black Thunder et al., supra note 137, at 63 (showing “Iyaza Mani [Iyasamani]” on list
of people U.S. Indian Agent Charles Crissey “reported in 1882 . . . had purchased farm
implements within the past five years with money they had earned”).
196
The life of Mahpiyawakonze is discussed in Carolyn Ruth Anderson, Dakota Identity
in Minnesota, 1820-1995, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, UMI No. 9727903, https://
www.proquest.com/docview/304367268/63CF3147D8E6485EPQ/1?accountid=14613
(Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1997). Professor Anderson writes:
A Dakota named Mahpiyawakonze, known to the whites as “Indian John”
(a common name attributed to Indian men), John Wakonze, or John Police was
one of the scouts enlisted to guard the frontier following the [U.S.-Dakota] Conflict. . . . During the Conflict Mahpiyawakonze rescued a mother and her four
193
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children, whom he protected for four weeks. The woman was the quarter-blood
daughter of the former Dakota agent at Fort Snelling, Lawrence Taliaferro. He was
seriously wounded by the butt of a rifle to his chest, damaging a lung, in the process
of rescuing a family. After the Conflict he was employed along with his brother as
a scout. On a scouting expedition sometime during 1862-1864 they were caught in
a snowstorm on the prairie, and Mahpiyawakonze suffered permanently damaging
frostbite to his arms and legs. He never recovered completely from the chest injury
or the freezing, becoming nearly incapacitated at the end of his life.
....
. . . Just before his death, through the efforts of white supporters in the community, he was awarded a military pension of fifteen dollars per month, which
was then transferred to his widow, Lucy (Tateiyayewin). They had no children
who survived them.
Id. at 223-24 (citations omitted); see also Jane Lamm Carroll, “Who Was Jane
Lamont?”: Anglo-Dakota Daughters in Early Minnesota, Minn. Hist., Spring 2005,
at 184, 191 (endnote omitted), http://collections.mnhs.org/mnhistorymagazine/
articles/59/v59i05p184-196.pdf (“In an 1888 affidavit, Mary [Taliaferro] . . . credited
a Mdewakanton Dakota man, Mahpiyawakonze (Indian John), with rescuing and
protecting her family, which now numbered four children. Mary, who apparently was
a skilled healer, had treated Mahpiyawakonze for serious injuries sustained in the
struggle and nursed him later that year after he almost froze to death on a scouting
expedition for General Sibley.”).
In 1885, Mahpiyawakonze testified for the U.S. government in litigation implicating
the corruption and greed of the traders among the Santee Dakota at the start of the
1862 U.S.-Dakota War, and he included testimony about the infamous provocation
uttered by trader Andrew J. Myrick. See In the Matter of the Claims of Nathan Myrick
et al. vs. The United States, for Goods and Supplies Furnished the Sioux Indians at
Upper and Lower Agencies in Minnesota, between the First Day of June, 1861, and the
Outbreak of Said Indians, in August, 1862, at 1, 50-52, Images 393, 444-46 (testimony
for the United States of “Marpiy-Wakunza [Mahpiyawakonze],” Aug. 1, 1885), Nat’l
Archives Recs. of the Bureau of Indian Aff. Microfilm Publication M574, Microfilm
Roll 75, Spec. File 274, available in digitized form at https://www.familysearch.org/
search/catalog/362686?availability=Family%20History%20Library). In a sworn state
ment, Mahpiyawakonze said that the traders “didn’t want to give credit to the Indians
from that time after the spring hunt” in 1862. Id. at 50, Image 444. He added:
Those lower Indians, they were starving, and a party went up to Fort Ridgely
to see an officer. Before they went to see the officer they went up to some store
and the store trader told the Indians to eat grass, and they went to Fort Ridgely
to make this complaint. They asked the officer if they could help those poor
Indians and they said there was an agent out there, and they could get some
help there[.] Several of those were sick.
Id. at 51, Image 445.
An intriguing observation is that Mahpiyawakonze’s name appears as one of the
names on the list of “two hundred and nine Indians,” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 8 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan), who allegedly signed
the 1889 Agreement, ratified by Congress in 1891, which permitted “the purchase and
release of the surplus lands in the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation,” id. at 1, and
which is the subject of the Supreme Court’s reservation disestablishment decision in
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975). See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 14 (listing “Marpingawakonze [Mahpiyawakonze] (his x mark)” as one of
the male adult Dakota Indians who “consent[ed] and agree[d] to all the stipulations,
conditions, and provisions . . . contained” in the 1889 Agreement). The difficulty with
the list’s inclusion of this name and “x mark” is that the Dakota signatories began
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Minnesota from age four to eighteen, between the years 1862 and 1876.197
Vines was born at Redwood Village (Lower Sioux Agency) in 1858—the
year Minnesota became a state—the son of Iyasamani and his first wife
Wasteyadan (“Little Good One”), my great-great-grandmother.198 After
the Indians were defeated in the U.S.-Dakota War, Wasteyadan, who
was in her mid-twenties, and her four-year-old son (known only as Hepi,
the Dakota name given to a third-born child, if male)199 were among the
approximately 1700 Indians forced into confinement at Fort Snelling,200 a
signing the agreement on December 13, 1889, see id. at 29 (report of councils with
Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (noting that “[a]t 12:25 [p.m.] signing the agreement
began by Simons [Simon Anawangmani, or “Walks Galloping On”] signing first”),
whereas Mahpiyawakonze had died the previous year, on September 20, 1888.
See “Indian John” Dead, St. Paul Daily Globe, Sept. 21, 1888, https://www.newspapers.
com/clip/20700750/native-american-hastings-mn/ (“‘Indian John,’ whose real name is
Mah-pe-ah-wa-ko-sia [Mahpiyawakonze], the Sioux brave who aided in saving the
lives of many people during the Indian outbreak and war in this state in 1862, and who
afterward served the United States as a scout, died last night of lockjaw attributed to a
nail running into his foot several days ago. His age was over seventy years.”).
197
See supra note 194.
198
See supra note 194. Wasteyadan was the daughter of my great-great-greatgrandfather Sakehota (“Grey Claws”) and Wakaninajinwin (“Stands Sacred” or “Stands
Like a Spirit”), my great-great-great-grandmother, who was one of the daughters of the
renowned Mdewakanton Dakota chief Mahpiyawicasta (“Cloud Man,” born between
1785 and 1795), my great-great-great-great-grandfather. See Mark Diedrich, A “Good
Man” in a Changing World: Cloud Man, the Dakota Leader, and His Life and Times,
36 Ramsey Cty. Hist. 4, 5, 7 (2001); see also id. at 21 (“ . . . Cloud Man and most of his
relatives surrendered to General Henry Sibley at Camp Release [at the end of the U.S.Dakota War of 1862] . . . . About 1,300 of the surrendered Dakota were brought down to
Fort Snelling. . . . Living conditions were deplorable and diseases spread quickly in the
crowded lodges. During the winter [of 1862-1863], about 130 people died, particularly of
measles, and Cloud Man was among them.”).
199
See Riggs, Dakota Grammar, Texts, and Ethnography, supra note 190, at 208
(“[I]f the first born is a boy, his inherited name is ‘Ćaske,’ and the second child, if a
boy, will be called ‘He-paŋ;’ and the third, ‘He-pi;’ and the fourth, Ća-taŋ;’ and the fifth,
‘Ha-ke.’ Some children have no other names given them, and wear these alone when
they are grown up.”).
200
See Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 172 (noting that “seventeen hundred Dakotas—
mainly women and children—were confined in Fort Snelling, outside Saint
Paul”). Among the confined Indians were some of the “friendly” Dakota who had
collaborated with U.S. forces to help end the U.S.-Dakota War, including those who
later represented the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota during the 1889 negotiations at
Sisseton Agency. See Corinne L. Monjeau-Marz, The Dakota Indian Internment
at Fort Snelling 1862-1864, at 138-39 (rev’d ed. 2006) (reprinting Rep. of the
Comm’r of Indian Aff. for the Year 1863, at 313, 316) (showing “Michael Renville,”
“Gabriel Renville,” and “Charles Crawford” as heads of families of six, eight, and
one, respectively, in “the census of the Indian camp” at Fort Snelling, Dec. 2, 1862,
as reported by Lieutenant William McKusick, “Superintendent of Indian Camp”);
see also Fort Snelling Concentration Camp Dakota Prisoners, 28 Am. Indian Q.
170, 174 (2004) (showing “Michael Renville,” “Gabriel Renville,” and “Charles
Crawford” as heads of families of six, eight, and one, respectively, in list of heads of
families at Fort Snelling, as compiled by U.S. Army on Dec. 2, 1862); Anderson, supra
note 160, at 41 (endnote omitted) (“[J]ust before the steamboats left for Crow Creek
in May 1863, [Gabriel] Renville recruited a number of ‘friendly’ Dakotas to join him
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U.S. military fort near St. Paul, Minnesota,201 where almost the entire population of Santee Dakota women, children, and elderly men in the state
endured rampant disease, exposure, mental distress, and hunger, and suffered many fatalities, in one of America’s earliest concentration camps.202
Fearing that Hepi, who had fallen ill, would die in the Fort Snelling
internment camp, Wasteyadan asked a Catholic priest, Father Augustin
Ravoux, to baptize him;203 the priest did so, giving the boy the name Vines.204
[in the corps of Indian scouts organized by General Henry H. Sibley] . . . . A list was
quickly established that exempted some twenty-three men and their dependents from
deportation to Crow Creek.”); cf. Robinson, supra note 181, at 348 (“Most, if not all
of the Sissetons and Wahpetons who remained in Minnesota after the battle of Wood
Lake [at the conclusion of the U.S.-Dakota War] volunteered under General Sibley as
scouts during the ensuing war.”).
201
See Monjeau-Marz, supra note 200, at 136 (reprinting Rep. of the Comm’r of Indian
Aff. for the Year 1863, supra note 200, at 315) (showing “Wastuiaduw [Wasteyadan]”
as head of family of seven in list of heads of families in census of the Indian camp at
Fort Snelling, Dec. 2, 1862); see also Fort Snelling Concentration Camp Dakota Prisoners,
supra note 200, at 173 (showing “Wasteiado [Wasteyadan]” as head of family of seven in
list of heads of families at Fort Snelling, as compiled by U.S. Army on Dec. 2, 1862). See
generally Peter DeCarlo, Fort Snelling at Bdote: A Brief History (2d ed. 2020).
202
See Mark Diedrich, Dakota Oratory: Great Moments in the Recorded Speech
of the Eastern Sioux, 1695-1874, at 81 (1989) (“[O]n November 7[, 1862] Lt. Col.
William R. Marshall [started marching those surrendered Dakota men who were
considered innocent, including the elderly, and the women and children from Redwood
Agency] to Fort Snelling. A large ‘pen’ was erected below the fort on the Minnesota
River to enclose the Dakota camp, which was guarded by soldiers on the perimeter.
Even embittered white visitors were appalled by the terrible conditions in the camp,
finding among other things that the paths between the lodges were ‘the receptacles of
all the offal.’”); Wingerd, supra note 187, at 331 (endnote omitted) (“The biting wind
blew off the river, chilling the internees to the bone. Crowded together on the cold,
damp bottomland, without adequate food or fuel to warm their tipis, the 1,600 Dakotas
confined there had no resistance to outbreaks of mumps, measles, or pneumonia that
infected the camp. The elderly and the young were especially vulnerable. More than 200
Dakotas died over the winter, mainly children and old people.”); cf. John Upton Terrell,
Sioux Trail 177 (1974) (“The remaining Santee [after the mass execution] . . . were
held in concentration camps. Their reservation was taken from them and opened to
white settlement.”). For a detailed study of the Santee Dakota people’s confinement at
Fort Snelling, see generally Monjeau-Marz, supra note 200.
203
See 2 William W. Folwell, A History of Minnesota 254 (1924) (footnote omitted)
(“Little is known of the ministrations of Father Augustin Ravoux in the Indian camp
at Fort Snelling. His own brief statement is that he visited it often and baptized 184
persons, almost all young children.”). Ravoux also had baptized at least 24 of the
condemned Dakota prisoners during the weeks leading to their mass execution at
Mankato on December 26, 1862. See id. at 210-11 & n.37; cf. Clemmons, supra note 181,
at 198 (endnote omitted) (“Thomas Williamson, Father Augustin Ravoux, and Stephen
Riggs were given the opportunity to baptize the condemned prisoners. By the time of
the hangings, twenty-five men had accepted baptism from Father Ravoux, fifteen from
Williamson, and none from Riggs. . . . It is not surprising that the Dakotas did not choose
to entrust their salvation to Riggs. His close association with the government and the
trials clearly lost him what little trust he had gained over the years.”).
204
See supra note 194; see also Monjeau-Marz, supra note 200, at 149, 152 (abstraction
of baptismal registry, 1862-1865 Dakota & Metis Ministry, Church of St. Peter, Mendota,
Minnesota, registry page 103, rec. no. 714, #111) (listing baptism of 4-year-old boy by Father
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When the government then arranged for all of the surviving Santee Dakota
people who were confined at Fort Snelling 205 to be permanently removed
from Minnesota in early 1863,206 Wasteyadan took further action to protect
Augustin Ravoux, Jan. 24, 1863, whose parents are stated to be “Iyoxamani [Iyasamani]”
and “Waxteyahdi marpi win [Wasteyadan]”). The Dakota words “marpi win” after
Wasteyadan’s name are approximations of “mahpiya win” (“cloud woman”), and
probably were included in the baptismal registry to signify her being part of the family
group of her maternal grandfather Chief Cloudman (Mahpiyawicasta), who was
confined along with Wasteyadan and her son Hepi/Vines at Fort Snelling. See supra
note 198; cf. Williamson, supra note 189, at vii, 34, 262 (translating “cloud” as “Maḣpiya”
and “woman” as “wiŋʹyaŋ,” and explaining that “[f]emale proper names very often take
the termination win (contraction of wiŋyaŋ) . . . .”).
205
See Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 174 (“The legislation . . . called for the Dakotas at
Fort Snelling to be deported. Scores had died during a harsh and hungry winter, but a
population of more than 1,450 remained.”).
206
See Meyer, supra note 181, at 140-41 (discussing federal legislation that facilitated
the removal of Santee Dakota people from Minnesota). As Meyer explains, the
legislation desired by “most white Minnesotans” for “the expulsion of the Sioux”
was finally obtained, in the form of two acts, the first approved February 16 and
the second March 3, 1863. The first of these was titled “An Act for the Relief
of Persons for Damages sustained by Reason of Depredations and Injuries by
certain Bands of Sioux Indians” and concerned chiefly the mechanics of paying
the victims of depredations. The first section, however, specifically abrogated all
treaties entered into by the government with the four bands of Santee Sioux and
denied them any further benefits under the terms of these treaties, including all
rights to occupancy of land in the state of Minnesota. The second piece of legislation, titled “An Act for the Removal of the Sisseton, Wahpeton, Medwakanton [Mdewakanton], and Wahpakoota [Wahpekute] Bands of Sioux or Dakota
Indians, and for the disposition of their Lands in Minnesota and Dakota” was
the necessary sequel to the first, which had left the dispossessed bands without a
place to live. The act of March 3 did not specifically designate a future home for
them, but it did call upon the President to assign to them a tract of land, outside
the limits of any state, large enough to provide each member of the tribe willing
to farm with “eighty acres of good agricultural land, the same to be well adapted
to agricultural purposes.” It further provided that the proceeds from the sale of
their former reservation should be invested for their benefit. None of the money
was to be paid directly to the Indians, as under the old system, but it was to be
used to advance them in farming so that they would become self-sustaining. On
the same date, Congress approved an appropriation of $50,016.66 for the removal
of the Sioux and their establishment in their new homes.
Id. (footnotes omitted). A separate congressional bill, enacted into law on February 21,
1863, “call[ed] for the ‘peaceful’ removal of the Winnebagos, who had not, as a tribe,
taken any part in the [1862] uprising.” Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). See generally
William E. Lass, The Removal from Minnesota of the Sioux and Winnebago Indians,
Minn. Hist., Dec. 1963, at 353, http://collections.mnhs.org/MNHistoryMagazine/
articles/38/v38i08p353-364.pdf; Jackson, supra note 181, at 218-56 (book chapter titled
“The Winnebagoes”).
In his 1880 book Our Indian Wards, George W. Manypenny, who chaired the
1876 U.S. commission for obtaining the Indians’ relinquishment of the Black Hills
region of the Great Sioux Reservation, described the government’s removal of the
Santee Dakota Indians “from Minnesota to the Crow Creek agency, on the Missouri
river, about one hundred and fifty miles above Yankton, in the Territory of Dakota.”
Manypenny, supra note 75, at 135. He wrote:
The Sioux were transported from Fort Snelling to Hannibal, Missouri, on
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two steamboats; one of the boats stopped there, and the Indians on it crossed
over to St. Joseph, on the Missouri river, by rail. The other boat continued to
the junction of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers, and thence up the latter to
St. Joseph; and here the Indians that crossed over by rail were put upon the
boat, and from thence to Crow Creek all of them were on one boat. They were
very much crowded from St. Joseph to Crow Creek. Sixteen died on the way,
being without attention or medical supplies. All the Indians were excluded from
the cabin of the boat, and confined to the lower and upper decks. It was in May,
and to go among them on the lower deck was suffocating. They were fed on
hard bread and mess pork, much of it not cooked, there being no opportunity
to cook it, only at night, when the boat laid up. They had no sugar, coffee, or
vegetables. Confinement on the boat, in such a mass, and want of proper food,
created much sickness, such as diarrhea and fevers. For weeks after they arrived
at Crow Creek, the Indians died at the rate of from three to four per day. In a
few weeks, one hundred and fifty had died, mainly on account of the treatment
they received after leaving Fort Snelling.
Id. at 135-36; see also Meyer, supra note 181, at 146 (footnote omitted) (“[Presbyterian
missionary John P. Williamson] described conditions on board the [steamboat] Florence,
saying that ‘when 1300 Indians were crowded like slaves on the boiler and hurricane
decks of a single boat, and fed on musty hardtack and briny pork, which they had not
half a chance to cook, diseases were bred which made fearful havoc during the hot
months, and the 1300 souls that were landed at Crow Creek June 1, 1863, decreased to
one thousand. . . . So were the hills soon covered with graves. The very memory of Crow
Creek became horrible to the Santees, who still hush their voices at the mention of the
name.’”). The subsequent removal of the Indians from Crow Creek to what became the
Santee Sioux Reservation in Nebraska is explained in a letter that was submitted to the
Congressional Record by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1898, in support of a
bill for restoring the treaty annuities that Congress had confiscated and cut off in 1863:
After three years’ trial the lands upon which these Indians were located were
found not to be “well adapted to agricultural purposes,” and steps were therefore taken to relocate them upon lands better adapted to the use of the Indians.
As a result of the Executive order dated February 27, 1866, four townships in
the then Territory of Nebraska were set apart and reserved for the Santee Sioux
Indians, then residing upon the said Crow Creek Reservation.
31 Cong. Rec. 1664 (1898) (reprinting letter from D.M. Browning, Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, as transmitted by M. Hoke Smith, Secretary of the Interior, to the
Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs). The Commissioner delineated three
classes of “the Indians now occupying the Santee Reservation in Nebraska,” as follows:
From office report, dated June 4, 1866, it appears that the Indians occupying
said lands consisted:
(1) Of the Indians who had been located at the Crow Creek Reservation, consisting of old men, women, and children who surrendered to or were captured
by General Sibley in 1863, together with some 75 others who were pardoned by
President Lincoln and sent there about one and one-half years before that time.
(2) Of Sioux Indian prisoners, some 200 in all, who had been confined at
Davenport, Iowa.
(3) Of Sioux Indians from Minnesota who were friendly to the United States
during the outbreak in 1862, and who were then in a destitute condition in that
State.
Id. at 1664-65.
For further discussion of Santee Dakota people’s struggle to survive during their
years at Crow Creek, see Clemmons, supra note 187, at 41-61; Doreen Chaky, Terrible
Justice: Sioux Chiefs and U.S. Soldiers on the Upper Missouri, 1854-1868, at 18397 (2012) (book chapter titled “A Reservation of Desolation”); Colette A. Hyman,

204

IPJLCR

2022:139

Survival at Crow Creek, 1863-1866, Minn. Hist., Winter 2008-2009, at 148, http://
collections.mnhs.org/mnhistorymagazine/articles/61/v61i04p148-161.pdf; see also
Anderson, supra note 181, at 279. Historian Gary Clayton Anderson writes:
Death rates at Crow Creek climbed appreciably by late summer [1863],
mainly from illness and malnutrition. By spring 1864, roughly two hundred had
died, many of them children. While the camp consisted originally of roughly
600 women, 600 children, and 116 men, literally two-thirds of the remaining
people left Crow Creek by spring 1864. By this time, even Dakota Indians knew
that crops could not easily be grown in the rocky soil, which dominated the
landscape around Crow Creek. Worse, the early years of the 1860s had been dry
on the Great Plains, leading to dust storms. . . .
Large numbers of these Mdewakanton Dakota people fled east to join the
scout camp established by Gabriel Renville near Coteau des Prairies, while
others migrated south to Fort Randall, where younger Dakota women p
 rostituted
themselves to the officers and men for food. Crow Creek had become a death
camp with a mere five hundred occupants remaining from the original group of
just over thirteen hundred that had been dropped at the location the year before.
Thus, it took little prompting to convince the Dakota Indians, then spread out
along the Missouri River, to move once again in spring 1866 to new lands at
Santee, Nebraska. Here the Mdewakanton band was fi
 nally reunited, as their
men, released from Davenport, arrived first, with their dependents following.
Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 160, at 65-66 (footnote omitted) (“With six hundred
women at Crow Creek and virtually no eligible men, Dakota women and their children
often went to live with officers or common soldiers at the fort or joined polygamous
arrangements in order to receive rations. The Mdewakanton refugees who reached
the scout camps in 1864 and 1865 were usually led by women. The army had agreed
to give rations—usually half-day rations—to all dependents of scouts, but the amount
consistently fell short. Thus, Gabriel Renville and his scouts had to make one of two
choices—they could turn destitute women away to starve to death or list them on the
rolls as wives, in which case the government would provide some food. The list of more
than a hundred active scouts from 13 September 1864 shows that about half of their
households included more than one woman.”).
Harrowing congressional testimony from 1865 by Santee Dakota victims of
confinement at Crow Creek Agency, as well as contemporaneous first-hand accounts
by U.S. soldiers and agency personnel familiar with conditions there, are appended to
a U.S. Senate report published in 1867. See Condition of the Indian Tribes: Rep. of
the J. Spec. Comm. Appointed Under J. Resol. of Mar. 3, 1865, app. at 401-19 (1867)
[hereinafter “Condition of the Indian Tribes”], https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/
pt?id=hvd.32044051726057&view=1up&seq=5&skin=2021. Mdewakanton Dakota
chief Passing Hail stated:
When the provisions were brought here the agent told us the food was to be
divided between us and the Winnebagoes, and only five sacks of flour were
given us per week through the winter; they were issued to us each Saturday.
They brought beef and piled it up here; they built a box and put the beef in it
and steamed it and made soup; . . . and that is the reason these hills about here
are filled with children’s graves; it seemed as though they wanted to kill us. We
have grown up among white folks, and we know the ways of white folks. White
folks do not eat animals that have died themselves; but the animals that died
here were piled up with the beef here and were fed out to us; and when the
women and children, on account of their great hunger, tried to get the heads,
blood, and entrails, when the butchering was being done, they were whipped
and put in the guard-house. . . . We heard that the agent traded some of our
goods away, and we suppose he traded them for robes and furs. We think if he
had not have traded them away there would have been plenty to go around, and
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the women would not have been crying with cold.
Id., app. at 407 (testimony of Chief Passing Hail). Another Santee Dakota witness
testified:
[The Indians at this agency] have suffered much for both clothing and provisions. . . . At times they have been two days without anything to eat, especially
the women who had no men to provide for them; and most of them were in that
condition at first, as less than a hundred men came here with them. In the fall
or winter of the same year I came a half-breed woman by the name of Moore
starved to death.
....
. . . They had no guns nor horses [to go and hunt], and but few men, and they
were unacquainted with the country. When they got guns along in that winter
[of 1863-1864], . . . they started on a [buffalo] hunt to James river. They were
compelled to pack their wood on their backs as far as the James river, about
60 miles. The reason they went on this hunt is that they were so near starved.
One aged woman became exhausted, and they had to leave her about forty
miles out. They had no provisions to leave with her, and she has never been
seen since.
Id., app. at 405 (testimony of David Faribault). A military surgeon testified further
about the noxious food the U.S. government provided for the Indians at Crow Creek
Agency:
Some time about the middle of the winter a large vat was constructed, of
cottonwood lumber, about six feet square and six feet deep, in connexion with
the steam saw-mill, with a pipe leading from the boiler into the vat. Into the
vat was thrown beef, beef heads, entrails of the beeves, some beans, flour, and
pork. I think there was put into the vat two barrels of flour each time, which
was not oftener than once in twenty-four hours. This mass was then cooked
by the steam from the boiler passing through the pipe into the vat. When that
was done, all the Indians were ordered to come there with their pails and get
it. . . . The Indians would pour off the thinner portion and eat that which settled
at the bottom. As it was dipped out of the vat some of the Indians would get
the thinner portions and some would get some meat. I passed there frequently
when it was cooking, and was often there when it was being issued, and it had a
very offensive odor; it had the odor of the contents of the entrails of the beeves.
I have seen the settlings of the vat after they were through issuing it to the
Indians, when they were cleaning it out, and the settlings smelt like carrion—
like decomposed meat. . . . [T]he quantity of food issued to them per day did
not exceed eight ounces per head for man, woman, and child. . . . The entrails of
the beeves thrown into the vat the Indians said were not washed, and I should
think by the smell that they were not.
....
. . . [The Indians] would pick up the corn left by the horses when fed; they
would eat wolves poisoned by the soldiers; they would skin the wolf for the
sake of the carcass to eat; they also ate the horses that died through the winter.
I mean the horses belonging to the soldiers.
....
. . . No other rations were issued during that time [when rations of soup were
issued from the vat]. Soup from the vat was all they had, and I think it was only
issued every other day.
Id., app. at 401-02 (testimony of Samuel C. Hynes, assistant surgeon, 6th Iowa Cavalry);
see also, e.g., id., app. at 407, 409-10 (testimony of Edward R. Pond, mission teacher of
the Santee Indians at Crow Creek Agency) (“They had but little clothing, not enough
to protect them from the cold. There had been no clothing issued to them for more
than a year. They suffered severely from exposure and want of clothing. . . . One year
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her young son. She entrusted Vines to the care of her aunt Tateiyayewin
(“Gone Wind Woman”) and her aunt’s husband Mahpiyawakonze,207
ago last winter several women and a boy, being very hungry, killed one of the cattle to
eat, and Major [Saint Andre Durand] Balcombe[, U.S. Indian agent for the Winnebagos
at Crow Creek,] put them in a very cold house in very cold weather and kept them
there nearly a week without fire, and day times he took them and had them work round
and fed them on bread and water. On another occasion, while they were slaughtering
the cattle, Balcombe ordered them not to let the women come near where they were
butchering, but some disobeyed and went near to get the blood, when he seized them
there in numbers and put them in a cold house and kept them over night without fire.
One of the women had a baby one week old, which she had left at her house, and
some woman brought it up to be nursed, but Balcombe refused to let it be nursed, but
finally relented and let it go in, and the woman that brought it up gave her one of her
blankets.”); id., app. at 415 (testimony of Rev. John P. Williamson, missionary among the
Santee Indians at Crow Creek Agency) (“For a short time the Winnebago physician
supplied the Santees with medicines, but for a year past no provision has been made
for medicine or medical attention. They very much need and are very desirous to have
a physician; it would be an act of mercy on the part of the government to furnish them
with one.”); see also Clemmons, supra note 187, at 49-50 (endnotes omitted) (“As winter
[1863-1864] approached, . . . Balcombe . . . took official charge of the Dakota side of
Crow Creek . . . . ‘Agent Balcombe,’ John Williamson bluntly stated, ‘hates the Sioux
and has said that they all deserved to starve to death.’ Balcombe’s animosity toward the
Dakota was palpable. He refused to hire an interpreter because ‘he likes it better—they
can’t trouble him too much.’ He also allotted the poorest cattle to the Dakota, reserving
the better animals for his family. This meant that Dakota families often received
‘nothing but heads, and sometimes nothing but entrails and feet.’ After Balcombe
distributed a few sickly cattle to the Dakota, he ordered agency employees to slaughter
the rest and spread out the carcasses to freeze over the winter. Agency workers stacked
the dead animals inside and outside the agency warehouse and covered them with
sawdust. According to Edward Pond, . . . by spring the meat was ‘spoiled and tainted
and produced an offensive odor’ and was swarming with maggots. Balcombe, however,
issued the spoiled meat to the families until the following June. . . . When . . . Balcombe
finally issued clothing and blankets, he did so in a way that humiliated and dehumanized
the women. He allegedly stood at the top window of the warehouse and threw out a
dress and a blanket for each family. He had the women stand below to catch the supplies.
Unfortunately, strong winds blew many of the dresses and blankets away, forcing the
women to chase them across the prairies. Later, the women found out that much of
the clothing had not been distributed and was being used by the reservation staff.
Wicahpewastewin (Good Star Woman) recalled that ‘the Indians were almost naked.
They wound burlap around their legs to keep warm. Many of the women had to wear
burlap gotten from the soldiers, and nobody had any sleeves in their garments.’”).
Among the hundreds of Santee Dakota Indians who perished at Crow Creek
was my great-great-great-grandfather Tunkanwasicunna (“Stone Little White
Man”)—the Wahpeton Dakota father of my great-great-grandfather Iyasamani
(“Yelling Walker”)—who died while confined there in 1864. See supra note 194; cf.
Clemmons, supra note 187, at 49 (endnotes omitted) (“For six weeks after they arrived
at Crow Creek, Dakota men, women, and especially children died at the average rate
of two, three, or more a day. By July, just over a month after arriving at Crow Creek, 70
had died from illness and starvation. By September, [John] Williamson reported that
about 150 had died, noting that ‘there are hardly any babies and small children left.’
By 1864, [Episcopal missionary] Samuel Hinman reported that more than six hundred
children had died from starvation and illness.”).
207
See supra note 194; see also Monjeau-Marz, supra note 200, at 136 (reprinting Rep.
of the Comm’r of Indian Aff. for the Year 1863, supra note 200, at 315) (showing
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enabling the boy to remain in Minnesota to be raised within a small community of Indian scouts and their families, who were permitted to continue
residing in the state.208 Thus, like my great-great-grandfather Iyasamani,
“Mahpiyawakinze [Mahpiyawakonze]” as head of family of four in list of heads
of families in census of the Indian camp at Fort Snelling, Dec. 2, 1862); Fort Snelling
Concentration Camp Dakota Prisoners, supra note 200, at 173 (showing “Mahpiyawakanzi
[Mahpiyawakonze]” as head of family of four in list of heads of families at Fort Snelling,
as compiled by U.S. Army on Dec. 2, 1862). Mahpiyawakonze’s name is included among
the Santee Dakota signatories to a “Petition of chiefs and headmen of Medawakanton
[Mdewakanton] and Wahpakoota [Wahpekute] Sioux Indians” confined at Fort Snelling,
dated December 18, 1862, pleading “to our Great Grand Father, the President of
the United States,” for fair and merciful treatment; this petition is reprinted in the
Congressional Record for the date February 11, 1898, in support of a bill for restoring
“the annuities . . . arising under the treaties . . . of . . . 1837, and . . . 1851, which annuities
[were] declared forfeited by the act of Congress approved February 16, 1863.”
31 Cong. Rec. 1651, 1656 (1898) (providing text of annuities restoration bill and including
“Marpeyawakonze [Mahpiyawakonze] (his x mark)” in list of 1862 petition’s signatories).
The petition states that “our young men all broke out” and “went to war,” but that the
signatories “felt bad for this and opposed it,” stating further:
We did not go to war. We killed nobody. We helped to save the captives, and
we succeeded in saving nearly 300 white women and children . . . .
. . . We did no harm and tried to do good. We know our young men and many
of our old men have broken the treaty, and we feel bad. We are farmers, and
want that our Great Father would allow us to farm again whenever he pleases,
only we never want to go away with the wild blanket Indians again, for what
we have done for the whites they would kill us. We of the Upper Sioux would
like to go to live on the Couteau des Prairie, 15 miles west of Big Stone Lake, in
Dakota Territory, and we of the Lower Sioux would like to go back to our farms
and there live as white men, or we would like to live among the white men and
farm as they do if they would let us. We think we ought to be dealt with as our
Great Father does with his white children.
. . . [W]e who did not do bad hope to live, and we ask our Great Father to
let us live and to aid us. We think we have not forfeited our annuities or other
funds, because we have done no wrong; and we ask that our Great Father will
use so much as belongs to us in such a way as to him seems best for our good
to help us to live, and as much as belongs to the bad Indian we would like to
have our Great Father pay our just debts out of, and it is in right that the white
people who have lost all their property should be paid out of the money which
was the Sioux’.
We humbly and respectfully ask that our Great Father take pity on us and
do as he thinks best for our good. We must have food and clothing and in the
spring somewhere to live. . . . We are here at Fort Snelling, 41 Lower Sioux
Indians, 20 Upper Sioux Indians, and about 1,500 women and children and 20
half breed men. We know not what to do and we submit ourselves into the
hands of our Great Father.
Id. at 1656 (reprinting text of 1862 petition).
208
See supra note 194; see also Clemmons, supra note 187, at 133, 143 (“[E]ach of
the approximately 280 men who eventually worked as scouts had varied reasons for
joining . . . . In addition to sending money to their relatives, scouting also allowed
some of the men . . . to feed and even remain with their families. . . . Approximately
thirty to forty families were allowed to remain in Minnesota during their husbands’
service as scouts.”); cf. Colette Routel, Minnesota Bounties on Dakota Men During
the U.S.-Dakota War, 40 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1, 3 & n.7 (2013) (“Not all of the
Dakota were removed from Minnesota, however. The United States allowed certain
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Mahpiyawakonze—the Mdewakanton Dakota scout who raised and protected my great-grandfather Vines Mitchell (Iyasamani and Wasteyadan’s
son) in Minnesota after the 1862 U.S.-Dakota War, serving as Vines’s adoptive father 209—settled among the Sisseton-Wahpeton people, received his
assigned allotment on the Lake Traverse Reservation,210 and even took
part, as an Indian scout, in punitive expeditions under the leadership of
Gabriel Renville, chief of the scouts, against other Dakota Indians targeted
as “hostiles” by the U.S. military.211
‘friendly’ or ‘loyal’ Dakota, who had helped whites during the War to remain within
the state.”); Lass, supra note 206, at 357 (“One hundred thirty-seven Sioux and halfbreeds . . . were to be retained at the fort. These included the scouts who were to
accompany the proposed Sibley expedition of 1863, and their families, as well as other
individuals who had remained friendly to the whites during the uprising.”).
209
See List of Sioux scouts and soldiers prepared by S.H. Elrod and approved Feb. 16,
1892 by Acting Interior Secretary George Chandler, at 14-15, U.S. Off. of Indian Aff.,
Manuscripts Collection, Minn. Hist. Soc’y, location M201 (microform reel) (on file with
author) [hereinafter “List of Sioux scouts and soldiers”], http://www2.mnhs.org/library/
findaids/00334.xml (showing “John Mar-piya-wa-kanza [Mahpiyawakonze]” as no. 28
on roll of “Scouts or Soldiers” and listing, under the heading “Descendants of Scouts or
Soldiers Deceased,” “Ta-ta-eya ya win” [Tateiyayewin]” as Mahpiyawakonze’s “Widow”
and “V.P. Mitchell” as his “Adopted Son”).
210
See H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 42, supra note 195, at 28 (schedule of allotments of land in
severalty assigned to members of the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians
residing on the Lake Traverse Indian reservation) (showing “Ma-rpi-ya-wa-kon-ze
[Mahpiyawakonze]” as name of allottee for allotment no. 261); 1867 Lake Traverse
Census, supra note 195 (showing “Morpiyawakenze [Mahpiyawakonze]” on 5th
unnumbered page of handwritten census list of Lake Traverse Indians).
211
See Gabriel Renville, A Sioux Narrative of the Outbreak in 1862 and Sibley’s
Expedition in 1863, in 10 Minn. Hist. Soc’y Collections 612, 613 (1905) (showing
“Mah-pe-yah-wah-koon-zay [Mahpiyawakonze]” on list of seven “Medawakantons
[Mdewakantons]” who were among the “scouts who with their families had come
from Fort Snelling” “to go on General Sibley’s [1863] expedition” against “the hostile
Sioux”; and showing the same Dakota Indian scout’s name on a second list of “the
names of those who were not to go [on this expedition], but to remain and scout
with their headquarters at Fort Ridgely”). Portions of Gabriel Renville’s narrative,
including the second list of Dakota scouts, are reprinted in Through Dakota Eyes:
Narrative Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862, at 100-05, 186-92, 230-34,
273-75 (Gary Clayton Anderson & Alan R. Woolworth eds., 1988). See also Laura L.
Anderson, Introduction to Amos E. Oneroad & Alanson B. Skinner, Being Dakota:
Tales & Traditions of the Sisseton & Wahpeton 3, 8-9, 20-21 (Laura L. Anderson ed.,
2003) (footnotes omitted) (“Some of the Dakota men enlisted as scouts with Gabriel
Renville (Tiwakaŋ [“Sacred Lodge”]). The scouts were a U.S. Army auxiliary group
used to control the Dakota camps, to bring in fugitives, to identify the active participants
in the war, and to be trackers for the 1863-66 military expeditions. The members of the
scouts’ extended families were in Davenport, Crow Creek, or with the roving bands,
while their immediate families were often at the scout station. The military provided
specific orders for the scouts to carry out, regardless of the obligations the scouts felt
toward their families. They understood that any redemption of the Dakota people,
any benevolence on the part of the government, and any hope of return to their
homeland depended on their performance for the army. . . . Early in 1865 Solomon
[Two Stars] and four [other] scouts . . . took the lives of three men from a group that
had entered Minnesota, killed the Jewett family in Blue Earth County, and were on
their way to the Missouri River when the scouts intercepted them. Jack Campbell, the
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Tribal Understanding of the 1889 U.S. Agreement with the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota (continued)

a. December 3-5, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
It would be unrealistic, of course, to expect the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court, when deciding an Indian case, to acquire
as intimate an understanding of the impact of U.S. Indian policy on
Native communities as those of us whose family histories and tribal destinies have been so directly and profoundly affected.212 In the DeCoteau
case, however, the Justices needed only have faithfully applied traditional
principles of Indian law to have avoided the erroneous, unjust, and indeed
preposterous conclusion that the 1889 Agreement with the SissetonWahpeton bands of Dakota Indians, ratified by Congress in 1891, imparted
“clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent” to abolish the Lake
Traverse Reservation.213 Crucial among those Indian law principles is the
rule that any agreement with an Indian tribe must be judicially construed
as the Indians would have understood the provisions when they negotiated and signed the agreement.214 In DeCoteau, not only is it certain that
favorite nephew of Solomon, was among the perpetrators. Under strict orders to take
no prisoners, Solomon Two Stars expediently and dutifully executed his sister’s son,
‘before my tears should blind me,’ in what he lamented as ‘the awfullest moment’ of
his life. Performing a soldier’s duty exacted a new loyalty . . . . Every scout . . . no doubt
felt ambivalent about his new duties.”).
212
In his watershed History of the Santee Sioux, published in 1967, the late Professor
Roy W. Meyer wrote:
Whatever the end of the Sioux Uprising may have meant to the white
man—a chance to speculate in land or acquire a farm in lands previously unavailable, a demonstration of the Lord’s saving power over men about to be
executed, or something else—for the Sioux it meant just one thing: catastrophe. It meant their expulsion from the land where they and their ancestors
had lived since the immemorial past, and, more than that, it meant the shattering of whatever unity the Santee bands had possessed. Never again were the
Mdewakantons, Wahpekutes, Sissetons, and Waheptons one people, occupying
a single fairly well defined area. Henceforth they were scattered over states and
provinces, with hundreds of miles separating their dispersed settlements and
the lands between rapidly filling up with white men, who learned eventually to
tolerate the Indian, if only to exploit him, but never to accept him as an equal.
Meyer, supra note 181, at 132.
213
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975).
214
See Cohen’s Handbook § 2.02[1], supra note 16, at 113-14 (footnote omitted)
(“[T]reaties and agreements are to be construed as the Indians would have understood
them.”). Professor Richard Collins explains the crucial function of this interpretive
rule in the context of nineteenth-century federal-tribal policy negotiations:
The [treaty] canon is a core part of the trust relationship that is firmly established as federal policy. Moreover, it is often difficult to prove the particular
circumstances of a treaty’s negotiation over a century after its making. The
effect of the canon is to place the burden on opponents of Indian claims to
prove uncoerced Indian consent to yield the asset at issue. This is an appropriate rule in light of the language barrier and the prevalence of at least some
degree of duress. The canon also forces courts to try to understand the unfa-
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the Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives would not have understood an
agreement that contained “not a word to suggest that the boundaries of
the reservation were altered”215 as nevertheless effectuating that devastating result; but they in fact left an eloquent and forceful record of their
position, concerns, and demands in the 1890 report of councils between
the Indians and the U.S. negotiators,216 a report that likewise contains
nothing to suggest that by merely agreeing to sell their unallotted lands
for a set price per acre, the Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders consented to the
destruction of their people’s “permanent reservation” home.217
As indicated previously,218 toward the beginning of those negotiations, on December 3, 1889, the Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives’
chosen spokesman, Chief Gabriel Renville, was adamant: the tribe
would not agree to sell any of its unallotted land unless and until the
federal government first satisfied the leaders’ demand for payment of
“back annuities” that were a major source of the Indians’ longstanding
grievances.219 The U.S. negotiators balked at this, making a series of long
speeches aimed at getting the Indians to back down from their stated
position and instead “put the two things together” by agreeing to have
miliar, Indian side of a case, and it stiffens the spines of uncertain judges when
prevailing politics run against Indian interests.
Richard B. Collins, Never Construed to Their Prejudice: In Honor of David Getches,
84 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2013) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 21 (footnotes omitted)
(“Congress ended new Indian treaties in 1871, but the government continued to make
formal agreements with Indian nations that were ratified by the full Congress rather
than by two-thirds of the Senate. These statutes are essentially treaty equivalents that
should be subject to the treaty canon.”); cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Textualism’s Gaze,
25 Mich. J. Race & L. 111, 116 (2020) (“As with treaty interpretation, the way Indians
and tribes understand texts is crucial to the interpretation of all relevant texts—and
should usually be dispositive. Federal Indian affairs statutes are usually more than
mere federal statutes; they are negotiated agreements between sovereign entities: the
United States and the Indian tribes. To treat a federal Indian affairs statute as merely
a creature of Congress is wrong.”).
215
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
216
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 15-29 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians).
217
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(noting that the 1867 Treaty “granted these Indians a permanent reservation with
defined boundaries and the right to make their own laws and be governed by them
subject to federal supervision”); cf. Robert N. Clinton, The Curse of Relevance:
An Essay on the Relationship of Historical Research to Federal Indian Litigation,
28 Ariz. L. Rev. 29, 41-42 (1986) (footnote omitted) (“In DeCoteau . . . Justice Stewart
relied on late nineteenth century statements by tribal leaders, federal negotiators,
and members of Congress that were addressed to the then salient question of land
ownership to resolve a quite different concern over jurisdiction defined in terms of
reservation diminishment. Stewart’s inquiry was at best misguided and at worst an
outright misuse of Native American legal history.”).
218
See supra notes 167-177 and accompanying text.
219
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs,
and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan)
(“[U]ntil those back annuities were paid [the Indians] positively declined to enter into
negotiations for the sale of any portion of their surplus lands . . . .”).
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“the [back annuities] claim and the sale of land on one agreement.”220
The commissioners used both carrot and stick in their efforts to get what
they wanted. Referring to a lapsed congressional bill from the previous
year that, if passed, would have partially satisfied the Indians’ “back
annuity” claims,221 the chairman of the commission, General Eliphalet
Whittlesey, said: “I will keep trying to get the bill through, I am so friendly
to this people; but if we could put these two things together now, we
should hope to succeed.”222 However, the commissioners also warned the
Dakota leaders that they and their people would suffer if they failed to
comply with the U.S. negotiators’ demand that the Indians “be willing to
sell this land” and state “how much [they] would . . . ask per acre.”223 Thus,
Whittlesey said: “You are very much in need of money for spring, and if
you should put off doing anything until this claim is settled you may not
get anything for several years. As you are intelligent men, we hope you
will come to some agreement and have both put together.”224
Id. at 18 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
221
See H.R. Rep. No. 1953, supra note 177. The 1888 House Report specified that the
proposed legislation would have benefited “certain Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux
Indians who served in the armies of the United States against their own people” by,
inter alia, appropriating money “for the payments of 1862 and 1863 [that] were never
made to them” because of “the confiscation of their [treaty] annuities” following
the U.S.-Dakota War. Id. at 1, 4 (report of William H. Perry, Chairman of the House
Committee on Indian Affairs; letter from J.D.C. Atkins, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, to William F. Vilas, Secretary of the Interior); see also supra notes 177-178 and
accompanying text.
222
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 18 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
223
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
224
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey). This technique of pressuring the Indians by stating or insinuating
that they lacked intelligence if they refused to comply with U.S. demands and that
such refusal would endanger the Indians’ survival and the lives of their children had
become a routine component of federal negotiations with Indian tribes in the late
nineteenth century. See, e.g., S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, 44th Cong., at 31-32 (2d Sess. 1876)
(journal of proceedings of the George Manypenny Commission tasked with securing
tribal consent to relinquishing ownership of the Black Hills area of the Great Sioux
Reservation in 1876) (remarks of commissioner Henry B. Whipple, Episcopal bishop
of Minnesota, to the Oglala Lakota) (“[T]he Great Father . . . selected this commission
of friends of the Indians that they might devise a plan, as he directed them, in order
that the Indian nations might be saved, and that, instead of growing smaller and
smaller until the last Indian looks upon his own grave, they might become, as the white
man has become, a great and powerful people. . . . [Y]ou cannot find an instance on
the earth where a people without government, without education, without labor, have
ever failed to go down into the grave and become extinct.”); id. at 42-43 (remarks of
commissioner Whipple to the Sicangu Lakota) (“You say these are very hard words;
but they are very kind words. They are kind words that will tell any people the way
to life instead of death. . . . I believe there are two ways open to you: one leads to
peace, happiness, and life; and I believe the other way is the path of sorrow. As I
know the Indian loves his children as I love my children, I ask them to act as wise
men.”); id. at 56 (remark of commissioner H.C. Bulis to the Cheyenne River Sioux)
220
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The pressure continued as commissioner D.W. Diggs, the
South Dakota banker, took up the refrain:
I have been your friend since I knew you ten years ago. I have
watched with great interest the progress your children are making,
because it is education that elevates man. Many of you are too old to
get the benefits of these schools, but you ought to do for your children what you were unable to do for yourselves. . . .
[T]he Secretary . . . appointed me because he knew that I was
your friend and would see that justice was done. I think your claim
ought to be paid. . . . Our instructions are to ask you if you want
to sell your surplus lands. You see these gentlemen coming a long
way do not care to have their mission fail, nor do I, as you need the
money, and while we will not attempt to force you, we shall use all
fair argument to have you see the matter as we see it. The chief has
shown us just what is between us. The error in survey of east line and
the payment of the claim of back annuities. . . . The Secretary wrote
to Congress saying that your claim was a just one and ought to have
been adjusted long ago. Every man who can read that treaty must
admit that your claim is a just one, and that you ought to have the
money. We are here to-day to help you to get that money; there is a
way we can help, and a way that may fail.
Our proposition is this: After setting aside lands for schools,
churches, and any who may not have received allotments, to buy the
balance. When we have agreed on a price per acre, we recommend
that the back annuities be paid first, from 1862 to date; second, that
the surplus lands be paid for at a price agreed upon; these are the two
points. . . . I know you think about the deceit of agents and others in
the past, but there is none of that now. . . . You need money now to
buy seed, oxen, wagons, and farming implements. If you fix the bill
now, you get the money in time for your crops. Why should you men
be denied this money any longer. It may be five years before another
commission comes out here. We want you to have it, and are willing
to wait. If you say the bars are up, we will go to our tepees; but if you
think the bars can be gotten over, we will wait and talk with you.
....
(“If you refuse to accept [this agreement], death and starvation stare you in the face.”),
all quoted in John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice
by Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great
Sioux Nation, 5 Great Plains Nat. Resources J. 40, 53 n.42 (2001); see also Ann
Laquer Estin, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: The Long Shadow, in The Aggressions of
Civilization: Federal Indian Policy Since the 1880s, at 218 (Sandra L. Cadwalader
& Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984) (citation omitted) (quoting remarks of David H. Jerome,
chair of the U.S. commission tasked with securing tribal consent to the allotment of
the Kiowa, Comanche, and Kiowa-Apache Reservation in 1892) (“If the Indians will
do what the Great Father wants them to do, and do their part well, it will result in
your having plenty of food and clothing; and instead of having, as you sometimes do,
only one meal a day, you will have three meals a day and have plenty of clothing and
things that will make you comfortable through the winter. . . . Now, if you follow the
plan that we have told you about you will not have your babies die from the cold, but
you will have them grow up good, strong, healthy men and women, instead of putting
them in the ground.”).
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. . . We can go to Congress this winter and have your claim allowed,
but now that the committee is here we would like to do both at once
and guaranty that both will pass together.225

Despite the pressure, Sisseton-Wahpeton Chief Gabriel Renville
remained steadfast. Perhaps recalling his long experience with congressional promises and procedural traps,226 he explained why it was
important that the matter of “back annuities” be resolved before the
tribe would hear any talk of the sale of “surplus land” within the Lake
Traverse Reservation:
It seems to us if Congress should fail to ratify this proposed agreement we would have to wait years before we could get anything from
Congress. If we should fail in getting our claim through we will raise
the price of our land.
....
We are very poor just now, as our crops have failed. In 1867
Congress said, by treaty, that it would help us when we were in need.
There has been several years we have received nothing, although
we relied upon it. If they were reminded of this they might help us
this winter.
....
. . . We know that the Government is rich and intends to do right.
Why does it not first settle what it owes us and then come to us for
our lands, which we will not refuse. . . . We are friends; first settle our
claim, and then we will listen to and talk with you about our surplus land. We are poor and our crops have failed, but you have our
money, holding it, and do not help us as promised in the sixth article
of the treaty of 1867, and now we are like a drowning man grabbing
at straws to save himself. We all want to do what is right. Why should
the Government refuse to pay us our claim before they wish to take
away our land.
....
I have spoken for all the people, and it is their wish that I should
say these things. In the past there has been lots of land sold, but we
have not benefited by the sales. In 1867 they promised us they would
help us, but they have not helped us very much for many years. Let
them first settle our claim and then we will talk about our surplus
lands. We are now citizens and can talk with you as such, and do not
care to talk about shoe pacs, etc., but cash. We can buy for ourselves
what we need if payment is made in cash, and then we do not care
to have an agency here after the surplus lands have been sold. The
people have asked me to say this as their wish.227

As this first full day of negotiations wore on, and seeing that the
chief of the Sisseton-Wahpeton people would not budge from his strongly
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 18-20 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statements of D.W. Diggs).
226
Cf. Anderson, supra note 160, at x (noting that in the course of his lifetime of
leadership Renville “frequently walked the halls of Congress, lobbying and often
getting support for his people”).
227
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 18-20 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statements of Gabriel Renville).
225
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stated position, the U.S. commission resorted to a different coercive
tactic: divide and conquer.228 First, General Whittlesey attempted to

humor Gabriel Renville with a rejoinder following the chief’s metaphor
about a drowning man grabbing at straws:
The Government does not want to take anything from you. If a
man was drowning and grabbed a straw he would drown, but if a
plank was handed him he would be saved. Now you have a chance
of getting on a plank. We would be glad for your sake if you would
put the two things together and get something for your lands and
your claim.229

Next, stating that the commission would “put down on paper just
what we think to be right and give it to you for your consideration” and
“give everyone a chance to sign it,”230 Whittlesey announced a workaround with regard to the position of the tribe’s spokesman, which Chief
Renville reiterated once again, saying, “It is understood that nothing more
will be said by the people, as we first want our claim paid.”231 Whittlesey
turned to the assembled Sisseton-Wahpeton people: “Is it the wish of
all that we do not meet tomorrow?”232 “No” was the people’s answer.233
A tribal member then asked the assembly, “Would any of you change
your minds in the next ten days?”234 “No” was the answer once again.235
Similar methods and tactics were used by other U.S. commissions during the
allotment era to dispossess Indians of their collectively owned tribal lands. In writing
about the United States’ 1892 negotiations with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
nations, Muscogee (Creek) historian Blue Clark reflects on the general strategy:
To persuade the Indians to cede further lands, the federal government often
used specially appointed commissioners as negotiators. Commissioners in many
earlier negotiations established their strategy when dealing with Indians. They
began mildly by explaining that they had come to befriend the Indians and
offer the best terms possible. Commissioners knew that Indians in council acted
unanimously, so the federal representatives tried to separate the groups into
more manageable smaller blocs. They attempted to find interested individual
Indians and work with them toward agreement. As deliberations continued
and Indians showed reluctance to part with their homelands, commissioners
hardened in their stance. . . . Finally, the commissioners dictated terms to their
wards and gained consenting signatures through intimidation, coercion, and
bribery.
Blue Clark, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End
of the Nineteenth Century 38-39 (1994); see also infra note 290.
229
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
230
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
231
Id. at 20 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gabriel Renville).
232
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
233
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
234
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Wicauspinonpa, or Two Stars).
235
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
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The tribal member rejoined, “Shall Gabriel tell them so?”236 “Yes,” the
Sisseton-Wahpeton people responded.237
Disregarding this demonstration of univocal support for the position stated repeatedly by Chief Gabriel Renville, General Whittlesey
said, “We propose to make and submit a fair agreement and put it before
you to-morrow for any to sign who wish, as it may be very many years
before you have another chance.”238 To this, the chief expressed affront:
“You are now treating us like children.”239 “No, not at all,” Whittlesey
said. “It is just as we would treat one another. If I was to make Mr. Diggs
a proposition I would submit it in writing, and if he agreed he would sign;
if not, he returns without signing.”240 Concluding the now-tense meeting
with an attempt at amicability, Whittlesey said:
We are friends of yours and will remain so, no matter how this
matter comes out. We will be here to-morrow, and do most earnestly
desire that you have something with which to start in the spring. If
nothing is done now you will remain just as you are. We will do what
we can to help you to get your claim through, although you are putting a load on us in asking us to help get your bill through Congress
before the reservation is opened.241

To this, a tribal member responded: “Gabriel Renville has expressed the
feeling of the people, and they have so decided and will not change. We
will now close, as we have our ponies to care for.”242
Many tribal attendees left the December 3 gathering offended by
the U.S. negotiators’ show of disrespect, and it took the commissioners
a full week—until December 10—to reassemble a critical mass.243 In the
interim, however, the commissioners moved ahead with a strategy of
overcoming resistance by meeting separately with individuals and small
groups of the Dakota people.244 Thus, on the evening of December 3,
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Wicauspinonpa, or Two Stars).
237
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
238
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
239
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville).
240
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
241
Id. at 20-21 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
242
Id. at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Star).
243
Id. at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan) (noting that the “large
number of Indians” who arrived on December 9, 1889 “convened in council” on the
morning of December 10).
244
In their report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the U.S. negotiators explained
how their series of meetings with small factions of the Dakota proved crucial to their
efforts:
We found two nearly equally divided elements upon the reservation, one
236
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after the close of the larger meeting, the commissioners had “a lengthy
consultation . . . with Chief Renville” at which the chief reiterated that
“the great fear of the Indians was that, should they consent to the sale
of a portion of their reservation, with a proviso or condition that their
back annuities should be paid, that portion of the agreement providing
for the sale of land would be ratified by Congress and the back annuity
clause be rejected.”245 The commissioners explained: “To meet this objection we promised to insert a clause in the agreement providing that the
sale of the lands should not take effect and be in force until the back
annuities shall have been paid.”246 And on December 4, with “many of
[the Indians] . . . having gone to their homes on remote parts of the reservation,” the commission had a meeting with a small faction at which “the
terms [the commissioners] proposed to submit, which had been reduced
to writing, except as to the price to be paid for the land, were fully and
carefully explained to the Indians.”247 The commissioners reported that
“[t]he result of this [December 4 meeting] and the bearing and attitude of
those Indians present gave us some encouragement and led us to believe
that the obstacles in the way might be removed and success yet crown our
efforts.”248 On the following day, December 5, “the Indians present held
a lengthy council among themselves, which resulted in a request from
them that messengers be dispatched to summon every absent Indian to
opposed to selling any portion of their lands until the back annuities were paid,
the other, the younger and more progressive element, in favor of an agreement
providing for the sale of the surplus land and payment of the back annuities at
the same time, and it was from this class that we received the most encouragement and assistance, and to which we are largely indebted for our success.
Id. at 7 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan); see also infra note 290.
245
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and
Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
While the U.S. government’s “report relative to the purchase and release of the
surplus lands in the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation,” id., contains transcripts for
some days of the negotiations (i.e., November 30, 1889, as well as from 2 to 5:20 p.m.
on December 3 and on December 6, 11, 12, and 13, see id. at 15-29), discussions with
the Indians that occurred on the evening of December 3 as well as on December 4,
5, 9, and 10 do not appear in transcript form but instead are cursorily summarized in
a letter from the U.S. negotiators transmitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
see id. at 5-8. The report provides no explanation for this discrepancy. But see infra
note 290.
246
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and
Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
Whereas “about 250 Indians” attended the larger meeting on the afternoon of
December 3, “about seventy-five of the Indians” were present for the December 4
meeting. Id.
247
Id. (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan). The commissioners reported that the
Indians “requested that a copy of our proposition be furnished them in their own
language . . . and this we agreed to do, and the council then adjourned.” Id.
248
Id. (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
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meet in a general council to be held on Monday, December 9, previous to
meeting [the commissioners again] on Tuesday[, December 10].”249
b. December 6, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
Prior to the arrival of the Indians “in large numbers” on
December 9,250 however, the commissioners continued to meet with small
groups of Sisseton-Wahpeton individuals. One of these meetings, with an
undisclosed number of Indians in attendance, occurred on December 6;
this is one of only two of the smaller meetings for which a transcript of
the day’s negotiations appears in the government’s published report.251
According to the transcript only two individuals spoke at this meeting,
General Whittlesey on behalf of the commission, and Michael Renville of
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota. Whittlesey did most of the talking:
My friends, we have been thinking of you almost all night. There
is no people that I have more interest in than the Sissetons. . . . [T]he
Government is dealing kindly and generously with you, and in this
matter before us the Government wishes to deal kindly with you. I
think you and I agree in what you want and what we want, the only
difference is in the way we want it. I think what we want will sooner
enable you to get what you want. We were sent here to ask you what
land you wished to sell and to make such arrangements and conditions as we could agree upon. We agree that the money due you
ought to be paid. We propose that that money be a part of any agreement we make, and until that money is paid all of the agreement will
be nothing. Now, if we could get together and talk the matter over,
we might agree on what ought to be done. (Here the figures on back
annuities were given in detail.)252

After thus imploring his audience’s cooperation with what the commission wanted (a land-sale agreement) in order for the Indians to get what
they wanted (payment of back annuities), Whittlesey sweetened the pot
by explaining that the government’s proposal would ensure that the back
annuities would be distributed per capita and “give every man, woman,
and child $240 each.”253 He then showed the Indians the prepared text of
the agreement, saying, “We have written out here all about the sale of the
surplus lands and the payment of the money. It is a long paper and would
take me a long time to read it.”254
Id. (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
250
Id. (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
251
See id. at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
252
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
253
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
254
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
249
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After “a synopsis of the agreement or proposition was read,”
Whittlesey continued:
The commission will recommend that all receive equal allotments of
land. In order to do this you need some land reserved. The money
paid for lands will be placed to your credit in the United States
Treasury at 3 per cent. interest. The money will be yours, and the
interest paid every year. If at any time you need a part of the principal you can petition Congress and it will have the right to give it to
you. The back annuities are included in the same paper, and unless
this payment is made the rest will come to nothing. . . . Now what can
we do and what do you want more than that?255

Knowing that he was addressing only a small fraction of the SissetonWahpeton people, and that the previous day the Indians still present had
agreed that messengers should be sent to summon to council a greater
number of their people,256 Whittlesey said:
In order to make this paper binding we want a majority of the adults
to sign it. We are sorry that so many have gone home, but a great
many have, and we do not know when they can be brought together
again. If you who are here think that we can get them here again you
will let us know, or if you think there is no use we will say good-by
and go home.257

Having listened patiently to General Whittlesey’s long speech,
Sisseton-Wahpeton leader Michael Renville responded:
We have always said that when the sale of surplus lands was considered we would ask that 160 acres be given to each member of
the tribe. You spoke of money due us; some of us think it ought to
come to all who belong here, while others think that none but scouts
should receive it. We said in council that we would not sell surplus
lands until back annuities were paid, but you say that if the lands are
now sold the back annuities would be paid at the same time. This
pleases us. We want a translation of the agreement so that we can
take it and consider it.258

Sensing (or perhaps knowing) which side of the intratribal debate
regarding back annuities his audience was on, Whittlesey concluded the
December 6 meeting by saying, “In this agreement we do not say anything about scout money, but call it the back annuities due the Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians, parties to this agreement.”259

Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
256
See supra text accompanying note 249.
257
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
258
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Michael
Renville).
259
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
255
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c. December 9-11, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
With the arrival of the larger body of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
people at Sisseton Agency on December 9, the Indians and the commissioners made their final respective preparations for the continuation of
negotiations. As stated in the U.S. negotiators’ letter to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs, on December 9 the Indians “held a protracted council
among themselves” out of which arose “many inquiries . . . respecting the
proposed agreement, and in some cases [the Indians] came in groups for
information.”260 The following day, on December 10, the commissioners
“proceeded to the council room” where “each article of the proposed
agreement was taken up and carefully explained in detail, except as to
the price proposed to be paid for the land.” This was in response to the
fact that “information [had] reached [the commissioners] that many of
[the Indians] did not understand our proposition, especially the article
relating to their back annuities.”261 After meeting with the commissioners,
the Indians used the rest of that day, December 10, “to further counsel among themselves”; out of this meeting grew the Sisseton-Wahpeton
people’s newly arrived-at position in response to the multifaceted pressure to immediately sell all of the Indians’ unallotted lands within the
Lake Traverse Reservation:
[T]he Indians agreed among themselves that they would sell all
the lands remaining after the allotments and additional allotments
provided for in article four of the agreement had been made,262
at $5 per acre, the fund arising therefrom to draw interest at
5 per cent. per annum. They also at this council appointed a committee of ten to confer with [the commission] in regard to the matter.263

By December 11, 1889, many of the Sisseton-Wahpeton people had
returned to Sisseton Agency, although it appears that a “full council” was
not present until the following day.264 Nevertheless, on December 11 the
chairman of the U.S. negotiating commission, General Whittlesey,
Id. at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
261
Id. (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
262
Article IV of the 1889 Agreement standardizes allotments within the Lake
Traverse Reservation “to equalize the allotments . . . so that each individual [tribal
member], including married women, shall have one hundred and sixty acres of land”
and provides that “patents shall issue for the lands allotted . . . upon the same terms
and conditions and limitation as is provided in” the General Allotment Act (or Dawes
Act) of 1887. Agreement of 1889, art. IV, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1037-38, reprinted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 458-59
(1975).
263
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and
Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
264
See id. at 7 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan) (noting that “on that
morning [Thursday, December 12] there was a full council”).
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proceeded with the important business of explaining the six articles of
the commission’s proposed agreement. But first he chastised the Indians
for having taken several days to reassemble, saying, “My friends, I am
glad to see so many of you here today. There were many of you here
on Tuesday, but many of you ran away like scared rabbits.”265 As with
the smaller meeting on December 6, the government’s report provides
a transcript of the December 11 proceedings; and, again, like at that
earlier meeting, the transcript shows that besides Whittlesey only one
other person—Charles Crawford of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota, this
time—spoke.266
In explaining the six articles of the government’s proposed agreement, Whittlesey first highlighted that the agreement would accommodate
those who desired to have the back annuities paid per capita. Referring to
the back annuities as “[t]he money you have tried for so long to get, but
have failed,”267 Whittlesey explained that the agreement “will give each
[of you] $240.”268 He then reiterated that the bill from the previous year
which would have provided a partial remedy for the U.S. government’s
unjust confiscation of the Sisseton Wahpeton people’s previous treaty
annuities269 “died with the last Congress,” and that “[t]his agreement, if
Congress ratifies it, will be just the same as a new bill.”270 Whittlesey concluded his summary of that part of the proposed agreement addressing
“back annuities” as follows: “I think now you understand what the agreement says about the back annuity money.”271
Id. at 22 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
266
See id. at 22-23 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians);
see also supra notes 250-259 and accompanying text.
267
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 22 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey). Whittlesey’s blaming the Indians
on December 11 for nonpassage of the prior remedial bill contrasts with his statement
on December 3 that “[t]he Secretary did all he could to get the bill through Congress
last winter, and we helped him, but there were so many things before Congress that we
failed.” Id. at 18 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement
of Gen. Whittlesey). Historian Valerie Sherer Mathes explains the real reason for the
bill’s defeat:
[A]lthough [the] scouts’ bill had passed the Senate, Joseph G. Cannon, chairman of
the House Appropriations Committee, had prevented its consideration. Cannon
did not believe that the annuities should be restored, despite both the secretary
of the interior and the commissioner of Indian affairs supporting it. They argued
that the Sisseton-Wahpetons were “in a starving condition” and that they deserved
the appropriation because it had been “unjustly and wrongfully withheld.” At one
point in the hearings, Cannon crossly responded, “Let them starve!”
Mathes, supra note 134, at 153-54 (footnotes omitted).
268
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 22 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
269
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
270
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 22 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
271
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
265
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Whittlesey then summarized other provisions of the government’s
proposed agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota:
Second. . . . [W]e have put in this agreement an equal division of
land so that each will receive 160 acres. That will include the children born since the allotment of land. These were the two conditions
made by you in regard to the sale of the surplus lands.
Third point. After you have received your back annuities, each
receive 160 acres of land; you will sell all that is left. . . . In this agreement the United States Government agrees to pay for the land so
sold under the allotment act, and draw interest at 3 per cent. The
principal is to be placed in the United States Treasury. This interest
money and, if at any time you wish it, a part of the principal can
be appropriated by Congress to be used for your benefit and educational purposes. I want you to understand one thing: The money
to be paid for your lands will not be paid to you at once, as the law
forbids; but if by failure of crops or any thing you wish to draw a part
of the principal you can do so.272

Having thus explained that the agreement provided for (1) payment
of back annuities; (2) equalized sizes of allotments for all tribal members,
including children; and (3) sale of all unallotted lands within the reservation at an annual interest rate of three percent, General Whittlesey
addressed the one matter that remained and that had not yet been
incorporated into the government’s proposed agreement, namely, “how
much will you ask per acre for the lands you wish to sell?”273 But before
allowing the Indians to answer that fundamental question, Whittlesey
cautioned them as follows:
There are two ways of making a bargain: If a man has a horse to
sell he says he will sell it for so much. Sometimes he says, how
much will you give for it? Now, you have not told us how much you
will ask for your surplus land, but we know about how much the
Government will give. I am going to tell you just how much we think
the Government will give for it.274

At this point, Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Charles Crawford
“asked for two minutes time to speak,” a request that was “granted.”275
Crawford said:
Yesterday there was an effort to have the scout bill pushed without signing the agreement, and then there are some who think they
can get their back annuities by having it included in this agreement.
Some have an idea that the scout bill is still before Congress; for that
reason I have asked that you be called here to explain. You have said
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
273
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
274
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
275
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
272
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that the scout bill is dead. I am glad it is as it is. We all want that this
annuity will go to each member of this people.276

General Whittlesey responded to Charles Crawford’s request for an
explanation regarding the status of the “scout bill,” saying:
What Mr. Crawford has said is good. You are all men and capable
of judging each for himself. He has asked us to explain again if annuity money will be paid to all alike. We have said, yes. . . . Mr. Crawford
asked if the old scout bill was still before Congress. As I have said
before that bill of yours is dead. It died with the last Congress,
March 4, 1889.277 There is no such bill now before Congress, but
if we can get this paper signed we shall hope to get it ratified and
that will secure to you your annuity money, and all the other things
spoken of.278

The chairman of the commission of U.S. negotiators ended the
December 11 meeting with a small group of Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
people with remarks strongly hinting that the government was inclined
to approve only a small price per acre for the unallotted lands within the
Lake Traverse Reservation:
Now, as you want to be by yourselves for a little while before we
name the price the Government will pay for your lands, we are willing to wait for you to consider that important question, but can not
wait very long. I will say this, your neighbors over west have agreed
to sell a tract of land at $1.25 and 75 and 50 cents per acre, and the
Creeks and Seminoles sold for $1.25 per acre. We want you to know
these things while you are thinking about the price.279

d. December 12, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
Having carried on intensive discussions with both large and small
groups of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota for eight of twelve days since
initiating the talks on November 30, the U.S. negotiating commission
managed to assemble a “full council” of the Indians for the crucial concluding two days, December 12 and 13, 1889.280 Unlike on some of the
preceding days, Chief Gabriel Renville, the Indians’ own chosen spokesman, was present for both of these final two days of the negotiations.281
On December 12, General Whittlesey called on one of the SissetonWahpeton representatives, the Reverend John B. Renville, to “lead us in
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Charles
Crawford).
277
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
278
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 22-23 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
279
Id. at 23 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
280
See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
281
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 23-29 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (showing Chief Gabriel Renville’s participation in transcribed
negotiations on Dec. 12 and 13, 1889).
276
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prayer,” having avowed to the assembly that “we all want to do just what
is right.”282
When the prayer was finished, Whittlesey stated that with respect
to the draft agreement he had discussed with some of the Indians the
previous day, “we have not taken a word out nor put in a word,” that
“[w]e have yielded to your wishes in the agreement,” and that “[t]here
is but one thing more; that is, the price of the land.”283 Whittlesey then
turned the meeting over to one of his fellow commissioners, the banker
D.W. Diggs, for the purpose of providing an explanation “[a]s to the
price of the land,” asserting that Diggs “knows all about the land in this
country.”284 In the ensuing long speech—the longest, by far, of any in
the transcript of the proceedings—Diggs increased the pressure on the
Indians to accept the U.S. negotiators’ assignment of a particular price
per acre. The following are highlights from Diggs’s speech:285
• “. . . I was appointed [to the negotiation commission] as I was your
friend. I can say from my heart that I am your friend, and whether
you accept this agreement or not, I am still your friend. Before I
met these gentlemen here I had never seen them, and thought that I
would find myself in antagonism in many respects, but I had resolved
to be firm and do what I thought to be right; but after meeting these
gentlemen I was agreeably surprised to find that they were as liberal
in their views as the law and treaty would permit.”
• “There are some points on which there are no disagreement [sic],
and others on which there are. The first was in regard to back annuities. We believed that it would be best to give it to you year by year,
but when we heard that you wanted it in a lump we yielded. We know
that some of you will spend it foolishly, as would so many educated
white people. We now have in the agreement that the entire amount
be paid you at once in cash, with an annual income of $18,400 for
twelve years.”
• “My colleagues are a long way from home, and have been restive at
times and wish to get away. I think you will bear testimony that the
commissioners have been patient up to this point, but now we have
come to that point when we must come to a decision. The point left
is the price of the land to be sold. If there is any other point it has not
been brought to our notice.”
• “The price agreed upon by the Commission is $2.50 per acre, you
having failed to make a proposition. . . . $1.25 is the price fixed by
the Government for wild lands. We know that you ask more than
that. We admit it is worth more, as you are surrounded by white settlers. You have taken the best of the land and when allotments are

Id. at 23 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
283
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
284
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
285
For all the bulleted excerpts from commissioner Diggs’s long speech to the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians, see id. at 23-24 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs).
282
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completed you will take as much more of the best, so that it leaves
the proportion of poor land much greater.”
• “The Government sells its good lands for $1.25 per acre. Now you
say, ‘If the Government sells for $1.25 why should you offer $2.50?’
I will tell you. It is nearer good markets and we have taken this view
of it. We can take it to Congress and get it through at double minimum; but no man can show that the Government will buy this land
at more than double minimum price.286 It would make no difference
to this Commission if the Government paid you $10 per acre, but
what did we come for? To make an agreement that would be ratified
by Congress.”
• “Now we do not feel confident that this bill will pass Congress with
these liberal arrangements made. There are men in Congress who
know nothing of you and care nothing for you. I have no doubt that
someone will bring up this point: That this reservation was given you
in place of all back annuities . . . . Now, I tell you what a lawyer would
say; he would say that you were not entitled to back annuities because
you received this land for it. You would say it was yours already; then
the lawyer would say that if one was void all was void and you have
no land. How are we to overcome that? Our Congressmen are your
lawyers and we shall put in their mouths this argument: ‘These people
have been wrongfully kept out this annuity and it is but justice to them
that you should admit it and that they be permitted to sell it for their
benefit as in part for injustice done them.’”287
Diggs’s assertion that $2.50 per acre was a “double minimum price” with respect
to the actual value of the Indians’ lands is rebutted in a speech by U.S. Representative
Darwin Hall of Minnesota, reprinted in a volume of the Congressional Record that
contains a significant portion of the legislative debates over the 1891 Act that ratified
the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota:
1. To the stipulation that the price stipulated for the purchase
[i.e., $2.50 per acre] is too high—
The answer is: That these lands are exceptionally fertile; that they are surrounded on all sides by populous and prosperous farming communities; they are
well watered and timbered; the average price of unimproved land in the v icinity
of the reservation is not less than $5 per acre; that $2.50 is the price fixed for
the alternate sections of land lying within the railroad grants of M
 innesota and
Dakota known as “double-minimum lands.” The price was fixed before there
was any settlement of the country.
22 Cong. Rec. app. at 105 (1891) (speech of Cong. Hall).
287
The scare tactic used by Diggs here—i.e., the threat that Congress might decline
to approve “these liberal arrangements” since “a lawyer would say” that the
establishment of the Lake Traverse Reservation in 1867 was itself compensation for
Congress’s 1863 confiscation of the Indians’ annuities—is a form of bluffing. As Diggs
certainly knew, that argument had been dispelled in the House Report accompanying
the 1888 bill “for the relief of certain Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux Indians who
served in the armies of the United States,” H.R. Rep. No. 1953, supra note 177, at 1. In
a letter reprinted in the House Report, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs derided
that argument after paraphrasing it as maintaining that the establishment of the Lake
Traverse and Devil’s Lake reservations under the 1867 Treaty
has been held to be in full satisfaction for the wrong done these Indians, and is
cited as an estoppel, and admission on their part that full compensation has been
received by them. But what did we give them by this treaty as a reward for their
faithful services in which they had imperiled their lives; and in compensation
286
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• “Now I appeal to you men who have families to act in this matter
like men, look at the present condition of your families without sufficient clothes and food or stock to cultivate your lands. Accept this
agreement as the best this Commission can make and hope to get
it through Congress, and if you accept this you will have a friend in
every white man in the surrounding country. But suppose you refuse
this proposition, what have you to hope for in the passage of your
annuity bill? . . . You hitch the two together and the white man and
the Indian will pull together.”
• “Now I tell you as a friend that if this agreement is not just as you
would like to have it, it is much better than your present condition. . . . It is nothing to me personally, but as your friend, honestly I
would advise you to accept this agreement as the best that can pass
Congress. This Commission is hedged about by laws and treaties. In
trying to follow your views we have run against laws on all sides, and
we have tried to steer so as to get between these laws.”
• “When I went home I wrote to these gentlemen to have patience,
but they say to me now that this day will decide whether they remain
another night. I believe that the first man that signs this paper will be
putting himself down as doing the very best for the people. Now we
are going to give every man an opportunity to sign this paper right
here. I hope every one of you will show this Commission courtesy
enough to come before it to say whether you will sign or not. Not
a word will be used on the part of the Commission to induce you
to sign. The Commission will now sign the agreement in your presence. My last word to you is that you sign this agreement and get all
you can.”

At the conclusion of this long speech by commissioner Diggs, and
without having solicited or obtained any indication of acceptance by
Chief Gabriel Renville, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people’s chosen
spokesman, all three of the U.S. negotiators came forward and signed
the “agreement” that they themselves had drafted.288 After signing the
document, the commission chairman, General Whittlesey, spoke scornfully to the assembled Indians: “We have been explaining over and over
again every day and have been two weeks explaining it, but if you do
for their annuities, which were confiscated; and for their crops, which our troops
consumed, valued at $120,000; and for their valuable lands in M
 innesota, from
which they were driven; and for the right of way for roads through their lands
in Dakota, which they ceded to us? What was the valuable consideration given
to which we refer as compensation for all their loss and wrong? Simply the reservations in Dakota on which they live, which were theirs already.
Id. at 6 (letter from J.D.C. Atkins, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to William F. Vilas,
Secretary of the Interior).
288
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 24 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians); see also id. at 6-7 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and
Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan)
(“[W]e . . . advised [the Indians] that we proposed to give $2.50 per acre for each and
every acre of the lands which they desired to dispose of, the funds arising therefrom
to be placed in the United States Treasury upon the terms and conditions named in
the general allotment act, and having affixed our signatures to the agreement in their
presence, that we were ready to receive their signatures.”).
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not understand it we will explain it again.”289 In response to this condescending remark, Chief Renville voiced discontent at the commission’s
presumptuousness and haste:
It took two summers on the Big Sioux Reservation and at White
Earth Agency. We do not care to do this in a hurry. We first decided
not to sell until after scout bill was paid, but we reconsidered yesterday and have made up our minds to do something, but you would
not hear us—
....
[Y]esterday about half of our people were not here. The people
chose ten men as a committee to consult with you in regard to what
was to be done. You would not consult with the committee.290

Chief Renville then made clear that the “agreement” the commissioners
had just presumed to openly sign did not accord with the position of the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people with respect to (1) the price per acre
at which they were willing to sell the unallotted lands within their reservation, or (2) the interest rate for proceeds from the land sales to be
deposited in the U.S. Treasury for the Indians’ benefit:
Id. at 24 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
290
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville). In their report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the U.S. negotiators
made reference to their refusal to meet with a ten-member committee of the SissetonWahpeton Dakota Indians to negotiate terms, stating that the commissioners
“informed [the Indians] . . . that we had no power to confer with a committee, as
we were sent to counsel and talk with the whole people.” Id. at 6-7 (letter from
E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian
Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan). This explanation is belied by the fact that the
U.S. negotiators met numerous times with individual Indians and small groups of
the Dakota people during the two weeks of the negotiations, without a “full council”
being present. See supra notes 160-174, 243-279 and accompanying text (recounting
the U.S. commission’s 1889 negotiations with individuals and small groups of Dakota
Indians on November 30 and on December 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11). Moreover, the fact
that even the smaller meetings are transcribed or summarized in the government’s
report of councils renders duplicitous commissioner Diggs’s palliative to the Indians
on December 12:
By what we have said about meeting that committee we mean no disrespect
to the committee nor to the people who made them, but we wish to follow our
instructions. The instructions further require us to make a report of each day’s
work, and if we should meet a committee we would have to show it.
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 26 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs); see also supra note 244. For the full
text of the Interior Secretary’s letter of instructions to the U.S. commissioners, see
supra note 164. The more obvious explanation for their refusing to meet with the tenmember committee of representatives of the entire Sisseton-Wahpeton people is that
doing so would undermine the strategy of meeting separately with small factions and
individuals of the commissioners’ own choosing and at their own option and discretion,
a routine divide-and-conquer tactic U.S. negotiators deployed in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries to dispossess Indians of their tribally owned reservation
lands. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
289
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We understand that paper; some things we like; some things we
do not like. The price of the land was just put in. The people have
decided not to take less than $5 per acre. We want it in cash, or the
interest in cash. The people decided that 5 per cent. was what would
be accepted, and now you have come here before this committee [of
ten tribal members] could talk with you. Now, if you can make these
changes we will do as we agreed. If not, there is nothing more to do.291

Despite what seemed, at the outset, a unified front by the Indians
regarding the land-sale terms specified by Chief Renville, Whittlesey
and the other U.S. commissioners insisted that the sale price remain
$2.50 per acre. “[W]e can not go back with $5,” General Whittlesey said,
“as Congress would throw the agreement on the floor. We have gone as
far as we can go. We have asked Congress to pay you twice as much as
any other Indians get. Therefore we mean just what we say when we put
it down at $2.50.”292
With regard to the other remaining term in contention, Whittlesey
said: “Now, about the other point, I will say we can not make a new law.
Congress makes the laws, and does not ask us what law to make, and this
is the law.”293 He then had a portion of the 1887 General Allotment Act
read aloud to the Indians, “in which is stated that 3 per cent. is to be the
interest on money paid for lands under that act.”294 In response to this,
Chief Renville stated: “That law was for all Indians, but when those out
West refused the 3 per cent., they were granted 5 per cent. interest.”295
Commissioner Diggs then interrupted the chief by reading aloud the
lengthy “letter of instructions” from the Secretary of the Interior that
provided guidance for the commission’s negotiations with the Indians.296
Chief Renville expressed his displeasure with Diggs’s long-windedness:
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 24 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
292
Id. at 24-25 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
293
Id. at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
294
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians); see also Act of Feb. 8,
1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 390 (General Allotment Act) (“And the sums agreed to
be paid by the United States as purchase money for any portion of any such reservation
[allotted pursuant to the Act] shall be held in the Treasury of the United States for
the sole use of the tribe or tribes of Indians; to whom such reservations belonged;
and the same, with interest thereon at three per cent per annum, shall be at all times
subject to appropriation by Congress for the education and civilization of such tribe
or tribes of Indians or the members thereof.”). The three percent rate was the result of
a last-minute amendment, demanded by the House of Representatives, to the Senate
bill Congress ultimately enacted as the General Allotment Act; the Senate bill (S. 54)
initially specified five percent as the interest rate on proceeds flowing from the Act’s
authorizing “the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with [an] Indian tribe for the
purchase and release . . . of such portions of its reservation not allotted as such tribe
shall . . . consent to sell,” id. See infra note 647 and accompanying text.
295
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
296
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
291
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We ought to make shorter speeches. Mr. Diggs made a long
speech, and we do not remember half. We know these extracts of
laws. We know that a change was made in the taking of land out
West, and also on the 3 per cent. interest. If they can change the
law in regard to the taking of land they can do so in regard to the
3 per cent. We have decided to sell all of the surplus after each has
received 160 acres. We know that the money due us on the treaty of
1851 is ours, and it has pleased us to have that in. In regard to the
people out West selling for $1.25 per acre, we know that one acre
of our land is worth ten of theirs. In 1872 a commission came here
and took all we had outside of this reservation for 5 cents per acre,
and in 1851 the very best lands were sold at less than 1 cent per acre.
This little reservation is ours, and all we have left. There is nothing in
our treaty that says that we must sell. It was given us as a permanent
home, but now we have decided to sell for $5 an acre. Now let us
hear what can be done. You seem to want to treat us like children,
put us back where we were twenty years ago. Let us do what is right
and just.297

General Whittlesey countered Chief Renville’s clear explanation
for insisting on a higher price per acre and a higher interest rate on proceeds from on-reservation land sales with false mockery and shaming:
My friend Gabriel made a pretty long speech, and I do not
know whether I can remember it all. We came here with feelings
of friendship for this people. We have done what we think the very
best Congress will do. In regard to payment of money, after you get
established as citizens you will probably get cash; as regards the price
per acre and the 5 per cent. interest, it will defeat the agreement and
you will be left as you are. Now I do not think we ought to explain
this again, but think you ought to show your manliness by coming
forward and signing it.298

Attempting to correct a misrepresentation, posited by Diggs in his long
speech,299 of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people’s position regarding
terms of the agreement, Chief Renville responded: “We decided yesterday what we can do. My friend seems to misunderstand us. We do not
want the pay for lands in a lump, but want the 5 per cent. interest to be
D.W. Diggs); see also id. at 26 (statement of Gen. Whittlesey) (“[O]n the rate of
interest and manner of payment we have our instructions, and we can not go contrary
to the instructions of the Secretary of the Interior, who sent us here.”). For the full text
of the letter of instructions, see supra note 164.
297
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
298
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey). Whittlesey’s disingenuousness in mocking Chief Renville for
having criticized Diggs’s lengthy statements, by Whittlesey’s pretending that he could
“not remember . . . all” of the chief’s “pretty long speech,” id., is apparent by simply
comparing the length of Renville’s speech as printed in the government’s report of
councils, see supra note 297 and accompanying text (15 lines of text), with the length
of Digg’s speech, see supra note 288 and accompanying text (81 lines of text).
299
See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
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paid in cash. We understand that some of the money will be used for
schools.”300
Seemingly irritated with the chief’s rebuttals and clarifications,
Whittlesey attempted to push past him: “Perhaps there are some others
who wish to speak.”301 Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Charles
Crawford spoke up with added support for Chief Gabriel Renville’s position: “Our chief says that the agreement in some things is not good. There
is one thing I do not like, and that is the payments of interest to be made
in goods. I would like to know if it is possible to have payments made in
cash?”302 Whittlesey responded:
I would be willing to recommend it, but not put it in the agreement. Congress has in this law reserved the right to appropriate as
it thinks right for the people. When Congress finds out that you can
use the money better than goods it will give it to you. I think you
can all trust Congress to do that for you, but we can not put it in the
agreement.303

Another tribal member elaborated on why the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota people insisted on cash payments: “In the past we have received
cattle wagons and implements for money due us and have found these
things to be very poor, but if we had the money we can buy what we want,
and for this reason we think we ought to receive the cash annually.”304
Whittlesey then offered an accommodation: “I think you can handle the
cash as well as any one can handle it for you, and will do all I can to see
that you get the payments of interest annually in cash.”305
This offer appears to have softened the bargaining position of some
of the Sisseton-Wahpeton people at the December 12 meeting. Charles
Crawford, who had met with the U.S. commissioners in one of the small
meetings, held the previous day,306 said:
This is business. I believe what the Commission has said. I do
not think they wish to deceive us. They represent the Government.
It is their duty to work for that Government and our duty to work
for ourselves. Some of us only got 40 and 80 acres of land and have
understood that 160 acres is put in agreement, as the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs recommended that all Indians should receive that
amount of land, but you say you can not change the rate of interest
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
301
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
302
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Charles
Crawford).
303
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
304
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Titus Jug).
305
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
306
See supra notes 264-279 and accompanying text.
300
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nor the manner of payments. Now, if the 160-acre clause can be
put in why can not the others? Congress has the right to amend
all laws. When the Government asked for the lands out West the
people asked for a 5 per cent. interest, and it was granted and put in
their agreement, although you say it has not become a law. Now, if
Congress ratifies their agreement and allows them 5 per cent. it will
do so with us. Now I ask that the interest at 5 per cent. be paid us
annually in cash.307

General Whittlesey’s response to Crawford’s forceful argument was
that the agreement could contain a provision equalizing the acreage of
the Indians’ allotments because “the Commissioner of Indian Affairs so
recommended,” but that “on the rate of interest and manner of payment
we have our instructions, and we can not go contrary to the instructions
of the Secretary of the Interior, who sent us here.”308 Tribal representative
Michael Renville—who, like Charles Crawford, had met previously with
the U.S. commissioners in a smaller meeting 309—then offered additional
conciliatory words while remaining in solidarity with his fellow tribesmen regarding the acceptable terms of the agreement:
I do not blame you for not doing all we ask. You are only following instructions of superior officers. . . .
....
Among a people who do not fully understand a thing, they talk
about it until they understand it. You were told to talk to us together.
One of your questions was, “What price do you put on your land?”
We decided that $5 was our price.310

Notwithstanding the accuracy of Michael Renville’s recollection, the
chairman of the commission dismissed it: “I think we have nothing more
to say. Our patience has not been worn out. If any wish to speak we will
listen.”311 Another Sisseton-Wahpeton speaker then joined his voice in
support of the position urged by the other tribal leaders: “It has been
decided by the people to sell all surplus lands after each get 160 acres
at $5 per acre, the interest to be paid annually in cash at 5 per cent.”312
Apparently fearing an impasse, General Whittlesey exclaimed:
We are dealing with you as we would with an assembly of whites.
If they had a piece of property and we offered to buy it we would
make a proposition, and each would consider the proposition, and if
more than one-half agreed to sell, that property would be sold. That
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25-26 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Charles Crawford).
308
Id. at 26 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
309
See supra notes 250-259 and accompanying text.
310
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 26 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Michael Renville).
311
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
312
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Daniel
Robertson).
307
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is what we want to do here. Everyone who signs says “yes,” everyone
who does not sign says “no.” That is the way white men do and that
is the way we want you to do.313

It was at this moment that a tribal member made a comment that
proved to be a wedge into the Indians’ position regarding land-sale terms:
I am an Indian and the Great Spirit made me to live on this land;
but as an Indian have never done anything for myself. I now speak for
the Indian. If you will put the price at $2.50 per acre and 5 per cent.
interest paid annually in cash I have no doubt it will please all.314

Commissioner Diggs responded immediately to this suggested com
promise:
Now, my friends, we are coming a little nearer, but you have seen
that it is impossible to do as you wish. We will write a letter recommending what you ask and read it to you, and I will say that I will
urge our Congressmen to get it in the bill. I should be very sorry if all
our negotiations should fail on these two points, which is asking too
much of us under our instructions.315

Perhaps sensing that this was an opportune moment to temporarily adjourn the negotiations, Diggs added: “We know that all of you
want to go home, and if we could go now and eat and write that letter
we will meet you in an hour. If you would rather wait until morning we
will wait until then. We leave it to you to decide.”316 A tribal member
responded:
You gentlemen have come here among us and are to us like
gods. We can do nothing. It is for the people to do for themselves.
You are hurrying us too much. If you will give us something to eat
we will feel better. We will adjourn our meeting until to-morrow
morning.317

Reminiscent of strategic threats by the United States to withhold food
from Indian people in previous negotiations with tribes in the nineteenth

Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
314
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Motoduzahan [Mahtoduzadan, or “Swift Bear”]).
315
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
D.W. Diggs).
316
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
D.W. Diggs).
317
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Star).
313
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century,318 Diggs said: “We think that you all have been furnished provisions by the agent. Council adjourned till next morning at 10 o’clock.”319
e. December 13, 1889—U.S.-Dakota Negotiations at
Sisseton Agency
As negotiations thus approached what became the final, culminating
day, the U.S. commissioners had reason to be optimistic. Through a variety
of tactics, they had leveraged the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people from
the Indians’ initial “no land sales until back annuities are paid” position320
to potential acceptance of terms incorporating, into a single agreement,
(1) payment of back annuities and (2) the government’s offer to pay a
low amount of only $2.50 per acre for all unallotted lands within the
Lake Traverse Reservation.321 What remained, as negotiations resumed
on Friday, December 13, 1889, was the question whether the interest rate
for proceeds from the land sales deposited in the U.S. Treasury would be
(1) three percent, with the amount of interest expended at the discretion
of the Secretary of the Interior for the Indians’ benefit, or (2) five percent, to be distributed annually to the Indians in cash.322
See, e.g., LaVelle, supra note 224, at 53 n.43 (citing S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, supra
note 224, at 31-32, as quoted in Virginia Irving Armstrong, I Have Spoken: American
History Through the Voices of the Indians 106 (1971)) (“The duress to which the
Sioux tribes were subjected is evident in a response by Standing Elk of the Sicangu
Lakota to the Commission’s negotiation tactics. In a meeting at Spotted Tail Agency in
September 1876 to coerce signatures for the cession of the Black Hills, commissioner
A.S. Gaylord announced that ‘the Great Council [U.S. Congress] has made a law
stating the things which must be done by you in order that more food shall be given
you.’ To this, Standing Elk replied: ‘[I]t seems that hard words are placed upon us
and bend down our backs. Whatever the white people say to us, wherever I go, we all
say “Yes” to them—“Yes,” “Yes,” “Yes.” Whenever we don’t agree to anything that is
said in council, they give the same reply—“You won’t get any food;” “You won’t get
any food.”’”); cf. Genetin-Pilawa, supra note 134, at 138 (endnote omitted) (“[Indian
Rights Association] members were thankful that some agencies ‘diminished’ or
‘ceased’ their distribution of treaty-stipulated rations. This practice, they argued
(despite the fact that the United States was obligated to uphold treaty agreements),
inhibited assimilation. Withdrawing rations would force Native people to assimilate
and participate in a market economy—or starve.”); supra note 181 and accompanying
text (noting how conditions of starvation triggered the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862 and
citing authorities elaborating on this causative factor).
319
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 26 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs).
320
See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text; notes 218-219 and accompanying
text; notes 226-227 and accompanying text; note 231 and accompanying text; note 245
and accompanying text.
321
See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text; notes 220-225 and accompanying
text; note 229 and accompanying text; note 246 and accompanying text; notes 252-259
and accompanying text; notes 267-272 and accompanying text; notes 275-278 and
accompanying text; note 285 and accompanying text; note 292 and accompanying text;
notes 314-315 and accompanying text.
322
See supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text; note 263 and accompanying
text; note 272 and accompanying text; note 279 and accompanying text; note 291
and accompanying text; notes 293-308 and accompanying text; notes 312-315 and
accompanying text.
318
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Accordingly, at the beginning of the December 13 meeting, the
chairman of the U.S. commission, General Whittlesey, framed the remaining issues succinctly:
When we closed yesterday there was one thing that seemed to be
in the way; that was the interest on amount to be paid for land and
how it should be paid. As we told you, we were compelled to put it
in the agreement, the interest to be at 3 per cent., and that Congress
would retain the right to appropriate money as they thought best.
You want the money and the interest at 5 per cent. in cash. We said
that we could not put it in the agreement but would write a letter to
the honorable Secretary of the Interior.323

Whittlesey then ordered that the letter be read aloud and interpreted
for the Indians; the text of the letter later was published in the government’s report:
SIR: In our negotiations with the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands
of Dakota or Sioux Indians at this agency we find them very persistent in demanding 5 per cent. interest on the proceeds of the lands
which they propose to sell, and that the interest be paid to them in
cash, except so much thereof as may be necessary to support the
agency boarding school now here. They claim that they are citizens
of the United States and are sufficiently intelligent and competent to
manage their own affairs, and that that they have the right to be dealt
with as men like other citizens. We are inclined to concede these
demands, but are restricted by the act of Congress of February 8,
1887, section five (24 Stat. 388) [i.e., the General Allotment Act],
and by our instructions. These Indians are aware that the prevailing
interest allowed by the Government on the funds of Indians is five
per cent. per annum, and they are at a loss to understand why an
exception should be made in their case.
We understand that heretofore the proceeds of the sale of Indian
lands have been placed in the Treasury of the United States and bear
interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum in lieu of investment, and
we therefore recommend that Congress be requested to allow interest at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on the amount agreed to be
paid for the lands of these Indians, and to direct that the said interest
be paid per capita to them in cash, after deducting the amount annually necessary for the support of the agency boarding school.324
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey).
324
Id. at 12 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to John W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior). The U.S. negotiators also
wrote to their immediate supervisor, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, summarizing
their advocacy with respect to interest payments to the Indians:
After much talk, the Indians strongly contending that they should have
5 per cent. interest, to be paid per capita in cash, we agreed to write a letter to
the Secretary of the Interior, recommending that Congress be urged to allow
that rate per cent., and that after deducting enough to support the Government
schools the balance to be paid to them in cash, and that we would make every
effort in our power to bring about the desired result.
We deemed it proper to make this promise for the reason that 5 per cent. is
323
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After the letter was read, Whittlesey said:
You have heard what we have written. I hope you understand it.
We promise, all three of us, to do all that we can to get what you ask
for. That the 5 per cent. interest will be paid in cash, except what is
needed to support Government schools. We believe that you are all
men and can manage your own affairs better than others can manage
them for you. I have said enough and think that you are all satisfied
that we are trying to do what is right. If any one wishes to speak
before signing we will listen.325

Exhibiting familiarity with the tactics used by U.S. negotiators in
the nineteenth century when pushing for the dispossession of lands held
collectively by Indian nations, Chief Gabriel Renville opened his remarks
on a note of sarcasm: “We have often heard from you that you want all
to understand this matter and all do what is right.”326 He then reiterated
the point of clarification that he had made the previous day 327 to disabuse
the negotiators of the erroneous notion that the Indians were seeking a
lump-sum payment from the government for all of their unallotted lands:
“There has never been money paid to Indians in a lump in payment for
the lands. The Government always owes for the land and pays the interest on the amount the same as when one of you borrow[s] money from
another.”328 Chief Renville also made a final effort to get Whittlesey and
the other commissioners to accept the Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s position regarding the price per acre for the sale of their unallotted lands:
Since you have been here we have twice decided as a people what
to do. First, to get back annuities before selling, second, we reconsidered that answer and decided to ask $5 per acre for all surplus lands,
the amount to draw 5 per cent. interest in cash, and then all would
willingly sign. . . . The last council of the people decided on asking
$5 per acre and 5 per cent. interest, to be paid in cash, and will sign no
other. I do not say this to make anybody angry, but talk plain because
the usual rate allowed by the Government on Indian funds. In all the special
acts of the last Congress authorizing the purchase of Indian lands, provision is
made that the money paid therefor shall be placed in the Treasury and bear
5 per cent. per annum . . . . We can see no reason why an exception should be
made in the case of these Indians, and they are at a loss to understand why they
are not treated as well as other Indians, some of whom are their relations and
neighbors.
Id. at 7 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners,
to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan).
325
Id. at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
326
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville).
327
See supra text accompanying note 300 (emphasis added) (quoting the following
clarification from Chief Renville: “My friend seems to misunderstand us. We do not
want the pay for the lands in a lump, but want the 5 per cent. interest to be paid in
cash.”).
328
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
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I know it is right. . . . You were told to do what is right and for that
reason I have been among the people begging them to do right.329

Despite this final push by Chief Renville “to get the best deal for
his people”330 regarding particular land-sale terms, after two weeks of
intensive discussions the U.S. negotiators’ efforts to chip away at the
Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s resistance at last achieved its object. A decisive “collapse of the [Indians’] united front”331 occurred when one of the
most respected and influential elders, 82-year-old Simon Anawangmani,
stated his desire to have the negotiations come to a close:
The headmen have said they want to do right, and do what is right
for the people and I want to be protected by the laws of the Great
Father, and now that I can reach that I am glad because I and my
people like to have money. I have tried to hold on to what we have
left, but what more than what is offered us do we want? If I should
ask for all the money the Great Father has we could not get it. I am
getting weary and will sign, then I will have nothing more to trouble
myself about.332

Following this declaration, other Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives voiced their intention to follow Simon Anawangmani’s lead.333
Apparently sensing that signing was now inevitable, the Dakota Indians
present raised a series of questions in rapid succession. Michael Renville
asked, “[I]f we sell surplus lands how long will interest run on that?”334
“Forever” was the commission’s answer, “unless Congress appropriates
the principal.”335 Michael Renville also asked whether any of the proceeds from the land sales would be used to pay for the past services of
an attorney who had failed to get Congress to pass legislation that would
have redressed some of the Sisseton-Wahpetons’ grievances regarding
back annuities.336 The commission responded: “That contract expired last
year. . . . If you get it [i.e., the new agreement] through this way you will
not pay any one 10 per cent. or even 1 per cent.”337
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville).
330
Anderson, supra note 160, at 145.
331
Id.
332
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Simons Ananwangrnam [Simon Anawangmani, or
“Walks Galloping On”]).
333
See id. at 27-28 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statements
of Michael Renville) (“I believe in the words of Simons. . . . If you people have picked
Simons out as one to sign he will do so.”); see also id. at 28 (statement of Motoduzahan
[Mahtoduzadan, or “Swift Bear”]) (“This man (Simons) says he will sign, and so will I.”).
334
Id. at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Michael Renville).
335
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (answer by
commission).
336
See id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Michael Renville) (“We gave papers to a certain man. . . . Now, can that man draw his
pay?”).
337
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (answer by
329
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It certainly must have been clear to Chief Gabriel Renville, too,
that momentum was now building toward the negotiations’ conclusion.
Accordingly, he seized the opportunity to bring up an issue especially
important to him as past leader of the Dakota scouts in whose honor
the Lake Traverse Reservation was established in 1867.338 Referring to
the lapsed congressional bill of the previous year titled “Indians Who
Served in the Army of the United States,”339 Chief Renville asked, “A
year ago last winter who was it that got the bill along so far as it is?”340
General Whittlesey replied that both he and another commissioner,
Charles A. Maxwell, had been involved in the effort, and that “the House
Committee on Indian Affairs helped. The Commissioner of Indian Affairs
and Secretary of the Interior both recommended it. All of these did from
friendship what they could for you.”341 Chief Renville reminded the commission that he himself had been entitled to a share of the anticipated
benefits pursuant to the lapsed bill,342 an astute maneuver that may have
helped pave the way for Congress’s subsequent inclusion of a separate
provision of the 1891 Act appropriating additional funds especially for
all of the still-living former Dakota scouts as well as the families and
descendants of deceased scouts.343
Another Sisseton-Wahpeton leader and tribal elder, Solomon
Two Stars, who also had served under Gabriel Renville as a Dakota
scout,344 spoke immediately after the chief during these winding-down
moments of the negotiations. Demonstrating both remarkable prescience and extraordinary political skill in trying to prevent any further
rift among the tribal leaders, Two Stars delivered the following oration:
commission); see also id. at 7 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A.
Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan) (“[T]he
Indians raised a question as to whether a certain attorney would be entitled to and
receive a per cent. of the back annuity money under contracts made with some of
them. We explained to them that as the time limited in the contracts had expired last
July, there were now no such contracts in existence and that therefore they were under
no obligation to pay any attorney’s fees.”).
338
See Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (setting
apart reservation “in consideration of the faithful and important services said to have
been rendered by friendly bands of the Sissitons [sic] and Warpetons [sic] Sioux here
represented”), reprinted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 451 (1975); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 1953, supra note 177, at 6 (letter from J.D.C. Atkins, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, to William F. Vilas, Secretary of the Interior) (noting that “the third
article [of the 1867 Treaty] . . . sets apart for the scouts and their families the Traverse
Lake Reservation”).
339
H.R. Rep. No. 1953, supra note 177; see also supra note 221 and accompanying text.
340
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 28 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
341
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
342
See id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gabriel Renville).
343
See infra notes 473-476 and accompanying text.
344
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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I will say a few words. This man Simons [i.e., Simon Anawangmani]
at the time of the outbreak saved a white woman and took her
to her people. He did a good act. After that there were over two
hundred prisoners in the camp and others of us got together and
delivered them to the whites. We took them to General Sibley. Some
of those who saved the prisoners are dead, but some are here. This
man (Gabriel Renville) is one. We afterward got a great many of the
hostile Indians who came to our camp at night and gave them up to
General Sibley. In February, 1863, Gabriel Renville and some others
were sent out as scouts. We guarded this country from the James
River to the settlements. I think we did a great deal towards making
the frontier safe. For eighteen months we did this work without pay.
We know that by these acts we got this reservation. I think we ought
to be allowed to judge for ourselves and do what is right. I do not
accuse you gentlemen at all, but in the past we have signed papers
that we were afterwards blamed for and each would regret having
done so. What I want is that all understand this paper, and none sign
until we understand the agreement. Let the committee we selected
look it over, and if they consent to sign we will sign, but we want
5 per cent. interest.
....
If this paper is signed as it is it will make trouble. If you have
written to the Secretary we want to wait until the answer comes, and
if all is agreeable we want to sign. Everything we do in our councils
seems to be overruled by you. We have heard remarks made about
commissions in the past, and if this is signed as it is it will make talk
about you.345

General Whittlesey’s only response to this impassioned speech was
with regard to Two Stars’ last-ditch effort to get the commission to yield
to the Indians’ desire to have the agreement itself specify an interest
rate of five percent on proceeds from the sale of the unallotted lands.
“We told you yesterday why we could not do that,” Whittlesey said.346
Mahtoduzadan (Swift Bear) then interjected, saying,
I do not understand much, but will speak on what I think I understand. I think you have in this agreement all we have asked. You have
told us that all our [back annuity] money will be returned, and what
we get from sale of land will be in cash. That paper says that it will
be in cash, and that the rate of interest will be 5 per cent. We think
all Sisseton and Wahpetons who have lived here have a right here.347

Perceiving a misunderstanding in Mahtoduzadan’s remarks, Whittlesey
said:
I do not want any mistake to go out. I want you to understand this
agreement. It says that the interest is 3 per cent. In this letter we say
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 28 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Two Stars).
346
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
347
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Motoduzahan [Mahtoduzadan, or “Swift Bear”]).
345
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that it ought to be 5 per cent., and we ask the honorable Secretary
to ask Congress to say it will be 5 per cent., and I think you will have
the help of the Representatives from Dakota. Now I believe that all
understand this.348

Apparently detecting the Indians’ growing inclination toward signing,
Whittlesey added:
We have talked a long time. If we should stay to hear more my hair
could not get much whiter, but I would become too old to act. This is
just as we explained it yesterday. We give you an opportunity to sign,
but if all of you decide not to sign you have that right, but if you sign
you put a great deal of work on us.349

The last attempt to stop or delay the proceedings was made by
Chief Renville. “Why is it that it takes three-fourths at other agencies
to rule,” he asked, “while with us you say it takes only a majority. Our
treaty does not provide for the sale of this land at any time.”350 Whittlesey
replied, “My friend Gabriel knows that among white people a majority
rules.”351 Following this final rebuff from the chairman of the federal government’s negotiating commission, the tribal elder Simon Anawangmani
initiated the process of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians’ signing the 1889
Agreement, saying, “This paper is presented for signatures and I have
said that I will sign. I am playing no game. I am doing what is right. I have
already said that I will sign and will do so now.”352
5.

DeCoteau’s False Narrative of Tribal Consent, Distortion of
Legislative History, and Expedient Disregard of Indian Law
Principles

a. Misrepresenting the Testimony of the SissetonWahpeton Dakota
As this Article demonstrates, the U.S. government’s 1889 negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota did not entail any discussion
regarding a potential diminishment or termination of the Lake Traverse
Reservation. This observation is crucial for discerning the fallacy and
injustice of the Supreme Court’s 1975 DeCoteau v. District County
Court decision, holding that the reservation was disestablished; for, as
the Court’s opinion implicitly concedes,353 during the nineteenth century
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
349
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
350
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville).
351
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey).
352
Id. at 29 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Simons Ananwangrnam [Simon Anawangmani, or “Walks Galloping On”]).
353
See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 448 (1975) (asserting that the 1891 Act
“is not a unilateral action by Congress but the ratification of a previously negotiated
agreement, to which a tribal majority consented”); see also id. at 438 (observing that
348

Of Reservation Boundary Lines

and Judicial

Battle Lines

239

the federal government’s understanding was that Congress could not
alter a treaty reservation’s boundaries without the Indians’ consent.354
Accordingly, to conclude that Congress in the nineteenth century had
altered or terminated a reservation, a court would have to overcome formidable barriers. These include (1) the requirement, pursuant to Indian
law canons, that any agreement with the tribe exhibit clear evidence that
the Indians actually understood and consented to the alleged diminishment or disestablishment;355 (2) the Indian law canons-compelled
requirement that any ambiguities in the congressional act that is alleged
to have shrunk or extinguished a reservation, together with any doubtful
expressions found in the act’s legislative history, be resolved in favor of
concluding that the reservation remained intact;356 and (3) satisfaction of
the Supreme Court’s treaty abrogation standard whenever the reservation in question had been set apart by treaty as the Indians’ federally
protected homeland.357
With respect to the Indians’ understanding, this Article’s thorough examination358 dispels the fiction that the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota consented to the termination of the Lake Traverse Reservation
during their 1889 negotiations with the U.S. government 359 and exposes
DeCoteau as resting on the deployment of a false narrative about U.S.Dakota relations and the documented history and circumstances of the
negotiations.360 As explained previously, this misrepresentation consists
during the ratification debates “Congress recognized that the [1889] Agreement could
not be altered . . . .”).
354
See, e.g., Maricopa & Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Territory of Arizona, 156 U.S. 347, 351
(1895) (noting that because “there was no treaty with the Indians for whose benefit
the reservation was established, limiting the power of [C]ongress to grant the
railroad the rights conveyed,” Congress’s “consent . . . to the railroad’s entering on
the land and using it . . . was . . . a valid exercise of power”); see also Tassie Hanna
& Robert Laurence, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty
Abrogation, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 797, 814 (1987) (observing that not until the Supreme
Court’s decision in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), was it “made . . . clear
that [the Indians’] agreement was not a constitutional requirement before a treaty
could be abrogated”). In an 1899 report reviewing the history of Sisseton-Wahpeton
annuities in light of a pending amendment to an Indian appropriations bill, the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs wrote: “Congress has no constitutional power to settle or
interfere with rights under treaties, except in cases purely political.” S. Rep. No. 1441,
55th Cong., 3d Sess., at 17 (1899) (“Annuities of Certain Sioux Indians”).
355
See supra note 214 and accompanying text; Collins, supra note 214, at 21 (noting that
statutes ratifying “formal agreements with Indian nations” like the 1889 Agreement
in DeCoteau “are essentially treaty equivalents that should be subject to the treaty
canon”).
356
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
357
See infra notes 624-636 and accompanying text.
358
Cf. Collins, supra note 214, at 47 n.296 (“The [DeCoteau] Court quoted statements
by Indian parties to the agreement from which one might have determined their
understanding that the reservation would be abolished, but the question is uncertain
in the absence of a systematic effort to examine it.”).
359
See supra notes 121-352 and accompanying text.
360
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
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partially of DeCoteau’s use of “cherry-picked statements” taken out
of context from a May 1889 Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story that
purported to quote from interviews with several Sisseton-Wahpeton
leaders.361 But, more centrally, DeCoteau’s misleading portrayal of the
Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s alleged consent to the termination of their
reservation stems from the Court’s misrepresentations regarding the
official negotiations conducted at Sisseton Agency in November and
December of 1889.362
For instance, the transcribed proceedings 363 clearly show that from
the start the Indians had no intention of selling any of the unallotted land
within their reservation, insisting that the government first fulfill its outstanding preexisting obligations to the Dakota people.364 The DeCoteau
majority opinion, however, states that prior to the negotiations “the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs had apparently been won over” by the
Indians’ desire to sell their lands and that “[w]hile [the Commissioner’s]
proposed instructions [to the U.S. negotiators] suggested that sale of
all the surplus lands might be ‘inadvisable,’ the negotiations in fact proceeded toward such a total sale.”365 Nowhere does the opinion disclose
or even mention the Indians’ resistance to the coercive tactics used by
the commissioners to pressure the Sisseton-Wahpeton people into signing the prepared text of an “agreement” to sell all of the unallotted
lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation,366 a document replete with
See supra notes 124-152 and accompanying text.
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 15-29 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians).
363
See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 434-35 (1975) (footnote omitted)
(noting that the “proceedings at these meetings were transcribed”).
364
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 6 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs,
and Charles A. Maxwell, commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan)
(“[U]ntil those back annuities were paid [the Indians] positively declined to enter into
negotiations for the sale of any portion of their surplus lands . . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 1356,
51st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1890) (citation omitted) (noting that “the Indians absolutely
refused to enter into any negotiations for the sale of their surplus lands, or any portion
of them, unless the commissioners would agree to incorporate in the agreement a
stipulation for the payment of certain annuities claimed to be due them under an
act of Congress approved February 16, 1863”); see also supra notes 218-242 and
accompanying text.
365
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 434. Although DeCoteau places the word “inadvisable” in
quotation marks, see id., that word does not appear in the “draught of instructions,”
see Letter of Instructions, supra note 164, at 198 (Aug. 13, 1889 letter from T.J. Morgan,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to John W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior), approved
by the Secretary of the Interior and transmitted to the U.S. commission tasked with
eliciting a land-sale agreement from the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota. Rather, the
letter of instructions states: “It is not considered advisable that the cession at this time
should embrace all these surplus lands. A sufficient quantity should be reserved for
future contingencies.” Id. at 200.
366
See supra notes 157-352 and accompanying text; see also Reply Brief for Petitioner,
supra note 132, at 14, 1974 WL 186005, at *9 (citing S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 23-29 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians)) (“A
close reading of the transcripts of the last two of the five council sessions that the
361
362
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boilerplate terminology in a language foreign to the Indians, and landsale terms selected and dictated by the commissioners themselves.367
The false light that DeCoteau casts on the U.S. government’s negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota is further displayed in this
sentence:
[T]he records show that the Indians wished to sell outright all of
their unallotted lands, on three conditions: that each tribal member, regardless of age or sex, receive an allotment of 160 acres; that
Congress appropriate moneys to make good on the tribe’s outstanding “loyal scout claim”; and that an adequate sales price per acre be
arrived at for all of the unallotted land.368

In this sentence use of the term “loyal scout claim”—a term invented, not
quoted, by the Court369—is misleading in two fundamental ways. First,
it positively misrepresents the record of negotiations that the sentence
purports to summarize; for the transcribed proceedings show that the
U.S. negotiators repeatedly clarified that the agreement the commissioners were urging the Indians to sign would not single out the Dakota
scouts for privileged benefits, but instead would provide per capita
distribution of “back annuity” payments to all the Sisseton-Wahpeton
people.370 Second, and relatedly, the term “loyal scout claim” in the sentence from DeCoteau is a red herring, diverting from acknowledging the
crucial condition that the Indians did impose—adamantly and repeatedly—during the negotiations, namely, that the United States at long
last pay restitution for having wrongfully confiscated and cut off treaty

commissioners held with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux reveals that the Tribe was
probably strong-armed into opening the Lake Traverse Reservation.”); Kunesh, supra
note 105, at 33 n.91 (“The Tribe did not so much willingly sell and cede its land, as
it acted out of desperation, sacrificing the land to ensure the community’s survival,
since the federal government at that time was under intense pressure to open the
Reservation for farming and railroad development.”); see also supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
367
See supra text accompanying note 288. The U.S. negotiators thus disregarded their
instructions when they confronted the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota with a unilaterally
preformulated “agreement”—a document the negotiators themselves defiantly and
dramatically signed in the Indians’ presence, see supra text accompanying note 288—
that (1) contained terms that were contrary to the terms demanded by the Indians,
see supra text accompanying note 291, and (2) dictated the sale of all of the unallotted
lands on the Lake Traverse Reservation despite the Indian Affairs Commissioner’s
warning, endorsed by the Secretary of the Interior, that a cession that “embrace[d] all
these surplus lands” would “not [be] considered advisable,” see supra note 365.
368
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 (footnote omitted).
369
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
370
See, e.g., S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey) (“In this agreement we do
not say anything about scout money, but call it the back annuities due the Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians, parties to this agreement.”); see also supra text accompanying
notes 258-259 supra text accompanying notes 276-278; infra notes 478-500 and
accompanying text.
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annuities after the U.S.-Dakota War,371 a “monstrous injustice to the
Sisseton and Wahpeton bands.”372
Evasion, omission, and diversion thus characterize DeCoteau’s
treatment of the Indians’ understanding of the agreement that they
signed at the closing of the 1889 negotiations. Most astonishing is
DeCoteau’s restricting to a single footnote its primary consideration of
the most compelling evidence of “tribal and congressional intent,”373
i.e., the meticulously transcribed negotiations contained in the 29-page
Executive Branch report on the U.S. commission’s proceedings.374
DeCoteau utilizes that footnote, moreover, as a conduit for misrepresenting testimony from the report and for promoting erroneous and
misleading implications drawn from dubious and only partially disclosed
sources. For example, the footnote begins by quoting only the first part
of a sentence in a letter from the U.S. negotiators to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs that appears in the government’s report, in which the
negotiators state “that they had ‘advised them [the tribe] that we proposed to give $2.50 per acre for each and every acre of the lands which
they desired to dispose of . . . .’”375 But in the report itself, that sentence
continues as follows: “. . . the funds arising therefrom to be placed in
the United States Treasury upon the terms and conditions named in the
general allotment act.”376 By this omission the Supreme Court evaded
having to reconcile its interpretation of the surplus land act in DeCoteau
as legislation that implied Congress’s intent to alter the reservation, with
the Court’s contrary interpretation of an allotment-era congressional
act in Mattz v. Arnett, where the Court reiterated that the legislation at
issue, which mirrored provisions of the General Allotment Act, “did no
more . . . than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the
reservation in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development
of its wards.”377 By omitting crucial contextualizing words from the negotiators’ letter, the DeCoteau Court avoided having to genuinely confront
or explain this contradiction.378
See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 2.
373
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447.
374
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157.
375
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 n.16 (alterations in original) (quoting S. Exec. Doc. No. 66,
supra note 157, at 7 (letter from appointed negotiators Eliphalet Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs,
and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan)).
376
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 7 (letter from appointed negotiators
Eliphalet Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs
Commissioner T.J. Morgan); see supra note 288.
377
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 497 (1973) (alteration omitted) (quoting
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1962)); see supra text accompanying
notes 44-48.
378
The Supreme Court purported to reconcile DeCoteau with Mattz v. Arnett by opining
that in Mattz the surplus land act brought about a “mere opening of [reservation] lands
to settlement” which was not inconsistent with “continued reservation status,” whereas
371
372
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Next, the footnote in DeCoteau exhibits a long excerpt from that
same letter in the government’s report, spotlighting the negotiators’
assertion that “upon informal inquiry among the Indians it was learned
that [the negotiators’] plan” to “reserve a large quantity of land for educational and Government purposes” “would not meet with [the Indians’]
approval.”379 The letter goes on to state that the negotiators “did not press
the matter, believing it better that the Government should own the lands
upon which the agency and school building are located.”380 At least two
erroneous implications spring from DeCoteau’s strategic emplacement
of this language from the negotiators’ letter. First, the language might
be misconstrued to suggest that, by purportedly refusing to approve the
commissioners’ “plan” to “reserve a large quantity of land for educational
and Government purposes,”381 the Indians were objecting to the continuation of reservation status beyond the sale of the unallotted land. Second,
the selected language from the negotiators’ letter might be misconstrued
as implying that the Sisseton-Wahpeton people wished to retain little or
no presence of the federal government in the Indians’ vicinity after the sale
of their unallotted lands, a presence that would endure if the agreement
were to “reserve a large quantity of land for educational and Government
purposes.”382 Both implications are without merit.
the 1891 Act in DeCoteau “is a very different instrument” because “[i]t is not a unilateral
action by Congress but the ratification of a previously negotiated agreement, to which
a tribal majority consented.” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447-48 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted); see also id. at 447 (opining that “the gross differences between the facts of
those cases [i.e., Mattz and Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)] and the
facts here cannot be ignored”). But the distinction is illusory because the appearance
in DeCoteau of tribal consent to the termination of the Lake Traverse Reservation
rests on the advancement of a false historical narrative that is contradicted and
dispelled by the record of actual negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota in
1889. See supra & infra notes 353-563 and accompanying text. Moreover, the fact that
“[t]he Lake Traverse reservation . . . has the distinction of being the first reservation
partitioned under the General Allotment Act,” Michael L. Lawson, Indian Heirship
Lands: The Lake Traverse Experience, S.D. Hist., Winter 1982, at 213, 217-18 (footnote
omitted), and that Congress followed the 1887 Act’s general prescription for acquiring
“such portions of its reservation . . . as [a] tribe shall . . . consent to sell,” Act of Feb. 8,
1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389, evinces a perfect alignment between the “purchase
and release,” id., of Sisseton-Wahpeton surplus lands, on the one hand, and the policy of
the General Allotment Act, on the other, a policy that “clearly does not . . . abolish the
reservations,” United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 287 (1909) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, the General Allotment Act’s “policy was
to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands . . . .” Moe v.
Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478
(1976) (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496); see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying
text; supra note 158 and accompanying text; infra notes 644-647 and accompanying
text.
379
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 7 (letter from appointed negotiators
Eliphalet Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs
Commissioner T.J. Morgan), quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 n.16.
380
Id.
381
Id.
382
Id.
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The first implication conflicts with additional language from the
government’s report that is left out of the DeCoteau footnote. That footnote concludes with an excerpt from a letter to the Secretary of the
Interior in which the Commissioner of Indian Affairs “explain[s] the
final agreement.”383 The Commissioner’s letter breaks down the proposed
allocation of acreage, stating that the “Indians entitled to allotments”
“number between 1,500 and 1,600 souls, . . . leaving 662,780 acres to
which the Indian title is extinguished by the terms of the agreement.”384
While the DeCoteau footnote stops there, the Commissioner’s letter continues as follows: “Included in this are the lands upon which the agency
and school buildings are located . . . .”385 This additional language from
the Commissioner’s letter is crucial for ascertaining the true meaning of
the U.S. negotiators’ phrase “reserve a large quantity of land for educational and Government purposes.”386 It demonstrates that the issue was
whether or not the “lands upon which the agency and school buildings
[were] located”387 would be included in the total acreage to be purchased
from the Indians, lands to which “the Indian title”—a possessory term,
not a jurisdictional one—would thus be “extinguished.”388 In other words,
the question whether the Indians wished to “reserve a large quantity
of land for educational and Government purposes”389 equates only to
whether they wanted to withhold such land from sale. It does not equate
to whether they intended to retain such land in reservation status.390
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 437 n.16.
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 4-5 (letter from Indian Affairs
Commissioner T.J. Morgan to Interior Secretary John W. Noble), quoted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 437 n.16.
385
Id. (letter from Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan to Interior Secretary
John W. Noble).
386
Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (letter from appointed negotiators Eliphalet Whittlesey,
D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan),
quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 n.16.
387
Id. at 5 (letter from Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan to Interior Secretary
John W. Noble).
388
Id. at 4-5 (letter from Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan to Interior
Secretary John W. Noble), quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 437 n.16.
389
Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (letter from appointed negotiators Eliphalet Whittlesey,
D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan),
quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 n.16.
390
The word “reserved” appears elsewhere in the transcribed proceedings as denoting
“withheld from sale” rather than “retained in reservation status.” See id. at 21 (emphasis
added) (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey) (“The commission will recommend that all receive equal allotments
of land. In order to do this you need some land reserved.”); supra text accompanying
note 255; cf. supra note 164 (emphasis added) (reprinting letter of instructions from
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the U.S. negotiators stating that “[a] sufficient
quantity [of surplus lands] should be reserved for future contingencies”). DeCoteau,
however, deploys the word “reserved” to forge an association with reservation
status, see DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added) (“In May [1889], Diggs met
with a council of tribal leaders, who told him that the tribe would consider selling
the reserved lands . . . .”), thereby promoting the fallacious implication discussed
383
384
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The second potential implication arising from the DeCoteau footnote is that the reason the Indians disapproved of a “plan” that would
“reserve a large quantity of land for educational and Government purposes” was because they wished to be rid of the federal government’s
presence.391 But this implication, too, is dispelled by the recorded testimony, if fairly and fully considered. DeCoteau, however, promotes
the erroneous implication by misrepresenting the views of SissetonWahpeton Chief Gabriel Renville, juxtaposing two strategically placed
extracts from the chief’s many speeches over the two weeks of negotiations. Thus, the Supreme Court wrote:
During the negotiations, the intent of all parties to effect a clear
conveyance of all unallotted lands was evident. For instance, on
December 3, 1889, Gabriel Renville, a tribal spokesman, stated:
“I have spoken for all the people, and it is their wish that I should
say these things. In the past there has been lots of land sold, but we
have not benefited by the sales. In 1867 they promised us they would
help us, but they have not helped us very much for many years. Let
them first settle our claim [loyal scout claim]392 and then we will talk
about our surplus lands. We are now citizens and can talk with you
as such, and do not care to talk about shoe pacs, etc., but cash. We
can buy for ourselves what we need if payment is made in cash, and
then we do not care to have an agency here after the surplus lands
have been sold. The people have asked me to say this as their wish.”
....
The Indians were aware that they were taking a not insignificant
step in selling the reservation lands. Gabriel Renville stated:
“This little reservation is ours, and all we have left. There is nothing
in our treaty that says that we must sell. It was given us as a permanent home, but now we have decided to sell . . . .”393

DeCoteau’s showcasing of selected and altered quotations in
footnote 16 projects a distorted and misleading depiction of the SissetonWahpeton people’s negotiations with the U.S. government in late 1889.
supra at text accompanying note 381 and at text accompanying notes 383-390. In this
regard, it should be noted further that the term “reserved lands” does not appear in
the May 1889 Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story which DeCoteau references in
stating, misleadingly, that “[i]n May [1889], Diggs met with a council of tribal leaders,
who told him that the tribe would consider selling the reserved lands . . . ,” DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added). Instead, the newspaper story states that “the general
object” of the May 1889 meeting was merely “to ascertain [the Indians’] views in
regard to opening the reservation,” not abolishing it. See A Large Pow-Wow, supra
note 125 (emphasis added); supra text accompanying note 126.
391
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 7 (letter from appointed negotiators
Eliphalet Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs
Commissioner T.J. Morgan), quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 n.16; see supra text
accompanying note 382.
392
DeCoteau’s altering of Chief Renville’s speech by inserting, in brackets, the term
“loyal scout claim”—a term invented by the Supreme Court itself, see supra note 369
and accompanying text—functions as a diversion. See infra notes 398-406 and
accompanying text.
393
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 436-37 n.16 (citations omitted).
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As an initial observation, there is bitter irony in the Supreme Court’s
quoting from Chief Renville’s testimony on December 3 as “eviden[ce]”
of the Indians’ “intent . . . to effect a clear conveyance of all unallotted
lands”;394 for, as this Article’s examination shows, Chief Renville strenuously and vocally opposed the sale of any of the unallotted lands during
the tense negotiations that took place on December 3.395 Indeed, the
chief’s opposition is manifest in the concluding sentences of a speech of
his that immediately precedes the extract from his December 3 testimony
that DeCoteau isolates. Just prior to his follow-up remark “I have spoken
for all the people, and it is their wish that I should say these things,”396
Chief Renville said:
We are friends; first settle our claim, and then we will listen to and
talk with you about our surplus land. . . . We all want to do what is
right. Why should the Government refuse to pay us our claim before
they wish to take away our land.397

The Supreme Court’s misleading, out-of-context portrayal of Chief
Renville’s remarks on December 3 alone casts considerable doubt on
DeCoteau’s purporting to draw from the testimony of Sisseton-Wahpeton
leaders any implication of tribal consent to the termination of the Lake
Traverse Reservation.
One of the ways DeCoteau misrepresents Chief Renville’s testimony is by adding an alteration to a quotation while keeping the actual
Id. at 436 n.16.
See supra notes 166-174 and accompanying text (examining U.S. negotiations with
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota on December 3, 1889, and showing Chief Gabriel
Renville’s opposition to the government’s proposal that the Indians immediately agree
to sell their unallotted lands on the Lake Traverse Reservation); supra notes 219-242
and accompanying text (same).
396
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville), quoted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 436 n.16 (citation omitted); see supra note 393 and accompanying text. In the
context of the transcribed December 3 negotiations Chief Renville’s statement “I have
spoken for all the people, and it is their wish that I should say these things” functions
both as (1) a follow-up remark underscoring his insistence that the government must
“first settle our [back annuities] claim” before “we will listen to and talk with you
about our surplus land,” infra text accompanying note 397, and (2) a defiant rebuttal
to the chairman’s stated intention to disregard and bypass the chief’s spokesman role
altogether, i.e., Whittlesey’s divisive threat to “to put down on paper just what we
think to be right” and “give every one a chance to sign it.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey); see also supra text accompanying notes 230-231.
397
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville); see supra notes 226-227 and
accompanying text. The chairman of the U.S. negotiating commission grudgingly
acknowledged Chief Renville’s refusal to discuss land-sale terms at the December 3
meeting, saying, just prior to the close of the meeting: “We will do what we can to help
you to get your claim through, although you are putting a load on us in asking us to help
get your bill through Congress before the reservation is opened.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66,
supra note 157, at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians)
(statement of Gen. Whittlesey); see supra note 241 and accompanying text.
394
395

Of Reservation Boundary Lines

and Judicial

Battle Lines

247

context undisclosed, thereby inviting an erroneous association between
the chief ’s words and a different, inapposite concept. Thus, DeCoteau displays the following altered quotation from Chief Renville: “In 1867 they
promised us they would help us, but they have not helped us very much
for many years. Let them first settle our claim [loyal scout claim] and then
we will talk about our surplus lands.”398 Insertion of the bracketed term
“loyal scout claim”—a term devised by the Supreme Court itself 399—
leads the reader to assume (wrongly) that “[i]n 1867” the United States
promised to “help” the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota through a treaty
promise that had something to do with satisfying a “loyal scout claim.”
Indeed, the Supreme Court promoted this association in express terms a
few pages previous to the Court’s distortion of Chief Renville’s words in
footnote 16;400 for, on page 433 DeCoteau states that during the May 1889
Minneapolis Tribune interview “a council of tribal leaders . . . told
[D.W. Diggs] that the tribe would consider selling the reserved lands
if the Government would first pay a ‘loyal scout claim’ which the tribe
believed was owing as part of the 1867 Treaty.”401
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 436 n.16 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville)); see supra text accompanying
note 393.
399
See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
400
See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
401
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433; see also supra note 178 and accompanying text. DeCoteau
adds a further layer of misdirection regarding the May 1889 Minneapolis Tribune
interview by asserting, in a footnote, that one month earlier banker D.W. Diggs and
“other local, non-Indian citizens from the counties adjacent to the reservation” had
written to the Secretary of the Interior and “promised to use their influence to secure
to the tribe further congressional appropriations, mentioned in the 1867 Treaty, Art. VI,
as compensation for the tribe’s loyalty during the 1862 Sioux uprising.” DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 432 n.8 (emphasis added). In actuality, the “resolution” Diggs sent to the
Secretary of the Interior, to which DeCoteau refers, see id., mentions neither the 1867
Treaty in general nor Article VI of that treaty in particular. Rather, in relevant part
Diggs’s “resolution” provided as follows:
WHEREAS the Indians on this reservation have certain grievances which
they urge as a reason for withholding their consent to final action necessary to
opening the Reservation to settlement.
RESOLVED: That it is the sense of this convention composed of all the
counties contiguous to the said Reservation that the government of the
United States owes a debt of gratitude to all Indians who were loyal and rendered service or befriended the white man in the terrible scenes of the massacre
of 1862, and that Chief Gabriel Renville having been conspicuous as a friend
of the government and the white man, the government should recognize such
loyalty and service in some substantial form.
RESOLVED, That as citizens we will use our influence to secure to Chief
Renville and all other Indians who were loyal to the government, who are
now members of this band, that justice that has been denied them. Confident
that the government will promptly accord to them such compensation as in its
judgment they are under the law entitled, and will see to it that the provisions
of treaties heretofore made are scrupulously carried out to the end, that any
wrong to them resulting from neglect shall be speedily redressed.
398
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But in truth, during the late 1889 negotiations, including the discussions that took place on December 3, the “claim” Chief Renville and
the other Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders repeatedly invoked was, as summarized by President Benjamin Harrison, a claim for “payment by the
United States of the annuities which were forfeited [by Congress] by
the act of February 16, 1863,” a payment that was “justly due to these
friendly Indians” and whose “allowance ha[d] already been too long
delayed.”402 Notwithstanding DeCoteau’s staging of inapposite and misRESOLVED, That we recommend to congress, that all men in this band who
acted as scouts under Genl. Sibley be suitably rewarded for their loyalty and
valuable services.
RESOLVED, that we urge upon the Secretary of the Interior the importance of immediately adjusting all just claims in order that the Sisseton Reservation may be speedily opened[.]
Nat’l Archives Recs. of the Bureau of Indian Aff. Rec. Grp. 75, Spec. Case 147
(Sisseton), Letter No. 26163-1889, encl. 3 (“Resolutions of the Convention” signed
by D.W. Diggs and six others, dated May 13, 1889, and stated to be “a true copy of
the resolutions passed by the Convention held at Watertown[, Dakota Territory,]
for the purpose of securing the Early opening of the Sisseton Indian Reservation”)
(on file with author) [hereinafter “Diggs Resolution”], cited in DeCoteau, 425 U.S.
at 431-32 n.8. As the Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives made clear at the May 1889
Minneapolis Tribune interview and during their two weeks of negotiations with the
U.S. commission in November and December of that year, the “certain grievances”
that the Indians “urge[d] as a reason for withholding their consent to final action
necessary to opening the Reservation to settlement,” id., stemmed not from concerns
about the federal government’s failure to compensate the unpaid scouts nor from
unfulfilled promises contained in Article VI of the 1867 Treaty, but from Congress’s
acts of retaliatory aggression in having confiscated and foreclosed annuity payments
guaranteed by treaties with the Santee Dakota Indians that predated the 1862 U.S.Dakota War. See supra notes 146-147 and accompanying text; supra notes 173-180 and
accompanying text; infra notes 483-490 and accompanying text; cf. 31 Cong. Rec. 1651
(1898) (exhibiting text of a bill for restoring “the annuities . . . arising under the [Santee
Dakota] treaties . . . of . . . 1837, and . . . 1851, which annuities [were] declared forfeited
by the act of Congress approved February 16, 1863”); Wolfchild v. Redwood Cty.,
91 F. Supp. 3d 1093, 1096-97 (D. Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (discussing annuities
established and extended under 1837, 1851, and 1858 treaties with the various bands of
the Santee Dakota Indians and explaining that “as a result [of the 1862 U.S.-Dakota
War], Congress [by the Act of Feb. 16, 1863, 12 Stat. 652,] abrogated and annulled all
treaties between [the United States and the Minnesota Sioux], and declared all lands
and rights of occupancy within the State of Minnesota and annuities and claims to
the United States forfeited”). The “recommend[ation]” that the scouts “be suitably
rewarded for their loyalty and valuable services,” Diggs Resolution, supra, likely was
added to the resolution in an attempt to appease Gabriel Renville, who had served
as leader of the Dakota scouts, in advance of the meeting Diggs had arranged to take
place a month later for the purpose of luring Renville and other tribal representatives
into accepting the white Dakota citizens’ schemes for obtaining congressional “action
necessary to opening the Reservation to settlement,” id. See infra note 488.
402
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 1-2 (letter from President Benjamin Harrison
to the Senate and House of Representatives); supra note 175 and accompanying text;
cf. S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 18-19 (emphasis added) (report of councils
with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statements of D.W. Diggs) (“The chief has
shown us just what is between us. The error in survey of east line and the payment of
the claim of back annuities. . . . We are here to-day to help you to get that money . . . .”);
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leading associations,403 Chief Renville’s statement that “[i]n 1867 [the
U.S. government] promised us they would help us” clearly was not in
reference to any “loyal scout claim.”404 Rather, that statement alluded to
Article VI of the 1867 Treaty, which promised that “in consideration of
the destitution . . . resulting from the confiscation of their annuities and
improvements, . . . Congress will, in its own discretion, from time to time
make such appropriations as may be deemed requisite to enable said
Indians to return to an agricultural life . . . .”405 Indeed, Chief Renville
made this exact reference explicit in the very exchange on December 3
from which DeCoteau strategically extracts, saying, “We are poor and our
crops have failed; but you have our money, holding it, and do not help us
as promised in the sixth article of the treaty of 1867 . . . .”406
supra text accompanying note 225.
403
Remarkably, three false and misleading associations are implanted in a single
pivotal sentence in DeCoteau. Thus, the Supreme Court wrote: “In May, Diggs met
with a council of tribal leaders, who told him that the tribe would consider selling
the reserved lands if the Government would first pay a ‘loyal scout claim’ which the
tribe believed was owing as part of the 1867 Treaty.” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433. But
in the May 1889 Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story to which DeCoteau refers,
there is no mention—by the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota leaders or anyone else—of
(1) the term “reserved lands,” (2) the judicially invented label “loyal scout claim,” or
(3) the 1867 Treaty that established the Lake Traverse Reservation. See A Large PowWow, supra note 125. All three of the illusory associations in this misleading sentence
from DeCoteau are instrumental in the case’s construction of a false narrative of
tribal consent to the reservation’s extinguishment. See, e.g., supra notes 379-390 and
accompanying text (discussing DeCoteau’s treatment of the phrase “reserve a large
quantity of land for educational and Government purposes”); supra & infra notes 398406 and accompanying text (discussing DeCoteau’s inapposite references to the 1867
Treaty); infra notes 473-500 and accompanying text (discussing DeCoteau’s use of the
label “loyal scout claim”).
404
Consistent with President Benjamin Harrison’s summary of the matter, see supra
note 402 and accompanying text, the original context of Renville’s speech shows
that in saying “our claim,” see supra text accompanying note 398, the chief meant
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people’s demand for restitution of annuity payments
that were guaranteed by the 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux but that had been
confiscated and cut off by Congress in 1863, in retaliation after the U.S.-Dakota War
of 1862. Thus, Renville’s reference to “our claim” is extracted from remarks of his
on December 3, 1889, which in turn responded to a long speech by commissioner
D.W. Diggs in which Diggs stated that the commission “recommend[ed] that the back
annuities be paid first, from 1862 to date,” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19
(report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs);
see also id. at 17 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (Dec. 3, 1889
statement of Gabriel Renville) (“The feeling among the people is not that they do not
intend to sell at all, but what we want is that our claim be allowed first. After that, if
a commission comes, we will sell to them if we can agree on terms. We claim that our
back annuities should be allowed from 1862 and not from 1864 as suggested by Indian
Office.”); supra text accompanying note 170. For further discussion of this, see infra
notes 478-500 and accompanying text.
405
Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. VI, 15 Stat. 505, 507, as amended, 15 Stat. 509, reprinted in
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 453; see also infra note 418 and accompanying text.
406
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville); supra text accompanying note 227.
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With regard to this second erroneous implication stemming from
DeCoteau’s selective quoting of words from the U.S. negotiators’ letter,
the crucial point is as follows. The notion that the letter’s language as
invoked in DeCoteau 407 implies the Indians wished to be rid of the federal
government’s presence 408 is contradicted by abundant testimony in the
record. Assuming that the U.S. commissioners were not simply fabricating what they claimed had been “learned” “upon informal inquiry among
the Indians,”409 the letter’s language, and Chief Renville’s remark disparaging the agency (i.e., “we do not care to have an agency here . . . .”),410 are
most reasonably construed as reflecting the Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s
grievances over the federal government’s corruption, incompetence,
and overall failures in the administration of Indian affairs on the Lake
Traverse Reservation, as well as their need to maximize revenue from the
sale of unallotted lands on account of the Indians’ impoverished and desperate condition.411 The language quoted from the negotiators’ letter and
A short time earlier during the same exchange with the U.S. commissioners on the
afternoon of December 3, 1889, Chief Renville made another remark that makes clear
he was not referring to any “loyal scout claim” when he invoked the 1867 Treaty. Thus,
the chief said: “In 1867 Congress said, by treaty, that it would help us when we were in
need.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 18 (emphasis added) (report of councils
with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville); supra text
accompanying note 227; see also supra note 404.
407
I.e., the negotiators’ purporting to report that “upon informal inquiry . . . it was
learned” that the Indians disapproved of the “plan” to “reserve a large quantity
of land for educational and Government purposes,” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 7 (letter from appointed negotiators Eliphalet Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs,
and Charles A. Maxwell to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan), quoted in
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435 n.16; see supra text accompanying note 379
408
See supra text accompanying notes 379-382.
409
See supra note 407 and accompanying text. Feigning consultation with the Indians
was a ploy that had been used in defrauding the Dakota previously, during the scandal
involving the 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux and the so-called “traders’ paper,”
see infra note 439 and accompanying text. See also Meyer, supra note 181, at 80-81
(“Each Indian, after he stepped away from the treaty table, was pulled to a barrel nearby
and made to sign a document prepared by the traders. . . . The Indians later claimed that
they had thought they were signing a third copy of the treaty . . . . The traders and some
others insisted, however, that the whole matter had been discussed privately beforehand
and that the Indians knew perfectly well what they were signing.”).
410
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville), quoted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 436 n.16 (citations omitted); see also supra note 393 and accompanying text.
411
See, e.g., S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 18 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville) (“We are very poor just now,
as our crops have failed. . . . There has been several years we have received nothing,
although we relied upon it. If [Congress] were reminded of this they might help us
this winter.”); supra note 227 and accompanying text; see also A Large Pow-Wow,
supra note 125 (conveying statement of Sisseton-Wahpeton representative Solomon
Two Stars) (“Don’t got any crops. We are suffering, no telling about this season. We
may all starve . . . .”); supra note 141 and accompanying text; 22 Cong. Rec. 611 (1890)
(“Executive and Other Communications”) (noting transmittal of “a communication
from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs [to the House Committee on Indian Affairs],
calling attention to the distressed and suffering condition of the Sisseton and Wahpeton
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Indians and the necessity for passage of” the bill ratifying the 1889 Agreement). In the
communication referenced in the Congressional Record, the Commissioner of Indian
Affairs wrote:
I am in receipt of the following telegram from Hon. Herbert Welsh, dated
Philadelphia, December 15, 1890: “John Robinson, Episcopal missionary,

Sisseton Reservation, has just wired me, ‘Get day for considering Sisseton bill
before holiday adjournment. Immediate action should be taken for the sake of
human life. Urge and insist on this. Sickness increasing on account of hunger
and cold. Do not delay a day.’”
H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 100, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., at 1 (1890) (letter from George Chandler,
Acting Secretary of the Interior, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
transmitting communication from T.J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs);
see also Nat’l Archives Recs. of the Bureau of Indian Aff. Rec. Grp. 75, Letters
Received: Spec. Case 147 (Sisseton), Letter No. 39462-1890 & encl. (on file with
author) (letter from South Dakota Governor Arthur C. Mellette to John W. Noble,
Secretary of the Interior, with enclosed Nov. 27, 1890 petition signed by Chief
Gabriel Renville and 67 other “delegates representing the Sisseton and Wahpeton
Indians” conveying “the absolute need and destitution existing at [Sisseton] Agency
as the result of crop failures,” “call[ing] upon the proper authorities at Washington
for aid during the coming winter,” and stating that “[u]nless we are helped in some
way, great suffering will be the result”), cited in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 432 n.8. In
a letter from the previous summer, dated July 14, 1890, the U.S. Indian agent for
Sisseton Agency wrote:
My annual report, together with all other reports and references, show that this
section of country suffered severely by drought during the summer of 1889,
and that nearly all of the crops on the Lake Traverse Reservation were blasted
and dried up. The Indians of this reservation having taken allotments in 1887
began to make quite an effort at farming in 1888 and 1889, and used up all the
means they had in opening up land, building, etc., and became almost entirely
dependent upon their crops for a living.
I found these Indians so poor and destitute in the fall of 1889, after the
drought of that season, that I immediately reported their condition, and the
honorable Secretary of the Interior at once authorized me to expend a sum
not exceeding $2,000 in the purchase of flour, pork, and beans for the relief
of the destitute. Said provisions were purchased in November last, and have
been carefully issued as directed, and there are no further provisions for these
destitute people. These Indians are in want of provisions. Their destitution
presses them so hard that the few trees that should be left to grow are being cut
and hauled away to purchase something to live on. They are digging the wild
turnips, and I often hear of ponies and oxen being sold for their value to obtain
provisions for their families. The agency physician, after visiting the sick, often
reports the destitution and poverty of the families. These Indians have but few
resources for obtaining the necessaries of life. They obtain a limited amount
of fish from the lakes, and this is all the wild game on this reservation. There is
but little timber, which is located around the lakes and in the ravines, and this is
wrongfully being cut from necessity, as before stated.
A very few Indian men can get employment among the whites, as they are
not that far advanced in civilization to command much pay as laborers. The old
Chief Renville and many of the leading men of the tribe have visited me of late,
and called my attention to the destitution of the people. They say that if the
tribe has anything coming to it from the Government from any source whatever, that it is the earnest desire of all that sufficient supplies and provisions
be purchased and issued to the tribe to relieve them from their destitution and
poverty. These leading Indians apply for food for the tribe and insist that such
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from Chief Renville’s testimony does not imply that the Indians wanted
their reservation abolished.
Thus, the transcribed proceedings exhibit the Indians’ resentment
over the corruption and meddling of U.S. agents assigned to superintend
the reservation. In one strikingly tense moment, Chief Renville demanded
that the commissioners remove one such former agent from the gathering at Sisseton Agency, saying, “There is one here who the people do not
want here any longer. They do not like him as agent, and do not think
he ought to be allowed to remain here, as he is not agent now.”412 In fact,
it is in the context of precisely this exchange with the commissioners—
recorded on the same page of the transcribed proceedings—that Chief
Renville exclaimed: “We can buy for ourselves what we need if payment
is made in cash, and then we do not care to have an agency here after the
surplus lands have been sold.”413 The context clearly shows that Chief
Renville was expressing disgust and exasperation at the presence of a
former U.S. agent whom the Sisseton-Wahpeton people loathed.414 His
destitution and poverty should not be allowed to continue. They say that a small
payment now will do more good than a large one after many of them have died
from destitution and want. They despair of the relief from the bill now before
Congress for the payment of back annuities, and earnestly apply for the earliest
assistance that can be obtained.
H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 443, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1890) (letter from U.S. Indian
Agent William McKusick to T.J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, transmitted
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives by John W. Noble, Secretary of the
Interior); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 17, 1974 WL 186007, at *14
(footnote omitted) (noting that the 1889 negotiations took place “at a time when the
[Sisseton-Wahpeton] Bands were very poor and hungry, due to three successive crop
failures, and faced with a winter of severe cold and high winds” and that “[i]n order
to survive, the Bands were forced to enter into an agreement opening some of their
lands for settlement”).
412
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 20 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
413
Id. (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel
Renville). Because of the similarity in the Dakota words for “agent” (Ateyapi) and
“agency” (Ateyapi ti), and in view of the context of Chief Renville’s anger over the
presence of an intensely disliked former Indian agent during the 1889 negotiations,
see supra text accompanying note 412, the accuracy of the transcript’s selecting the
word “agency” rather than “agent” in the Dakota-to-English translation of Renville’s
December 3 remark is questionable. See Williamson, supra note 189, at 5 (specifying
Dakota-language translations for “agency” and “agent”).
414
Gabriel Renville’s contentious relationship with Moses N. Adams, U.S. Indian
agent at Sisseton Agency from 1872 to 1875, was notorious. See, e.g., Champions
of Excellence: Gabriel Renville, Hall of Fame Inductee, https://sdexcellence.org/
Chief_Gabriel_Renville_1978 (last visited Dec. 6, 2021) (website for South Dakota
Hall of Fame) (“Even though Chief Renville was an ally of the whites, after he
settled on the reservation the government agent, Moses N. Adams, considered him
hostile. . . . The Sisseton agent favored the ‘church’ Indians and Renville and other
leaders of the traditional Indians accused the agent of discriminating against them
in the disposition of supplies and equipment. Renville said Adams favored the idle
church-goers instead of encouraging them to work. Agent Adams considered Renville
a detriment and removed the chief from the reservation executive board which the
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remark was not a plea for the annihilation of his people’s reservation, as
DeCoteau falsely insinuates through a decontextualized misappropriation of Chief Renville’s testimony.415
Other testimony further substantiates the Indians’ complaints about
corruption and mismanagement at Sisseton Agency, as well as their grievances regarding the government’s defective administration of Indian
education on the reservation. Commissioner D.W. Diggs, for instance,
broached the subject of the Dakota people’s anger over corrupt agents in
one of his long speeches earlier on December 3, saying, “I know you think
about the deceit of agents and others in the past, but there is none of that
now. In early days, when Indians were on the frontier, the agent or men
sent out could do just as they pleased.”416 In the same speech, Diggs also
urged continuation of schools among the Indians, saying, “I have watched
with great interest the progress your children are making, because it is education that elevates man. Many of you are too old to get the benefits of
these schools, but you ought to do for your children what you were unable
to do for yourselves.”417 To this, Chief Renville responded:
You spoke of education. We all know that we are not educated;
for that reason the sixth article of the treaty 418 was made. Since then
our schools have been full, and why is it that none of our children
have been educated so that we can use them. Perhaps it is because
the teachers do not care. . . . The whites around us have taught us to
be religious and we know what Christians are, but they have never
treated us as they have been told to in the tenth commandment.419
agent had organized to carry out his policies. This action was considered unnecessarily
violent. In 1874 Renville was finally successful in securing a government investigation
of the agent’s activities which resulted in an official censure of Adams.”). See generally
Anderson, supra note 160, at 90-107 (discussing Gabriel Renville’s interactions and
altercations with Moses N. Adams in book chapter titled “Agent Adams Takes the
Helm”).
415
See supra note 393 and accompanying text.
416
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs).
417
Id. at 18 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
D.W. Diggs); see also supra note 225 and accompanying text.
418
See Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. VI, 15 Stat. 505, 507, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (“[I]n
consideration of the destitution of said bands of Sisset[o]n and Wa[h]peton Sioux . . . ,
resulting from the confiscation of their annuities and improvements, it is agreed that
Congress will, in its own discretion, from time to time make such appropriations as may
be deemed requisite to enable said Indians to return to an agricultural life, under the
system in operation on the Sioux reservation in 1862; including, if thought advisable,
the establishment and support of local and manual labor schools; the employment
of agricultural, mechanical, and other teachers; the opening and improvement of
individual farms; and generally such objects as Congress in its wisdom shall deem
necessary to promote the agricultural improvement and civilization of said bands.”),
reprinted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 453 (1975).
419
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville). In the King James version of the
Bible, the tenth commandment states: “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s house,
thou shalt not covet thy neighbour’s wife, nor his manservant, nor his maidservant, nor
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Once again, the context makes clear that Chief Renville was giving powerful, morally commanding voice to the indignities that his people were
suffering because of the apathy, arrogance, and neglect of personnel
involved in educational efforts among the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota.
He was not suggesting or implying that governmental support for educating the Indians should come to an end,420 nor that the reservation itself
should be extinguished.
Chief Renville was hardly alone, moreover, in condemning wrongdoing by U.S. agents on the Lake Traverse Reservation and pleading
with the commissioners not to allow any agent to serve as middleman
with respect to the Dakota people’s government funds. Other SissetonWahpeton leaders likewise insisted that proceeds from the sale of the
unallotted lands be provided in the form of cash payments, rather than
farming provisions, in view of notorious past and continuing instances
of U.S. agents’ misappropriating those provisions for the agents’ own
enrichment.421 During the December 12 negotiations, for instance,
his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor’s.” Exodus 20:17 (KJV).
420
The record does provide some evidence that the commissioners themselves
were trying to manipulate the negotiations to ensure that maximum acreage on
the reservation, including land on which government schools were located, would
be available for purchase by white settlers. Thus, commissioner Diggs included the
following comment in his extraordinarily long speech on December 12, toward the end
of the 1889 negotiations: “This reservation will be quickly settled by whites, bringing
the arts of civilization, establishing schools in every township, so that you can send your
children to school without sending them miles away, and I have no doubt you will have
entire control of all money coming to you, there being no use for Government schools.”
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 24 (emphasis added) (report of councils with
Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of D.W. Diggs). In addition to expressing
frustration because of Diggs’s “long speech” about which “we do not remember half,”
see supra text accompanying note 297, Chief Renville countered Diggs’s apparent
interest in seeing an end to “Government schools” on the Lake Traverse Reservation,
saying, “We understand that some of the money [from the sale of unallotted land] will
be used for [Government] schools.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report
of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
421
In his biographical study of Henry Benjamin Whipple, Episcopal bishop of
Minnesota, focusing on Whipple’s determined efforts to bring about reform in the
notoriously corrupt national administration of Indian affairs around the time of the
U.S.-Dakota War, Professor Gustav Niebuhr writes that even before the start of the
conflict Whipple
made it clear he believed from what he had seen that Native Americans—and
not just in Minnesota—had been treated with appalling dishonesty, essentially
robbed, plied with liquor, and left to fend for themselves. He laid the blame on
a highly politicized Indian Affairs office that in all practicality served the interests of its officials rather than the Indians. It was the spoils system, run rampant,
thieves appointed to supervise thieves. Whipple offered blunt, critical analysis
that he would use often to make his point: “The Indian agents who are placed
in trust of the honor and faith of the government are generally selected without
any reference to their fitness for the place. The congressional delegation desire to
reward John Doe for party work, and John Doe desires the place because there is
a tradition on the border that an Indian agent with Fifteen hundred dollars a year
can retire on an ample fortune in four years.” In Whipple’s view, work that should
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Charles Crawford spoke in support of Renville’s concerns, declaring,
“Our chief says that the agreement in some things is not good. There is
one thing I do not like, and that is the payments of interest to be made
in goods. I would like to know if it is possible to have payments made in
cash?”422 A fellow tribesman, Titus Jug, pressed harder on this demand:
“In the past we have received cattle wagons and implements for money
due us and have found these things to be very poor, but if we had the
money we can buy what we want, and for this reason we think we ought
to receive the cash annually.”423 The Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders doubtless also were aware of corruption-induced hardship suffered by their
Dakota and Lakota relatives farther west in 1875, 1876, and 1877, a time
of U.S. military subjugation of the Great Sioux Nation and the forced
dispossession of the sacred Black Hills;424 and of course the role of corhave meant service to Native American tribes amounted to avaricious scheming
by men who wanted nothing more than to get rich very quickly.
Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 33 (endnote omitted).
422
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Charles Crawford); see supra note 302 and
accompanying text.
423
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Titus Jug); see supra note 304 and accompanying
text.
424
See generally LaVelle, supra note 224, at 43-62. After the Indians defeated
Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer and his troops at the Battle of the
Little Bighorn on June 25, 1876, Congress authorized a commission to coerce the Sioux
tribes’ “agreement” to the relinquishment of the gold-laden Black Hills region of the
Great Sioux Reservation. See id. at 52-60 (describing the origins of the Manypenny
Commission and detailing the commission’s coercive methods and tactics). The
transcribed proceedings of the commission’s negotiations catalog many complaints
by the Indians about the pervasive corruption among U.S. Indian agents. For instance,
White Bear of the Crow Creek Sioux addressed the commissioners as follows:
My people have been told that any of them who would go to farming, plowing
the ground and fencing it in, would be assisted by the Great Father. They have
done it, wearing the skin from their hands in doing so, but they have received
nothing and are poorer than they were before. . . . They were also told that they
would receive mowing-machines and scythes to cut hay, but they have not received them. If they had mowing-machines, such as they could ride upon, to ride
around their country and cut hay, they would be able to earn something; but the
agent considers that the country belongs to him personally and cuts all the hay.
My friends, I would like to have our agent, before the sun goes down, climb up
into the second story of the warehouse and take down all the teepee cloths and
blankets that he has there and divide them among the people. Then, in regard
to the harnesses for horses that were sent here by the Great Father to be given
to the chiefs, they are obliged to work for them and buy them. I do not know
whether the Great Father is ashamed of this, but my people are ashamed of it.
S. Exec. Doc. No. 9, supra note 224, at 75 (journal of proceedings of the Manypenny
Commission) (speech of White Bear of the Crow Creek Sioux). Mad Bear of the
Standing Rock Sioux gave testimony describing in detail the organized ring of
corruption operating at Standing Rock Agency:
If we had had the implements of all descriptions that the Great Father has to
work with we probably could have supported ourselves. . . . A great many of
these things have not been given to us. The white men living on the agency now
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rupt and incompetent agents in instigating the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862
remained painfully present in memory for all the Santee Dakota survivors of that cataclysmic conflict.425 In view of this traumatic postwar
know what has become of these things. . . . Men, civilians, that we have had for
agents would steal our food, steal things that were sent to us, and when they
were likely to be caught in the act and be brought to justice for their misdeeds
they used the money that they had accumulated by these thefts to clear themselves. . . . Of the cattle that have been purchased for the Indians by the Government and sent out here, they were counted by a man on horseback riding at
a gallop, and he made two hundred out of one hundred, and then they grabbed
for the money. . . . It is the fault of the white men that this is done. They select
men that belong to the ring, that have been used as clerks at agencies, &c. When
one agent is removed they select his friend to succeed him, and so the stealing
still goes on.
Id. at 50-51 (journal of proceedings of the Manypenny Commission) (speech of
Mad Bear of the Standing Rock Sioux); see also id. at 70-71 (journal of proceedings
of the Manypenny Commission) (speech of White Ghost of the Crow Creek Sioux)
(“My people think that the flour that is sent here is for them to eat, and they are not
pleased that it is fed to the pigs about the agency. . . . I have for a long time known the
ways of your people in dealing with us and taking away our country, and I know that
they have been such as to make us miserable.”). For these and other examples of Sioux
Indians’ testimony, as transcribed in the 1876 report of the Manypenny Commission,
regarding corruption in the administration of the U.S. agencies on the Great Sioux
Reservation, see LaVelle, supra note 224, at 51-52 n.38; cf. Mardock, supra note 75,
at 43 (“References to the existence of a shadowy but sinister ‘Indian Ring’ were
frequently expressed by critics of Indian policy in 1868. This ‘ring’ was supposedly
a clandestine group of unprincipled contractors, Indian agents, and politicians who
made illegal profits from handling government transactions with the tribes.”).
Systemic corruption by U.S. agents among the Sioux Indians had been reported in
a congressional investigation a decade before the taking of the Black Hills. See, e.g.,
Condition of the Indian Tribes, supra note 206, app. at 367-68 (1865 testimony of
Yankton Nakota chief Struck by the Ree) (“If they bring any goods for the Indians
to eat and put them in the warehouse, the agents live out of them, and the mess-house
where travellers stop has been supplied from the Indians’ goods, and pay has been taken
by the agents, and they have put the money in their pockets and taken it away with them.
I have seen them take the goods from the storehouse of the Indians and take them to
the mess-house, and I have had to pay for a meal for myself at the mess-house, and so
have others of our Indians had to pay for meals at the mess-house, prepared from their
own goods. . . . If I had understood from what my grandfather [i.e., the President] had
told me, that I was to be treated as I have been, I would never have done as I have done;
I never would have signed the treaty. Mr. [Alexander H.] Redfield said to me, ‘when I
am gone, you will meet with a great many agents; but you will never meet one like me.’
I think I never want to see one like him. . . . When agent [Walter A.] Burleigh came he
made fine promises of what he would do. I asked for my invoice, but he would not let me
have it . . . . I think the agents are all alike. The agent puts his foot on me as though I were
a skunk. And the agents are all getting rich and we are getting poor.”).
425
See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 181, at 110 (“[W]hen [Santee Dakota Chief] Little Crow
began to negotiate with Colonel [Henry H.] Sibley in the dying days of the uprising, he
started his letter with these words: ‘Dear Sirs: For what reason we have commenced
this war I will tell you, it is on account of Maj. Galbrait[h]. . . .’ The causes of the Sioux
Uprising are manifold and complex, but it is no exaggeration to say that Thomas J.
Galbraith had more to do with bringing on the war than any other single individual. If
the picture of him that emerges from contemporaneous and later testimony and from
his own correspondence is substantially correct, his appointment as Sioux agent was
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historical context—a context almost entirely ignored in DeCoteau 426—
a political blunder of major proportions.”). Galbraith’s predecessor was U.S. Indian
Agent Joseph R. Brown, who had played a key role in the “traders’ paper” corruption
scandal that had defrauded and dispossessed the Dakota Indians through their signing
of the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux in 1851. See infra note 439; see also Anderson, supra
note 181, at 72-75 (discussing widespread, systemic corruption in the administration
of Indian affairs among the Santee Dakota Indians by agents Brown and Galbraith).
Historian Gary Clayton Anderson writes:
The “Indian business,” as it was often called, had been good to Brown. While
clearly siphoning funds from contracts, debts, and annuity payments, Brown had
also employed his wife Susan, son Samuel, and daughter Ellen, at the cost of
$1,200 a year. Samuel was just fifteen years old at the time.
Thomas Galbraith replaced Brown as agent in May 1861. He had the backing from Minnesota Congressman Cyrus Aldrich, who sat on the House Committee on Indian Affairs. Aldrich obviously picked Galbraith so that he might
join in the pillaging of Dakota and Anishinaabe funds. . . .
Galbraith inherited the same system for distributing annuities and cash
as former agents, systematically taking a share. The corruption had become
institutionalized, the superintendent of Indian affairs only competing with
the various Indian agents at Anishinaabe, Dakota, and the recently moved
Winnebago agencies.
Id. at 73. When Henry B. Whipple, Episcopal bishop of Minnesota, was granted an
audience to meet with Abraham Lincoln in September 1862, at the end of the U.S.Dakota War, he drew the President’s attention to the widespread corruption in the
administration of Indian affairs:
Whipple sought a total reform in the Office of Indian Affairs. . . . He had
seen up close the effects of alcohol sales, fraudulent dealing, and even violence
by the men entrusted to keep the Indians’ welfare in mind, rather than to enrich
themselves.
At one point, Lincoln needed to pause and absorb the urgency of the message and register his own grasp of Whipple’s information. It was characteristic
of the president. He told Whipple a homespun story, providing an opportunity
for them both to sit back a bit—and to show Whipple that he had heard him.
“Bishop,” he said, “a man thought that monkeys could pick cotton better than
negroes could because they were quicker and their fingers smaller. He turned a
lot of them into his cotton field, but he found that it took two overseers to watch
one monkey. It needs more than one honest man to watch one Indian Agent.”
The story pleased Whipple; he felt he had gotten through at last. Ten weeks
later Lincoln would casually speak with a friend from Illinois whose brotherin-law Luther Dearborn had recently visited Minnesota. “When you see Lute,”
Lincoln told the friend, “ask him if he knows Bishop Whipple. He came here the
other day and talked with me about the rascality of this Indian business until I
felt it down to my boots.”
Lincoln made a promise after that meeting—poignantly, when viewed in
retrospect—to address America’s other racial sin after first dealing with s lavery
and secession. “If we get through this war,” he said, “and I live, this Indian
system shall be reformed!”
Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 132 (endnotes omitted); see also Mardock, supra note 75,
at 14 (footnote omitted) (“In his second annual message to Congress, on December 1,
1862, Lincoln asked that Congress give special consideration to . . . a reorganization
[of the Indian system] and added, ‘Many wise and good men have impressed me with
the belief that this can be profitably done.’”).
426
DeCoteau’s only allusions to the context of the U.S.-Dakota War are (1) its
perfunctory and unelaborated statement that “[w]hen the Sioux Nation rebelled
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Chief Renville’s remarks denigrating the agency-as-corrupt-middleman
during the 1889 negotiations 427 cannot be construed as implying consent
to the U.S. government’s destruction of the very reservation Renville
had worked heroically to establish as his people’s desperately needed
refuge428 and “permanent” homeland.429
against the United States in 1862, the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of the Nation
remained loyal to the Federal Government, many members serving as ‘scouts’
for federal troops,” DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 431 (1975); and (2) its
trivializing and diversionary mislabeling of the Indians’ demand for “back annuity”
payments during the 1889 negotiations as a “loyal scout claim.” See supra note 178 and
accompanying text; supra notes 368-372 and accompanying text; supra notes 398-405
and accompanying text; infra notes 473-500 and accompanying text.
427
See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
428
See Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, 15 Stat. 505, 505, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (final alteration
in original) (acknowledging that “Congress, in confiscating the Sioux annuities and
reservations, made no provision for the support of these, the friendly portion of the
Siss[e]ton and Wa[h]peton bands, and it is believed [that] they have been suffered
to remain homeless wanderers, frequently subject to intense suffering from want of
subsistence and clothing to protect them from the rigors of a high northern latitude”),
reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 450; see also Mathes, supra note 134, at 141 (footnote
omitted) (“[Congress] . . . denied annuity payments for past land sales to all Dakotas,
including the army scouts. Instead, Congress paid out these funds to Minnesota families
who had suffered ‘damage by the depredations’ of the Dakotas and the army. Despite
their roles assisting the army, Renville and his people were left homeless and penniless.”);
Meyer, supra note 181, at 201 (“The plight of the upper Sioux [i.e., the Sisseton and
Wahpeton bands of Dakota Indians] was extremely serious at this time [i.e., before the
establishment of the Lake Traverse Reservation in 1867]. Since one of the objects of
making a treaty was to keep them from indiscriminate roving, they were expected to
remain on the reservation at all times and ran the risk of being treated as hostile if they
strayed outside its boundaries.”); Folwell, supra note 203, at 418 (“By confiscating their
annuities and reservations [in Minnesota] Congress had left these friendly and innocent
[Sisseton-Wahpeton] people homeless, to wander and suffer for lack of food and
clothing in a high latitude. The purposes of the [1867] treaty were to secure a recognition
of their friendship to the government and the people of the United States, relief from
their precarious life by the chase, and their settlement on the soil.”).
In his own published narrative, Chief Renville himself invoked the hopelessness and
desperation of the Dakota people over the loss of their Minnesota homelands in the
aftermath of the U.S.-Dakota War. Reflecting on his confinement at Fort Snelling with
the large mass of Santee Dakota Indians during the winter of 1862-1863, Renville stated:
[A] fence was built on the south side of the fort and close to it. We all moved
into this enclosure, but were so crowded and confined that an epidemic broke
out among us and children were dying day and night, among them [Solomon]
Two Stars’ oldest child, a little girl.
The news then came of the hanging at Mankato. Amid all this sickness and
these great tribulations, it seemed doubtful at night whether a person would
be alive in the morning. We had no land, no homes, no means of support, and
the outlook was most dreary and discouraging. How can we get lands and have
homes again, were the questions which troubled many thinking minds, and
were hard questions to answer.
Renville, supra note 211, at 610-11, reprinted in Through Dakota Eyes, supra note 211,
at 234; see also supra note 200.
429
Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (“[T]here
shall be set apart for the members of said bands . . . the following described lands as
a permanent reservation . . . .”), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 451-52; see, e.g.,
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In this regard, DeCoteau’s purporting to quote from Chief Renville
as having averred that the Lake Traverse Reservation “was given us as
a permanent home, but now we have decided to sell . . . ”430 amounts
to an egregious misrepresentation. Once again, the DeCoteau footnote
extracts only the first part of a crucial sentence, leaving the remainder
undisclosed.431 In the full context of his recorded testimony, Renville was
responding, angrily, to the commission chairman’s false and misleading
argument that changing the proposed interest rate on proceeds from
land sales—from the three percent in the draft foisted on the assembled
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people by the U.S. negotiators 432 to the five
percent demanded by the Indians—was a request that was impossible to
accommodate.433 Expressing disgust for yet another long-winded speech
by Diggs, and calling the chairman’s bluff (a bluff which included the
chairman’s pointing to a three percent interest-rate figure in the text of
the General Allotment Act),434 Chief Renville said:
Patrick Springer, “It’s home”: The saga of two Dakota Sioux reservations, born of
injustice, but enduring cultural homelands, Bemidji Pioneer, Sept. 23, 2020, https://
www.bemidjipioneer.com/indigenous-impacts/6627292-Its-home-The-saga-of-twoDakota-Sioux-reservations-born-of-injustice-but-enduring-cultural-homelands (“The
contributions of the Dakota scouts like Renville and the loyalty of Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakotas during the [1862] outbreak were instrumental in founding the Lake Traverse
Reservation . . . . Renville played a major part in the creation of Lake Traverse
Reservation . . . .”). See generally Anderson, supra note 160, at 58-89 (discussing
Gabriel Renville’s leadership among the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota in book chapters
on “Creation of a New Homeland” and “Building a Reservation”). Historian Valerie
Sherer Mathes describes a tragic incident—emblematic of the widespread animosity
and violence against Dakota Indians in the decades following the U.S.- Dakota War—
that befell Renville and other Sisseton-Wahpeton representatives when they traveled
to Washington, D.C. to negotiate the 1867 treaty:
. . . Congress . . . brought a delegation representing these bands to Washington
to negotiate a new treaty in the winter of 1867 . . . . The delegates had a
horrific experience. They were cooped up for four months and one member,
Scarlet Night, also known as Scarlet Crow, was kidnapped on the evening of
24 February 1867. Only after government officials offered a one-hundred-dollar
reward was his lifeless body found near today’s Key Bridge on the Virginia side
of the Potomac River two weeks later.
Mathes, supra note 134, at 150 (footnote omitted). Professor Mathes notes further:
Although it was made to look like Scarlet Night had hanged himself, Indian
affairs agent Joseph R. Brown noted the knots used to tie the blanket strips
were not the kind that Indians used. Furthermore, the branch would never
have held his weight. Officials paid the reward despite Brown’s misgivings that
the people who reported the body probably killed him. The government gave
Scarlet Night’s family five hundred dollars in trade goods as compensation. His
grave in the Congressional Cemetery in Washington, D.C., remained unmarked
until 1916.
Id. at 150-51 n.37 (citations omitted).
430
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 436-37 n.16 (alteration in original) (citation omitted);
see supra note 391 and accompanying text.
431
See supra note 375 and accompanying text.
432
See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
433
See supra notes 293-296 and accompanying text.
434
See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
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We ought to make shorter speeches. Mr. Diggs made a long
speech, and we do not remember half.435 We know these extracts of
laws. We know that a change was made in the taking of land out
West, and also on the 3 per cent. interest. If they can change the
law in regard to the taking of land they can do so in regard to the
3 per cent.436 We have decided to sell all of the surplus after each has
received 160 acres. We know that the money due us on the treaty of
See supra notes 284-288 and accompanying text.
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 2-3 (letter from John W. Noble, Secretary
of the Interior, to President Benjamin Harrison) (“The rate of interest stipulated to be
paid by the agreement is 3 per cent., as provided in said act [i.e., the General Allotment
Act], but upon the recommendation of the Commissioners who negotiated the
agreement, based upon their promise to the Indians to that effect, the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs has in his draught of the bill fixed the rate of interest at 5 per cent.
per annum.”); id. at 7 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan) (“We deemed it proper
to make this promise for the reason that 5 per cent. is the usual rate allowed by the
Government on Indian funds. In all the special acts of the last Congress authorizing
the purchase of Indian lands, provision is made that the money paid therefor shall
be placed in the Treasury and bear 5 per cent. per annum . . . . We can see no reason
why an exception should be made in the case of these Indians, and they are at a loss
to understand why they are not treated as well as other Indians, some of whom are
their relations and neighbors.”); see also supra note 294 and accompanying text; supra
note 324 and accompanying text.
Ultimately, Congress approved the five percent interest rate demanded by
Chief Renville and the other Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders. See infra note 446. However,
the Congressional Record shows that the Senate may have come close to keeping the
rate at three percent on the argument that the signed agreement itself so provided,
notwithstanding the commissioners’ reassurances to the Indians:
Mr. PETTIGREW: The agreement was 5 per cent., and we have paid
5 per cent. on the present funds of all other Indians. There is no reason why the
Sissetons and Wahpetons, who were friendly to the Government in 1862 and
have always since been friendly, should be discriminated against.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on the amendment to the
amendment of the committee.
The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
Mr. CASEY. In the amendment of the committee, on page 196, line 2, before
the words “per cent.,” I move to strike out “three” and insert “five.”
Mr. COCKRELL. That raises a question about modifying the agreement.
This is a provision carrying the agreement into effect.
....
Mr. DAWES. If [3 per cent interest] is a part of the agreement, of course it
can not be altered.
Mr. COCKRELL. It is unquestionably a part of the agreement.
Mr. DAWES. I have not the text before me. The motion of the Senator from
South Dakota [Mr. PETTIGREW], I supposed, applied to a section of the bill
providing what should be done.
Mr. PETTIGREW. It did.
Mr. DAWES. But we can not alter the agreement. If the Indians have agreed
with us that their funds shall draw but 3 per cent. interest, it must so stand.
Mr. CASEY. I withdraw the amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn.
22 Cong. Rec. 3457 (1891).
435
436
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1851 is ours, and it has pleased us to have that in.437 In regard to the
people out West selling for $1.25 per acre,438 we know that one acre of
our land is worth ten of theirs. In 1872 a commission came here and
took all we had outside of this reservation for 5 cents per acre, and in
1851 the very best lands were sold at less than 1 cent per acre.439 This
Chief Renville’s reference was to General Whittlesey’s having stated the previous
day, on December 11, 1889, that the redrafted agreement would “secure to you your
annuity money,” a promise he reiterated at the start of this December 12 meeting,
saying: “We have yielded to your wishes in the agreement.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 22-23 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statements
of Gen. Whittlesey); see also supra note 278 and accompanying text; supra note 283
and accompanying text. The agreement’s inclusion of “the money due us on the treaty
of 1851,” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville), was the accomplishment of
an objective Chief Renville had been pursuing all along, as reflected in the interview
he gave for the May 1889 newspaper story that was published in the Minneapolis
Tribune. See A Large Pow-Wow, supra note 125 (summarizing interview with Chief
Gabriel Renville) (noting that the Indians “claim that under the treaty of 1851 there is
due them in annuities cut off in 1862” certain stated back annuity amounts and quoting
Chief Renville’s complaint that after the U.S.-Dakota War “the government took our
annuities and we have suffered from it”); see also supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
438
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 23 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey) (“I will say this, your neighbors
over west have agreed to sell a tract of land at $1.25 and 75 and 50 cents per acre . . . .”);
see also supra note 279 and accompanying text.
439
Resentment, like Chief Renville’s, over the 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux was
longstanding, as “[t]he Sissetons and Wahpetons . . . believed they had been duped
and cheated at Traverse des Sioux,” Wingerd, supra note 187, at 199. Historian
Mary Lethert Wingerd elaborates on the circumstances surrounding the advent of
the 1851 treaty, including the role of trader/entrepreneur Henry H. Sibley—who later
became the first governor of the state of Minnesota, and later still led the state and
federal forces (and oversaw the trials of Dakota prisoners) during the U.S.-Dakota
War of 1862—in masterminding a plot to trick the Indians into signing a “traders’
paper” that funneled most of the money due the Indians under the treaty to Sibley
and other traders:
Sibley also took pains to win support from the missionaries, who wielded
considerable influence among some Dakotas who were beginning to adapt
themselves to euro-American ways. Though the missionaries tended to blame
the traders for all the Indians’ ills, they made an exception for the gentlemanly Sibley, who seemed to share their cultural values more than the rest of the
rough-hewn backwoods fraternity. Moreover, Sibley was known as a critic of
the way previous treaties had “betrayed and deceived” the Indians. Even as
he paved the way for an unprecedented land grab, he spoke out in Congress
against the policy of “utter extermination” that his government had practiced.
“Minnesota,” he vowed, “shall at least be freed from any responsibility on that
score.” [Missionaries] Stephen Riggs and Thomas Williamson thus regarded
Sibley approvingly as a kindred spirit who shared their Christian concerns and
were easily enlisted as treaty advocates. The treaty also neatly supported their
plan for “saving” the Indians. Only recently, they had jointly published an “Outline of a Plan for Civilizing the Dakota.” The agenda it set out called for the
abolishment of the “community property system” and the need to “restrict” and
“confine” the Indians to “persuade” them to give up hunting and gathering for a
more “worthwhile” agricultural lifestyle. In other words, since proselytizing and
437
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little reservation is ours, and all we have left. There is nothing in our
persuasion had failed, they hoped to force the Indians into farming by limiting
their access to land, which would make it impossible to sustain themselves by
hunting. Once civilized and under the close supervision of the missionaries, the
former savages would more readily embrace Christian principles. The proposed
massive land cession would clearly advance the plan they had conceived.
. . . In the west, the Sissetons and Wahpetons were in dire straits. A succession of bad winters had repeatedly brought the bands to the brink of starvation, forcing them to eat their “horses, dogs, and even the skins covering their
tepees.” In 1850, massive autumn prairie fires had raged from the Minnesota
River valley to the James River in present-day South Dakota, driving the buffalo west to the Missouri. Trader Martin McLeod, writing from his post on the
Minnesota River, reported that the desperate Sissetons and Wahpetons were
anxious for a treaty and would sell “a large portion of their country if liberally
dealt with.” . . .
....
[T]he treaty strategizers determined to hold two councils, first with the
Sissetons and Wahpetons at Traverse des Sioux, followed by a second council
with the Mdewakantons and Wahpekutes at Mendota. Sibley was confident
that he had prepared the ground for a smooth operation. He could assure his
creditor, Pierre Chouteau in St. Louis, that his debts would soon be cleared,
confidently boasting, “The Indians are all prepared to make a treaty when we
tell them to do so, and such a one as I may dictate. . . . I think I may safely
promise you that no treaty can be made without our claims being first secured.”
....
The Indians spent the night in heated discussion. Though most of those
present had desired a treaty, they had not expected to be asked for their
entire homeland. Some wanted to reject the treaty; others, with an educated
understanding of land values, wanted to set a price of $6 million. But tribal
elders sorrowfully knew that they had little negotiating room. As historian
Rhoda Gilman writes, “Scarcely anyone was too naïve to see that the elaborate
drama at the treaty table was a mask for naked conquest. If no treaty were
signed, white men would swarm into the land anyway, and should the Dakota
try to drive them out, some pretext would be found to send in troops.”
....
[Minnesota Territory Governor and treaty commissioner Alexander
Ramsey] ordered no further rations be issued and notified the Indians that
unless they agreed to treat by evening, the commissioners would strike their
tents and depart the next day. Faced with the naked reality of their need and
the limits of their options, within hours the chiefs capitulated. . . . The next day
negotiations commenced in earnest, with Sibley and his traders and Stephen
Riggs constantly shuttling among the bands to urge their acceptance of the
terms. Two days later, on July 23, the chiefs put their hand to the pen and signed
away their lands. It was not a happy occasion. Though Commissioner [of Indian
Affairs Luke] Lea pronounced that “nothing but our kind feelings to the Sioux
people would have induced us to make a treaty so favorable to them,” the
Indians were not deceived. [Sisseton chief] Sleepy eyes, before signing, stated
that the commissioners had taken advantage of their “difficult circumstances”
to offer less than the land was worth. He wanted a copy of the treaty to be
kept with the Indians “that we may be looking at it and know whether you are
telling us the truth or not.” . . . Wahpeton chief Big Curly Head perhaps said it
best: “You think it a great deal of money to give for this land, but you must well
understand that the money will all go back to the whites again, and the country
will also remain theirs.”
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Even as the chief was speaking, treaty payments were transferring into
the hands of the traders, thanks to a clever provision designed to take care of
traders’ claims. Though the treaty did not specifically compensate them, a special
cash sum of $305,000, called “hand money,” was allotted to assist the bands in
establishing their new homes on the reservation, provide for their mixed-blood
relations, and allow the chiefs in open council to “settle their affairs”—which, of
course, meant pay their debts to the traders. Sibley and his friends had prepared
a paper that pledged the chiefs to repay their bands’ debts and provide gift
money to mixed-blood relatives. At the treaty-signing ceremony, each signator,
after making his mark, was directed, either by a trader or mixed blood or
by missionary Stephen Riggs, to a nearby upended barrel, where [fur trader
and later U.S. Indian Agent Joseph R.] Brown waited with another pen. The
prepared “traders’ paper” that the Indians were then handed to sign was not
explained. Some understood the nature of the document but many thought it
was another copy of the treaty, though in later testimony the traders swore it had
been previously agreed upon. Indian subagent Nathaniel McLean, suspecting
that the Indians did not understand what they were signing, requested that the
paper be read and explained in open council. The commissioners, indebted
to the traders and anxious to end the tiresome proceedings, brushed him off.
The result was a masterful coup for the debt-ridden traders, clearing accounts
that stretched back to 1819. Henry Sibley, true to form, stayed aloof during the
signing ceremony. Though he was the architect of the plan, he could rely on his
friends and associates to see it through. Nearly every veteran of the Dakota
trade appeared on the list of creditors for substantial sums, which in large part
would go to pay off their own debts to Sibley—who made direct claims of
$144,984. His efforts on behalf of the treaty had been well worthwhile. When
the claims were tallied and adjusted, $210,000 went to the traders and $40,000
to mixed-blood payments, leaving a mere $60,000 for the more than 15,000
Wahpetons and Sissetons to establish and sustain themselves for a year on the
narrow strip of land that was to be their home.
Id. at 187-93 (endnotes omitted); see also Clemmons, supra note 181, at 131-33
(endnotes omitted) (discussing the respective roles of missionaries Thomas Williamson
and Stephen Riggs in the “traders’ paper” controversy and noting that during a
Senate inquiry into the matter Williamson “offered incendiary testimony against the
government agents” and “claimed that he . . . believed, like the Dakotas, that they
were signing multiple copies of the same document, not a traders’ paper” while Riggs
testified that “[a]lthough he admitted that he had never interpreted the traders’ paper
to the Dakotas . . . he was sure that they understood it.”); Satterlee, supra note 191,
at 4 (“When the Indians signed the [1851] treaty they were subjected to a gross fraud
right in presence of the Agent, Treaty Officials and supposed friends including the
Missionaries. . . . It was an evasion of law and a dishonest collection of unproven
claims.”); Isaac V.D. Heard, History of the Sioux War and Massacres of 1862 and
1863, at 37 (1863) (recounting and quoting speech of Wahpeton Dakota Chief Red Iron,
or Mazaduta, in council with Minnesota Territory Governor Alexander Ramsey in
December 1852, after the signing of the 1851 Treaty of Traverse des Sioux) (“When
you first sent for us there were two or three chiefs here, and we wanted to wait till the
rest would come, that we might all be in council together, and know what was done,
and so that we might all understand the papers, and know what we were signing. When
we signed the treaty the traders threw a blanket over our faces, and darkened our eyes,
and made us sign papers which we did not understand, and which were not explained
or read to us. We want our Great Father at Washington to know what has been done.”),
quoted in Jackson, supra note 181, at 390. For a thorough discussion and critique of
the two 1851 U.S.-Dakota treaties—i.e., the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux with the
Sisseton and Wahpeton bands and the Treaty of Mendota with the Mdewakanton and
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treaty that says that we must sell.440 It was given us as a permanent
home, but now we have decided to sell for $5 an acre. Now let us
hear what can be done. You seem to want to treat us like children,
put us back where we were twenty years ago. Let us do what is right
and just.441

By omitting the words “for $5 an acre”442 and thus altering the sentence
from Chief Renville’s speech to make it say that the reservation “was
given us as a permanent home, but now we have decided to sell . . . ,”443
DeCoteau facilitates the false implication that the Indians intended to
divest themselves of the reservation itself—their “permanent home.”444
But with the concealed words restored—and in light of the actual context
of Renville’s speech445—it is clear that the chief was simply communicating a readiness to sell lands within the reservation, provided that
the U.S. negotiators would accept the terms demanded by the Indians
regarding (1) the price per acre (five dollars) and (2) the interest rate
(five percent) on proceeds from the sale that would generate funds for
the Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s benefit.446 In context, Chief Renville
Wahpekute bands—see Gwen Westerman & Bruce White, Mni Sota Makoce: The
Land of the Dakota 163-90 (2012).
440
Chief Renville made essentially the same point—that “nothing in our treaty . . . says
that we must sell,” supra text accompanying note 440; see also supra note 393 and
accompanying text—at the end of the negotiations, when he made a final attempt to
forestall the signing ceremony, saying: “Our treaty does not provide for the sale of this
land at any time.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 28 (report of councils with
Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville); see supra note 350
and accompanying text. In that later instance, too, Renville’s objective was strictly to
leverage the negotiations to ensure that the agreement’s final land-sale terms were
optimally beneficial to the Sisseton-Wahpeton people. See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gabriel Renville) (“The last council of the people decided on asking $5 per acre and
5 per cent. interest, to be paid in cash, and will sign no other. I do not say this to make
anybody angry, but talk plain because I know it is right. . . . I have been among the
people begging them to do right.”); see also supra notes 329-330 and accompanying
text.
441
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (emphasis added) (report of councils
with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville).
442
See supra text accompanying note 441.
443
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 436-37 n.16 (1975) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted); see supra note 391 and accompanying text.
444
Supra text accompanying note 441; see also supra note 217 and accompanying text.
445
See supra notes 433-441 and accompanying text.
446
See supra note 263 and accompanying text; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543,
§ 27, 26 Stat. 1035, 1039 (specifying that proceeds from the sale of the unallotted
land within the Lake Traverse Reservation “shall be placed in the Treasury of the
United States, to the credit of said Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux
Indians . . . , and the same, with interest thereof at five per centum per annum, shall
be at all times subject to appropriation by Congress or to application by the President
for the education and civilization of said bands of Indians or members thereof”);
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 441 (quoting language from Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 27,
26 Stat. 1035, 1039, adopting the five percent interest rate). The 1891 Act’s specification
that proceeds from the sale of the unallotted lands would be used “for the education
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clearly was not announcing or implying his people’s agreement to having
“[t]his little reservation”447 of theirs “completely wip[ed] out”448 by the
United States government.
In addition to misrepresenting quotations from Chief Renville to
foster an illusion of tribal consent to the destruction of the Lake Traverse
Reservation, DeCoteau disregards testimony that gives witness to a
contrary understanding of the Sisseton-Wahpeton people. For instance,
during the December 3, 1889 negotiations, a highly respected tribal elder,
Solomon Two Stars, extended high praise to Chief Renville for his longstanding and continuing leadership, saying to the commissioners:
You have already heard that we have selected one man to do the
talking. We all desire that he should speak for us. We have been with
him since the happenings of 1862. We know how he has brought us
on since then, and hence we select him; he has led us in everything
since then, and we are satisfied with him. We know that through his
efforts we have each made a home here, have an agency and schools.
We know him to be worthy of the confidence placed in him, and have
given him the power to answer all questions for us. We are not alone
in knowing these things, but the whites about here know them to be
facts. I have been selected to say these things, and have said them.449

Later, in his oration on the last day of the negotiations, December 13,
Two Stars spoke movingly once again of Chief Renville’s leadership, and
he included these significant remarks:
In February, 1863, Gabriel Renville and some others were sent out as
scouts. We guarded this country from the James River to the settlements. I think we did a great deal towards making the frontier safe.
For eighteen months we did this work without pay. We know that by
these acts we got this reservation.450

Clearly, testimony made on-the-record by a revered tribal elder, speaking for all the Sisseton-Wahpeton people in praising Chief Renville for
“acts” through which “we got this reservation” and for “efforts” that led
to the Indians having “an agency and schools” on their Lake Traverse
and civilization of” the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians, Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 27,
26 Stat. 1035, 1039, triggers application of the rule that “[i]n construing provisions
designed for their education and civilization as fully if not more than in construing
provisions for their material wants, is it a duty to secure to the Indians all that by any
fair construction of treaty or statute can be held to have been understood by them or
intended by Congress.” Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373, 402 (1902).
447
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 27 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville); see supra note 441 and
accompanying text.
448
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 355 (1962); see supra note 21 and
accompanying text; see also supra note 119.
449
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 16 (emphasis added) (report of councils
with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Wicaurpinoupa [Wicanhpinonpa],
or [Solomon] Two Stars); see also supra note 168 and accompanying text.
450
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 28 (emphasis added) (report of councils
with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Wicaurpinoupa [Wicanhpinonpa],
or [Solomon] Two Stars); see also supra note 345 and accompanying text.
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Reservation “home,” constitutes additional compelling evidence against
DeCoteau’s conclusion that “the tribe spoke clearly”451 in favor of abolishing the reservation.452
b. Cherry-Picking the Legislative Reports
In the final analysis, there is nothing in the extensive record of the
1889 negotiations between the United States and the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota from which one could fairly infer or reasonably conclude that the
Indians consented to the termination of their permanent home, the Lake
Traverse Reservation. The record of negotiations—like the text of the
1891 Act that ratified the 1889 Agreement 453—is devoid of anything “to
suggest that the boundaries of the reservation were altered.” 454 Indeed,
the possibility that the government might alter or abolish the reservation
was never raised during the negotiations and, hence, the issue appears
nowhere in the transcribed proceedings.455 It is unsurprising, then, that the
issue likewise is nowhere to be found in other documents that comprise
the 1891 Act’s legislative history—neither in the respective reports of the
House of Representatives and Senate456 nor in the legislative debates in
the Congressional Record.457
The absence of any reference to altering or terminating the reservation boundaries is thus readily apparent in DeCoteau’s excerpt from
the 1890 Senate Report on the bill “to ratify and confirm an agreement
with the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakotas or Sioux Indians.” 458
The three-paragraph excerpt—which, as DeCoteau notes, “summarized
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449.
It should also be noted that U.S. Indian agents continued to be appointed to
superintend the Sisseton Agency even after the 1891 Act ratifying the 1889 Agreement
with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota was enacted. See, e.g., 23 Cong. Rec. 115 (1892)
(“Daniel T. Hindman, of Britton, S. Dak., to be agent for the Indians of the Sisseton
Agency in South Dakota, vice William McKusick, resigned.”); see also 60th Ann.
Rep. of the Comm’r of Indian Aff. 418, 421-22 (1891) (Report of Sisseton Agency
submitted by U.S. Indian Agent William McKusick to Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
Sept. 30, 1891) (“I retire from the Indian service knowing much more than I did, and
shall always hereafter have much charity for the man who has United States Indian
agent affixed to his name . . . .”).
453
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 1035, cited in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 427.
454
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
455
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 15-29 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians). In fact, the U.S. commissioners were never instructed or
authorized by the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota for an alteration or abolishment of the Lake Traverse Reservation’s boundaries.
See infra note 645.
456
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 20, 1974 WL 186007, at *16 (citation and
footnotes omitted) (“The committee reports do not express any intent to dissolve the
Reservation. These reports . . . manifest a primary concern to alleviate the destitution
and suffering of the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands by relief owed them ‘as a matter of
right.’”).
457
See infra notes 501-553 and accompanying text; infra notes 574-586 and
accompanying text.
458
S. Rep. No. 661, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1890).
451
452
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the Agreement”459—speaks of the Indians’ “agree[ing] to cede, sell,
relinquish, and convey . . . unallotted lands within the Lake Traverse
Reservation” and recites the obvious fact that “the Indian title . . . will be
extinguished” as to the acreage thus sold.460 The excerpt does not mention,
allude to, or hint at any alteration of the reservation’s boundaries.461 The
Supreme Court may have selected this excerpt because it uses the word
“reserved,” with the Senate Report’s noting “the fact that the additional
[i.e., equalized] allotments are in lieu of any residue which, under their
title, these Indians could have reserved for the future benefit of their families.”462 But, similar to the other instances wherein DeCoteau appears to
promote misleading implications concerning the word “reserved,”463 the
context in the Senate Report makes clear that, in observing the “Indians
could have reserved [a residue of Indian-title land] for the future benefit
of their families,”464 the Senate meant the Indians might have withheld
such land from sale, not that they might have retained such land in reservation status.
Although DeCoteau states that “[a]lmost identical language appears
in” the House Report on the bill for ratifying the 1889 Agreement,465 the
House Report in fact is more than twice as long as the Senate Report and
contains additional language and material absent from the Senate Report
which cast further doubt on DeCoteau’s conclusion that the SissetonWahpeton Indians consented to the elimination of their reservation.
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 438 n.19.
S. Rep. No. 661, supra note 458, at 1, 3, quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 438 n.19.
Significantly, in purporting to quote from the Senate Report DeCoteau declines to
provide an ellipsis marking the Supreme Court’s having omitted crucial additional
language. Compare DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 438 n.19 (purporting to quote S. Rep.
No. 661, supra note 458, at 1) (“‘By the terms of this Agreement the said bands of
Indians agreed [sic] to cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States the
unallotted lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation.’”), with S. Rep. No. 661, supra
note 458, at 1 (emphasis added) (“By the terms of this Agreement the said bands of
Indians agree to cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States the unallotted
lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation on the following conditions, to wit: That
certain annuities claimed by them to have been unjustly withheld or forfeited under the
act of February 16, 1863 (12 Stats., 652), be restored and paid . . . .”). By silently omitting
this additional language DeCoteau suppresses the Senate Report’s explicit recognition
of the fact that the Sisseton-Wahpeton bands had conditioned their consent to selling
unallotted lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation on the U.S. government’s
promise to restore the Dakota people’s wrongly confiscated past treaty annuities,
see supra notes 176-177 and accompanying text, not on the government’s payment of
a “loyal scout claim.” See infra notes 473-500 and accompanying text (discussing “The
‘Loyal Scout Claim’ Stratagem”).
461
See infra note 674.
462
S. Rep. No. 661, supra note 458, at 3 (emphases added), quoted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 438 n.19.
463
See supra notes 379-390 and accompanying text; supra note 403 and accompanying
text.
464
S. Rep. No. 661, supra note 458, at 3 (emphases added), quoted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 438 n.19.
465
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 438 n.19 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 8-9).
459
460
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Unlike the Senate Report, the House Report describes the Agreement
as one “for the purchase and release of the surplus lands in the Lake
Traverse Reservation,”466 clearly indicating that what the Indians consented to was merely the sale of acreage in the continuously existing
reservation,467 and not the dissolution of the reservation itself. Perhaps
most significantly, the House Report eschews the word “reserved” when
explaining the Agreement’s provision for “the equalization of allotments
on the basis of 160 acres.”468 In contrast to the verbiage in the Senate
Report, discussed above,469 the House Report adverts to “the . . . fact that
the additional allotments are in lieu of any residue which, under their title,
they [i.e., the Indians] might have retained for the minor children of their
respective families.”470 This clarifying language—which dispels the false
implication DeCoteau appears to promote regarding the word “reserved,”
discussed previously 471—is hardly “[a]lmost identical” 472 to the different,
potentially confusing and misleading language that DeCoteau selects
from the Senate Report instead.
c. The “Loyal Scout Claim” Stratagem
Another important difference between the two legislative reports
is that the House Report, unlike the Senate Report, contains letters from
Interior Department officials addressing the need for enacting an additional provision of legislation to provide a remedy specifically for former
Dakota scouts (not just Sisseton and Wahpeton scouts but Mdewakanton
and Wahpekute scouts too), and the descendants of deceased scouts, who
resided outside the Lake Traverse Reservation.473 This proposed provision eventually was enacted as part of § 27 of the 1891 Act of Congress
that also ratified and enacted (as § 26) the 1889 Agreement.474 The special provision’s enactment appears to have been a culminating, hard-won
achievement of the former leader of the Dakota scouts, Chief Gabriel
H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 1 (emphasis added). Regarding the probative
significance of the House Report’s use of the phrase “for the purchase and release
of the surplus lands”—which mirrors language in the General Allotment Act, Act of
Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389—see supra note 158 and accompanying text;
infra note 645.
467
See also H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 1 (emphasis added) (referring to
the “unallotted lands within the reservation”); id. at 8 (emphases added) (referring
to “unimproved lands in the vicinity of this reservation” and to a railway company’s
being “entitled to a confirmation of their title” on the basis of the company’s having
purchased from the Indians a “right of way through this reservation”).
468
Id. at 8.
469
See supra notes 458-462 and accompanying text.
470
H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 8 (emphasis added).
471
See supra notes 379-390 and accompanying text.
472
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 438 n.19 (1975) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1356,
supra note 364, at 8-9); see also supra note 465 and accompanying text.
473
See H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 2-7 (reprinting letter from John W.
Noble, Secretary of the Interior, to T.J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and
letter from T.J. Morgan, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to John W. Noble, Secretary
of the Interior).
474
See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, §§ 26-27, 26 Stat. 1035, 1035-38.
466
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Renville, after many years of lobbying,475 including advocacy Renville
advanced by making certain leveraging comments to the U.S. commission
on the last day of the 1889 negotiations at Sisseton Agency.476 The Interior
Department letters in the House Report thus provide crucial contextual
information for clearing up the unnecessary—but expedient—confusion
DeCoteau creates regarding the relationship between what DeCoteau
repeatedly labels as a “loyal scout claim,” on the one hand, and the 1889
Agreement’s provision of “back annuities,” on the other.477
As enacted in 1891, the new provision regarding the former Dakota
scouts appropriated $126,620, to be paid
[t]o the scouts and soldiers of the Sisseton, Wahpeton, Medawakanton
[Mdewakanton], and Wapakoota [Wahpekute] bands of Sioux
Indians, who were enrolled and entered into the military service of
the United States and served in suppressing what is known as the
“Sioux outbreak of [1862];” or those who were enrolled and served
in the armies of the United States in the war of the rebellion, and to
the members of their families and descendants, now living, of such

See, e.g., 20 Cong. Rec. 1497 (1889) (remarks of Cong. Nelson) (“[T]he object of
this bill is to restore to that portion of the Sioux Indians who were in our Army either
as scouts aiding us against their own people, or in the Army of the Union during the
war down South—to restore to them the share of the annuities to which they were
properly entitled. . . . Two of the leading men of these bands, Chief Renville and Sam
Johnson, came here during the last session of Congress and went before the Indian
Office, and there is a voluminous report from the Department, embodied in the report
of the committee, setting forth in detail their just dues and making a computation
which the committee adopted in framing this bill as the amount belonging to these
Indians.”); Mathes, supra note 134, at 148 (footnote omitted) (“In 1888, Renville had
come to Washington, D.C., to solicit [Indian Rights Association agent Charles C.]
Painter’s help in restoring the annuities of tribal members who had served as scouts
during the Dakota War. Because he did not speak English, Renville brought his
interpreter Samuel Jerome Brown, who was part Dakota.”); see also supra note 226.
476
See supra notes 338-343 and accompanying text. Shortly after the conclusion of
the 1889 negotiations at Sisseton Agency, bills were introduced in both the House
of Representatives and the Senate calling for enactment of special relief for the
Dakota scouts. See 21 Cong. Rec. 243 (1889) (introduction of bill on Dec. 18, 1889 by
Cong. Comstock “to relieve certain Sioux Indians, their families and descendants, who
remained loyal to the United States during the Indian war following the outbreak
of the Sioux Indians of August, 1862, and the male members of the families of which
served either as scouts on the frontier against their own people, or as soldiers in
the armies of the United States during the civil war of 1861, and who in the Indian
outbreak in August, 1862, were annuitants as members of the Sisseton, Wahpeton,
Medawakanton [sic], or Waupakoota [sic] bands of Sioux Indians, from the operation
of certain acts of Congress passed to punish the hostile Indians”); 21 Cong. Rec. 581-82
(1890) (introduction of bill on Jan. 15, 1890 by Sen. Pettigrew “for the relief of certain
Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux Indians who served in the armies of the United States
against their own people when at war with the United States, and of their families,
descendants, and legal representatives, and of certain other Indians of said bands who
served as soldiers in the armies of the United States during the civil war, from the
operation of certain acts of Congress passed to punish the hostile Indians”).
477
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
475
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scouts and soldiers that are dead, who are not included in the foregoing class, as parties to said agreement . . . .478

The italicized words highlight the fact that this was a special statutory
appropriation in addition to the money appropriated under Article III of
the 1889 Agreement that paid restitution to all the Sisseton-Wahpeton
people of the Lake Traverse Reservation, “parties hereto, per capita,” who
had been “wrongfully and unjustly deprived [of annuity payments] by the
operation of the provisions of [the Act of February 16, 1863] . . . entitled
‘An act for the relief of persons for damages sustained by reason of depredation, and injuries by certain bands of Sioux Indians.’”479 The House
Report provides further clarification regarding this crucial distinction
between (1) the general “back annuity” payments authorized by Article III
of the 1889 Agreement and (2) the special, separate appropriation earmarked for off-reservation former Dakota scouts and the descendants of
deceased scouts which Congress was persuaded to add, ultimately, to the
1891 Act.480 In particular, the House Report incorporates an explanatory
letter from the Secretary of the Interior, introduced in the following way
by the Committee on Indian Affairs:
We submit the following letter . . . addressed to this committee
in response to our inquiries respecting the claims of the scouts, soldiers, and others of the Sisseton, Wahpeton, Medawakanton [sic],
and Waupakoota [sic] bands of Sioux Indians named in the bill. This
letter contains . . . a detailed statement of their accounts with the
United States, showing [(1)] the sum of $376,578.37 now due the
Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians, parties to the [1889] agreement,481
and [(2) an additional] $126,200 due the members of these bands
who were enrolled in the military service and who served as scouts
and soldiers during the civil war, and who are now living outside the
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 27, 26 Stat. 1035, 1038 (emphasis added).
Agreement of 1889, art. III, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1037, reprinted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 457-58
(1975); see also 31 Cong. Rec. 1664 (1898) (reprinting letter from D.M. Browning,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, as transmitted by M. Hoke Smith, Secretary of the
Interior, to the Chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs) (“Article 3 of said
agreement [of 1889] provided for the appropriation of $342,778.37. Besides this the
annuities for the years remaining unpaid, twelve in all, were also restored by said
article.”). For a description of the Act of February 16, 1863, see supra note 206.
480
See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
481
Significantly, years after passage of the 1891 Act the federal government
continued to administer and account for the proceeds of the 1889 agreement, and
in so doing adverted to the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing existence. See,
e.g., S. Doc. No. 68, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19 (1898) (emphasis added) (“A Report
Concerning the Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, in
Conformity with the Requirements of the Indian Appropriation Act of June 7, 1897”)
(exhibiting, among statements of financial transactions, “Statement No. 8.—Payments
for land ceded, Lake Traverse Reservation, agreement of December 12, 1889,”
and stating that “[b]y Executive order of January 19, 1895, under the provision of
section 27 of the act of March 3, 1891, authority was granted for a per capita payment
of $199,800 out of the . . . principal to the Sissetons and Wahpetons of the Lake
Traverse Reservation . . . .”).
478
479
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reservation, including also certain loyal Medawakanton [sic] and
Waupakoota [sic] Indians living in Minnesota . . . .482

DeCoteau imposes the made-up label “loyal scout claim” to conflate these two separate appropriations authorized by the 1891 Act 483
and to falsely assert that in 1889 the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota had
agreed to sell their unallotted lands on the “condition[] . . . that Congress
appropriate moneys to make good on the tribe’s outstanding ‘loyal
scout claim,’” 484 a “claim” DeCoteau further posits was one that “the
tribe believed was owing as part of the 1867 Treaty.”485 But in truth
the Indians’ demand for “back annuities,” which the U.S. negotiators
H.R. Rep. No. 1356, supra note 364, at 2 (emphasis added). The Secretary of the
Interior had transmitted the recommendation of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs
“that provision be made for the 250 Medawakanton [sic] and Waupakoota [sic] scouts,
and also for 50 families, numbering 250 persons, of the loyal scouts of the Sisseton
and Wahpeton bands, who reside outside of the Sisseton Reservation, and that they
should receive the same per capita allowance as that to be paid to the Sisseton and
Wahpeton scouts who reside on the reservation, under the [1889] agreement made
with the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians.” Id. (letter from Interior Secretary John W.
Noble to Committee on Indian Affairs); see also S. Exec. Doc. No. 143, 52d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 2 (1892) (letter from Indian Affairs Commissioner T.J. Morgan to John W.
Noble, Secretary of the Interior) (“The amount appropriated by the [1891] act . . . was
$126,620. From this amount there was set apart, by order of the Department, $2,250
for the payment of the necessary expenses incident to the preparation of the roll and
payment of funds, leaving the sum of $124,370 to be paid to those entitled thereto. The
roll approved by this office and by the Department embraced the names of 138 scouts
and soldiers. Dividing the above-named amount of $124,370 among the 138 scouts
and soldiers would give a per capita of $901.23, and this latter amount is that which
Special Agent [Samuel H.] Elrod is presumed to have paid to each scout or soldier
who was living at the time of payment, or, in the event of the death of any scout or
soldier, said amount, under direction of the Department, was to be paid to the family
and descendants of such scout or soldier.”). Two of the 138 names on the “roll of Sioux
scouts and soldiers” were stricken as duplicative prior to Acting Interior Secretary
George Chandler’s final approval of the roll on February 16, 1892. See List of Sioux
scouts and soldiers, supra note 209, at 32, 44, 51 (striking nos. 97 & 129).
The name of the Mdewakanton Dakota scout Mahpiyawakonze (“Influences
the Clouds”) is included on the roll as no. 28, and the name of my great-grandfather
Vines P. Mitchell (my maternal grandmother Cora Mitchell Trudell’s father) is
included as Mahpiyawakonze’s “Adopted Son” under the heading “Descendants of
Scouts and Soldiers Deceased.” See id. at 14-15; see also supra note 209. Two collateral
ancestors of mine also are included on the 1882 roll of former and deceased scouts
and soldiers: “Jack Frazer,” i.e., Joseph “Jack” Frazer (Ite Maza, or “Iron Face”), elder
brother of my great-great-great-grandmother Margaret Frazier (Waktehinhedwin, or
“Woman Who Comes Suddenly in Triumph,” my maternal grandmother Cora Mitchell
Trudell’s great-grandmother); and “Frances Trudel [Francis Hepi Trudell],” elder
brother of my great-grandfather Antoine Trudell (Oyatetawa, or “His Nation,” my
maternal grandfather Martin Trudell’s father). See List of Sioux scouts and soldiers,
supra note 209, at 38 (listing “Jack Frazer,” no 115); id. at 18 (listing “Frances Trudel,”
no. 44); see also id. (listing “Trudel, Francis” in alphabetically arranged index on 28th
unnumbered page preceding enumerated roll of “Scouts or Soldiers”).
483
See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
484
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435; see supra note 368 and accompanying text.
485
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433; see also supra text accompanying note 401.
482
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ultimately agreed to accommodate486 and which is addressed in Article III
of the 1889 Agreement,487 was not, as DeCoteau wrongly intimates, merely
a claim for compensation because of the government’s failure to pay the
scouts for their service at the time of the U.S.-Dakota War; nor was it
a claim arising from the 1867 Treaty that established the Lake Traverse
Reservation.488 Rather, the “back annuities” claim was for something far
See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
Agreement of 1889, art. III, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1037, reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 457-58.
488
DeCoteau’s only allusion to authority for describing what it brands a “loyal scout
claim” as a claim that “the tribe believed was owing as part of the 1867 Treaty”
is this assertion: “In May, [D.W.] Diggs met with a council of tribal leaders, who
told him that the tribe would consider selling the reserved lands if the Government
would first pay a ‘loyal scout claim’ which the tribe believed was owing as part of
the 1867 Treaty.” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 433. DeCoteau then merely displays its
own excerpts from the Minneapolis Tribune newspaper story that purported to
convey the statements of Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders as interviewed in May of
1889, six months prior to the start of the official U.S. negotiations with the SissetonWahpeton Dakota in November and December of that year. See supra notes 124132 and accompanying text. Although none of the “cherry-picked” quotations,
see supra note 131 and accompanying text, nor anything else in the newspaper story,
mentions or refers to any “loyal scout claim,” see supra note 178 and accompanying
text, one of the quotations—a fragment from a longer statement attributed to
Michael Renville, see supra text accompanying note 136—begins as follows: “‘. . . If
we get the money we will open up.’” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 434 (alteration in
original) (quoting A Large Pow-Wow, supra note 125). DeCoteau thus creates the
appearance that Michael Renville was referring to what DeCoteau calls a “loyal
scout claim” when he said “If we get the money we will open up”; but in truth, the
reference was to the Indians’ demand that “the government . . . pay what they owe,”
A Large Pow-Wow, supra note 125 (quoting Michael Renville), an assertion that in
turn referenced Chief Gabriel Renville’s immediately preceding statement insisting
that the government fulfill a “claim” described by the newspaper as a “claim that
under the [Traverse des Sioux] treaty of 1851 there is due [the Indians] in annuities
cut off in 1862” certain amounts of money, including treaty annuity allocations for
“the two years [i.e., 1862 and 1863] left out” of a previous insufficient accounting
by the Department of the Interior. Id. (quoting Gabriel Renville); see also infra
notes 491-497 and accompanying text (discussing Michael Renville’s opposition to
any privileged payments for scouts during the U.S. negotiations at Sisseton Agency
in late 1889).
It is true, of course, that the newspaper story refers to Chief Renville’s also having
spoken of the U.S. government’s failure to pay for the work of the Dakota scouts
during 1863 and 1864, see supra text accompanying note 135; supra note 145 and
accompanying text, a topic D.W. Diggs, the meeting’s “stenographer,” see supra text
accompanying note 126, likely instigated to ingratiate himself with the chief after
the lapse earlier that spring of a congressional bill Renville favored that would have
appropriated “back annuity” monies exclusively for the scouts and the families and
descendants of deceased scouts. See supra notes 338-343 and accompanying text. That
particular issue, however, was not pursued during the U.S. negotiations at Sisseton
Agency, apparently because the majority of the Indians wanted the 1889 Agreement to
provide “back annuity” payments to all Sisseton-Wahpeton people instead, payments
that the Indians therefore demanded (successfully) be distributed per capita. See
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 2 (letter from President Benjamin Harrison
to the Senate and House of Representatives) (reporting to Congress that per capita
486
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“payment of the [back] annuities justly due to these friendly Indians” was “said to be
the unanimous wish of the Indians”); supra text accompanying note 175; see also supra
notes 368-370 and accompanying text. Chief Renville’s continuing efforts, post-1889,
to secure benefits for the Dakota scouts appear to have contributed substantially to
Congress’s decision to add a special appropriation inclusive of all the scouts to the
1891 Act. See supra notes 473-482 and accompanying text. But regardless of Chief
Renville’s separate and independent advocacy, satisfying a “loyal scout claim” was
not a “condition[],” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435, demanded by the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota during their 1889 negotiations with U.S. commissioners.
The confusion DeCoteau creates by representing that the asserted “loyal scout
claim” was one that “the tribe believed was owing as part of the 1867 Treaty,” supra text
accompanying note 485, would appear to exploit the historical fact that, as originally
agreed-to by the Indians, the 1867 Treaty would indeed have provided ample benefits
for the Dakota scouts. Historian Gary Clayton Anderson explains:
. . . Articles 11 and 12 [of the original draft of the treaty] set up a massive
troop of Indian scouts, 250 in number, who would be paid $60 a month and
given rations. The chief of scouts—[Gabriel] Renville being the logical choice—
would receive $75 a month. Renville proudly signed his name to the agreement
in cursive.
....
At the same time, Congress was embroiled in debate over much headier
issues. . . . These postwar reforms cost money, and expensive Indian treaties
simply did not fit into this agenda. . . . [Indian Affairs Committee Chairman
James Harlan] struck out Articles 6 through 14 and sent the treaty to the Senate
floor. In place of the articles funding the reservation, the new Article 6 simply
stated that Congress would make appropriations “at its own discretion” for the
new reservation. . . . [T]here would be no large distribution of funds, no massive
organization of well-paid scouts, only the creation of two large Indian reservations. With these changes, the Senate ratified the agreement on 15 April 1867.
Anderson, supra note 160, at 70-71 (endnotes omitted); see also Treaty of Feb. 19,
1867, 15 Stat. 505, 507-09 (showing articles VI through XIV of original, subsequently
amended version of treaty, together with “his x mark” signatures of “the delegates
representing the Sissiton [sic] and Warpeton [sic] bands of Sioux Indians”); Treaty
with Sissiton [sic] and Warpeton [sic] Sioux, Exec. Doc., 39th Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-11
(1867) (“Confidential”) (same); S. Rep. No. 9, 55th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1897)
(“Sections 6 to 14 [of the original version of the 1867 Treaty], inclusive, made valuable
concessions to said Indians, but these sections were all stricken out by the Senate and
no compensation whatever given for the cessions made by these Indians in this treaty.
Other sections were inserted imposing hard conditions upon these people, in violation
of the treaty, and as thus amended the treaty was sent back for their approval. These
Indians were broken in spirit, destitute, and starving. By their friendship for the whites
during the outbreak they had incurred the hatred of the other tribes of Sioux Indians,
and therefore dared not go west into Dakota, where game was plenty, and hunt for
food and clothing, but were obliged to accept whatever was offered, and so accepted
the amendments imposed by the Senate.”).
In view of this historical backdrop—a backdrop DeCoteau, again, does not provide,
examine, or explain—Chief Gabriel Renville’s impassioned, lifelong advocacy on
behalf of the Dakota scouts is understandable. But the crucial point is that whatever
subsequent course Chief Renville’s advocacy may have taken, the U.S. government’s
1889 negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton people simply did not entail the parties’
agreeing on any special “condition[],” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 435, accommodating the
Dakota scouts, DeCoteau’s obfuscating use of the invented label “loyal scout claim”
notwithstanding. See also supra note 403.
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more serious: the “monstrous injustice”489 inflicted on all Dakota people
by the U.S. government in 1863, i.e., Congress’s retaliatory abrogation
of all Dakota treaties, forced expulsion and removal of Dakota people
from Minnesota, and confiscation and forfeiture of all annuity payments
essential for the Dakota people’s subsistence and survival.490
As discussed previously, DeCoteau deploys the term “loyal scout
claim” in misrepresenting the transcribed remarks of Sisseton-Wahpeton
Chief Gabriel Renville.491 The case treats the speech of another tribal
representative, Michael Renville, in similar fashion, displaying that testimony as follows:
Michael Renville, another tribal spokesman, stated:
“We have always said that when the sale of surplus lands was considered we would ask that 160 acres be given to each member of the
tribe . . . . We said in council that we would not sell surplus lands
until back annuities [for the loyal scout claim] were paid, but you say
that if the lands are now sold the back annuities would be paid at the
same time. This pleases us.” Id., at 21.492

What DeCoteau omits from Michael Renville’s testimony, replacing it
with an ellipsis, is the following sentence: “You spoke of money due us;
some of us think it ought to come to all who belong here, while others
think that none but scouts should receive it.”493 Also left out, as context,
is the response from the chairman of the U.S. commission, a response
that immediately follows Michael Renville’s December 6, 1889 speech,
quoted in altered form in DeCoteau;494 Chairman Whittlesey said: “In
this agreement we do not say anything about scout money, but call it the
back annuities due the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians, parties to this
agreement.”495 The omitted material makes clear that the “money due
us” to which Michael Renville was referring was not past wages for the
unpaid Dakota scouts but “back annuities” that the government owed
to all the “Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians, parties to [the 1889] agreement.”496 It is ironic, to say the least, that DeCoteau should make it look
See supra note 372 and accompanying text.
See supra note 177 and accompanying text; supra note 206 and accompanying text.
491
See supra notes 393-452 and accompanying text.
492
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 436 n.16 (alterations in original).
493
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Michael Renville); see supra note 258 and
accompanying text.
494
See supra note 492 and accompanying text.
495
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey); see supra note 259 and
accompanying text.
496
See supra note 495 and accompanying text. It is thus equally clear that Michael
Renville was referring to the same “money due us” as was Gabriel Renville when
the chief invoked that same phrase during the negotiations, saying, “We know that
the money due us on the treaty of 1851 is ours, and it has pleased us to have that
in.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 25 (report of councils with Sisseton
and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gabriel Renville); supra text accompanying
note 297; supra note 437; see also Charles C. Painter, Some Dangers Which Now
489
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like Michael Renville was thanking the Commission for satisfying a
“loyal scout claim” in a speech in which he was stating his approval of
the fact that the Agreement would not single out the scouts for privileged
and exclusive payments but would distribute “back annuities” to all the
Sisseton-Wahpeton people.497
Threaten the Interests of the Indians, in Proceedings of the 10th Ann. Meeting of the
Lake Mohonk Conf. of Friends of the Indian 76-77 (Martha D. Adams ed., 1892)
(“[A] commission was appointed to negotiate with the Indians on the Sisseton
reservation for the sale of their surplus land. . . . The Indians insisted on the payment
of their confiscated annuities as a condition precedent to a sale of their land, and the
commissioners were compelled to put this into the agreement.”).
497
The fact that Michael Renville and Chairman Whittlesey, in their December 6,
1889 exchange, were referring to the “back annuities” that the U.S. government
wrongly confiscated from the Dakota people in 1863 and not any “loyal scout claim”
is confirmed by additional testimony from the transcribed proceedings. Thus, in saying
“You spoke of money due us,” see supra note 493 and accompanying text, Michael
Renville was referring to Chairman Whittlesey’s having just said, “We agree the
money due you ought to be paid.” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 21 (report
of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey);
see also supra note 258 and accompanying text. Whittlesey’s statement in turn was
in reference to extensive discussion from the preceding date on which negotiations
took place, December 3, 1889, a day on which D.W. Diggs, speaking for the
commission, said: “When we have agreed on a price per acre, we recommend that
the back annuities be paid first, from 1862 to date . . . .” S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 19 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
D.W. Diggs); see supra note 225 and accompanying text. This negotiated arrangement
for satisfying the demands of Michael Renville, Chief Gabriel Renville, and the other
Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders for payment of “back annuities” was codified in the 1889
Agreement, as ratified by Congress in 1891:
The United States stipulates and agrees to pay the Sisseton and Wahpeton
bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, parties hereto, per capita, the sum of
[$342,778.37], being the amount found to be due . . . under the provisions of the
fourth article of the treaty of [July 23, 1851, i.e., the Treaty of Traverse des Sioux],
and of which they have been wrongfully and unjustly deprived by the operation
of the provisions of an act of Congress approved [February 16, 1863] . . . .
Agreement of 1889, art. III, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, 1037,
reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 457-58; see also supra note 479 and accompanying
text. The Senate Report on the bill to ratify and confirm the 1889 Agreement sheds
light on Diggs’s statement that the back annuities should be paid “from 1862 to date”:
By the terms of their treaties they were to be paid an annuity of $150,050
for fifty years, beginning July 1, 1851, and terminating on July 1, 1901, except
$15,000 of which was to continue forever. . . . The two unpaid appropriations
[for 1862 and 1863] were covered back into the Treasury . . . . Of their annuities twelve installments had been appropriated, two of which [i.e., for 1862 and
1863] had been unpaid when the confiscation act [of 1863] went into effect,
leaving twenty-nine installments from 1862 to 1890, inclusive, or $2,134,400
still unpaid.
S. Rep. No. 661, supra note 458, at 2.
Also illuminating is a chronicle provided by Eliphalet Whittlesey, chairman
of the U.S. commission at Sisseton Agency, and published as part of the October 7
proceedings of the 1891 meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of
the Indian, a meeting of Indian policy reformers that took place immediately after
Congress passed the 1891 Act that ratified the 1889 Agreement with the SissetonWahpeton Dakota:
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By interjecting the label “loyal scout claim” to deflect from the
Dakota people’s demand for restitution of their “back annuities,” the
DeCoteau Court sidestepped its obligation to consider the oppressive
historical circumstances of the 1889 negotiations—i.e., the dire hardship
and widespread suffering caused by Congress’s postwar retaliation and
acts of genocidal aggression against the Dakota people498—when underThe Indian Appropriation Bill passed last winter makes appropriation for the
fiscal year 1892, which began the first day of July, 1891. It contains ratifications
of agreements with Indians, some of which have been lying unacted upon for
several years. The agreement with the Pottawattomies [sic] of Oklahoma, with the
absentee Shawnees, with the Sac and Fox, the Cheyennes and Arrapahoes [sic], the
Coeur d’Alène of Idaho, the Fort Berthold Indians of North Dakota, the Sissetons
of South Dakota, and the Crows in Montana,—all these have been ratified by
Congress, and appropriations made for carrying them out involving several
millions of dollars, a small part of which only is paid in cash. Where cash payments
have been provided, it has been to carry out old, previously made treaties with the
United States. Certainly, that was the case with the Sissetons. There was a treaty
made with them in 1851, just forty years ago, by which the United States bound
itself to pay to these Indians certain money per capita. That was suspended on
account of the outbreak in Minnesota in 1862,—the whole of it,—the innocent
suffering with the guilty. The agreement with the Sissetons provided that those
annuities should be restored to the Sissetons, on the ground that they had remained
loyal and firm friends of the whites during that terrible time. By these ratifications
all the agreements are completed that have been made, and which were remaining
unratified until the last Congress, excepting one with the southern Utes, which
many of us hope will remain pigeon-holed for a good many years to come.
General E. Whittlesey, Survey of the Year’s Work, in Proceedings of the 9th Ann.
Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conf. of Friends of the Indian 13 (Israel C.
Barrows ed., 1891). For descriptions and brief histories of the Lake Mohonk Conference
meetings of Indian policy reform advocates, see Mathes, supra note 134, at 147; Patricia
Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American
West 196-200 (1987); Francis Paul Prucha, 2 The Great Father: The United States
Government and the American Indians 617-23 (1984); Mardock, supra note 75,
at 200-01; William T. Hagan, American Indians 123-24 (1961); see also Richard B.
Collins & Karla D. Miller, A People Without Law, 5 Indigenous L.J. 83, 93-104 (2006)
(discussing the role and legacy of the “Friends of the Indian” with regard to misplaced
doubts, historically, about “whether Native American tribes had legal capacity to sue”).
498
See supra note 490 and accompanying text; cf. Herbert [Glass], supra note 183, at 75357 (discussing the initial plans of government and military officials for “a war of
extermination as the preferred response” to the Indian attacks at the start of the U.S.Dakota War); Routel, supra note 208, at 4, 77 (footnote omitted) (“Like the bounty
system in Minnesota, these programs [that placed a bounty on Indian inhabitants
elsewhere in the United States] were creatures of state and territorial law, but they
were implicitly and explicitly approved by the federal government. In fact, they could
be viewed as part of a much broader extermination program that was at the heart of
federal Indian policy during this time period. . . . Federal, state, and local governments
all had a hand in creating the bounty system that provided monetary rewards for the
killing of Dakota men beginning in 1863.”); Meyer, supra note 181, at 124-25 (“[I]n
view of the remarks made in 1857 by Special Agent [Kintzing] Prichette about the
desire of the whites to use an Indian war as a pretext for seizing lands, one is justified in
wondering how much that motive figured in the hysterical utterances of the newspapers
and of public men in the weeks following the [1862] outbreak.”); id. at 101-02 (footnote
omitted) (“The attitude . . . toward the Indians was suggested by an item in a Red Wing

Of Reservation Boundary Lines

and Judicial

Battle Lines

277

newspaper noted by Prichette [in his 1857 report]: ‘We have plenty of young men who
would like no better fun than a good Indian hunt.’ In Minnesota he found that ‘but
one sentiment appeared to inspire almost the entire population, and this was, the total
annihilation of the Indian race within their borders.’ Thus the objectives of the Indian
Bureau and the missionaries were impossible of attainment in the face of a populace
who found no room in their world for live Indians.”); Anderson, supra note 181, at 234
(footnote omitted) (“Minnesota newspaper editors soon joined the chorus of angry
politicians who wanted revenge. ‘Nothing short of extermination’ was acceptable, read
a banner headline in the St. Paul Press. And as for the women and children, the paper
recommended a ‘penal colony’ be created on Isle Royale in Lake Superior. . . . The
Indians’ ‘refusal to be civilized, forces upon us the hard alternative of exterminating him.’
Never had an American frontier community been more closely aligned in supporting a
policy approaching genocide than in Minnesota in the late fall of 1862.”); Extra Sess.
Message of Gov. Ramsey to the Leg. of Minn. 12 (Sept. 9, 1862) (“Our course then is
plain. The Sioux Indians of Minnesota must be exterminated or driven forever beyond
the borders of the State. . . . They have themselves made their annihilation an imperative
social necessity.”); Chomsky, supra note 144, at 23 & n.60 (footnote omitted) (quoting
Sept. 28, 1862 letter from Maj. Gen. John Pope, commander of the U.S. Army Dep’t of the
Northwest, to Brigadier Gen. Henry H. Sibley of the U.S. Military District of Minnesota)
(“It is my purpose utterly to exterminate the Sioux if I have the power to do so and even
if it requires a campaign lasting the whole of next year. Destroy everything belonging
to them and force them out to the plains, unless, as I suggest, you can capture them.
They are to be treated as maniacs or wild beasts, and by no means as people with whom
treaties or compromises can be made.”); Green, supra note 183, at 74 & n.17 (endnote
omitted) (quoting Aug. 17, 1862 letter from President Lincoln’s private secretary John G.
Nicolay to U.S. Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton) (“As against the Sioux, it must be
a war of extermination.”). In his annual report, dated January 27, 1863, as “agent for the
Sioux of the Mississippi,” Rep. of the Comm’r of Indian Aff. for the Year 1863, supra
note 200, at 266 (letter from Clark W. Thompson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs,
St. Paul, Minnesota, to William P. Dole, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, transmitting
report of Thomas J. Galbraith, U.S. Indian agent for the Sioux of the Mississippi),
Thomas J. Galbraith echoed the sentiments of the white citizens of Minnesota in the
months following the U.S.-Dakota War:
I shall now proceed to consider the question, What shall be done with the Sioux
Indians, and what policy shall be adopted toward them? . . .
....
Since the outbreak countless theories have been advanced on this subject.
Extermination, massacre, banishment, torture, huddling together, killing with
small-pox, poison, and kindness, have all been proposed. . . . When we look this
subject in the face, I take it few will contend seriously that the Sioux and all the
other Indians can be “exterminated” just now. Exterminate is a severe, a terrible
word—much easier written than put into practical operation. . . .
....
The power of the government must be brought to bear upon them; they must
be whipped, coerced into obedience. After this is accomplished, few will be left
to put up on a reservation; many will be killed; more must perish from famine
and exposure, and the more desperate will flee and seek refuge on the plains or
in the mountains. Few except women and children can be captured, and if they
should be, they never should be allowed to cause trouble again. A very small
reservation should suffice for them.
....
One of two things must, in my opinion, happen: either the entire race must
become extinct, or they must assimilate with the whites, and become part of
the people, or, if not part of the people, at least friends of the people. Unless
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taking the crucial and indispensable judicial task of ascertaining what the
Indians understood they were agreeing to (and demanding) in signing the
1889 Agreement. This evasion is integral to DeCoteau’s false narrative of
tribal consent. Without it, the fiction that the Dakota people consented to
further aggression—that is, federal annihilation of the Indians’ “permanent home,” the Lake Traverse Reservation499—would be readily seen as
preposterous and quickly dispelled. In piercing DeCoteau’s fictitious
and absurd historical narrative, it is the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision, not Congress’s 1891 Act, that is laid bare as the real source of this

Indian nationality is abolished, the Indian race must, ere long, be known only
in history. Before the approach of the aggressive civilization of the age, unless
they become a part of it, they must disappear.
Id. at 294, 296, 297 (report of U.S. Indian Agent Thomas J. Galbraith to Clark W.
Thompson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, St. Paul, Minnesota). See generally
Niebuhr, supra note 176, at 87-106 (book chapter titled “A ‘War of Extermination,’”
addressing the immediate aftermath of the 1862 U.S.-Dakota War in Minnesota).
For a compelling, cautionary critique addressing the propriety and limitations of
using the term “genocide” to characterize “patterns of colonial dispossession” that
Indigenous peoples have endured historically, see Joseph P. Gone, Colonial Genocide
and Historical Trauma in Native North America: Complicating Contemporary
Attributions, in Colonial Genocide in Native North America 273, 275
(Andrew Woolford, Jeff Benvenuto & Alexander Laban Hinton eds., 2014). Professor
Gone, a clinical and community psychologist, anthropologist, and member of the
Gros Ventre (Aaniiih) Nation of the Fort Belknap Indian Community in Montana,
writes:
[A]dvocates [who promote the concept of historical trauma] must attend more
closely to the concrete and specific historical events that have shaped the emergence of any contemporary Indigenous community . . . . [T]he rhetorical and
political efficacy of overgeneralized attribution of this term [i.e., genocide] remains in serious question . . . . [B]eyond those actual instances of group-based
mass murder that intermittently occurred during the colonization of Native
North America, it may be that understatement will best serve Indigenous interests more effectively than hyperbole. Moreover the terms colonization and
colonial subjugation would appear to serve readily enough for general characterizations of the postcontact historical experiences of Indigenous North
Americans without sacrificing either historical accuracy or scholarly integrity.
Most important, neither risks trivializing the intermittent occurrences of murderous settler campaigns undertaken for outright extermination of Indigenous
peoples that even today threaten to rend the very fabric of human communality
in the United States and Canada.
Id. at 287; cf. Pierre Clastres, Of Ethnocide, in Archeology of Violence 43, 4346 (Jeanine Herman trans., Semiotext(e) 1994) (1980) (discussing the emergence of
the word “ethnocide” in the twentieth century as a response to the need for naming
a “phenomenon” that is distinct “from the reality that ‘genocide’ represents” in that
“ethnocide signals not the physical destruction” of human beings “but the destruction
of their culture,” and observing that, vis-à-vis the Indian tribes of North and South
America and “[f]rom its agents’ perspective, . . . ethnocide would not be an undertaking
of destruction: it is, on the contrary, a necessary task demanded by the humanism
inscribed at the heart of western culture”).
499
See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
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unconscionable destruction of the Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s reservation by the United States government.500
d. Distorting the Congressional Record
With regard to DeCoteau’s use of the Congressional Record to
bolster its decision, the problem of “cherry-picked statements”501 crops up
once more. The opinion stacks and splices together in a single column502
different quoted fragments of paragraphs from “the sponsors of the
comprehensive legislation”503 (i.e., the 1891 Act) that “also ratified several
other agreements providing the outright cession of surplus reservation
lands to the Government.”504 But none of those chosen paragraph
fragments makes any reference to altering or terminating reservation
boundaries. Thus, DeCoteau extracts from the recorded remarks of
Congressman George D. Perkins and Senator John Tyler Morgan the
following respective comments:
“All the pending agreements or treaties for the purchase of Indian
lands are ratified and confirmed by the provisions of this bill. . . .
“The bill carries the largest appropriation ever carried by an
Indian appropriation bill, but it extinguishes the Indian title to a
great domain and opens it to settlement by the hardy and progressive pioneers . . . .”
“We do not pretend to make any modification or amendment of the
agreements themselves. We merely ratify those, and then we take the
Cf. Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic
Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1148-49 (1990) (observing that in
DeCoteau and other reservation diminishment/disestablishment cases it is clear “that
the holdings, although couched in legislative intent terms, are based on other factors”).
501
See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
502
See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 440-41.
503
Id. at 440.
504
Id. at 439. As for DeCoteau’s apparent intimation (without explanation) of a
legally significant distinction among otherwise virtually indistinguishable Indian landsale agreements because of the Sisseton-Wahpeton cession’s being an “outright” one,
the case contradicts the contrary position of the overturned appellate decision below,
in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Lake Traverse Reservation
was not disestablished:
The case before us is not unlike Seymour, Mattz and Condon. The overall
climate of legislative activity concerning Indian reservations during the period
from 1887 through 1910 received its primary impetus from the General Allotment Act. The 1891 Act, by its express terms, refers to the General Allotment
Act of 1887. Just as in the beforementioned three cases, the reservation here was
not sold to the government outright but merely opened for settlement under the
homestead laws and the 1887 general allotment plan. Allotment and homesteading do not suggest congressional purpose to terminate the reservation.
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1973) (decision
below) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (adverting to Seymour v. Superintendent,
368 U.S. 351 (1962); Matz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); United States ex rel.
Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973)), rev’d, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425
(1975); see also Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 132, at 15, 1974 WL 186005, at *9
(citations omitted) (“The General Allotment Act contemplated the extinguishment
of Indian titles or right to occupation of surplus lands within reservations and not the
disestablishment of any part of the reservation.”).
500
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estate we have acquired in this way, and after providing for the payment of the money, or whatever it is we have agreed to pay these
Indians, we take these landed estates and parcel and divide them out
among the people in a fashion that we think is the most conducive to
the occupancy of that country by an honest, laborious, earnest, and
faithful set of people.”505

Apart from exuding the white-settler supremacism that was prevalent in
nineteenth-century America,506 there is nothing particularly noteworthy
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 440-41 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting
22 Cong. Rec. 3784 (1891) (remarks of Cong. Perkins); 22 Cong. Rec. 3455 (1891)
(remarks of Sen. Morgan)).
506
See generally Stephen Kantrowitz, White Supremacy, Settler Colonialism, and the
Two Citizenships of the Fourteenth Amendment, 10 J. Civ. War Era 29 (2020), https://
muse.jhu.edu/article/750248. Discussing mid-nineteenth-century federal Indian policy,
Professor Kantrowitz writes:
Land cessions often followed Native military defeats, and military
removals of Native populations formed part of the violent conquest of Indian
Country. . . . In various forms over successive national administrations, this
policy sought to transform Native people into American-style farmers; to
reshape their lifeways and customs so thoroughly that they became acceptable
neighbors for white settlers; to transform them so totally, that is, that they
ceased to be alien at all and were absorbed into the American body politic.
In particular, this policy required that Native people surrender their collective
ownership of land, accept “allotments” of small tracts of this land to individuals
and households, and allow the rest to be sold to American settlers.
....
. . . The pressure of white settlement was inexorable [according to the
“mainstream” thinking of policymakers]. Native peoples would be absorbed
by the white settler societies around them, or they would fail to assimilate and
would “perish from the face of the earth.” Either way, the march of settlement
would continue.
Id. at 37, 44-46 (endnote and citation omitted).
The careers of both U.S. Representative George D. Perkins of Iowa and U.S. Senator
John Tyler Morgan of Alabama involved advocating white supremacist policy
positions. See Jane Conard, Charles Collins: The Sioux City Promotion of the Black
Hills, S.D. Hist., Spring 1972, at 131, 160 (footnote omitted), https://www.sdhspress.
com/journal/south-dakota-history-2-2/charles-collins-the-sioux-city-promotion-ofthe-black-hills (noting Perkins’s role, as editor of the Sioux City Journal, in “criticizing
governmental policy” in 1875 guarding against the invasion of the treaty-protected
Black Hills by miners, and indicating Perkins’s alignment with Charles Collins, editor
of the Sioux City, Iowa rival newspaper Weekly Times, in the belief, as stated by Collins,
that “[t]he government had reached the point where it ‘must declare that [Black
Hills] country open to white men, or decree that white men have no rights that the
government is bound to respect’”); see also David Holthouse, Activists Confront Hate
in Selma, Ala., Intelligence Rep., Nov. 30, 2008, https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2008/activists-confront-hate-selma-ala (“Lynching blacks
was just fine with John Tyler Morgan. In fact, when Morgan represented Alabama
in Washington, D.C., following the Civil War, the former Confederate generalturned-grand dragon of the Ku Klux Klan and six-term U.S. senator introduced and
championed several bills to legalize the practice of racist vigilante murder as a means
of preserving white power in the Deep South. A lawyer from Selma, Morgan was
one of the fiercest segregationists and white supremacists of the early Jim Crow era.
During Reconstruction, he advocated the forced removal of the South’s entire black
505
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or significant, vis-à-vis the reservation diminishment/disestablishment
inquiry, about these legislators’ remarks. The references to “extinguish[ing] the Indian title,” “settlement” of “these landed estates,” and
“occupancy of that country” previously occupied solely by the Indians
advert only to the proposed alienation of land-title, that is, the transfer
of property rights in the ceded “estates”;507 those references do not signify or imply loss of reservation status or the destruction of federal and
tribal jurisdiction, as the pre-DeCoteau Supreme Court precedents make
clear.508 Both of these legislators, moreover, made additional statements
that appear elsewhere in the Congressional Record that imply their
shared understanding that the Lake Traverse Reservation would continue to exist after the 1889 Agreement’s ratification.509
Potentially more foreboding, however, if only in retrospect, is
DeCoteau’s singling out the following portion of a paragraph from the
recorded remarks of Senator Henry L. Dawes:
“The remainder of the bill is made up of the other appropriations
necessary to carry out the agreements that were made with Indians
for the surrender of a large portion of their reservations to the public
domain. In the main it has cost the United States between $1.25 and
$1.50 an acre for some ten or eleven million acres of land. All this land
is opened by this bill to settlement as part of the public domain upon
the payment by the settlers of $1.50 an acre, for all except that which
was obtained from the Sisseton and Wahpeton reservation, which is
open to settlement at $2.50 an acre, because the United States gave
the Indians for the surrender $2.50 an acre.”510

With regard to Senator Dawes’s use of the term “public domain,” it should
be noted at the outset that in DeCoteau (1) “the ‘public domain’ language
was found not in the act itself” and (2) “[t]here was no evidence of similar
language in the negotiations leading to the [1889] agreement, and consequently no evidence that the tribe understood that the ceded lands would
be deleted from the reservation.”511 Although it could not have been known
population to Cuba, Hawaii and the Philippines. He once said, ‘The snows will fall
from heaven in sooty blackness,’ before whites would accept blacks as their equals.”).
507
Likewise, DeCoteau’s citations to the Congressional Record in support of
the statement “it was decided that these lands should be sold to settlers at $2.50
per acre under the homestead laws,” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 438-39 & n.20 (citing
22 Cong. Rec. 2809-10, 3784 (1891) (remarks of Congs. Holmann and Perkins);
22 Cong. Rec. 3453, 3457-58 (1891) (remarks of Sens. Pettigrew and Dawes)),
implicate only an ineluctable land-sale issue, not a question of altering or eliminating
reservation boundaries.
508
See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U.S. 481 (1973)); supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962)).
509
Regarding the implications of Senator Morgan’s additional remarks, see infra
note 517. Regarding Congressman Perkins’s further remarks, see infra notes 526-538
and accompanying text.
510
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 441 (emphases added) (quoting 22 Cong. Rec. 3879 (1891)
(remarks of Sen. Dawes)).
511
Royster, supra note 56, at 33 n.162 (citation omitted). DeCoteau’s assertion that “[t]he
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in 1975 when the case was decided, DeCoteau’s pinpointing a senator’s use
of the term “public domain” in the case’s legislative history was a strategic move in advance of the Supreme Court’s 1994 decision to add “public
domain” to the list of words with “magic” reservation-boundary-altering
properties.512 But in the context of DeCoteau, the notion that Senator
Dawes’s mention of “public domain” might imply Congress’s extinguishment of the Lake Traverse Reservation is exceedingly implausible.513
sponsors of the legislation stated repeatedly that the ratified agreements would return the
ceded land to the ‘public domain,’” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added) (citations
omitted), is misleading. As direct support DeCoteau cites only its own three stacked
and strung-together excerpts from the Congressional Record, see id. (citing id. at 44041). But among those excerpts—quotes extracted from three different legislators—the
term “public domain” is used by only one individual, Senator Dawes, see id. at 44041 & nn.23-25 (excerpting quotes from Cong. Perkins, 22 Cong. Rec. 3784 (1891),
Sen. Morgan, 22 Cong. Rec. 3455 (1891), and Sen. Dawes, 22 Cong. Rec. 3879 (1891));
see also supra notes 502-505 and accompanying text; supra note 510 and accompanying
text. Moreover, an online legal database search for the term “public domain” in the
Congressional Record for 1890 and 1891 yielded no other instance where that term
was used by Senator Dawes or anyone else in connection with the 1889 Agreement or
the land-disposition provision associated with the agreement. See 21 Cong. Rec. 38110800 (1890); 22 Cong. Rec. 1-3921 (1891); 23 Cong. Rec. 1-104 (1892). In other words,
notwithstanding DeCoteau’s misleading assertion, there was only one legislator—not
multiple “sponsors”—who mentioned “public domain” in connection with the disposal
of the Sisseton-Wahpeton lands, and that one legislator, Senator Dawes, used the term in
this way only in the single instance quoted in DeCoteau and nowhere else in the two years
(1890 and 1891) of legislative proceedings, transcribed in volumes 21, 22, and 23 of the
Congressional Record, during which the Indian appropriations bill that became the 1891
Act was addressed numerous times by the Senate and the House of Representatives.
For further analysis regarding Senator Dawes’s mention of the term “public domain,” as
quoted in DeCoteau, see infra notes 574-586 and accompanying text.
512
See Tweedy, supra note 1, at 751 (footnote omitted) (observing that after DeCoteau
“[t]he Court . . . expanded this universe of so-called magic language to include run-ofthe-mill language that ‘restor[ed] land to the public domain’”); see also supra note 116
and accompanying text.
513
See, e.g., Susan D. Campbell, Reservations: The Surplus Lands Acts and the Question
of Reservation Disestablishment, 12 Am. Indian L. Rev. 57, 73-74 (1984) (footnote
omitted) (“[A] body of case law gives strong support to the argument . . . that the public
domain language in surplus lands acts carried little meaning. This case law indicates that
when the phrase ‘public domain’ was used in federal public lands legislation, it merely
referred to land available for sale or disposition under the general land laws. ‘Public
domain’ was used interchangeably with ‘public lands.’”); cf. Leavenworth, Lawrence &
Galveston R.R. Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733, 741 (1876) (emphasis added) (holding
that an act of Congress that granted lands to a state for railroad development cannot
be construed to encompass lands that were within Indian reservations at the time the
statute was enacted and observing that “these grants have always been recognized as
attaching only to so much of the public domain as was subject to sale or other disposal,
although the roads of many subsidized companies pass through Indian reservations”).
That the term “public domain” had varying, conflicting meanings during the allotment
era is illustrated by an 1879 report of the Board of Indian Commissioners, “a group
of Eastern philanthropists who advised the Interior Department regarding its
administration of Indian affairs.” Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam’s Stepchildren:
The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887, at 12 (Octagon Books,
1969) (1942); see also Mathes, supra note 134, at 146 n.22 (“The Board of Indian
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Most significant in this regard is the fact that nothing in the 1889
Agreement provides for the disposition of the lands sold by the Indians and
purchased by the U.S. government. Rather, Congress added a provision
for disposing of those lands as a separate section (§ 30)514 of the “comprehensive legislation” of 1891, legislation that included (as § 26) the entire
1889 Agreement.515 Because Congress understood that it could not change
or abolish the boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation, established
by treaty in 1867, without tribal consent,516 the provision for the post-sale
disposition of the Sisseton-Wahpeton lands—a provision that was never
presented to the Indians for their consideration or approval—could have
had no effect at all on the reservation’s existence regardless of whether
Congress unilaterally relegated the ceded lands to “public domain” status.517
Commissioners consisted of unpaid philanthropists and humanitarians nominated by
major Protestant denominations. It also had authorization to exercise joint control
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs to purchase and inspect food, disburse funds,
negotiate treaties, and make inspection tours.”). In a caustic passage, the 1879 report
exhibits the Board members’ understanding of “public domain” as encompassing
lands occupied by Indians within a reservation’s boundaries:
“We may moralize over the natural rights of the Indian as much as we please,
but after all they have their limit. . . . [I]t is evident that no 12,000,000 acres of
the public domain, whose hills are full of ores, and whose valleys are waiting for
the diligent hand to ‘dress and keep them,’ in obedience to the divine command,
can long be kept simply as a park, in which wild beasts are hunted by wilder
men. This Anglo-Saxon race will not allow the car of civilization to stop long
at any line of latitude or longitude on our broad domain. If the Indian in his
wildness plants himself on the track, he must inevitably be crushed by it.”
Priest, supra, at 219-20 (endnote omitted) (quoting 11th Ann. Rep. of the Bd. of Indian
Comm’rs 12 (1879)). General Eliphalet Whittlesey, who chaired the U.S. negotiating
commission at Sisseton Agency in November and December, 1889, served as assistant
secretary, and then as secretary, of the Board of Indian Commissioners for a quarter
century, from 1875 to 1899. See 41st Ann. Rep. of the Bd. of Indian Comm’rs 25 (1909)
(notice regarding “Death of Gen. Eliphalet Whittlesey”); see also supra note 160.
514
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 30, 26 Stat. 1035, 1039 (providing that the ceded
lands “shall . . . be subject only to entry and settlement under the homestead and
township laws of the United States” and “[t]hat patents shall not issue until the settler
or entryman shall have paid to the United States the sum of [$2.50] per acre for the
land taken up by such homesteader”).
515
See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, 1035-38, reprinted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 455-60.
516
See supra notes 353-354 and accompanying text.
517
This crucial point is borne out further by remarks from the Congressional Record
that are left out of DeCoteau. In the Senate debate that took place from February 27
to March 3, 1891, from which DeCoteau extracts two senators’ comments, Senator
Dawes opened his remarks, on February 27, by stating that the amended Indian
appropriations bill under consideration contained “agreements made by these Indians
by which they have agreed to surrender to the United States about 10,000,000 acres
of land.” 22 Cong. Rec. 3453 (1891) (emphases added) (remarks of Sen. Dawes). This
statement establishes a contextualizing reference point for Dawes’s later elaboration,
on March 3—i.e., that “the United States gave the Indians for the surrender $2.50 an
acre,” see supra note 510 and accompanying text—showing that what the SissetonWahpeton Dakota agreed to “surrender” was “acres of land,” not their reservation.
See also infra note 647 (further discussing the significance of Senator Dawes’s use
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DeCoteau’s dubious use of the Congressional Record implicates other problems as well. The case disregards, for instance, crucial
of the word “surrender” in debates leading to enactment of the bill that became
the 1891 Act). In addition, Senator Dawes made clear that although in its proposed
amendments to the appropriations bill the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs “ha[d]
modified the disposition of the land” with respect to some of the agreements, no
change could be made to the agreements themselves: “Of course, it is beyond our power
to modify the agreements. The agreements are in haec verba [i.e., verbatim] as made
[with the Indians] by the commissioners . . . .” 22 Cong. Rec. 3453 (1891) (emphasis
added) (remarks of Sen. Dawes).
The same basic point—that Congress had discretion to select the methods for
disposing of lands purchased from Indian tribes but could not change the agreements
themselves—is the true import of Senator Morgan’s remark, a key opening sentence
from which is omitted in DeCoteau, see supra note 505 and accompanying text.
Morgan had risen in support of Dawes’s urging the Senate to pass the comprehensive
Indian appropriations bill, saying: “Mr. President, this Congress ought not to adjourn
without disposing of these treaties, not so much on account of the Indians out there
as on account of the people who are occupying and intend to occupy that country.”
22 Cong. Rec. 3455 (1891) (remarks of Sen. Morgan). He further stated that the
agreements were essentially “contracts by which two-thirds or three-fourths of the
male adults of any tribe may dispose of what is, or is supposed to be, their interest in the
land included within their reservations.” Id. (emphasis added). After bluntly criticizing
how U.S. officials had been carrying out negotiations with the Indians (“Now, while
we have been dickering with these people in this way . . .”), Senator Morgan added:
When we adopt this bill the statute will not change all these agreements. We do
not pretend to make any modification or amendment of the agreements themselves. We merely ratify those, and then we take the estate we have acquired in
this way, and after providing for the payment of the money, or whatever it is
we have agreed to pay these Indians, we take these landed estates and parcel
and divide them out among the people in a fashion that we think is the most
conducive to the occupancy of that country by an honest, laborious, earnest,
and faithful set of people.
Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, Senator Morgan was not positing that “[t]he intended
effect of all these ratification agreements,” DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425,
439-40 (1975), was to shrink or abolish reservations by paying the Indians “outright,”
see id. at 439 (referring to “outright cession of surplus reservation lands”); see also
supra note 504, for lands that Congress, at its discretion, would then make available
for purchase by homesteaders. Rather, Morgan was rallying votes by reassuring his
colleagues that the proposed amendment to the Indian appropriations bill was not
an unconstitutional power-grab by Congress, modifying negotiated agreements with
Indian tribes, but instead was—to borrow a phrase from a different senator—a perfectly
legal “provision [for] carrying the agreement[s] into effect,” 22 Cong. Rec. 3457 (1891)
(remarks of Sen. Cockrell).
It is also important to observe that DeCoteau concedes that “Congress recognized
that the [1889] Agreement could not be altered” and that “debate [therefore] centered
largely on the disposition to be made by the United States of the lands it had acquired
under the Agreement.” DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 438 (footnote omitted); see also supra
notes 353-354 and accompanying text. But DeCoteau fails to further concede that this
fact negates any implication that legislators’ use of the term “public domain,” when
debating how Congress should dispose of the Sisseton-Wahpeton lands, is relevant (given
the requirement of tribal consent) to the question of the Lake Traverse Reservation’s
alleged termination. For further discussion of DeCoteau’s problematic treatment of the
ambiguous term “public domain,” see infra notes 574-586 and accompanying text.
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remarks made by a key “sponsor[] of the comprehensive legislation”518
regarding the bill’s Sisseton-Wahpeton-specific sections and provisions,519 Congressman Oscar S. Gifford, one of the first two elected
legislators to represent the state of South Dakota in the U.S. House of
Representatives.520 Thus, the following transcribed remarks appear in the
Congressional Record for the date September 29, 1890, under the heading “Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, Sioux Indians”:
Mr. PERKINS. I yield to the gentleman from South Dakota
[Mr. GIFFORD].
Mr. GIFFORD. Mr. Speaker, I desire to present the following
Senate bill which I send to the Clerk’s desk.
The Clerk read the title of the bill, as follows:
A bill (S. 3216) to ratify and confirm an agreement with the
Sisseton and Wahpeton band of Dakota or Sioux Indians, and for
other purposes.
Mr. GIFFORD. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the House, I
will make a brief statement with regard to this bill.
Mr. KILGORE. Let the bill be read.
Mr. GIFFORD. It is a long bill, and I will make a brief statement
as to its provisions if there is no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without unanimous consent is
given [sic] the bill will have to be read at length.
Mr. GIFFORD. I want to make a brief statement before the bill
is read, if I may have unanimous consent to do so. This bill ratifies an
agreement made with Indians in South Dakota, something like one
thousand Indians, for the cession or opening to settlement of a portion of their reservation. The portion opened to settlement amounts to
about 700,000 acres of land—678,000 acres. There are something like
900,000 acres in the total reservation. These Indians have all taken
their allotments. They are civilized Indians, not blanket Indians.
There remain unallotted for their use and benefit 112,000 acres in
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 440; see supra text accompanying note 503.
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 19 n.12, 1974 WL 186007, at *15 n.12
(“Although the bill that became the 1891 Act was not introduced by Congressman
Gifford, the sections pertaining to the Lake Traverse Reservation were incorporations
of earlier bills introduced by him.”); 21 Cong. Rec. 380 (1890) (noting that on Dec. 21,
1889, Congressman Gifford introduced “[a] bill (H. R. 3732) to accept and ratify an
agreement made by the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians, and to grant
a right of way for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway through the Lake
Traverse reservation, in South Dakota,” and that the bill was sent “to the Committee
on Indian Affairs”); 22 Cong. Rec. 3875, 3877 (1891) (identifying Congressman
Gifford as one of three “Managers on the part of the House” for the “committee of
conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses” who met with their Senate
counterparts regarding the comprehensive Indian appropriations bill and “after full
and free conference . . . agreed to recommend and [did] recommend to their respective
Houses” final, successful passage of the bill which became the 1891 Act).
520
See Hon. O.S. Gifford Passed Away, Dakota Farmers’ Leader, Jan. 24, 1913,
https://www.newspapers.com/image/167025978/ (noting that Gifford “was a member
of the constitutional convention when Dakota Territory was divided into North and
South Dakota” and “was a delegate to Congress three terms and honorably served on
important committees”).
518
519
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round numbers. By the terms of the agreement it is proposed to pay
to these Indians the sum of $2.50 per acre. The agreement is perfectly satisfactory to the Indians and to all the parties concerned. The
$2.50 per acre will be paid back by the settlers, or, in other words, the
Government is reimbursed for the value of the land paid to these
Indians for the land. It will all be paid back into the Treasury of the
United States by the settlers whenever the land is taken and occupied for settlement, which will be at once.521

As the italicized selection indicates, Representative Gifford clearly
understood that (1) the term “cession,” as used in the 1889 Agreement
with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota,522 meant only the “opening to
settlement of a portion of [the Indians’] reservation” and (2) the “portion” thus “opened to settlement” amounted to “678,000 acres” of the
approximately “900,000 acres in the total [Lake Traverse] reservation.”523
Gifford’s explanation of the 1889 Agreement—soon to be ratified by
the 1891 Act 524—coming, as it was, from the primary sponsor/proponent
of the agreement’s ratification in the House of Representatives, is both
weighty and highly probative, vividly pointing toward the conclusion that
Congress’s ratification of the Indians’ “cession . . . of a portion” of their
“total reservation”525 did not eliminate the reservation’s boundaries.
DeCoteau also ignores additional remarks by legislators in debates
over bills closely tied to the 1889 Agreement and the 1891 Act, remarks
that likewise clearly evince the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing
existence. One such bill was H.R. 3732, a bill “to accept and ratify an agreement made by the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians, and to
grant a right of way for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway
through the Lake Traverse reservation, in South Dakota.”526 The bill,
which was debated in the House of Representatives on March 12, 1890,
referenced “a certain memorandum of agreement” dated December 8,
1884, “signed by Gabriel Renville, principal chief,” and other SissetonWahpeton representatives, including “Michael Renville, president of
council.”527 In fact, the contents of that memorandum already had been
incorporated into the body of the 1889 Agreement itself, comprising its
fifth article.528 Accordingly, the March 12, 1890 debate was, in essence,
21 Cong. Rec. 10699 (1890) (emphasis added).
See Agreement of 1889, art. II, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1037 (referring to “the cession, sale, relinquishment, and conveyance of
the lands described in article one of this agreement”), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S.
at 457.
523
See 21 Cong. Rec. 10699 (1890) (remarks of Cong. Gifford); supra text
accompanying note 521.
524
See Agreement of 1889, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1035-38, reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 455-60.
525
21 Cong. Rec. 10699 (1890) (remarks of Cong. Gifford); supra text accompanying
note 521.
526
21 Cong. Rec. 2162-63 (1890) (remarks of Cong. Perkins).
527
21 Cong. Rec. 2163 (1890) (reading of H.R. 3702).
528
Agreement of 1889, art. V, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
521
522
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Congress’s initial consideration of a portion of the agreement that the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota Indians had signed three months earlier, at
Sisseton Agency in December 1889.529
Crucial, then, are the legislators’ contemporaneous—and consistent—references to the Lake Traverse Reservation’s existence when they
began debating the 1889 Agreement’s provisions in March of 1890:
Mr. PERKINS. . . . [T]his [railway] road has been already built
and is now in operation. It secured, after negotiation with these
Indians, by treaty the right to enter the reservation. The money has
been on deposit in the Treasury Department, but the Indians can not
get it because there has been no ratification of the agreement. . . .
Mr. GIFFORD. I will state, Mr. Speaker, there are two short lines
of road provided in this bill, one of which extends 40 miles in the
reservation.
Mr. ANDERSON, of Kansas. How much is the reservation?
Mr. GIFFORD. It contains somewhere in the neighborhood of a
million acres.
And one line extends across the reservation, the other a short distance into it. . . .
....
Mr. COBB. Let me ask the gentleman how do these Indians hold
that reservation?
Mr. GIFFORD. As a permanent reservation.
Mr. COBB. By act of Congress?
Mr. GIFFORD. No sir: under a treaty: and the language is that
they shall hold it as a permanent reservation. That is the exact language, I believe, of the treaty.
....
Mr. ANDERSON, of Kansas. . . . Has this company ever received
from the United States, by an act of Congress, permission to enter
that reservation?
Mr. PERKINS. The object of this legislation is to ratify the agreement they made with the Indians, including the right of way across
the reservation. There has never been any legislative action ratifying
it. The Indians themselves gave the company this permission. Hence
the necessity for the passage of this bill.
Mr. ANDERSON, of Kansas. In other words, the railroad company, as I understand it, assume that they are the United States
Government and enter into a treaty with the Indians for the purpose
of constructing a railway through that reservation. They construct the
road, and now come to us under the guise of confirming a treaty to
justify them in their unmitigated impertinence in the attempt to exercise the authority which is only vested in Congress. Am I correct?
26 Stat. 1035, 1038 (“The agreement, concluded with the said Sisseton and Wahpeton
bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, on the eighth day of December, eighteen hundred
and eighty-four, granting a right of way through their reservation for the Chicago,
Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, is hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed.”),
reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 459.
529
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 14-15 (listing Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota signatories to 1889 Agreement).
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Mr. GIFFORD. No: I do not think you are at all. [Laughter.]
Mr. ANDERSON, of Kansas. That is the position as it appears to
me from the statements I have heard.
Mr. GIFFORD. I have no doubt that is the gentleman’s view, but
it is not correct.530

While the Sisseton-Wahpeton leaders had first consented to the railway
right-of-way across the Lake Traverse Reservation in 1884,531 the spring
1890 debate took place after the contents of that yet-to-be-ratified memorandum had been formally incorporated into the 1889 Agreement.532
By confirming, without modification, the entire 1884 railway memorandum,533 the 1889 Agreement incorporated by reference the Indians’
21 Cong. Rec. 2163-64 (1890) (emphases added).
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 22, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2-5 (1885) (letter from J.D.C. Atkins,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to L.Q.C. Lamar, Secretary of the Interior) (transmitting
“the agreement [made by the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Sioux Indians to grant
a right of way for the Chicago, Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railway through the Lake
Traverse Reservation], modified and amended . . . , and signed by a large majority of
the Indians interested,” executed at Sisseton Agency, Dakota Territory, Dec. 8, 1884).
As was typical of the era, see supra note 228, U.S. officials used strong-arm methods to
coerce the Indians’ “consent” to the railway right-of-way. See, e.g., S. Exec. Doc. No. 22,
supra, at 8 (letter from U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin W. Thompson to Hiram Price,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs) (“The chief and some of his headmen have fought me
most persistently about this matter, and did not yield finally until after an all-day and allnight session at the beginning of the issue. I have used to combat them a party of young
men, who, with the more progressive element, completely outvoted Chief Renville and
party.”); see also H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 71, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., at 39-40 (1884) (letter
from U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin W. Thompson to Hiram Price, Commissioner of
Indian Affairs) (“[A] council of chiefs and headmen was held on the 24th instant [i.e.,
Nov. 24, 1883], Col. W.R. Barr, inspector, being present. At that council the headmen
complained of the short crops, especially the short corn crop, which was cut off by the
frost in September. They asked for a grant from the old Sioux Reservation fund to
help them through the winter. . . . At Colonel Barr’s suggestion we told them that I
would ask the honorable Commissioner to place the money to my credit to be paid out
pro rata to the members of the tribe upon their signing the railroad agreement. This was
strenuously opposed by Chief Gabriel Renville, who, for some reason, seems determined
to prevent the agreement being signed, and in the council he was able to prevent any
action favoring the signing. However, there was some argument on the subject, and I
believe that if the suggestion of Colonel Barr is carried out, and I am enabled to offer the
money to the individual Indians upon their signature being affixed to the contract, that
the agreement will be rapidly and readily signed.”); id. at 41 (letter from Hiram Price,
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to Henry M. Teller, Secretary of the Interior) (“Whilst I
do not favor the proposition to distribute the money on hand as an inducement per se to
the Indians to now sign the agreement, or upon the basis of a per capita payment, I see
no objection, considering the wants and necessities of the tribe on account of short crops,
as detailed by Agent Thompson in his letter, to an immediate application of the fund as
heretofore authorized by the Department, viz: for the equal benefit of the Indians as, in
the judgment of this office, their best interests may require; they (the Indians) being given
to understand the source from which the money is derived, and that they are in all good
faith bound to carry out the proceedings of their council, and execute the agreement
without delay. Of course, if they still decline, the money can be returned and redeposited
to my official credit to await further action in the premises.”).
532
See supra note 528 and accompanying text.
533
Agreement of 1889, art. V, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
530
531
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insistence “that when the land is no longer used for railroad purposes it
[must] revert back to the Sissetonewan [Sisseton] and Wahpetonewan
[Wahpeton] Nation,”534 a demand the United States accommodated via
section 2 of the 1884 railway agreement.535 Thus, the numerous references
to “the reservation” in the 1890 congressional debate over this right-ofway provision536 and the 1889 Agreement’s wholesale incorporation of
the 1884 railway memorandum,537 in conjunction with the absence of any
mention in the Congressional Record of the notion that the reservation
would cease to exist once the agreement was ratified, point to only one
rational conclusion: that Congress, like the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indians,
did not believe, assume, or intend that the agreement’s enactment would
extinguish the reservation’s boundaries but instead understood that tribal
sovereignty and jurisdiction would persist, post-ratification, throughout
the entire, unaltered reservation.538
26 Stat. 1035, 1038 (ratifying and confirming “agreement concluded with the said
Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians, on the eighth day of
December, [1884], granting a right of way through their reservation for the Chicago,
Milwaukee and Saint Paul Railway”), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 459; see supra
note 528 and accompanying text.
534
S. Exec. Doc. No. 22, supra note 531, at 5 (May 15, 1884 letter from Principal
Chief Gabriel Renville and other Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota leaders to U.S. Indian
Agent Benjamin W. Thompson) (“[W]e, the chief and council of the Sissetonewan
and Wahpetonewan Nation . . . respectfully request that said agreement be amended
as follows, viz: . . . that when the land is no longer used for railroad purposes it revert
back to the Sissetonewan and Wahpetonewan Nation.”); see also id. at 6 (letter from
Hiram Price, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to L.Q.C. Lamar, Secretary of the
Interior) (acknowledging receipt of letter “transmitting the action of the council of
the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Indians” requesting that the proposed railway
agreement be amended to provide “that when the land is no longer used for railroad
purposes it shall revert back to the Indians”).
535
Id. at 5 (letter from J.D.C. Atkins, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to L.Q.C. Lamar,
Secretary of the Interior) (showing § 2 of 1884 railway agreement as stating “[t]hat
whenever the right of way and lands, the use and occupancy whereof are hereby granted,
shall cease to be used for Indian purposes the same shall revert to the United States.”).
Because § 2 was added to satisfy the Indians’ demand that the agreement be modified
to require reversion of the right-of-way (while reservation status persisted) “back to the
[Sisseton] and [Wahpeton] Nation” should the land “no longer [be] used for railroad
purposes,” id. (May 16, 1884 letter from Principal Chief Gabriel Renville and other
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota leaders to U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin W. Thompson),
the provision must be so interpreted. Cf. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 553 (1832)
(instructing that if a term in an agreement with the Indians otherwise “would admit of
no other signification” but one, when that term’s “being mis[un]derstood” by the Indians
nevertheless “is so apparent” and “results so necessarily from the whole transaction,” the
term “must . . . be taken in the sense in which it was most obviously used”—that is, the
text must be construed according to how the Indians understood or misunderstood it).
536
See supra text accompanying note 530.
537
See supra note 533 and accompanying text.
538
Authority for the 1884 railway right-of-way agreement derived from a provision of
the 1867 Treaty which stated that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota “hereby cede to the
United States the right to construct . . . railroads . . . over and across the lands claimed
by said bands (including their reservation as herein designated).” Treaty of Feb. 19,
1867, art. II, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (emphasis added), reprinted in
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This conclusion is further cemented by examining ensuing debates
regarding the comprehensive Indian appropriations bill, which ultimately
became the 1891 Act, that took place in the House of Representatives
in the summer of 1890.539 As in the March 1890 debate over the railway
right-of-way through the Lake Traverse Reservation,540 a prominent and
authoritative voice in the debate on June 17, 1890 was that of Congressman
Gifford of South Dakota, the primary House sponsor/proponent of
congressional ratification of the 1889 Agreement with the SissetonWahpeton Dakota.541 In one colloquy that exhibits extensive remarks
by Congressman Gifford, the legislators debated how Indian education
moneys should be appropriated:542
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 451; see S. Exec. Doc. No. 22, supra note 531, at 3 (letter from
J.D.C. Atkins, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to L.Q.C. Lamar, Secretary of the
Interior) (transmitting 1884 agreement and indicating authorization for it in article II
of the 1867 Treaty). Thus, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota and the U.S. government
were familiar with use of the word “cede” in a context that ensured that when the
Indians agreed to “cede” rights to the United States the boundaries of their “permanent
reservation,” Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509,
reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 452, were not affected at all and remained intact.
539
See 21 Cong. Rec. 6192-6205 (1890).
540
See supra text accompanying note 530.
541
See supra notes 518-519 and accompanying text.
542
Criticism, as reflected in this colloquy, of the policy of transporting Indians from
remote reservations to “Eastern schools,” to be educated apart from the cultural
influences of their own tribal communities, was delivered in scathing terms by
Senator Preston B. Plumb of Kansas during the congressional debates over the Indian
appropriations bill that became the 1891 Act:
Mr. President, I want to say, and I say it with the full understanding of the
effect of my words, that I do not believe the system of education upon which we
spend millions of dollars has advanced the Indian one single iota in the scale
of civilization. It has pacified him; it has to some extent given him as a hostage
against war and things of that sort. It is in response to that sentiment which says
it is cheaper to feed than it is to fight, and so on; and it is especially to the delectation of a few ladies and gentlemen who are worth some millions of dollars
and who have got so high above those by whom they are surrounded that they
do not care about the poor, and the weak, and the feeble, and the down-trodden
in the cities from which they come, and who disport themselves annually at
Mohonk and Newport and at other places where there is plenty of good living
and plenty of good wines and things of that kind in delivering diatribes about
the unwillingness of Congress to do the proper thing, about the unchristianlike
conduct which we exhibit toward the Indian, and drink a few more bottles of
champagne, stroke their bowels complacently, and adjourn.
Mr. President, it is out of conditions of that kind and in response to sentiments uttered by men of that kind that we have evolved, in my judgment, the
most pernicious thing that could possibly be applied to the Indian system of
education, which does not take him at the bottom, which does not begin with
him where we began and where all people who have advanced began, but takes
him, so to speak, by the nape of the neck and yanks him upon a plane of civilization where, like the seed that was sown on the unfruitful ground, when the
sun comes out he is parched and disappears.
Mr. President, there is not one single living evidence of the usefulness, that
is, the permanent usefulness, of this system of education. . . .
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Mr. GIFFORD. Mr. Chairman, I should very much dislike to have
the House or the country misled in regard to the course of life that
the students in these Indian schools lead after they leave the schools.
My experience, of course, is confined to the twenty or twenty-five
thousand Indians within the State of South Dakota and to some in
Wisconsin and in Minnesota. . . .
....
This Indian problem is by no means solved as yet. The question is
not settled. The Indian is not yet a civilized being, but he is becoming civilized rapidly. All of these tribes of Indians that to-day feel
the influences of the settlements in their vicinity are becoming civilized and self-supporting rapidly. We are brought into immediate and
close contact with this question in South Dakota. We know these
Indians in our State can be made self-supporting. . . .
The Indians, let me say as an evidence of this, in Dakota, in
Michigan, in Minnesota, and, I apprehend, largely in Montana, will be
self-supporting after awhile; but the Government must maintain and
carry on the industrial schools and they must be conducted somewhere near these reservations. Eastern schools are beneficial, and,
as the chairman of the committee says, some of the most beneficial
results we have seen have grown out of the establishment of these
Eastern schools and their influences. But, I repeat, the Government
must maintain its influence over the Indians; it must retain its guardianship over them and must conduct industrial schools itself on or
near the reservations. . . .
This process of improving the condition of the Indians by educational industrial facilities must be continued in the East as well
as in the West; but should be carried on largely in the vicinity of the
reservations. . . .
I now yield the time back to the chairman of the committee.
Mr. PICKLER. Before the gentleman takes his seat, will he permit a question?
Mr. GIFFORD. Certainly.
Mr. PICKLER. That is as to whether or not it is the desire of the
parents of these Indians that these schools should be had at their
homes or in their immediate vicinity rather than away from them.
Mr. GIFFORD. That is the desire largely among the Indians in
our State. They so expressed themselves while here. But at the same
....
. . . I have had plenty of opportunities to see that the Indians we have kept
on the reservations, whom we have put under the stress of the necessity to do
something in order that they might have that whereby they were clothed and
whereby their stomachs were filled, and who have had no education at all, have
done better and are better worth citizenship to-day than the people upon whom
we spend thousands of dollars in education, and who the more we educate them
the less they become self-supporting and the less fitted practically for citizenship, if citizenship means anything except refined loaferism.
. . . We have got into the way of yielding everything in the sacred name of
education to such an extent that if anyone proposes to limit any expenditure
of the public money for that purpose, no matter how derived nor for whom
expended, he of course is esteemed a heretic from thenceforth.
22 Cong. Rec. 3445-46 (1891) (remarks of Sen. Plumb).
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time there is no difficulty in securing some of these Indian children
for the Eastern schools. The parents prefer to have them educated
near their homes. There is no question about that. The Indians will
receive much more benefit from the influence of the schools if they
are located near the reservation. I am not in favor of discontinuing
the Eastern schools; let the Eastern schools continue their work, but
let us have some industrial schools near their reservation. It will be
much more satisfactory to the Indians.543

Once again, this colloquy in the House of Representatives strongly implies
that the legislators understood that the Lake Traverse Reservation would
continue to exist after enactment of the provisions of the Indian appropriations bill.544 The Supreme Court’s disregard of these crucial House
debates in the 1891 Act’s legislative history adds to the many egregious
errors in DeCoteau’s reasoning and conclusion.
The Court also ignored an illuminating Senate debate regarding
an 1898 amendment to an Indian appropriations bill that altered provisions for disposing of the acreage the United States had purchased,
pursuant to the 1891 Act, from the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota and other
Indian nations. The amendment was proposed by Richard F. Pettigrew
of South Dakota, the state’s first full-term U.S. senator,545 who had been
centrally involved in the debates that led to passage of the 1891 Act.546 In
relevant part, the 1898 amendment provided:
21 Cong. Rec. 6195 (1890) (emphases added).
See also supra notes 524-525 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying
note 537.
545
See John Andrews, Pettigrew’s Redemption: Might a Sculptor Vindicate Sioux Falls’
Forgotten Father?, S.D. Mag., Sept./Oct. 2010, https://www.southdakotamagazine.com/
pettigrews-redemption (subsequently revised for online publication).
546
See 22 Cong. Rec. 3434-60 (1891) (showing Sen. Pettigrew’s participation in
Feb. 27, 1891 debate on Indian appropriations bill). Senator Pettigrew was—to borrow
a label the Supreme Court applied to other legislators, see DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct.,
420 U.S. 425, 440 (1975)—one of the de facto “sponsors of the comprehensive
legislation.” He had proposed, for instance, language amending the bill with regard
to school-section lands on the Sisseton-Wahpeton reservation, language that became
part of § 30 of the 1891 Act. See infra notes 611-619 and accompanying text. The
importance of Senator Pettigrew’s participation in debates on the bill that became the
1891 Act is illustrated in an excerpt from the February 17, 1891 Senate proceedings, a
colloquy that also exhibits Congress’s understanding that to alter the boundaries of
an Indian reservation, prior tribal consent was needed. The focus of the colloquy was
Senator Pettigrew’s proposed amendment for, among other purposes, securing “an
agreement with the Indians residing upon the Pine Ridge and Rosebud agencies for a
readjustment of the boundary line between said reservations,” 22 Cong. Rec. 3436-37
(1891) (reprinting text of proposed amendment). In Senator Pettigrew’s absence, his
colleagues proceeded with the following discussion:
Mr. DAWES. The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. PETTIGREW] desires
to amend the phraseology of that in some particular. He is not in the Senate
Chamber. I ask unanimous consent for him, if he comes in before the bill is finished, to go back and offer such amendment as he chooses to this amendment.
Mr. McPHERSON. I should like to hear the Senator from Massachusetts
state, as this seems to be some radical change, the object and purpose of this
amendment.
543
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That all settlers under the homestead laws of the United States
upon the public lands acquired prior to the passage of this act by
Mr. DAWES. I will state it to the Senate briefly. The Senator will call to
mind the efforts which have been made to open a large portion of the Sioux
reservation. Two propositions were made by Congress to the Sioux Nation to
open about 11,000,000 acres. The first proposition failed. A commission was
sent out there. They refused to accept the proposition. When that proposition
was made, the line between the Pine Ridge and the Rosebud ran along a certain
river. That was objected to, and is one of the reasons on the part of the Indians
for not accepting the proposition.
It was suggested by the agent at Pine Ridge and by the commission when
they came back that the line be changed over to another river, but in the
mean time, while that was going on the Indians from the Rosebud agency
moved out to that land supposing that it was coming within their reservation.
The line was moved over to another river and included those Indians in the
Pine Ridge reservation. That was accepted. Then the Department found it necessary to remove all those Indians back to the Rosebud agency; and that was
one of the grievous complaints they made as a justification for the late war.
General [Nelson A.] Miles told them he would try and get some new arrangement of that line, and he has represented here that he assured them he
would do what he could to make a new arrangement. It is a pretty difficult thing
because the amount of annuities of the Indians there depends upon the number
of Indians taking rations at the particular agency, and the fund here is to be divided into six separate funds in the same way. It is necessary, therefore, for two
or three careful men to go on the ground and try to adjust that difficulty with
them. That is the purpose of the amendment. I think it was a mistake to change
the line, and I take this occasion to say that I made it myself, but I made it on
the representation of these Indians.
Mr. McPHERSON. Then do I understand the Senator from Massachusetts
to profess that he individually has been the cause of the last Indian war?
Mr. DAWES. No, not exactly that, because I simply was the humble scribe
who wrote that change; that is all. I was not a Pharisee; I was nothing but a
scribe.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. In view of the intention to go back to this
amendment at a subsequent hour the Chair understands that it is not to be put
on at the present time.
Mr. DAWES. I ask that the amendment be adopted, reserving the privilege
to the Senator from South Dakota to come back to it to modify it if he desires.
Mr. SANDERS. The Senator from South Dakota is in the cloak room.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be agreed to, with the
understanding that it may be regarded as open hereafter, if it is desired.
Mr. DAWES. The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. PETTIGREW] made a
suggestion of a modification of phraseology, and I told him that I would give
him an opportunity to offer it. He is absent, and I should like if he comes in and
wants to modify it that his amendment to it shall be in order. It would not be in
order after we had agreed to insert it unless by unanimous consent.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the understanding.
Mr. DAWES. The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. PETTIGREW] is now
here. I call his attention to changes in the phraseology which he suggested in
the Pine Ridge commission amendment, on pages 52 and 53. I do not know that
it is important. Perhaps the Senator will not care to offer an amendment. That
amendment is pending now. If the Clerk will proceed with the reading of the
bill the Senator can look it over and offer the amendment.
Id. at 3437.
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treaty or agreement from the various Indian tribes who have
[resided] or who shall hereafter reside upon the tract entered in good
faith for the period hereby required by existing law, shall be entitled
to a patent for the land so entered, upon the payment to the local
land officers of the usual and customary fees, and no other or further
charge of any kind whatsoever shall be required from such settler to
entitle him to a patent for the land covered by his entry . . . .547

In the debate over this proposed legislation—labeled by a skeptical senator as “the free-homes bill”548—Senator Pettigrew was challenged
for not having included any parallel provision allowing homesteaders to
obtain free parcels of land within abandoned military reservations.549 In
the ensuing extensive discussion, Pettigrew and all the other senators
who participated in the debate—i.e., Pettigrew’s supporters as well as
his challengers—repeatedly adverted to the Lake Traverse Reservation’s
existence in the present tense. Because of the importance of this highly
probative material from the Congressional Record evincing the Lake
Traverse Reservation’s post-1891 continuing existence—evidence
DeCoteau does not disclose 550—this Article displays it fully:
31 Cong. Rec. 1647 (1898) (introduction of Sen. Pettigrew’s proposed modification
to amendment).
548
Id. at 1648 (remarks of Sen. Pasco).
549
See infra text accompanying note 553.
550
In a footnote DeCoteau opines that “[n]o consistent pattern emerges” from
the Supreme Court’s avowed consideration of “numerous Interior Department
memoranda and letters issued over the past 80-odd years, which refer to the area
as either the ‘reservation’ or a ‘former reservation,’” and that “[t]he authors of these
documents appear to have put no particular significance on their choice of a label.”
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 442 n.27. This footnote appears to be a deflection from the
obligation, in a reservation diminishment/disestablishment case, to judicially evaluate
any ambiguities in the record of post-enactment governmental references to “the area”
at issue in accordance with Indian law canons of construction, see infra notes 565-567
and accompanying text. Be that as it may, the four instances this Article examines, of
debates and procedural activity from the Congressional Record conveying remarks
that evince the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing existence, are not examples of
merely casual references with respect to matters unrelated, or only tangentially related,
to Congress’s 1891 Act ratifying the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota. Rather, all four instances—i.e., (1) the March 1890 debate in the House of
Representatives over whether to ratify the provision comprising Article V of the 1889
Agreement, see supra notes 526-537 and accompanying text, (2) the June 1890 House
debate over the 1891 Act’s appropriations for Indian education, see supra notes 540544 and accompanying text, (3) Congressman Gifford’s September 1890 introduction
of S. 3216, the bill ratifying the 1889 Agreement, into the House of Representatives,
see supra notes 518-525 and accompanying text, and (4) the 1898 Senate debate over a
proposed amendment to the 1891 Act’s land-disposition provisions, see supra & infra
notes 545-553 and accompanying text—are debates and legislative actions pertaining
to matters that are inextricable parts of the 1891 statute itself. By not addressing or
even mentioning the congressional debates and other activity regarding these
intrinsic components of the 1891 Act, DeCoteau refrains from disclosing relevant and
crucial evidence from the legislative history showing Congress’s contemporaneous
understanding and intent with respect to the 1889 Agreement and the 1891 Act,
evidence that weighs heavily against DeCoteau’s holding.
547
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Mr. ALLISON. . . . I still believe that it [i.e., the amendment as
now modified by the Senator from South Dakota] ought not to be
a part of this bill. In substance, this measure has passed this body
during the present Congress, and in substance it passed this body
during last Congress as applied to Indian reservations. . . .
I have not objected to the general policy suggested in the amendment of allowing homesteads upon Indian reservations, because that
has been the policy of our Government for many years. . . .
The amendment as it stands will do injustice in some respects
upon several of the reservations, because the lands which have been
open to settlement have cost the Government a considerable sum
of money per acre, and some of those lands, at least, are now worth
from thirty to forty dollars an acre; yet this amendment makes no
distinction as between the more valuable and less valuable lands.
....
[B]y placing amendments upon this appropriation bill in a few
instances—I do not know how many, because I have not been able
to investigate the question—the men who have taken valuable lands
upon these Indian reservations will now be entitled to receive them
practically without paying anything for them.
Regarding the great reservations, I know as well as the Senator from
Montana or the Senator from South Dakota that the Government
will never realize any considerable sum out of the lands. That is eminently true in the State of South Dakota. Lands have been opened
there to homestead settlement since 1889, I believe. Many of them
have not been taken up, and for those that have been taken up I have
no doubt the settlers have not been able to pay in many instances,
because they can not raise crops upon those lands and compete with
the rich lands in the Middle States.
....
Mr. PASCO. I ask the Senator from South Dakota if the same
provision with reference to abandoned military reservations is contained in this amendment which is contained in the free-homes bill?
Mr. PETTIGREW. The amendment does not include military reservations; otherwise it is just the same as before.
Mr. PASCO. Then I will ask the Senator from South Dakota to
make it harmonious with the action of the Senate hitherto upon this
subject and include the same amendment with reference to military
reservations that is contained in the free-homes bill.
....
Mr. PETTIGREW. I will say in reply to the Senator that the chief
objection to this measure has been the fear that we would open up
to settlement military reservations, which are often near large cities,
and which are of great value. It is claimed that the rule ought not to
apply to those. For that reason that portion of the amendment was
stricken out.
The great reservations that we propose to reach contain lands
that are not of great value. One reservation which was made in
South Dakota was opened up to settlement in 1889. There were
9,000,000 acres of land in it, and there are 8,000,000 acres untaken
and unoccupied. From that reservation only $87,000 has been
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received.551 As to the other two reservations in South Dakota, one of
which was opened in 1890 and the other in 1894, at least one-third of
the area is still untaken and open to settlement.552 The reason it was
not taken and has not been settled is that the people who did take
land there found they were unable to pay for it, and therefore others
would not come.
The total receipts of the Government since 1889 up to 1896 from
the sale of these reservations was but $87,000, according to the official
report, and since 1896 the total receipts have been $132,000, showing
that the Government can not dispose of these lands under the provisions of existing law.
....
Mr. PASCO. This is a very large question which is brought up by
the Senator from South Dakota. It has hitherto been acted upon by
the Senate. It relieves the actual settlers from their obligations to
pay for the lands which have been purchased from the Indians and
entered as homesteads with the full understanding that the purchase
price was to be paid by the entrymen. The proposition is made to
change this policy and to give to the settlers their homes free. If this
policy is to be changed, I urged when the subject was before the
Senate that the same privilege should be extended to actual settlers
upon abandoned and opened military reservations. The appeal was
so just that the Senator from South Dakota made no objection to
the amendment when I offered it and it was adopted by the Senate.
It has been discussed elsewhere and the proposition was regarded as
fair and just. There is no reason why the settlers upon the abandoned
military reservations in my own State and in other States should not
be treated as liberally as settlers upon the Indian reservation lands
which have been opened.
....
Mr. ALLISON. The original amendment offered by the Senator
from South Dakota included military reservations; but it is manifestly
improper to deal with military reservations on an Indian appropriation bill, because it would be confessedly general legislation.
....
Mr. PASCO. . . .
....
The policy proposed by the Senator from South Dakota, that the
people who went upon these lands shall have free homesteads, is a
liberal one; but it ought to apply to them all. It ought not to segregate
the settlers upon particular lands and grant relief to others, and I
hope that if this question is to be pressed in its present shape some
action will be taken which will protect them all and not give one set
of settlers advantages over others.
The reference is to the Great Sioux Reservation. See infra note 617 and
accompanying text.
552
The references are to the Lake Traverse Reservation and the Yankton Sioux
Reservation, respectively. See Agreement of 1889, ratified by Act of Mar. 3,
1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 455-60; Act of
Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286, 314-19.
551
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Mr. MORRILL. Mr. President, it seems to me that this is a question as to which we ought to go rather slowly. It is a little curious that
Senators will come here and persuade us to buy Indian lands and pay
a high price for them on the sole ground that the Government is to
be reimbursed by the sale of the lands, and when the treaty for the
purchase of the lands has been consummated, then they come here
and urge that we shall abandon the idea of taking any price for such
lands, but that they shall be given free as homesteads.
....
Mr. PETTIGREW. Mr. President, I will state, in reference to the
amendment offered by the Senator from Florida, that it was offered
on the floor during the extra session, and I did not object to it. We
now find ourselves in a different situation. It is not germane to the
pending bill. It refers to military reservations. This is legislation with
regard to Indians and Indian reservations, and the question of disposing of a military reservation is of so much importance that it ought
to be considered by a committee of this body, properly investigated,
and reported upon.
....
Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I heartily agree with the Senator from
Florida that many of the military reservations ought to be thrown
open to settlement. . . .
But I hope the Senator from Florida will not insist on his proposed
amendment, and by that means imperil the worthy and meritorious
amendment offered by the Senator from South Dakota.
I do not think anything is to be gained by putting an amendment
on the bill which would have the effect of defeating itself and defeating that portion of the bill to which it is offered or may be offered
as an amendment. I feel confident that if every Senator here understood the situation and the condition of the homestead settlers on
the Indian lands as they are understood by those of us who represent
States having Indian reservations in them, there would be no serious
objection to the adoption of the amendment.
....
Mr. KYLE. . . .
....
The committee should understand, with reference to the lands
upon the Sisseton and Yankton reservations, in South Dakota, lands
that will be particularly affected by this bill, that they are on the border of the semiarid region. When the reservations were thrown open
to settlement, hundreds gathered upon the borders. They were ready
with their fast teams to make a general run for the coveted lands.
They seized whatever they could put their hands upon, only to find,
after they had agreed to pay $2.50 an acre—that is the price upon the
Sisseton Reservation—that the land was in many instances valueless.
Many of them will have to prove up this year, I believe, and will
be forced to pay the $2.50 an acre. To do this, Mr. President, a mortgage will have to be placed upon the land, as with poor crops they
have been able to save but little, and this has been expended for necessary improvements. I appeal, therefore, to the Senate to pass this
amendment. It is in the line of fair treatment to this noble band of
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self-sacrificing people, who, by subduing the wildness of the frontier,
do more for progress and civilization than any other class of citizens.
....
Mr. PASCO. . . .
....
. . . I give notice now that if this amendment is adopted by the
House of Representatives and the settlers upon the Indian lands are
provided for in this bill, I shall take further steps to see that these
other interests of settlers on abandoned military reservations in
Florida and elsewhere are protected, and I shall be glad then to have
the assistance of the Senators who have this morning assured us that
they would assist when the question comes before the Senate as a
separate proposition. I feel, however, that injustice is being done in
excluding from this beneficent legislation the privilege of free homes
for these worthy people who have settled upon abandoned military
reservations, who are just as much entitled to consideration as those
who have settled upon the Indian lands . . . .
....
The VICE-PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to
the amendment offered by the Senator from South Dakota
[Mr. PETTIGREW].
The amendment was agreed to.553

The Supreme Court’s nondisclosure of ample evidence from the 1891
Act’s legislative history weighing against a finding of reservation extinguishment,554 including remarks by legislators from South Dakota (where
the Lake Traverse Reservation was located) who personally shepherded
the 1889 Agreement through the ratification process, reveals a pattern in
DeCoteau of distorting the congressional record.
e. Muting the Presidential Proclamation
For Congress’s 1891 ratification of the 1889 Agreement with the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota to become law, the President, of course,
had to approve and proclaim it. DeCoteau’s only reference to President
Benjamin Harrison’s final approval is a single sentence: “On April 11, 1892,
President Harrison declared open for settlement all ‘lands embraced in
said reservation, saving and excepting the lands reserved for and allotted
to said Indians.’”555 The President’s express reference—when approving,
in 1892, the ratified agreement—to “lands embraced in [the] reservation”556 obviously is crucial evidence that the legislation, thus proclaimed,
did not abolish the Lake Traverse Reservation.557 But there is more, and
31 Cong. Rec. 1648-50 (1898).
Cf. Fletcher § 7.2, supra note 14, at 298-99 (observing that DeCoteau’s questionable
legal analysis, including the case’s “drawing from anecdotal histories” and generally
conducting arguably “shoddy history at best,” lends the impression that “there was no
legislative history directed at the continued existence of the reservation”).
555
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 442 (footnote omitted) (quoting Proclamation of the
President, Apr. 11, 1892, No. 22, 27 Stat. 1017, 1017).
556
Proclamation of the President, Apr. 11, 1892, No. 22, 27 Stat. 1017, 1017 (emphasis
added), quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 442; see supra text accompanying note 555.
557
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 40, 1974 WL 186007, at *24-*25 (citations
553
554
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stronger, evidence of the reservation’s continuing existence in the 1892
proclamation—evidence DeCoteau leaves undisclosed.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, for instance, in the lower-court
decision that the Supreme Court reversed in DeCoteau, had stated that
“[t]he only direct reference to the boundaries of the reservation subsequent to the 1891 Act came from President Harrison in his proclamation
opening the lands ‘within the Lake Traverse Reservation’ to settlement,”
a reference that was “by no means conclusive” with respect to the argument that the boundaries had been legislatively extinguished.558 The full
sentence from which the Eighth Circuit borrowed the quoted phrase
states as follows: “The lands to be opened for settlement are for greater
convenience particularly described in the accompanying schedule, entitled ‘Schedule of lands within the Lake Traverse Reservation opened to
settlement by proclamation of the President dated April 11, 1892,’ and
which schedule is made a part hereof.”559 But in addition to this second
reference, noted by the appellate court, to the “opened” lands560 being “in”
or “within” the reservation there is this third instance, embedded in one
of the proclamation’s “Whereas” clauses: “Whereas, by agreement made
with said Indians residing on said reservation, dated December 12, 1889,
they conveyed, as set forth in article one thereof, to the United States, all
their title and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits
of the reservation . . . .”561 Neither of these two additional examples of
language from the presidential proclamation evincing the reservation’s
existence is addressed, of course, in DeCoteau. Nor is an informative
margin note that appears adjacent to the solitary fragment extracted
in DeCoteau—i.e., a note designating the for-sale acreage as “Lands on
Lake Traverse reservation, North and South Dakota, open to settlement
April 15, 1892.”562
But the most telling evidence is the proclamation’s detailed specifications of the existing boundaries of the Lake Traverse Reservation,
omitted) (“That the President, as the chief executive of the United States, the ultimate
guardian of the Sisseton and Wahpeton Sioux, contemplated an undiminished
reservation is clearly indicated by the terms of the Proclamation. . . . The President
also warned that until the official opening no entry was to be made upon the
reservation lands except by the Indians. Surely, if the lands had been excluded from
the Reservation, the Indians would have no greater right of entry than others.”).
558
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 102 (8th Cir. 1973) (decision
below) (emphasis in original) (quoting Proclamation of the President, Apr. 11, 1892,
No. 22, 27 Stat. 1017, 1018), rev’d, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
559
Proclamation of the President, Apr. 11, 1892, No. 22, 27 Stat. 1017, 1018 (emphasis
added).
560
See supra text accompanying note 559.
561
Proclamation of the President, Apr. 11, 1892, No. 22, 27 Stat. 1017, 1017 (emphasis
added).
562
Id. (emphasis added) (margin note). The margin note is particularly significant
because it shows that the President understood that the unallotted lands that were
proclaimed to be “open to settlement” starting on April 15, 1892—a year after the 1891
Act’s ratification of the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota—were
“[l]ands on [the] Lake Traverse reservation.” Id. (emphasis added).
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exact descriptions President Harrison provided for the practical purpose
of allowing land-district offices to administer homesteaders’ acquisition
of the for-sale parcels. Thus, the proclamation includes the following specific geographical guideposts in attaching the acreage to particular land
districts:
All that portion of the Lake Traverse Reservation, commencing at
the northwest corner of said reservation; thence south 12 degrees 2
minutes west, following the west boundary of the reservation to the
new seventh standard parallel, or boundary line between the States
of North and South Dakota; thence east, following the new seventh
standard parallel to its intersection with the north boundary of said
Indian reservation; thence northwesterly with said boundary to the
place of beginning, is attached to the Fargo land district, the office of
which is now located at Fargo, North Dakota.
All that portion of the Lake Traverse Reservation, commencing at
a point where the new seventh standard parallel intersects the west
boundary of said reservation; thence southerly along the west boundary of said reservation to its extreme southern limit; thence northerly
along the east boundary of said reservation to Lake Traverse; thence
north with said lake to the northeast corner of the Lake Traverse
Indian Reservation; thence westerly with the north boundary of said
reservation to its intersection with the new seventh standard parallel,
or boundary line between the States of North and South Dakota;
thence with the new seventh standard parallel to the place of beginning, is attached to the Watertown land district, the office of which is
now located at Watertown, South Dakota.563

None of this additional compelling evidence confirming the President’s
recognition of the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing, post-1891
existence is mentioned or discussed in DeCoteau.564
Id. at 1018 (emphases added) (enumeration of paragraphs omitted); see also Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 39, 1974 WL 186007, at *24 (emphasis in original)
(citation omitted) (“On March 22, 1892, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs issued a
Circular on ‘Sisseton and Wahpeton Lands’ in which he discusses the ‘proclamation to
be hereafter issued by the President, opening to settlement and entry the unallotted
lands embraced within the limits of the Sisseton and Wahpeton (Lake Traverse) Indian
reservation, in the State of North Dakota and South Dakota.’ The Commissioner also
mentions the ‘boundary line between the States of North and South Dakota across the
Lake Traverse reservation.’”).
564
Other instances of Executive Branch evidence left undisclosed and unexamined in
DeCoteau include the body of federal administrative adjudications of the same period
that clearly evince the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing, post-1891 existence.
See, e.g., [In re] Edward Parant, in 20 Decisions of the Dep’t of the Interior and
Gen. Land Off. in Cases Relating to the Public Lands from Jan. 1, 1895, to June 30,
1895, at 53-55 (S.V. Proudfit ed., 1895) (emphases added) (Jan. 21, 1895 final decision of
M. Hoke Smith, Secretary of the Interior, reversing a judgment of the Commissioner
of the General Land Office, referring to the place of appellant’s July 26, 1892
homestead entry as a tract of “ceded land, lying within the Sisseton-Wahpeton Indian
reservation, known as Lake Traverse reservation,” and advising the Commissioner:
“. . . I can not agree with you that Parant is disqualified to take a homestead in the
Lake Traverse reservation”); see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 41,
1974 WL 186007, at *25 (citations omitted) (discussing the Edward Parant case as
563
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one of “[t]wo decisions of the Department of the Interior” that “expressly state the
contemporaneous understanding that the [1891] Act did not disestablish or diminish
the [Lake Traverse] reservation,” with the other case being “[In re] Madella O. Wilson,
decided on August 10, 1893,” wherein “the First Assistant Secretary of the Interior
refers to the land in question as ‘in the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indian reservation’”).
Also unaddressed in DeCoteau are comprehensive reports of the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs for the years 1890, 1891, and 1892 which evince the Interior
Department’s recognition of the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing existence.
In his “Report of Sisseton Agency” dated September 20, 1890, U.S. Indian Agent
William McKusick stated, under the subheading “Reservation,” that “this reservation
is triangular in form, with its southern point near Watertown, S. Dak., and reaching
north about 90 miles, covering a small piece of North Dakota. It contains about
918,000 acres of land . . . .” Reports of Agents at 65, in 59th Ann. Rep. of the Comm’r
of Indian Aff. (1890) (emphasis added) (“Report of Sisseton Agency”). The report
includes a subsection titled “Sale of Surplus Lands” that refers to the yet-to-be-ratified
Agreement of 1889 with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota, but makes no mention of any
impact the agreement would have on the reservation’s boundaries:
In November last commissioners of the General Government held a council
with these Indians for the purpose of obtaining a proposition to sell their surplus lands. A proposition was obtained, signed by a large majority of the tribe,
and the same is now before Congress for ratification. It is earnestly hoped that
said agreement will be ratified, in order that these Indians may be relieved from
a half-starved, half-clothed condition and placed in more comfortable circumstances.
Id. A year later, in a report dated September 30, 1891, Agent McKusick similarly
described the still-existing reservation: “This reservation, which is known as the
Lake Traverse Reservation of South Dakota, contains about 918,000 acres of land,
is triangular in shape, with its point near Watertown, S. Dak., and extending north
90 miles or more, covering a small part of North Dakota.” 60th Ann. Rep. of the
Comm’r of Indian Aff., supra note 452, at 418 (emphasis added) (“Report of Sisseton
Agency”). The Commissioner of Indian Affairs likewise invoked the reservation’s
existence in 1891, stating that “[o]n the Lake Traverse Reservation, in South Dakota,
[the work of making allotments] will probably be completed early in October.” Id. at
41 (emphasis added). And in 1892 the Commissioner made a similar reference to the
reservation’s continuing existence: “All the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians located
upon the Lake Traverse Reservation have received their allotments and the surplus
lands have been opened to settlement.” 61st Ann. Rep. of the Comm’r of Indian
Aff. 67 (1892) (emphasis added). Significantly, in the 1892 report the Commissioner
adverted to the case of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota as an example of “an entire
change of the industrial situation on the reservations” that had come about after the
sale of surplus lands. Id. at 98 (emphasis added). The Commissioner wrote:
Where the lands have been allotted, the surplus sold, and a white community
has been brought into immediate contact with the Indians, as is the case, for
instance, among the . . . Sissetons . . . , it is believed that such an entire change in
the situation will be brought about in the course of a comparatively short time
that every competent Indian, man or woman who desires employment can have
it either at good wages working for white people or in remunerative return
when working at their own homes.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 108-09 (emphasis added) (listing as “Action Pending
Before Congress,” under the subheading “Sisseton and Wahpeton Reservation,”
a “‘bill granting right of way to the Watertown, Sioux City and Duluth Railway
Company through the Sisseton and Wahpeton Indian Reservation’” and stating that
“[t]he bill was reported on in office letter of May 21, 1892, to the Secretary of the
Interior”). As in the 1890 and 1891 reports, the report of the Commissioner of Indian
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f. Loading the Canons with Magic Weapons
This Article has shown that a full and fair examination of (1) the text
of the 1891 Act ratifying the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota, (2) the proceedings of U.S. negotiations with tribal representatives, (3) the Act’s additional legislative history as manifested in Senate
and House reports and in congressional debates, and (4) the President’s
1892 proclamation of the ratified agreement demonstrates overwhelmingly that the Act did not terminate or alter the boundaries of the Lake
Traverse Reservation. This conclusion is reinforced in consideration of
the applicable Indian law canons of construction, judicial rules that are
crucial for interpreting statutes and treaty provisions involving Indian
rights.565 Only by systematically violating these canons while purporting
to validate them566—and, in effect, supplanting them with a contrary and
antithetical interpretive approach—could the Supreme Court presume
to write that “‘the face of the act,’ and its ‘surrounding circumstances’
Affairs of 1892 contains a “Report of Sisseton Agency,” dated September 26, 1892,
wherein newly appointed agent D.T. Hindman referred repeatedly to the reservation’s
continuing existence. See, e.g., id. at 469 (“The Reservation and Indians.—The Sisseton
and Wahpetons no longer hold their land in common, having taken allotments in
severalty, and on April 15 of the present year this reservation was thrown open for
settlement . . . .”); id. (emphasis added) (“[T]here is with the introduction of whites
on this reservation, yet a worse enemy to the red man than the dance. It is alcohol.”).
For additional examples of language from the reports of, and correspondence with,
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs during the period 1892-1906 evidencing the Lake
Traverse Reservations’ continuing existence—“early interpretations of the 1891 Act
[that] should be given great weight in ascertaining Congressional intent”—see Brief
for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 41-42, 1974 WL 186007, at *25-*26; cf. Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973) (“[O]ur conclusion that the 1892 Act did not terminate the
Klamath River Reservation is reinforced by repeated recognition of the reservation
status of the land after 1892 by the Department of the Interior and by Congress.”);
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357 (1962) (footnote omitted) (stating that
the Supreme Court’s non-disestablishment “construction of the 1906 Act has been
adopted by the Department of Interior, the agency of government having primary
responsibility for Indian affairs”); supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
565
The leading treatise in the field of Indian law concisely summarizes the canons:
The basic Indian law canons of construction require that treaties, agreements,
statutes, and executive orders be liberally construed in favor of the Indians and
that all ambiguities are to be resolved in their favor. In addition, treaties and
agreements are to be construed as the Indians would have understood them,
and tribal property rights and sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s
intent to the contrary is clear and unambiguous.
Cohen’s Handbook § 2.02[1], supra note 16, at 113-14 (footnotes omitted); see also
Fletcher §§ 5.4, 5.5, supra note 14, at 219-26 (discussing “Canons of Construction
of Indian Treaties” and “Canons of Statutory Construction”); William C. Canby, Jr.,
American Indian Law in a Nutshell 122-30 (6th ed. 2015) (discussing “Sympathetic
Construction of Treaties (and Statutes)”).
566
See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975) (avowing that “[t]his
Court does not lightly conclude that an Indian reservation has been terminated”
and quoting from several cases that applied Indian law canons). But see Royster,
supra note 120, at 307 n.189 (citing DeCoteau as a “diminishment case in which the
Court . . . recited the [Indian law] canons and then refused to apply them”).
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and ‘legislative history,’ all point unmistakably to the conclusion that the
Lake Traverse Reservation was terminated in 1891.”567
Thus, instead of following the rule that “[t]reaties [and agreements]
are to be construed as they were understood by the tribal representatives
who participated in their negotiation,”568 DeCoteau fashions a false narrative regarding U.S. negotiations with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota,
creating an illusion of tribal consent to the Lake Traverse Reservation’s
extinguishment that is utterly contradicted by the historical record.569 And
instead of “constru[ing] federal legislation addressing Indian affairs liberally in favor of the Indians, . . . with ambiguous provisions interpreted to
their benefit,”570 DeCoteau assigns the text of the 1891 Act imaginary or
“magic” meaning divorced from the shared understanding and intentions
of the parties to the 1889 Agreement,571 and cherry-picks from the Act’s
legislative history to conceal all evidence of Congress’s recognition that
the sale of the unallotted land did not alter the reservation’s boundaries.572
It is true, of course, that “there is no doubtful language in the [1889]
Agreement or in the 1891 Act” to which the canon requiring that ambiguities be “resolved in favor of the Indians” might be applied in DeCoteau;
after all, neither the Act nor the Agreement contains “a word to suggest
that the boundaries of the reservation were altered.”573 Still, where ambiguities on subsidiary issues arguably appear in the case, DeCoteau resolves
them against the Indians. As discussed previously, DeCoteau isolates a
remark by Senator Henry L. Dawes concerning the 1891 Act because
of Dawes’s mentioning the ambiguous term “public domain,” thereby
judicially promoting the implication that the Act relegated the unallotted
acreage of the Lake Traverse Reservation, purchased by the U.S. government, to “public domain” status (whatever “public domain” might
have meant for Senator Dawes).574 But not only was Dawes adverting
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445 (quoting Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505).
Canby, supra note 565, at 122; see also Collins, supra note 214, at 21 (noting that
“formal agreements with Indian nations that were ratified by the full Congress” are
“essentially treaty equivalents that should be subject to the treaty canon”).
569
See supra notes 353-451 and accompanying text.
570
Fletcher § 5.5, supra note 14, at 223.
571
See supra notes 116-120 and accompanying text; see also Pirtle, supra note 106,
at 446 (stating that with the DeCoteau decision the Supreme Court used “factitious
reasoning” and “engaged . . . in intellectual legerdemain”).
572
See supra notes 453-499 and accompanying text.
573
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 461, 463 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
see also Pirtle, supra note 106, at 446 (“In the [1889] agreement and the [1891]
Congressional Act approving it there is not one single word of an intent to terminate
the [Lake Traverse] Reservation.”); cf. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 21-22,
1974 WL 186007, at *16 (citation omitted) (“The construction of the 1891 Act probably
does not require invocation of ‘the general rule that statutes passed for the benefit
of dependent Indian tribes or communities are to be liberally construed, doubtful
expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.’ No language in the 1891 Act
expressly disestablishes or diminishes the reservation nor is such a consequence clear
from the surrounding circumstances and legislative history.”).
574
See supra notes 510-513 and accompanying text. For evidence that Senator Dawes
567
568
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to a section of the 1891 Act that could not possibly have altered the reservation since the Indians never consented to that unilaterally enacted
land-disposal provision;575 he also was not even purporting to provide
a definitive, accurate summary of the land-status effects of the many
different agreements with Indian tribes, including the 1889 Agreement
with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota as ratified by the 1891 Act. Rather,
Dawes was simply responding to a direct question posed by a fellow senator amidst a barrage of complaints by perturbed colleagues about the
convoluted and confusing process (then concluding) by which the colossal Indian appropriations bill was being rushed through Congress. An
examination of the full context of Dawes’s “public domain” comment—a
context DeCoteau neither exhibits nor explains—reveals the unnerving
circumstances in which the senator from Massachusetts found himself:
Mr. STEWART said: Mr. President, I do not believe that the reading of a conference report which refers to amendments by numbers
only furnishes any information to the Senate, and I ask unanimous
consent that the report may be adopted without reading.
Mr. GORMAN. No, no.
Mr. STEWART. It will take an hour to read it. We can not know
what it means when nothing but the numbers of the amendments
are stated.
Mr. COCKRELL. If we can not understand the amendments we
shall have them read.
....
The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the conference report.
Mr. CULLOM. Mr. President—
Mr. DAWES. Has the conference report been adopted?
Mr. CULLOM. Not yet.
I was not present, Mr. President, when this bill was considered in
the Senate, and I supposed it was an appropriation bill for the benefit
of the Indians. But in looking it over I find less about appropriations
than almost any other subject. There are provisions in reference to
treaties, in reference to the appointment of commissions, in reference
to cessions of land, and all manner of contracts, and, so far as I have
been able to observe it within the last few minutes, I can scarcely
imagine any subject that is not involved in this bill.
. . . I would like very much, if the Senator from Massachusetts
feels disposed to do so, that he should explain somewhat why all
these different propositions and provisions in reference to other
matters besides appropriations are incorporated in this bill.
Mr. DAWES. When this bill was up for consideration before the
Senate its peculiar character was unfolded and discussed at great
length. Therefore the Senate is responsible for its peculiar condition,
for it was thrashed about as well as the Senators on different sides of
actually understood that the sale of any Indian tribe’s surplus lands pursuant to the
provisions of the 1887 General Allotment Act would keep reservation boundaries
intact, see infra note 647.
575
See supra notes 513-517 and accompanying text.
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the Senate Chamber were capable of doing. I will say to the Senator
that it is the most ill-shaped and ill-gotten-up bill I have ever had any
experience with.
Mr. CULLOM. I hope the Senator from Massachusetts is not
responsible for it.
Mr. DAWES. I took particular pains to show to the Senate, as
well as I was able, who was responsible for it. The bill came to this
body in such shape that it was impossible for the Senate to relieve
itself of the condition in which it was, for if this body stripped it and
left it with nothing but the Indian appropriation bill proper, still the
conference committee had to dispose of the matter stripped out of it,
and therefore the Senate alone could not strip it and keep it stripped.
All but two of these large agreements with the Indians passed the
Senate a long time ago in separate bills. They went to another body
and were not acted upon there, but were taken by the Committee on
Indian Affairs in the last week of the session and put bodily into this
bill. That body, by an overwhelming vote, kept them there, in spite
of everything that could be done. Therefore, this Senate, having no
power over any other body than itself, was compelled to conform its
action to this condition of things.
Mr. CULLOM. Mr. President, I suppose it is entirely too late in
the session to think about rejecting this bill containing these appropriations and starting anew. So far as I am concerned, I do not feel
disposed to vote for the conference report. I apprehend what the
Senator from Massachusetts has stated, that almost every bill which
has been before this Senate with reference to the Indians, or Indian
reservations, or Indian lands, or Indian contracts, or Indian treaties,
has managed somehow or other to get into this bill which is called an
appropriation bill. I must insist that that kind of legislation, which we
are going into more and more every session of the Congress of the
United States, embodying measures of every sort, size, and kind that
we can not take care of separately, certainly ought to be abolished
before a very much longer time elapses, or else we may as well abolish
all attempted legislation by separate acts, and let the Committee on
Appropriations embody in the bills called appropriation bills whatever legislation they think necessary in the interest of the country.
....
Mr. PLUMB. . . .
. . . Mr. President, I am glad the Senator from Illinois [i.e., Senator
Collum] has brought this matter to the attention of the Senate and
shown to some extent how vicious this practice is and how from time
to time it breaks out as a sort of eruption, not now so bad as heretofore, and yet I fear worse than it ought to be, indicating dereliction
of duty in certain quarters, whereby at the last moment the only
resource left for the passage of important legislation is that it shall
be incorporated upon an appropriation bill.
Mr. DAWES. Let us have a vote.
Mr. COLLUM. I want to say one word further.
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The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. SANDERS in the chair).
The question is, Shall the report of the conference committee be
agreed to?576

After an enforced pause to require the chamber “to proceed to the
consideration of an amendment by the House to the Senate joint resolution . . . to provide for the organization of the circuit courts of appeal,”577
the cacophony of complaints about the still-pending conference report
on the Indian appropriations bill continued:
Mr. CULLOM. I simply desire to say a word or two in addition to
what I have already said upon this bill.
I called the attention of the Senate . . . to this tremendous bill
or conference report which we are considering, because I have
been impressed with the belief that unless something is done by the
Congress of the United States to stop the tendency of accumulating
legislation upon appropriation bills we shall reach the point after
awhile of legislating upon appropriation bills altogether, so that
nobody will know where to find a law upon any subject unless he
goes all through all the appropriation bills of the Government. And
while I am not complaining of anybody in this Senate in connection
with this bill I do think that there should be a more determined effort
on the part of Senators and committees of the Senate to keep out of
appropriation bills the vast amount of legislation that is going into
them upon every occasion when we get near the end of a session. I
do hope that hereafter committees having charge of appropriations,
whoever they may be, will do whatever it is possible for them to do
to prevent such an amount of legislation as has been ingrafted upon
appropriation bills at this very session up to this time. If we do not,
we might as well, as I said awhile ago, abandon almost any effort at
legislation outside of appropriation bills and depend upon getting
whatever we want ingrafted upon appropriation bills.
Mr. GORMAN. Now, I should like the Senator from Massachusetts
to favor us with a statement of how much this bill appropriates or
carries on its face.
Mr. DAWES. Mr. President, the bill on its face, as nearly as it can be
ascertained (there being some indefinite appropriations connected
with it), is about $16,000,000. The Indian appropriation bill proper
contains about $7,200,000. The remainder of the bill is made up of the
other appropriations necessary to carry out the agreements that were
made with Indians for the surrender of a large portion of their reservations to the public domain. In the main it has cost the United States
between $1.25 and $1.50 an acre for some ten or eleven million acres
of land. All this land is opened by this bill to settlement as part of the
public domain upon the payment by the settler of $1.50 an acre, for
all except that which was obtained from the Sisseton and Wahpeton
reservation, which is open to settlement at $2.50 an acre, because the
United States gave the Indians for the surrender $2.50 per acre.
Mr. GORMAN. Now, do I understand the Senator from
Massachusetts to say that provision is made here for the Government
576
577

22 Cong. Rec. 3877-79 (1891).
Id. at 3879.
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to charge the settler the same amount per acre that the Government
has paid to the Indian for this land?
Mr. DAWES. As nearly as could be calculated. The idea of the
several agreements, and the idea of their ratification in this bill, is
to reimburse the United States for this land. In other words, the
United States purchases for the homesteader and acts as go-between
between the Indian and the homesteader. It is not the intention of
the United States to make any money out of the homesteader, but it
is trying to take pains to secure reimbursement.
Mr. GORMAN. What is the price per acre? Have the conferees
agreed upon the amount fixed by the Senate?
Mr. DAWES. The amount originally was $1.25. I am not certain whether the change from $l.25 to $1.50 was effected by the
Committee on Indian Affairs or by the committee of conference. My
recollection on that point is vague.
Mr. GORMAN. When the Senate considered this bill it fixed the
price at $1.50 and $2.50.
Mr. DAWES. Yes. When it came from the other branch it was $1.25
upon every part of it except the Sisseton and Wahpeton reservation.
Mr. GORMAN. Was it not retained at $1.50 and $2.50 in the conference report?
Mr. DAWES. Yes.
Mr. GORMAN. Then there is no loss to the Government in that
direction?
Mr. DAWES. It has been complained that the Government has
more than reimbursed itself, but I do not think the Government has,
because there are a good many indefinite appropriations.
Mr. GORMAN. Mr. President, I agree with the suggestion of
the Senator from Illinois [Mr. CULLOM], and I so stated when this
bill was under consideration in the Senate, when it came here from
elsewhere at so late an hour in this session, freighted with all these
treaties that have been pending for years. They are not treaties made
in the last three or four months, but treaties made in the last three or
four years, that had never been ratified, although this body, engaged
as it has been in the discussion of other measures foreign to the ordinary business of the Senate, in committees and the body itself had
found time to consider the separate proposition of these treaties in
separate bills, as is the right thing to do always to secure fair action.
Mr. DAWES. Will the Senator from Maryland allow me to correct myself?
Mr. GORMAN. Certainly.
Mr. DAWES. I am reminded by the Senator occupying the chair
[Mr. SANDERS] that by the agreement with the Crow Indians we
purchased land for very much less than $1.50 an acre, I think less
than $1 per acre, and we sell that land for $1.50 an acre. The Senator
from Montana [Mr. SANDERS] complained that we were making
too much money out of that transaction.
Mr. GORMAN. . . .
....
[W]hile attempts have been recently made to legislate here in
relation to these treaties, they have never been considered. Yet now,
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in the closing hours of this session, this bill came to us in such a form
that it was impossible to ascertain what was contained within its
pages. . . .
. . . I do not believe there is another member of the Committee
on Appropriations besides the Senator from Massachusetts who can
tell whether it is a fair bill, in the interest of this Government, or not;
and I do not hold the Senator from Massachusetts responsible for
what may result from the provisions contained within this measure.
....
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on concurring in
the report of the committee of conference.
The report was concurred in.578

In view of the illuminating context occluded by DeCoteau’s isolated paragraph fragment, italicized above,579 Senator Dawes’s remark
cannot be construed as implying Congress’s elimination of the SissetonWahpeton people’s reservation.580 At most the comment is ambiguous, in
which case application of the Indian law canons requires construing the
comment in favor of preserving Indian rights and against any implication
or inference of disestablishment.581 But the remark’s full context, as transcribed in the Congressional Record, shows that Dawes was merely doing
the best he could to field irate comments and questions that were being
pressed on him by fellow senators on the very day—and at the very hour—
that the massive Indian appropriations bill was completing its arduous
journey through the Senate’s legislative process. Dawes’s reference to the
price to be paid per acre ($2.50) by the U.S. government for the SissetonWahpeton lands was in direct response to Senator Gorman’s having
asked him “how much this bill appropriates or carries on its face.” In
trying to answer that difficult question (and making mistakes, concededly,
Id. at 3879-81 (emphasis added).
I.e., Senator Dawes’s referring to “the agreements that were made with Indians
for the surrender of a large portion of their reservations to the public domain” and
his assertion that “[a]ll this land is opened by this bill to settlement as part of the
public domain,” including land “which was obtained from the Sisseton and Wahpeton
reservation, which is open at $2.50 an acre, because the United States gave the
Indians for the surrender $2.50 an acre,” 22 Cong. Rec. 3879 (1891) (remarks of
Sen. Dawes), quoted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 441 (1975); see supra
text accompanying note 510; see also supra text accompanying note 578.
580
Further evidence that Senator Dawes was not implying that the 1891 Act, by making
the Sisseton-Wahpeton unallotted lands available for purchase by settlers, would
abolish the Lake Traverse Reservation is found in the 1891 volume of the proceedings
of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian, of which Dawes was an
active member. In a discussion of the Conference that took place on October 8, 1891,
Senator Dawes said to his fellow assembled participants: “In all of the agreements that
were ratified [by the 1891 Act], it was provided that the land purchased should be open
to the homestead settlers, who were to pay for it the sum of $1.25 an acre, except in
the Sisseton reservation, where they were to pay $2.50.” Proceedings of the 9th Ann.
Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conf. of Friends of the Indian, supra note 497, at 65
(emphasis added).
581
See supra note 31 and accompanying text; supra note 56 and accompanying text;
supra note 570 and accompanying text.
578
579
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in the process),582 Senator Dawes was not even trying to accurately delineate or specify the bill’s multitudinous effects on the land status of the
various reservations and tribes affected by the comprehensive legislation.583 The legislative context, as shown in the Congressional Record,
See supra text accompanying note 578.
Although Senator Dawes had introduced the bill that became the 1887 General
Allotment Act (or Dawes Act) into the Senate and “[h]is name stuck to the . . . act,”
Prucha, supra note 497, at 666, his views regarding the legal effects of allotment were,
in fundamental ways, contrary to conventional understanding and disputed by leading
Indian policy reform advocates and thinkers of his own time. Illustrating this are
the September 27, 1888 transcribed proceedings of the Lake Mohonk Conference of
Friends of the Indian, which show the assembly’s adoption of a resolution endorsing
congressional passage of a comprehensive bill “to establish Indian Police Courts and
to define their Jurisdiction, and to regulate Judicial Proceedings within the Indian
Reservations, and for other purposes.” Proceedings of the 6th Ann. Meeting of the
Lake Mohonk Conf. of Friends of the Indian 46, 71 (Isabel C. Barrows ed., 1888).
In urging such adoption the proposal’s architect, Professor James Bradley Thayer of
Harvard Law School, chairman of the Lake Mohonk Conference’s law committee,
reminded the assembly that it had been the
opinion of this Conference last year . . . that there is need of further legislation to protect the rights of Indians and others on the reservations. . . . I will
assume it as the just view, that all persons on the Indian reservations, whether
tribal Indians, or citizen Indians, or whites, should have courts and a system of
law applicable to the reservations, and administered under the authority of the
United States Government.
Id. at 47 (remarks of Prof. J.B. Thayer). Thayer acknowledged the lack of support from
Senator Dawes, who was absent from that day’s proceedings, explaining that “Dawes
holds that when an Indian has taken up land in severalty, that land is taken out of
the reservation. It is as if it were taken up bodily and lifted outside the reservation.
It appears rather to us that he is still on the reservation . . . .” Id. at 69 (remarks
of Prof. J.B. Thayer); see also Proceedings of the 5th Ann. Meeting of the Lake
Mohonk Conf. 65 (1887) (remarks of Sen. Dawes) (opining that when Indians are
assigned allotments “[t]hey stand upon the reservation no more” and that “[t]hey
stand upon their homesteads as citizens of the United States, and no part of the
homestead is a part of the reservation, and all the rest of the land is reservation”),
reprinted in Henry L. Dawes, Defense of the Dawes Act, in Americanizing the
American Indians: Writings by the “Friends of the Indian” 1880-1900, at 100, 106
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973). Responding to a concern raised at the meeting by
General Eliphalet Whittlesey—who a year later would lead the U.S. negotiations with
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota—that the proposed bill might “keep [the Indians]
from becoming absorbed as a part of our body politic,” Proceedings of the 6th Ann.
Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conf. of Friends of the Indian, supra, at 68 (remarks
of Gen. Whittlesey), Professor Thayer said:
I do not see that it would have that effect. . . . The bill assumes the continuance of the reservation system . . . . The bill is neutral as touching the length
of time the reservation system shall continue; but while it continues it insists
on the power of the United States Government to retain the control. It has a
duty to these people as its wards so long as it keeps up this system,—the duty of
administering as well as providing law, instead of allowing that system to be administered by their worst enemies, or by their neighbors in the States adjoining.
Id. (remarks of Prof. J.B. Thayer) (alluding to United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384
(1886) (“Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where [the Indians]
are found are often their deadliest enemies.”)). Following some fretting by the
Lake Mohonk Conference’s founder over having to disagree with Senator Dawes,
582
583
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of Dawes’s adverting to “the public domain” when answering a fellow
senator’s question about how much the massive Indian appropriations
bill would cost the U.S. government584 dispels any inference that Dawes’s
see id. at 70 (remarks of Quaker schoolteacher Albert K. Smiley) (“We cannot afford
to lose the support of a man who is, by general consent, the best friend of the Indian in
this country.”), Dawes’s own daughter offered words of reassurance:
I think there is no danger that any difference of opinion here will “offend”
Mr. Dawes. He is very sensitive lest there should be any such feeling. Of course,
he has very strong opinions on this subject. He feels bound to hold them because he feels bound to do for the Indian the best that he can see to be done
for him. Nothing that I remember for many years has grieved him so much as
differing from the friends of the Indian on this subject. But he will be the first
and strongest to beg you not to qualify your opinions on his account. He hopes
the Mohonk Conference will feel no delicacy in supporting its own opinion on
his account. The members of this Conference are responsible for their opinions
as he is for his, and you may be sure that he will appreciate the delicate consideration that has been exhibited this morning.
Id. (remarks of Anna L. Dawes). The record of proceedings states that “[i]t was then
unanimously voted that [the Conference’s resolution endorsing passage of the Thayer
Bill] should be referred to the Committee on Resolutions.” Id. at 71.
This vignette from an 1888 meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference underscores
the peril of relying on a single, isolated remark by Senator Dawes when endeavoring
to discern the congressionally intended land-status effects of the comprehensive
1891 Indian Appropriations Act which, in one of its numerous sections, ratified
the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota. It also evinces a “widely
held, contemporaneous understanding,” Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 471 (1984),
that congressional acts facilitating allotment generally would not shrink or abolish
reservation boundaries. See also Campbell, supra note 513, at 90 (“While the Thayer
Bill never passed (largely because of the cost it was expected to involve), its proposal
reflected the fact that lawyers saw the Dawes Act as deficient. . . . [A] number of
lawyers [including Thayer] believed that the Dawes Act caused only uncertainty as
to legal jurisdiction over the reservations and dire need for further legislation. This
suggests that the provisions of the Dawes Act, and the surplus lands acts passed to
implement it, did not, and were not meant to, accomplish the extension of state law
over the reservations. . . . Allotment, paradoxically, did not weaken the reservation
system, but necessitated its expansion.”); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478 (1976) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett,
412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973)) (observing that the policy of the General Allotment Act “was
to continue the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands”); cf. Cohen’s
Handbook § 1.04, supra note 16, at 75 (footnote omitted) (observing that “[u]nder
the federal allotment and assimilation policy,” as advocated by “the so-called ‘Friends
of the Indian,’” “Indians had to be permanently settled on fixed reservations, since
only then could tribal lands be assigned to individuals”). For further discussion of
the Thayer Bill and its implications, see Mathes, supra note 134, at 151; Prucha, supra
note 497, at 679-81; Collins & Miller, supra note 497, at 97-100; H.R. Exec. Doc. No. 1,
Pt. 5, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., at 898-900 (1890).
584
See supra text accompanying note 578. Senator Dawes’s focus, during the
congressional debate, on allaying fears about the total cost of the Indian appropriations
bill strongly implies his having used the term “public domain” in the sense of its
“merely refer[ing] to land available for sale or disposition under the general land
laws.” Campbell, supra note 513, at 73; see also Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481, 490
(1901) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘Public domain’ is equivalent
to ‘public lands,’ and these words have acquired a settled meaning in the legislation of
this country. The words ‘public lands’ are habitually used in our legislation to describe
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imprecise, off-the-cuff-and-on-the-fly response implied Congress’s intent
to “destroy the existence of” 585 the Lake Traverse Reservation.586
Perhaps the starkest illustration of DeCoteau’s refusal to apply the
Indian law ambiguities canon is the Supreme Court’s rejection of the
argument that a provision regarding school lands in the text of the 1891
Act strongly implies that Congress intended the reservation’s continuing
existence. As Justice William Douglas framed the matter in his DeCoteau
dissent, “The only provision of the 1891 Act which extends state jurisdiction into the reservation is a clause in § 30 which exempts sections 16 and
36 and reserves them ‘for common school purposes,’ and makes them
‘subject to the laws of the State wherein located.’”587 In particular, § 30 of
the 1891 Act provides:
That the lands by said agreement ceded, sold, relinquished, and
conveyed to the United States shall immediately, upon the payment to the parties entitled thereto of their share of the funds made
immediately available by this act, and upon the completion of the
allotments as provided for in said agreement, be subject only to
entry and settlement under the homestead and townsite laws of the
United States, excepting the sixteenth and thirty-sixth sections of
said lands, which shall be reserved for common school purposes, and
be subject to the laws of the State wherein located . . . .588

Adherence to Indian law canons is implicit in Justice Douglas’s observation that § 30’s express provision for the applicability of state law
to sections 16 and 36 school lands clearly implies the absence of state
jurisdiction everywhere else within the ceded acreage by virtue of the reservation’s continuing existence.589 This, of course, is the proper resolution,
in accordance with Indian law principles,590 of the debate among counsel
such as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws.”).
585
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962); see supra text accompanying
note 24.
586
In light of the courts’ “hav[ing] generally served as the conscience of federal
Indian law, protecting tribal powers and rights,” David H. Getches, Conquering
the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law,
84 Calif. L. Rev. 1573, 1573-74 (1996), the corrosive impact of DeCoteau’s wielding
the term “public domain” cannot be overstated. As Professor Judith Royster bluntly
puts it, “Hitching the language of the [1891] Act to the statements of the congressional
sponsors, the Court held that the act disestablished the entire Sisseton-Wahpeton
Reservation.” Royster, supra note 56, at 33.
587
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 464 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
588
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 30, 26 Stat. 1039 (emphasis added), quoted in
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445 n.33.
589
See supra text accompanying note 587; see also Pirtle, supra note 106, at 446 (“This
provision is proof positive that Congress did not intend to terminate the Reservation
and to make state law apply throughout!”); Erin Hogan Fouberg, Tribal Territory,
Sovereignty, and Governance: A Study of the Cheyenne River and Lake Traverse
Indian Reservations 117 (2000) (“By making sections 16 and 36 school lands, the
[1891] act was recognizing the continued existence of the reservation. Otherwise, that
clause would have been unnecessary.”).
590
See supra note 565 and accompanying text.
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in DeCoteau 591 about the meaning of the 1891 Act’s inclusion (in § 30) of
the phrase “and be subject to the laws of the State wherein located.”592 In
an amicus memorandum submitted to the Supreme Court in DeCoteau,
the United States summarized the issue and how it should be resolved:
[Respondent District County Court] argues that the placement
of the comma between “purposes” and “and” indicates that all the
land, not just the school sections, would be subject to state jurisdiction. We agree that non-Indians on those lands (and their interests)
are subject to state law, but submit that the most reasonable reading
of this clause, in historical context and in light of the “crazy quilt”
pattern, is that the land remains a part of the Reservation and that
tribal authority over Indians on these portions of the Reservation
remains undiminished. Moreover, . . . the clause does not give a clear
indication of congressional intent to terminate or diminish the reservation, and any doubt should, of course, be resolved in favor of the
Indians. And here, since the 1891 Act ratified the 1889 agreement
with the Tribe, it is to be construed according to the sense understood
by the Indians.593
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 153, at 22, 30-32, 1974 WL 186007, at *17, *20*21; Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 126-29, 1974 WL 187535, at *76-*77;
Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 132, at 6-9, 1974 WL 186005, at *5-*7.
592
See supra text accompanying note 588.
593
Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8-9, DeCoteau v. Dist.
Cty. Ct. for the Tenth Jud. Dist., 420 U.S. 425 (1975) (No. 73-1148), 1974 WL 187467,
at *5 (emphases added) (citations omitted). The United States’ position on the schoollands issue was in accord with that of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in one of the
two consolidated cases reviewed by the Supreme Court in DeCoteau:
Appellee leans upon a phrase extracted from section 30 of the 1891 Act.
The phrase “, and be subject to the laws of the state wherein located” is read
by appellee to confer state jurisdiction upon the entire portion of land opened
to homesteading. Appellant argues a misplaced comma and contends that only
school lands, sections sixteen and thirty-six, are subject to state jurisdiction.
Appellant’s argument is more plausible in light of the general pattern adopted
by Congress in making specific grants of these numbered sections in each
township to the states. We do not read this clause as a clear indication of
congressional intention to terminate the Lake Traverse reservation.
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 101-02 (8th Cir. 1973) (decision
below) (citations omitted), rev’d, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
In arguing what it called “the ‘subject to the laws of the State’ comma issue,” Brief
for Respondent, supra note 132, at 134, 1974 WL 187535, at *79, the District County
Court stated it had “addressed a letter to the English Department of the University
of South Dakota, Vermillion, South Dakota, and requested an interpretation of the
meaning and intent of Congress in regard to the aforementioned language contained
in Section 30 of the 1891 Act.” Id. at 128, 1974 WL 187535, at *77. Respondent reported
that “[s]even members of the English Department responded in a detailed analysis of
parallel structure, word order and punctuation,” and that “[t]he majority, based upon
their observations and analyses, ‘supported the conclusion that the writer’s intent was
to allow the first “shall” to control the final phrase, with the resultant interpretation
that all of the lands, not just those sections reserved for school purposes, are to be
subject to state law.’” Id. at 128, 1974 WL 187535, at *77 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted). The fact that the seven South Dakota English professors did not all agree
(and respondent District County Court neglected to disclose just how closely divided
591

Of Reservation Boundary Lines

and Judicial

Battle Lines

313

The Supreme Court majority in DeCoteau avoided applying the
Indian law canons and brushed off the school-lands issue in a footnote,
siding with the state and against the Indians. The wording of the brushoff, however, is subtly revealing:
We think the disagreement irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue
before us. The “school provision” was not part of the 1889 Agreement,
and there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress
intended the provision to qualify the terms of the cession of unallotted lands to the Government. . . . Even if we were to assume, with
counsel for the tribal members, that the “state law” phrase of § 30
refers only to school lands, the natural inference would be that state
law is to govern the manner in which the 16th and 36th sections are
to be employed “for common school purposes.” This implies nothing
about the presence or absence of state civil and criminal jurisdiction
over the remainder of the ceded lands.594

The DeCoteau majority opinion is correct in stating that “[t]he ‘school provision’ was not part of the 1889 Agreement . . . .”595—just as the land-disposal
the panel’s vote was) supports, of course, judicially resolving the arguably ambiguous
“comma issue” in favor of the Indians, not the state. But moreover, the entire tedious
punctuative enterprise is a textbook illustration of the kind of interpretive approach
that longstanding Indian law principles forbid. See, e.g., Fletcher § 5.5, supra note 14,
at 224 (“[C]ourts presume the United States intends its enactments to benefit tribal
interests. Standard rules of statutory interpretation do not apply, and courts interpret
ambiguous provisions in federal statutes to the benefit of tribal interests.”).
Curiously—and undoubtedly to make the final divergent vote of the selected
state university academics appear less close than it really was—a solitary member
of the University of South Dakota law faculty, Marion R. Smyser, also was tapped
to weigh in on the “comma issue,” rendering an opinion in alignment with that of
the respondent state court and the majority of the English professors who answered
the survey. The District County Court stated that Professor Smyser “ha[d] for
several years instructed Legislation and similar courses at the School of Law of
the University of South Dakota,” Brief for Respondent, supra note 132, at 128-29,
1974 WL 187535, at *77. An online search-engine search conducted by this author
yielded little further information about Professor Smyser—except an anecdote posted
in the comments section of the website for the Madville Times, a blog billed as “Real
liberal media for the great state of South Dakota”:
I recall a story about Professor Marion Smyser, a former railroad lawyer
turned long time law school teacher at USD Law School. In the 70’s a student
in his civil procedure class argued that a particular court decision was “unjust.”
Smyser did not defend the decision, rather, he told the student to leave the
classroom and look at the name engraved at the top of the entrance to the law
school, and then come back and report to the class what the engraving said.
The student returned and reported the engraving as “School of Law.” Smyser
then asked if the student saw any language about “justice” anywhere near the
engraving, and the answer was no. Smyser had no further comment.
Caheidelberger, President Obama All Action, Congress All Talk on Immigration
Reform, Madville Times, subsequently renamed Dakota Free Press, Nov. 21, 2014,
http://madvilletimes.com/2014/11/21/president-obama-all-action-congress-all-talk-onimmigration-reform/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2021) (anonymous comment).
594
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445-46 n.33.
595
Supra text accompanying note 594.
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provision likewise was not part of the agreement either.596 With regard to
the latter point, any reference in the Congressional Record, as explained
above,597 to the lands the 1891 Act made available to homesteaders as being
“public domain” lands therefore could not have altered reservation boundaries since reducing or abolishing the Lake Traverse Reservation required
the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people’s consent.The same is true with regard
to the school-lands issue: whatever the school-lands provision’s precise
meaning, that provision could not affect the boundaries of the reservation
because the Indians never agreed to any change in those boundaries when
they negotiated and signed the 1889 Agreement.598 The unstated predicate
implicit in DeCoteau’s school-lands footnote,599 therefore, is the Supreme
Court’s embrace—and enforcement—of the fiction that the SissetonWahpeton Indians had agreed to their reservation’s extinguishment.600
Having curated and promoted an appearance of tribal consent in a previous footnote,601 the Court could, in this subsequent footnote, proceed on
the assumption that state jurisdiction was “a given” because tribal consent
to the reservation’s dissolution was manifest in “the terms of [the Indians’]
cession of unallotted lands to the Government” in 1889.602 Accordingly, the
Court could—and did—assign to the tribal-member parties the burden
of proving any departure from this (false) baseline premise of complete
“state civil and criminal jurisdiction over . . . the ceded lands”—that is, the
burden of persuading the Justices that in § 30 of the 1891 Act, Congress
chose “to qualify” such plenary state jurisdiction with regard, specifically,
to the sections 16 and 36 school lands.603 And from this judicially contrived
starting point, the Court could—and did—conclude that the SissetonWahpeton parties had failed to prove that Congress had deviated from
the (false) premise in enacting the school-lands provision. Hence, “the
presence . . . of state civil and criminal jurisdiction over [all of] . . . the
ceded lands”604 remained uniform and unbroken notwithstanding the
school-lands provision because—in the Court’s flawed analysis—(1) the
Indians had consented, in 1889, to the elimination of the Lake Traverse
Reservation605 and (2) “there is no indication in the [1891 Act’s] legislative
history that Congress intended the [school-lands] provision to qualify” the
resulting plenary state jurisdiction over all of the ceded lands.606

596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606

See supra notes 514-517 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 514-517 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 358-451 and accompanying text.
See supra note 594 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 373-451 and accompanying text.
See supra note 594 and accompanying text.
See supra note 594 and accompanying text.
See supra note 594 and accompanying text.
See supra note 180.
See supra note 594 and accompanying text.
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The absence of any mention of the Indian law canons in the
Supreme Court’s treatment of the school-lands issue in DeCoteau thus
reflects a sub silentio “swapping-in” of a countervailing states’-rights
premise to obviate the need to apply any otherwise pertinent Indian
rights principles.607 This, in turn, explains why the DeCoteau majority did
not even bother to rebut Justice Douglas’s facially compelling point that
the 1891 Act’s language regarding school lands “was deemed necessary
because the South Dakota Enabling Act did not reserve the 16th and
36th sections in Indian reservations for school purposes; hence this special provision had to be made.”608 Notwithstanding the irrefutable truth
of Douglas’s observation about the South Dakota Enabling Act,609 for
the DeCoteau majority Congress’s ratification of the 1889 Agreement
meant that the Lake Traverse Reservation no longer existed; accordingly, the Court could simply ignore the negative implication urged by
Justice Douglas and instead assign a trivial explanation for the schoollands provision, namely, that Congress wanted “state law . . . to govern
the manner in which the 16th and 36th sections are to be employed ‘for
common school purposes.’”610 Having founded its analysis on imaginary
tribal consent, the DeCoteau majority had to—and did—come up with an
imaginary congressional purpose for the school-lands provision.
Nevertheless, the only relevant contemporaneous discussion in
the Congressional Record strongly supports Justice Douglas’s dissenting position on the school-lands provision, not the contorted, falsely
premised post hoc rationalizing of the DeCoteau majority. Thus, on
February 27, 1891, Senator Pettigrew of South Dakota proposed adding
the exact language that became the school-lands provision of the 1891
Act.611 He explained:
[M]y amendment requires that sections 16 and 36 shall be donated
for the purpose of supporting the common schools of the State of
South Dakota. If that provision were rejected as to every reservation
See Ennis, supra note 86, at 663 (discussing DeCoteau as illustrative of cases where
“the Court’s tendency to view state sovereignty as obviating the application of the
[Indian law] canons is manifest”).
608
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 464 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
609
The relevant language from the Enabling Act states:
That upon the admission of each of said States [i.e., North Dakota and
South Dakota] into the Union sections numbered sixteen and thirty-six in every
township of said proposed States . . . are hereby granted to said States for the
support of common schools . . . : Provided, That the sixteenth and thirty-sixth
sections embraced in permanent reservations for national purposes shall not,
at any time, be subject to the grants . . . of this act, nor shall any lands embraced in Indian, military, or other reservations of any character be subject to
the grants . . . of this act until the reservation shall have been extinguished and
such lands be restored to, and become a part of, the public domain.
Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 180, § 10, 25 Stat. 676, 679.
610
See supra note 594 and accompanying text.
611
See 22 Cong. Rec. 3457 (1891) (proposed insertion of section of Indian
appropriations bill by Sen. Pettigrew).
607
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in the State of South Dakota when we were admitted in to the Union,
we would have lost more than half of all the school lands donated to
the State, which would be unjust and unfair . . . .612

Senator Pettigrew’s remark reflects an understanding regarding the need
for the school-lands provision that is parallel to, and supportive of, the
point made by Justice Douglas, dissenting in DeCoteau—i.e., that the
provision “was . . . necessary because the South Dakota Enabling Act did
not reserve the 16th and 36th sections in Indian reservations for school
purposes.”613 Pettigrew recognized that if the South Dakota Enabling
Act had not contained a special provision facilitating the donation of
school lands from the corpus of public lands that formerly were part of
Indian reservations, South Dakota would have been shut out from real
property resources, available to other states, “for the support of common schools.”614 Avoiding a similarly “unfair”615 outcome vis-à-vis the
Lake Traverse Reservation’s ceded acreage clearly was on Pettigrew’s
mind when he proposed adding the school-lands provision to the 1891
Act. Pettigrew’s apparent sense of urgency is understandable, moreover,
for just one year previously—and only four months after South Dakota
became a state616—President Benjamin Harrison had issued a proclamation accepting agreements obtained from the Sioux tribes of the former
Dakota Territory pursuant to the Act of March 2, 1889, a momentous
piece of legislation that broke up the Great Sioux Reservation and made
millions of acres available to homesteaders.617 While the South Dakota
Id. at 3457-58 (remarks of Sen. Pettigrew). Although DeCoteau cites these same
pages from the Congressional Record, it does so solely to support the point that “it
was decided that these lands should be sold to settlers at $2.50 per acre under the
homestead laws,” see supra note 507, without noting or mentioning Senator Pettigrew’s
explanation therein for proposing that the school-lands provision be added to the bill
that became the 1891 Act.
613
See supra note 608 and accompanying text.
614
Act of Feb. 22, 1889, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 180, § 10, 25 Stat. 676, 679; supra
note 609.
615
See supra text accompanying note 612.
616
See supra note 161.
617
See Proclamation of the President, Feb. 10, 1890, No. 9, 51st Cong., 1st Sess.,
26 Stat. 1554, 1554 (“Now, therefore, I, Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States,
by virtue of the power in me vested, do hereby make known and proclaim the acceptance
of said act [of Mar. 2, 1889] by the different bands of the Sioux Nation of Indians, and
the consent thereto by them as required by the act is hereby declared to be in full force
and effect . . . .”); Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 50th Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 405, § 28, 25 Stat. 888,
899 (“An act to divide a portion of the reservation of the Sioux Nation of Indians in
Dakota into separate reservations and to secure the relinquishment of the Indian title to
the remainder, and for other purposes”) (providing that “this act shall take effect, only,
upon the acceptance thereof and consent thereto by the different bands of the Sioux
Nation of Indians”); see also Herbert T. Hoover, The Sioux Agreement of 1889 and Its
Aftermath, S.D. Hist., Spring 1989, at 56, 58 (footnote omitted) (“The Sioux Agreement
of 2 March 1889 [further] reduced [the Great Sioux] reservation by 9,274,668.7 acres,
leaving the Teton and Yanktonai tribes only 12,681,911 acres within the boundaries of the
Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, Lower Brule, Pine Ridge, Rosebud, and Standing Rock
reservations.”); cf. Ann E. Tweedy, Unjustifiable Expectations: Laying to Rest the Ghosts
612
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Enabling Act ensured that school lands would be granted to the state
automatically once a reservation was “extinguished” and its lands “were
restored to, and [became] a part of, the public domain,”618 a “special provision had to be made”619 regarding the Sisseton-Wahpeton lands because
the 1891 Act would not extinguish the Lake Traverse Reservation and
thereby trigger the automatic transfer of school land to the state. Senator
Pettigrew’s concerns were well taken, moreover, because his proposed
school-lands provision was indeed added to the Indian appropriations
bill and enacted into law as part of § 30 of the 1891 Act.620
As DeCoteau’s constant disregard of the Indian law canons
demonstrates, the central defect in the case is the Supreme Court’s rigid
adherence to its own false narrative of tribal consent to the abolishment of the Lake Traverse Reservation.621 This adherence is interwoven
through the Gordian knot of DeCoteau’s multilayered contrivances and
distortions of analysis; and in the course of this aggressive judicial activism622 DeCoteau emplaces a menacing, albeit unspoken, proposition for
of Allotment-Era Settlers, 36 Seattle U. L. Rev. 129, 150 (2012) (footnotes omitted)
(“[E]ventually the required number of adult males signed the [1889] agreement to cede
over 9 million acres of land and divide themselves onto several smaller reservations.
However, the signatures were coerced: the Sioux were told that, if they did not sign, their
land would be taken on less favorable terms. More aggressive tactics included jailing
opponents of the cession and forbidding influential leaders, such as Sitting Bull, from
speaking out publicly against the proposal.”).
618
See supra note 609. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissenting opinion in DeCoteau,
remarks by legislators in subsequent sessions of Congress reflected this understanding
of how the South Dakota enabling act functioned to generate state school lands from
public lands that formerly were within Indian reservations. See DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty.
Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 462 n.1 (1975) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting 35 Cong. Rec. 3187
(1902) (remarks of Sen. Gamble)) (“This provision [of the enabling act] did not apply
to permanent Indian reservations, but became operative when the Indian title was
extinguished and the lands restored to and became a part of the public domain.”); id.
(quoting 38 Cong. Rec. 1423 (1904) (remarks of Cong. Burke)) (“I would state that
under the enabling act under which the State of South Dakota was admitted to the
Union it was provided that sections 16 and 36 in said State should be reserved for the
use of the common schools of that State, and it further provided that as to the lands
within an Indian reservation the provisions of that grant would not become operative
until the reservation was extinguished and the land restored to the public domain.”).
619
See supra note 608 and accompanying text.
620
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 30, 26 Stat. 1039, quoted in DeCoteau,
420 U.S. at 445 n.33; see supra note 588 and accompanying text.
621
Cf. Campbell, supra note 513, at 66-67 (noting that “in DeCoteau, the Court seized
on the apparent acquiescence of the tribe (however that may have been gained) in the
sale of the surplus lands”).
622
Cf. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34
Ariz. St. L.J. 113, 219 (2002) (“[U]nder the guise of interpreting allotment statutes,
these [reservation diminishment and termination] cases accomplish precisely what
Congress later sought to avoid by enacting its definition of Indian country—a clear
indication that the Court has established and is enforcing its own Indian policy under
the guise of judicial Indian plenary power.”); Getches, supra note 586, at 1654 (“The
foundation principles of Indian law demand resistance to the temptation of judicial
activism. A return to foundation principles . . . would spare tribes the subjective
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undermining the U.S. government’s historical commitment to protecting
and preserving Indian treaty rights.623 Thus, without mentioning the word,
DeCoteau effectuates an abrogation of the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
people’s right to a “permanent reservation” home, expressly guaranteed
by the 1867 Treaty that established the Lake Traverse Reservation.624 Yet,
the Supreme Court did not even attempt to reconcile this consequence of
its analysis in DeCoteau with the Court’s own stringent rules for finding
Congress has deliberately abrogated an Indian treaty. That treaty abrogation standard itself was the product of judicial decisions that adhered
to Indian law canons when addressing whether Congress had unilaterally
destroyed the treaty rights of an Indian tribe.625 In its overturned decision finding that the reservation was not disestablished in DeCoteau, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals included the treaty abrogation rule as
judgments of courts by requiring congressional action, with the scrutiny of the
political process and the tribes’ full participation, before modifying their rights as
sovereigns.”); Frank Pommersheim, Broken Landscapes: Indians, Indian Tribes,
and the Constitution 297 (2009) (discussing cases that exemplify the proliferation
of “a judicial version of plenary power” in modern Indian law and that “permit[] the
[Supreme] Court to make policy-driven decisions about what is ‘best’ for non-Indians
who might potentially be subject to tribal jurisdiction”).
623
Cf. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: “As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a
Time is That?, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 601, 606-07 (1975) (footnote omitted) (“Because of the
great importance of the rights guaranteed by Indian treaties, the power of Congress
to abrogate should be exercised sparingly. Indian treaties should be abrogated only if
‘consistent with perfect good faith toward the Indians.’ Plainly, these treaty rights are
significant enough that our jurisprudence should carefully guard against their loss.”);
King, supra note 65, at 403 (“The supremacy of Indian treaties, the weight given to
treaty promises, and the deference the Indian canons accord the breadth of those
promises demand an accordingly high bar for abrogation of treaty rights. Although
the Supreme Court has established a relatively high bar for abrogation of treaty
usufructuary rights, it has established an inexplicably low bar for abrogation of treaty
rights to a homeland, i.e., for reservation disestablishment.”).
624
Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (“[T]here
shall be set apart for the members of said bands . . . the following described lands as
a permanent reservation . . . .”), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 451-52; see, e.g.,
Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 623, at 629 n.147 (observing that in DeCoteau
the Supreme Court purported to have “found a strong showing that Congress had
intended an abrogation”); cf. Frickey, supra note 500, at 1148 (“Diminishment
or disestablishment would, of course, abrogate the treaty that established the
reservation.”).
625
See Cohen’s Handbook § 2.02[1], supra note 16, at 114 & n.5 (collecting, inter alia,
treaty abrogation cases supporting the principle that “tribal property rights and
sovereignty are preserved unless Congress’s intent to the contrary is clear and
unambiguous”); see also Frickey, supra note 98, at 417 (“[T]he Supreme Court has
long applied a clear-statement requirement to congressional acts that appear to
invade tribal sovereignty. The clearest example is the principle that, absent compelling
evidence, a court should not hold that a federal statute has abrogated an Indian
treaty. . . . Just as contemporary decisions protect against all but express repeals of
values rooted in the Constitution, the Indian treaty abrogation doctrine protects
against all but clear repeals of values rooted in the spirit of Indian treaties.”).

Of Reservation Boundary Lines

and Judicial

Battle Lines

319

first on the appellate court’s list of Indian law principles that had to be
applied to resolve the dispute:
We must answer this question: Did the 1891 Act either on its
face, or alternatively, when considered with the contemporaneous
and subsequent legislative history, manifest Congressional intent to
diminish the Lake Traverse reservation boundaries?
We have these guidelines: (1) Intent to abrogate treaty rights is not
lightly imputed to Congress; (2) Congress having once established a
reservation, all tracts remain a part of that reservation until separated
therefrom by Congress. Indeed, Congressional intent to disestablish
the reservation must be either expressed on the face of the Act or
be clearly discernible from the “surrounding circumstances and legislative history.” (3) Opening an Indian reservation for settlement
by homesteading is not necessarily inconsistent with its continued
existence as a reservation. (4) The well-preserved general rule is that
Indians are to be left free from state jurisdiction and control. Federal
jurisdiction is preferred.626

For its assertion that courts may not “lightly impute[] to Congress”
an “[i]ntent to abrogate treaty rights”627 the Eighth Circuit relied on a 1968
U.S. Supreme Court case, Menominee Tribe v. United States,628 in which the
high court manifested the judiciary’s historical role in protecting Indian
rights to the greatest extent possible by “not interpret[ing] a federal statute to abrogate an Indian treaty right . . . absent a clear statement to that
effect.”629 Even after DeCoteau, when the Supreme Court in 1986 announced
a relatively diluted treaty abrogation standard in United States v. Dion,630
the threshold remained high enough to have prevented the Court from
concluding that the 1891 Act abridged the guarantee of a “permanent reservation” under the 1867 Treaty with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota.631
“What is essential,” the Court wrote in Dion, “is clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on
the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 101 (8th Cir. 1973) (decision
below) (emphasis added), rev’d, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
627
Id.; see supra text accompanying note 626.
628
Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968), cited in United States
ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d at 101; see Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 623,
at 637 (discussing Menominee Tribe as “a particularly strong statement in support of
Indian treaty rights”).
629
Fletcher § 5.6, supra note 14, at 226.
630
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). DeCoteau is the initial buildingblock toward Dion’s weakened treaty abrogation standard. See id. at 739 (citing,
inter alia, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 587 (1977)) (“We have
enunciated . . . different standards . . . for determining how such clear and plain
intent [to abrogate Indian treaty rights] must be demonstrated. . . . In other cases we
have looked to the statute’s ‘legislative history’ and ‘surrounding circumstances’ as
well as ‘the face of the Act’”); Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 587 (citing, inter alia,
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425 (1975)) (“But the ‘general rule’ [regarding ambiguities]
does not command a determination that reservation status survives in the face of
congressionally manifested intent to the contrary.”).
631
See supra note 624 and accompanying text.
626
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that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”632 But in DeCoteau, there was no
“clear evidence”—indeed, no evidence at all—that “Congress actually considered” any such conflict between deliberately “destroy[ing] the existence
of”633 the Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s reservation home, on the one hand,
and preserving the Indians’ 1867 treaty rights, on the other, “and chose to
resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty.”634 All Congress intended,
in passing the 1891 Act, was to purchase the unallotted acreage that the
Indians had agreed to sell, and to make those parcels available so that
homesteaders could buy them from the U.S. government and move onto
the Lake Traverse Reservation. The fact that DeCoteau defies the Supreme
Court’s own treaty abrogation standard—and indeed does not even
acknowledge the existence of a treaty abrogation issue—points, once again,
to the pervasive role of the case’s core fiction, i.e., the judicially fabricated
narrative about the Sisseton-Wahpeton people’s consent to the destruction
of their own reservation,635 a device the Court used, successfully, to circumvent the treaty abrogation issue altogether.
Because DeCoteau’s disregard of Indian law principles and
adherence to a false narrative of tribal consent unfolded in a reservation
disestablishment case in which the Supreme Court was purporting to
heed “clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent,”636 the case
raised disturbing questions about the framework for interpreting acts of
Congress in this area of Indian law going forward. Especially alarming was
DeCoteau’s projecting an entirely imaginary tribal position regarding the
impact reservation disestablishment would have on the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota people’s ability to continue functioning as a sovereign government,637
Dion, 476 U.S. at 739-40; see also Clark, supra note 228, at 110 (endnote omitted)
(“Of the various judicial tests applied to determine whether Congress actually
intended to abrogate an Indian treaty, most involve some sort of express legislative
reference to the Indian treaty rights under question and a clear showing of legislative
intent to modify the treaty terms.”).
633
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 356 (1962); see supra text accompanying
note 24.
634
Dion, 476 U.S. at 739-40; see supra note 632 and accompanying text.
635
See supra notes 353-451 and accompanying text.
636
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 447 (1975).
637
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s erroneous statement in DeCoteau that “[a] tribal
constitution did not appear until 1946 . . . ,” id. at 443 (footnote omitted), the SissetonWahpeton Dakota had adopted a tribal constitution and legal code in 1884, governing
conduct by Indians and non-Indians on the Lake Traverse Reservation. See SissetonWahpeton Constitution (Sisseton and Wahpeton Peoples, 1884), in Documents
of Native American Political Development: 1500s to 1933, at 423-51 (David E.
Wilkins ed., 2009) [hereinafter “1884 Sisseton-Wahpeton Constitution”]; see also
Anderson, supra note 160, at 124 (“As was typical with such constitutions in this age,
the agent had a final say when any important issue came up, including the approval
of law enforcement officers selected in the various districts that the new constitution
created. After reviewing the various agreements and compromises in the document,
the commissioner of Indian affairs signed it in February 1884.”). Tribal historian Elijah
Black Thunder and colleagues summarize the formation and structure of the SissetonWahpeton constitutional government in the nineteenth century:
A clause of the [1867] treaty allowed the tribe to make their own laws and
632
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with the Court’s opining, on the basis of no evidence whatsoever, that
to form their own legislative body. A constitution was drafted in 1884. This
was adopted by a grand council and submitted to the Indian Department in
Washington where some changes were made. The constitution was then resubmitted to the grand council for final approval. The legislative body consisted of
two divisions—the upper house composed of those recognized by the Indian
Department as chief and headmen, and the lower house, composed of two representatives from each of the ten districts. The executive department consisted
of a head chief, assistant chief, attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer and
sheriff. There was a supreme court with a chief justice and four associates, and a
constable and justice of the peace for each district. The justices of the peace had
jurisdiction in cases involving $25 or less with all suits of larger amounts going
to the supreme court. The sheriff had power to make arrests in any district and
was paid in fees for services performed. . . .
....
The legislature met every winter. At the first election one representative was
chosen from each district to serve one year and one to serve two years. Subsequent elections provided for half the lower house to be elected each year. The
executive officers held office for two years.
The law-making bodies’ actions were modeled after the state legislature
with each house having to pass bills and then these being signed by the head
chief and the Indian agent.
Black Thunder et al., supra note 137, at 63-64. The 1884 Sisseton-Wahpeton
Constitution included several provisions that referred specifically to the reservation
itself. The preamble states that
in the year (1867) in a Treaty made between the United States and the Sisseton
and Wahpeton Nations, it is provided in the tenth article that the chiefs and
headmen located upon either of the reservations set apart for said bands are
authorized to adopt such rules, regulations, or laws for the security of life and
property, the advancement of civilization, and the agricultural prosperity of the
members of said bands upon the reservations.
1884 Sisseton-Wahpeton Constitution, supra, at 424. Article 1, section 1, of the 1884
tribal constitution provides that “[t]he boundary [of the] Sisseton and Wahpeton
Reservation is that described in the treaty of 1867 . . . ,” and Article 3, which
established “[t]he Legislative power,” provides that “[t]here shall be ten districts on
the Reservation.” Id. at 425 (second alteration in original). Article 4, section 2, includes
the provision that “if any white man shall be found guilty of any of the offenses herein
mentioned, he shall be immediately removed from the reservation . . . .” Id. at 439.
Article 5, section 1, specifies criminal penalties for anyone who “except for medicinal
purpose for the physician shall bring any whiskey, wine, beer, or any other intoxicating
liquor within the Reservation.” Id. at 440. In addition, the tribal legislature enacted
bills in March of 1884, approved by both Principal Chief Gabriel Renville and
U.S. Indian Agent Benjamin W. Thompson, that (1) required “[a]ny person desiring to
trade within the bounds of the Reservation” to “apply to the Secretary of the nation
for a License” in order to “be permitted to trade,” and (2) imposed a tribal tax on
“wood and hay sold outside the Reservation” by “[a]ny person.” See id. at 448-49.
In DeCoteau’s implausible reasoning, this elaborate, developing system of
nineteenth-century reservation-based tribal constitutional government—a system
whose very existence the Supreme Court wrongly disavowed, see DeCoteau, 420 U.S.
at 443 (footnote omitted) (“A tribal constitution did not appear until 1946 . . . .”)—was
abandoned, discarded, and swept away without a word or thought, and without the
convoking of any constitutional amendment process, as a consequence of the SissetonWahpeton Indians’ simply having signed an agreement to sell their unallotted lands
to the United States.
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“the tribe . . . [was] satisfied that retention of allotments would provide
an adequate fulcrum for tribal affairs.”638 The obligation to ascertain the
Indians’ own understanding of treaties and agreements639 would amount
to little or nothing if courts could continue to simply invent a subjective
position on a key issue like this, as DeCoteau did, and falsely attribute it
to the Indians. Also ominous was DeCoteau’s referring to land-cession
language like that in the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Dakota640 as being “precisely suited” to finding a reservation extinguished.641
There is nothing intrinsic in words like “cede, sell, relinquish, and convey”642
that denotes that parties to an on-reservation land-sale agreement
understood the sale also would eliminate the reservation itself.643 Moreover,
the policy of the 1887 General Allotment Act—which Congress followed
when obtaining and ratifying the 1889 Agreement 644—specifies a procedure
for the federal government’s securing nothing more than “the purchase
and release” of lands that a tribe might voluntarily “consent to sell”;645 it
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 446.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
640
Agreement of 1889, art. I, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035,
1036 (providing that the Indians “hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the
United States all their claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands
within the limits of the reservation”), quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445; see also infra
note 674.
641
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445 (concluding “that the Lake Traverse Reservation was
terminated in 1891” and opining that “[t]he Agreement’s [land-sale] language, adopted
by majority vote of the tribe, was precisely suited to this purpose”).
642
Agreement of 1889, art. I, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035,
1036, quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 445.
643
See Collins, supra note 214, at 47 (“But these words said nothing about abolishing
the reservation, and the Court made no effort to ascertain the Indians’ understanding
of their import.”).
644
See S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 1 (letter from President Benjamin
Harrison to the Senate and House of Representatives) (observing that the 1889
negotiations with the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands “for the purchase and release
of the surplus lands in the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation” had been “conducted
under the authority contained in the fifth section of the general allotment act of
February 8, 1887”); see also supra note 158 and accompanying text; supra note 378; cf.
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437 (1903) (“Upon inspection of that agreement
[of 1889 with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota] we find nothing that indicates any
different relation of the United States to the allotted lands from that created or
recognized by the [General Allotment] act of 1887.”).
645
Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to negotiate with an Indian tribe “for the purchase and release” of surplus
lands within a reservation “as such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell”); see
Agreement of 1889, art. I, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035,
1036 (quoting and paraphrasing section five of the 1887 General Allotment Act, in
the Agreement’s opening “Whereas” provision, as authority for the U.S. government’s
lawfully negotiating with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota “for the purchase and
release” of “such portions” of the Lake Traverse Reservation as the Indians might
“consent to sell”), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 455; see also supra note 158. The
Interior Secretary’s letter of instructions to the U.S. commissioners who negotiated
with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota likewise restricted the commissioners to the task
of negotiating land-sale terms based on a determination of “the quantity of land to be
638
639
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does not prescribe, expressly or implicitly,646 any procedure for abolishing
or diminishing a tribe’s reservation
, as the Supreme Court repeatedly
has recognized.647 By declaring that garden-variety land-sale terms were
sold” by the Indians. Letter of Instructions, supra note 164; cf. S. Exec. Doc. No. 66,
supra note 157, at 12 (letter from E. Whittlesey, D.W. Diggs, and Charles A. Maxwell,
commissioners, to John W. Noble, Secretary of the Interior) (“We . . . are restricted
by the act of Congress of February 8, 1887, section five (24 Stat. 388) [i.e., the General
Allotment Act], and by our instructions.”); supra text accompanying note 324;
S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra note 157, at 21 (report of councils with Sisseton and
Wahpeton Indians) (statement of Gen. Whittlesey) (“We were sent here to ask you
what land you wished to sell and to make such arrangements and conditions as we
could agree upon.”); supra text accompanying note 252; S. Exec. Doc. No. 66, supra
note 157, at 22 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians) (statement of
Gen. Whittlesey) (“In this agreement the United States Government agrees to pay for
the land so sold under the allotment act . . . .”); supra text accompanying note 272. The
Secretary’s letter contains no authorization for negotiating a reduction or elimination
of the Lake Traverse Reservation’s boundaries, and the U.S. government’s report shows
that the commissioners never engaged in any discussion, ultra vires their charge, about
a potential abolishment of the reservation during the two weeks of the transcribed
negotiations. See generally Letter of Instructions, supra note 164; S. Exec. Doc. No. 66,
supra note 157, at 15-29 (report of councils with Sisseton and Wahpeton Indians).
During the negotiations, moreover, the U.S. commissioners repeatedly apprised the
Indians of the fact that the Secretary had expressly confined the commission to “the
purpose of negotiating . . . for the relinquishment of such portions of the Lake Traverse
Reservation, not allotted, as said Indians may consent to release” and that the resulting
written “form of agreement” must therefore specify the “terms and conditions agreed
upon in Council” together with an exact “description of the lands to be relinquished.”
Letter of Instructions, supra note 164; see supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text;
supra note 296 and accompanying text.
646
Construing section five of the General Allotment Act as implicitly prescribing a
reservation diminishment/disestablishment procedure would violate the Indian law
canons that require, inter alia, “that . . . statutes . . . be liberally construed in favor
of the Indians and that all ambiguities are to be resolved in their favor.” Cohen’s
Handbook § 2.02[1], supra note 16, at 113 (footnotes omitted); see supra note 565.
Thus the Supreme Court has instructed that provisions of the General Allotment Act
are to be interpreted “[a]ccording to a familiar rule,” i.e., that “legislation affecting the
Indians is to be construed in their interest.” United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599
(1916); see also supra note 64 and accompanying text. Inferring an implicit reservation
diminishment/disestablishment procedure would defy, moreover, the Supreme
Court’s acknowledgment that the General Allotment Act’s “policy was to continue
the reservation system and the trust status of Indian lands . . . .” Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 478 (1976) (quoting
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973)); see also infra note 647 and accompanying text.
647
See, e.g., Mattz, 412 U.S. at 497 (observing that the allotment provisions of an 1892
congressional act “which do not differ materially from those of the General Allotment
Act . . . do not, alone, recite or even suggest that Congress intended to terminate”
the reservation in question); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357-58 (1962)
(noting that the “contention . . . that, even though the reservation was not dissolved
completely by the Act permitting non-Indian settlers to come upon it, its limits would
be diminished by the actual purchase of land within it by non-Indians because land
owned in fee by non-Indians cannot be said to be reserved for Indians” raises an issue
that “has . . . been squarely put to rest by congressional enactment of the currently
prevailing definition of Indian country in [18 U.S.C.] § 1151 to include ‘all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States
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Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent’”); Nice, 241 U.S. at 599
(“. . . Section 5 [of the General Allotment Act] expressly authorizes negotiations with
the tribe, either before or after the allotments are completed, for the purchase of
so much of the surplus lands ‘as such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell’,
directs that the purchase money be held in the Treasury ‘for the sole use of the tribe’,
and requires that the same, with the interest thereon, ‘shall be at all times subject
to appropriation by Congress for the education and civilization of such tribe . . . or
the members thereof.’ This provision for holding and using these proceeds . . . makes
strongly against the claim that the national guardianship was to be presently
terminated. . . . [The provision] relating to the use by Congress of their moneys in their
‘education and civilization’ implies the retention of a control reaching far beyond their
property.”); United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 287 (1909) (quoting Eells v. Ross,
64 F. 417, 419-20 (9th Cir. 1894) (citation omitted)) (“It is clear that allotment alone
could not have this effect [of revoking a reservation] . . . . The [General Allotment] act
of 1887 . . . clearly does not . . . abolish the reservations.”); Cohen’s Handbook § 3.04[3],
supra note 16, at 199 (footnote omitted) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the act of opening a reservation alone does not diminish or terminate the Indian
country status of the reservation.”); Anderson, Krakoff & Berger, supra note 116,
at 275 (citation omitted) (“[W]ithout more, the mere opening of a reservation to nonIndians (through the allotment process or otherwise) has not been held to terminate
reservation status.”); see also supra note 16; supra note 378; cf. Reply Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 132, at 16, 1974 WL 186005, at *9 (citations omitted) (observing
that the Seymour and Mattz decisions “reaffirm [the Supreme] Court’s early holdings
which recognized continued reservation existence after allotment and ‘cession’”).
Significantly, on the eve of Congress’s adoption of the bill that became the
General Allotment Act, Senator Henry Dawes personally reassured attendees of the
Lake Mohonk Conference that the pending legislation would not bring about the
extinguishment of a reservation by the mere sale of surplus lands as authorized by
section five of the bill. Just before the senator’s October 13, 1886 speech, titled “The
Dawes Bill,” Presbyterian mission administrator Frank Field Ellinwood expressed
concern about the bill’s potential impact on church properties, saying, “I would like to
ask Senator Dawes whether this bill contemplates the proper guarantees desired and
needed by missionary societies in relation to their investments in building on Indian
reservations.” Proceedings of the 4th Ann. Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conf. 30
(1886) (remark of Dr. Ellinwood). At the conclusion of the speech a participant asked,
“In view of the present condition of the Indian is twenty-five years enough?” Id. at 32
(remark of unnamed attendee). Dawes responded to both matters:
I propose to let the tribal patents go [i.e., let the trust status of individual
allotments expire after 25 years] and to let the reservation stand as it is, with this
provision [reads “And provided further, That at any time after lands have been
allotted to all the Indians of any tribe as herein provided,” &c., S. 54, p. 9].
As fast as you allot this land, as fast as you can negotiate with the Indians for
the rest of the land, you shall capitalize that land and put the money in the Treasury, and pay 5 per cent. annually for the education of the Indians. I think any
one who is troubled about having these reservations protected will see that this
is provided for. They are just as safe if the tribal patent is taken away as before.
Id. (remarks of Sen. Dawes) (second alteration in original) (emphases added)
(quoting language from portion of Senate bill 54 that became § 5 of the Act of
Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90); see supra note 164 (showing text of § 5 of
the General Allotment Act embedded in Interior Secretary’s letter of instructions to
U.S. commissioners tasked with negotiating a land-sale agreement with the SissetonWahpeton Dakota at Sisseton Agency in November and December, 1889); see also
17 Cong. Rec. 123 (1886) (showing that on Dec. 8, 1885 Senator Dawes “introduced a
bill (S. 54) to provide for the allotment of lands in severalty to Indians on the various
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reservations, and to extend the protection of the laws of the United States and the
Territories over the Indians, and for other purposes; which was read twice by its
title, and referred to the Committee on Indian Affairs”); 18 Cong. Rec. 1577 (1887)
(“A message from the President of the United States, by Mr. O.L. Pruden, one of his
secretaries, announced that the President had on the 8th instant [i.e., Feb. 8, 1887]
approved and signed the following act[]: An act (S. 54) to provide for the allotment of
lands in severalty to Indians on the various reservations and to extend the protection
of the laws of the United States and the Territories over the Indians, and for other
purposes.”); cf. Priest, supra note 513, at 186-87 (noting the sparse “congressional
history of such an important measure as the Dawes Act” and observing that
“[d]etailed consideration of the bill at Board [of Indian Commissioners] meetings,
by the various Indian associations, and at Mohonk conference meetings took the
place of the usual hearings and debates”); Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Assault on
Indian Tribalism: The General Allotment Law (Dawes Act) of 1887, at 17 & n.9
(1975) (citing Proceedings of the 3rd Ann. Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conf. 39
(1885)) (observing that during debates over precursor legislative proposals that
preceded enactment of the General Allotment Act “[Senator] Dawes opposed the
instant abolition of reservations” and “was particularly outraged at the loose talk
about breaking up Indian reservations in violation of existing treaties and title”). Prior
to final passage of the General Allotment Act Congress reduced from five to three
percent the interest rate on proceeds from the sale of any unallotted lands within a
consenting tribe’s reservation pursuant to § 5 of the Act. See 18 Cong. Rec. 974 (1887)
(remarks of Sen. Dawes) (“The other change is the difference between 5 per cent. and
3 per cent. interest. Five per cent. is the uniform rate of interest paid for Indian funds,
and the answer to that on the part of the House was that that rate was established at
a time when all interest was at that high rate; all interest now is at 3 per cent. and less,
and they insisted upon those two amendments, and the Senate yielded.”).
Senator Dawes’s apparent understanding that land-sale agreements with Indian
tribes pursuant to section five of the General Allotment Act would leave reservation
boundaries intact sheds essential light on his subsequent paraphrasing that Act as “a
statute which authorized the Secretary of the Interior whenever in his judgment—that
is the language of it—the interests of the Indians and of the United States are promoted
thereby, to enter into negotiations with any tribe of Indians for a surrender of any
portion of their reservations.” 22 Cong. Rec. 3880 (1891) (emphasis added) (remarks
of Sen. Dawes); cf. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (providing that
“at any time after lands have been allotted to all the Indians of any tribe as herein
provided, or sooner if in the opinion of the President it shall be for the best interests of
said tribe, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with such Indian
tribe for the purchase and release by said tribe . . . of such portions of its reservation
not allotted as such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell, on such terms and
conditions as shall be considered just and equitable between the United States and
said tribe of Indians”). As thus illuminated, what Dawes obviously meant when using
the phrase “for a surrender of any portion of their reservations” was simply a tribe’s
consent to the transfer of property interests in particular acreage within a reservation, a
transfer that would not change the reservation’s boundaries. In turn, the fact that Dawes
so paraphrased the General Allotment Act when debating the bill that became the 1891
Act at issue in DeCoteau informs the sense in which Dawes, during that same debate,
used the term “surrender” when referring to “the agreements that were made with
Indians for the surrender of a large portion of their reservations to the public domain”
and when stating that “the United States gave the [Sisseton-Wahpeton] Indians for the
surrender $2.50 an acre.” 22 Cong. Rec. 3879 (1891) (emphases added) (remarks of Sen.
Dawes), quoted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 441; see supra note 510 and accompanying
text; supra notes 578-579 and accompanying text; see also supra note 517 (discussing the
significance of an additional instance of Senator Dawes’s use of the word “surrender”
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“precisely suited” to abolishing a reservation,648 DeCoteau seemed to have
weaponized the interpretive enterprise in this area of Indian law, arming
judicial construction of surplus land acts with a precedent that created an
arsenal of “magic language”649 precisely suited to the task of “wiping out”650
other reservations as well.651 It remained to be seen, when DeCoteau was
decided, whether this aberrant case construing federal Indian legislation
to a tribe’s detriment would be wielded in future litigation also,652 afflicting
other Indian nations and eroding even further the historical duty of the
U.S. government in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, to protect
Indian rights and tribal sovereignty to the maximum extent possible.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of reconciling DeCoteau with Indian
law principles, it is important to note that the Court gave formal recognition, at least, to several of those principles, including (1) “[the Supreme]
during senate debates on the bill that became the 1891 Act).
648
See supra note 641 and accompanying text.
649
See supra note 116 and accompanying text; supra note 121 and accompanying text.
650
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
651
Cf. Kunesh, supra note 105, at 46 (observing that “the Court’s determination in
DeCoteau radically altered not only the tribe’s geographical borders, but also seriously
damaged its authority over all manner of issues, civil, criminal, and regulatory,
particularly its authority to safeguard the welfare of children and families”); Frank
Pommersheim, Braid of Feathers: American Indian Law and Contemporary Tribal
Life 25 (1995) (“The social, cultural, and psychological—not to mention the obvious
legal—impact of [reservation diminishment/disestablishment] decisions exacerbates
the burden of maintaining individual and tribal well-being and integrity.”).
DeCoteau’s immediate threat to other Indian nations is apparent in footnote 22 of
the majority opinion, where the Supreme Court appeared to aim the case’s weaponizing
of land-sale terms at other reservations as well. See DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 439 & n.22
(quoting Agreement of 1889, art. I, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26,
26 Stat. 1035, 1036) (asserting that “[t]he language in the other agreements ratified at
the same time is comparable” to the “‘cede, sell, relinquish, and convey’” terminology
in the 1889 Agreement with the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota, and insinuating that all
such language in “agreements providing for the outright cession of surplus reservation
lands to the Government” is sufficient for concluding that the reservation status of
the sold lands has terminated). The DeCoteau Court’s devising to assign reservationextinguishing meaning to the “outright cession of surplus reservation lands” collides
with the fact that the General Allotment Act—which “clearly does not . . . abolish
the reservations,” Celestine, 215 U.S. at 287 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)—itself requires “that such lands be purchased from the tribes prior to being
sold off to non-Indians,” Tweedy, supra note 617, at 134 (footnote omitted).
652
An early, approving commentary asserts that DeCoteau provides courts “the guidance
needed to determine the effect a surplus land statute had on the boundaries of the
reservation involved” in any reservation diminishment/disestablishment case, including
“that to determine the effect a particular statute had on reservation boundaries, the
courts must not rely on general principles of Indian law in ascertaining congressional
intent.” James M. Bekken, Indians—Reservations—Jurisdictional Effect of Surplus Land
Statute Upon Traditional Boundaries of an Indian Reservation, 52 N.D. L. Rev. 411, 41819 (1975). The then-student author of the case note went on to serve for many years
as a state-court jurist. See All District Court Judges, State of North Dakota Courts,
https://www.ndcourts.gov/district-court/all-district-court-judges (noting Bekken’s
having served as a county court judge for four North Dakota counties and having
been “[e]lected Judge of the Southeast Judicial District in 1994, 1998 and 2004”).
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Court will not lightly conclude that an Indian reservation has been terminated”; (2) when “Congress has once established a reservation all tracts
included within it remain part of the reservation until separated therefrom
by Congress”; and (3) “congressional intent must be clear, to overcome the
general rule that doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of” the
Indians.653 In dissent, Justice William Douglas underscored the centrality of
the rule that “doubtful clauses in agreements with Indians are resolved in
favor of the Indians,” but correctly maintained that “there is no doubtful language in the Agreement or in the 1891 Act” since neither of them contained
the “‘clear language of express termination’” demanded by the controlling
Supreme Court precedent.654 Douglas also castigated the majority for ignoring a crucial warning in Seymour v. Superintendent about practical problems
stemming from the kind of “‘crazy quilt’ or ‘checkerboard’ jurisdiction”
inflicted by the Court’s decision dissolving the boundaries of the Lake
Traverse Reservation.655 He elaborated that “[j]urisdiction dependent on the
‘tract book’ promises to be uncertain and hectic” with “the only beneficiaries
being those who benefit from confusion and uncertainty.”656 Justice Douglas
added, “Checkerboard jurisdiction cripples the United States in fulfilling its
fiduciary responsibilities of guardianship and protection of Indians.”657

DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 463 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504 n.22
(1973)).
655
Id. at 466-67 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing Seymour v. Superintendent,
368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962)); cf. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 25
(No. 73-1148) (“QUESTION: [W]ouldn’t you have an extraordinarily difficult
problem of administering the laws, civil or criminal, if it would be on a patchwork
basis of everything that’s white there being under the jurisdiction of South Dakota,
and everything that’s red being under the jurisdiction of the tribe?”); Kunesh, supra
note 105, at 76 (observing that in his DeCoteau dissent Justice Douglas “chastised his
Court’s disregard for the Indian law canons of construction and its extraordinarily
upending conclusion that the Lake Traverse Reservation had been disestablished,” and
noting further Douglas’s “uncanny trepidation” regarding “the decision’s indifference
to the preservation of family and community relations, essential to cultural survival”).
656
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas’s concern about
“confusion and uncertainty” being a part of DeCoteau’s legacy is reminiscent of Felix
Cohen’s similar observation that “confusion and ignorance in fields of law are allies of
despotism.” Felix S. Cohen, Author’s Acknowledgments, in Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook
of Federal Indian Law xxxii (University of New Mexico Press 1971) (1941).
657
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 467 (Douglas, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note that in
what appears to be the earliest, type-written draft of Justice Potter Stewart’s majority
opinion in DeCoteau there is a sentence that is crossed out with a pencil and that
does not appear in the final published opinion. That sentence reads: “At present,
the Indian allotments take up some fifteen percent of the original reservation lands,
the allotments being scattered in a checkerboard pattern over the area.” See Potter
Stewart Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, MS 1367, Box No. 99, Folder No. 862
(DeCoteau, Natural Mother and Next Friend of Feather v. District Court, No. 73-1148),
retrieved from Yale University Library. One might reasonably speculate that Justice
Stewart thought it inadvisable to keep that sentence in his opinion after reading a
circulated draft of Justice Douglas’s dissenting opinion.
653
654
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Excavating the Truth About DeCoteau—Clues from the
Indian Law Justice Files

The files of Supreme Court Justices shed light on the behind-thescenes deliberations that precipitated the devastating DeCoteau decision.
A conference notes sheet retained by Justice William Rehnquist shows
that Justice Lewis Powell, who ultimately joined Justice Potter Stewart’s
majority opinion concluding that Congress had “terminated the Lake
Traverse Reservation,”658 initially was against that conclusion, having
been “persuaded by SG [Solicitor General].”659 The tally of the initial
conference votes, as recorded in a vote table, thus was 5 to 4, with Powell
casting his vote along with the others in the minority, i.e., Justices William
Douglas, William Brennan, and Thurgood Marshall, in support of
upholding the reservation’s continuing existence.660 Reversing course, in
a February 10, 1975 memorandum Powell wrote: “Dear Potter: Although
I voted the other way (relying primarily on Mattz) your opinion—especially the full exposition of the history—persuades me to your view.”661
What is most intriguing from the documents in the Justices’ papers,
however, is evidence showing the apparent force of Justice Harry
Blackmun—author of the unanimous Mattz v. Arnett decision preserving the Klamath River Reservation662—in consolidating support among
his fellow Justices for reaching a contrary conclusion in the case of the
Sisseton and Wahpeton bands’ Lake Traverse Reservation. For instance
Justice Rehnquist, in a note-taking area of his own copy of the DeCoteau
conference notes sheet, wrote, in the box labeled “Blackmun, J.”:
Mattz correct—here 1889 agreement speaks rather plainly—Indians
agreed to convey for a price—CA8 made too much out of Mattz in its
second case—perhaps civil case dist. [distinguished] from crim . . . if
ever any reservation case lose by Indians, this is prime candidate[.]663
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 428.
William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 16 (Vote sheets,
argued cases 1970-1974), retrieved from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University;
see also Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 731148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress (stating,
in note-taking box of conference notes sheet for “Powell, J.”: “Persuaded by t[he] SG”
and “C/8 [i.e., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals] was right 2d ti[me]”).
660
William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 16 (Vote sheets,
argued cases 1970-1974), retrieved from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
661
Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, MS 1367, Box No. 99,
Folder No. 862 (DeCoteau, Natural Mother and Next Friend of Feather v. District
Court, No. 73-1148), retrieved from Yale University Library.
662
See supra notes 36-64 and accompanying text.
663
William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 16 (Vote sheets,
argued cases 1970-1974), retrieved from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
Conference notes taken by Justice William O. Douglas are consistent: “HB [Harry
Blackmun] Mattz is right—1889 Act reflect[s] agreement to cede—8th Cir. makes too
much out of Mattz . . . .” Papers of William O. Douglas, Manuscript/Mixed Material,
Box 1691, Nos. 73-1148 and 73-1500 (DeCoteau v. District County Court 10th Judicial
Dist.; Erickson v. Feather), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
658
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Rehnquist’s handwritten notes also record other Justices’ deference to
Blackmun’s stated position. In the box labeled “White, J.,” Rehnquist
wrote: “agrees w/HAB [Harry A. Blackmun]”; and in the box for
“Stewart, J.”—author of the DeCoteau majority opinion—Rehnquist
wrote: “agrees with HAB—Mattz was as far as I would go.”664
These conference notes are consistent, moreover, with a wealth of
documents found among the Harry A. Blackmun Papers at the Library of
Congress, elaborating Justice Blackmun’s position in DeCoteau. Echoing
the conference notes taken by Justice Rehnquist, Blackmun ultimately
sent Justice Stewart a memorandum, dated February 11, 1975, that reads:
“Dear Potter: I feel that your opinion for these cases is a most constructive
one. If Indians are ever to lose a case, these, it seems to me, are the ones
they will lose.”665 Even more significant is a seven-page typewritten draft,
dated “12/4/74,” of a memorandum by Justice Blackmun addressed to the
other Justices, a document that in turn borrows heavily from a 23-page
memorandum submitted to Blackmun by a law clerk. In familiar phrasing,
the Blackmun memo states: “David suggests, and I am inclined to agree,
that if ever any of these Reservation cases are to be lost by the Indians, this
is a prime candidate for that very result.” Similarly, the law clerk’s memorandum opens with a “Discussion” section that states, “[I]f the Indians are
going to lose any of these reservation cases, this would be the one.” Tellingly,
a small check mark (in Justice Blackmun’s characteristically diminutive
handwriting)—a recurring device Blackmun employed as a supplement to
his use of yellow highlighting—appears next to this comment from the law
clerk’s memo.666 Both the Blackmun memorandum and the parallel one
produced by the law clerk afford crucial insight into the deliberations that
resulted in the DeCoteau decision.667 Accordingly, this Article reproduces
substantial portions of both memos, followed by analysis and commentary.
William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 16 (Vote sheets,
argued cases 1970-1974), retrieved from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University;
see also Papers of William O. Douglas, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 1691, Nos.
73-1148 and 73-1500 (DeCoteau v. District County Court 10th Judicial Dist.; Erickson
v. Feather), retrieved from the Library of Congress (noting the position of “CJ,” i.e.,
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, in conference as follows: “8th Circ. was right the 1st
time & he affirms”).
665
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 731148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress; see
App. Exhibit 3, infra p. 347.
666
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress. It is unclear
whether Justice Blackmun’s draft memorandum ever was distributed to the other
Justices. No copy exists in the files of any of the other Justices who participated in the
DeCoteau case and whose papers are available for research, i.e., all the Justices except
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Cf. deMaine, supra note 5, at 219 (appendix table)
(noting, under the heading “Disposition of Judicial Papers,” that “William and Mary
Law Library holds the Burger Papers,” which “are closed until 2026, forty years after
his retirement, as instructed in the deed of gift”).
667
Cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier
to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 Ariz. L. Rev. 933, 934-36 (2009) (arguing, based on a
664
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In his own DeCoteau memorandum Justice Blackmun wrote the
following:
In these cases the supreme court of South Dakota and the CA 8
have reached opposing conclusions regarding the disestablishment
of the Lake Traverse Reservation, originally set up by treaty with the
Sioux Indians in 1867. The South Dakota court reached a conclusion
of disestablishment. The CA 8 reached a conclusion of nondisestablishment and in so doing in effect overruled an earlier case in 319 F.2d
845 where the panel consisted of Judges Vogel, Van Oosterhout
[name underlined by Justice Blackmun] and Ridge.668
Bearing somewhat on this is Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973),
an opinion I wrote for a unanimous Court at the end of the Term
before last. That concerned the continuance of the Klamath River
Reservation. We reached the conclusion that the Reservation had
not been disestablished and that land within its boundaries was
still Indian country. We held that allotment provisions of the 1892
Act, there under consideration, was [sic] consistent with continued
Reservation status; that the Act’s legislative history did not support
the view that the Reservation was terminated but really compelled
the conclusion that efforts to terminate it failed completely; that a
Congressional determination to terminate must be expressed on
the face of the statute or be clear from the circumstances in [“and”
inserted by Blackmun] legislative history; and that the conclusion of
nontermination was reinforced by repeated recognition thereafter
by the Department of Interior and by the Congress. Thus the Mattz
opinion gave a great big boost to the continued status of a reservation absent clear opposing indications.
....
Some dates have perhaps a little significance. The first is 1867 when
the Lake Traverse Reservation was established by Treaty. The second
is 1889 when the government and the Indians reached an agreement
whereby the Indians agreed to “seed [“cede” inserted by Blackmun],
sell, relinquish and convey” the surplus lands to the United States
for $2.50 an acre. The third is the Act of 1891 which reflected the
1889 agreement. It specifically stated that the Act seeded [“ceded”
inserted by Blackmun], and conveyed to the United States [sic]
should be subject only to entry and settlement under the Homestead
review of “163 preliminary memoranda written by Supreme Court clerks in the certiorari
decision-making process . . . made public in the Digital Archive of the Papers of Justice
Harry A. Blackmun,” that the “process harshly discriminates against the interests of
Indian tribes and individual American Indians” by “undervalu[ing] the merits and
importance of petitions filed by tribal interests” while “overvalu[ing] the merits and
importance of petitions filed by the traditional opponents of tribal interests”).
668
The citation refers to DeMarrias v. South Dakota, 319 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1963).
See also supra note 109 and accompanying text. Judge Martin D. Van Oosterhout
was a colleague of Justice Blackmun for the full duration of Blackmun’s tenure as
a judge on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See History of the Federal Judiciary:
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit: Judges, Federal Judicial Center, https://
www.fjc.gov/history/courts/u.s.-court-appeals-eighth-circuit-judges (showing Harry
Andrew Blackmun’s tenure on the Eighth Circuit as lasting from 1959 to 1970 and
Martin Donald Van Oosterhout’s as lasting from 1954 to 1979).
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Laws, excepting the 16th and 36th sections “which shall be reserved
for common school purposes, and be subject to the laws of the State
wherein located.” Much of the controversy centers in the presence
of the comma after the word “purposes.” Does the following phrase
modify and apply only to the school sections or, in contrast, does it
apply to the lands seeded [sic]? Surely the statute can be read either
way. If, however, it were to apply only to the school lands, then the
comma after “purposes” would have been better omitted.
The CA8 in overruling the earlier CA 8 case gave emphasis to
much of what we said in the Mattz case. They reasoned that Congress
having once established a reservation, must demonstrate its intent
to disestablish either by something expressed on the face of the Act
or something discernable from the circumstances and legislative
history. It stated that opening a reservation for homesteading is not
inconsistent with its continued existence as a reservation. The general rule, said the CA 8, is that Indians are to be left free from state
jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction is to be preferred.
In contrast, the South Dakota court stressed the fact that the
1891 Act was a sale in session [“and cession” inserted by Blackmun]
and went on to say that there was no occasion for construction. It is
manifest that Congress intended to restore to the public domain all
unallotted lands. Each side makes what it can out of the Mattz opinion.
David Becker 669 points out that neither side here in its briefs
makes an investigation of the background of all this. I take it he is
David M. Becker served as a law clerk for Justice Stanley Forman Reed (retired)
from 1974 to 1975. See SEC Says Its Former Top Lawyer Should Be Investigated
Over Madoff Work, Financial Advisor, Sept. 21, 2011, https://www.fa-mag.com/
news/sec-says-its-former-top-lawyer-should-be-investigated-over-madoff-work-8395.
html?section=43 (noting that Becker “worked as a clerk for former U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Stanley Reed”); see also List of law clerks of the Supreme Court
of the United States (Seat 6), Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_
law_clerks_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States_(Seat_6) (last visited
Aug. 25, 2021) (noting Becker’s having clerked for Justice Reed from 1974 to 1975).
In a 2015 interview, Becker explained that he also provided support for Justice Harry
Blackmun: “I was Justice Reed’s law clerk, but he was retired and quite elderly, and
rarely came into the office. What I did is split my time among four active justices. I
spent several months with Chief Justice Burger, and then I spent three or four months
each with Justices Blackmun, White, and Stewart.” William Thomas, Securities and
Exchange Commission Historical Society Interview with David Becker, May 21, 2015,
http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rackcdn.
com/collection/oral-histories/20150521_Becker_David_T.pdf; cf. Randall P. Bezanson,
Good Old Number Three: Harry Blackmun and His Clerks, in In Chambers: Stories
of Supreme Court Law Clerks and Their Justices 326, 340 n.2 (Todd C. Peppers
& Artemus Ward eds., 2012) (“During October term 1975, Justice Blackmun’s clerks
were supplemented by the law clerk for retired Justice Stanley Reed.”).
Although David Becker’s work with both Justice Blackmun and Justice Potter
Stewart, the author of the DeCoteau majority opinion, suggests Becker’s influence in
the development of that opinion, notations connected with Justice Stewart’s original
draft of DeCoteau indicate that Stewart’s law clerk, Curtis A. Hessler, also may have had
a significant role in the production of that draft. See Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscript/
Mixed Material, MS 1367, Box No. 99, Folder No. 862 (DeCoteau, Natural Mother and
Next Friend of Feather v. District Court, No. 73-1148), retrieved from Yale University
Library (showing the name “C Hessler” handwritten in pencil at top of first page of
669

332

IPJLCR

2022:139

suggesting that legislative history needs some investigating before
we can be certain as to the result to be reached.
....
The Indian parties, supported by the SG, argue that South Dakota
has no jurisdiction in either of these cases and that the tribal counsel
[sic] is the pertinent court to which the controversy should be taken.
They argue substantially as follows: No intent to disestablish can be
found. There is no expressed language of disestablishment in the Act.
Congress knew how to use disestablishment language when it wanted
to. The comma after the work [sic] “purposes” is surplusage and unintended. The last phrase of the Act refers only to the school sections.
The legislative history shows a desire to reward the Sioux for their
loyalty. Disestablishment is hardly a reward. There is a continuance of
trust responsibilities of the United States, and this is consistent with
continued reservation status. Modern maps show the Reservation, and
the Department of Interior has made noises consistent with its continued status. If South Dakota has jurisdiction here, we have an inevitable
checkerboard effect which is undesirable. Further, to rule in favor of
the state is to defeat effective self-government on the part of the Sioux
and to place the Indians under the control of South Dakota.
The state’s arguments are about as anticipated. It claims that
the language of session [the letter “c” is inserted in place of “s” by
Blackmun] and disestablishment could hardly be more unambiguous.
The Act under which South Dakota entered the Union prohibited
the establishment of schools within Indian land until the surrounding Reservation had been disestablished. Thus, the reference in the
Act to school sections clearly shows an intent to disestablish. Senator
Dawes is revealed by the legislative history as speaking of the actual
return of vast amounts of land to the public domain. The continuation of trust responsibility is not inconsistent with disestablishment.
Further, these lands were sold to the United States for a specific sum.
The United States did not enter as a trustee but rather as a buyer.
Contemporary maps show the immediate removal of the Reservation
and their later reinclusion as a former Reservation. Checkerboarding
is neither here nor there, for this is inevitable whenever land allotted
to Indians is defined as Indian country. Checkerboarding does not
argue either for or against a disestablishment conclusion. Finally, the
state points out that the Sioux constitute only 10% of the population
of the land area in question and occupy only 1.5% of the land.
David suggests, and I am inclined to agree, that if ever any of these
Reservation cases are to be lost by the Indians, this is a prime candidate for that very result. The language of the statute stands there as
a very definite barrier. There are specific words of session [the letter
original typewritten draft of DeCoteau majority opinion, and containing a typewritten
note with the handwritten signature “Curt” stating “I have corrected the slips at
pp. 5 & 21 noted by Mr. Justice Blackmun in our Indian opn.”); see also Nomination
of Curtis A. Hessler: Hearing Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate,
96th Cong. 1 (1980), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/HRG96-76.pdf
(stating “Law Clerk to Justice Potter Stewart” from “August 1974 to August 1975” as
part of Hessler’s “biographical data” for Senate hearing on the nomination of Hessler
to be an Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy).
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“c” is inserted in place of “s” by Blackmun], relinquishment, sale and
conveyance. The Mattz opinion clearly contemplated that some language can be used which would disestablish, although the conclusion
there was that the language employed did not disestablish. True, there
is no specific reference or recital that the land is being returned “to
the public domain.” Are those very words, however, absolutely necessary? Congress did given [sic] evidence that it was returning this land
to the public domain, and the Indians can come up with nothing that is
more specific. Thus, definitely on balance, I am inclined to believe that
South Dakota has the better argument here.
I must confess, however, that the CA 8’s difficulty and its overruling
of its earlier case causes me a little bit of personal embarrassment. I think
the earlier case was correctly decided, and I suspect that the second and
contrary decision was arrived at only because of what was held in Mattz.
I suspect, however, that the CA 8 panel just went too far and failed to
see that we had allowed plenty of elbowroom for contrary results on
different facts. Roy Stephenson670 will be upset if this case is reversed.
David points out, of course, that there are some policy matters
that the Court might consider. In favor of the State is that the Indian
population and the Indian territory actually owned is small. On the
other side of that coin is the fact that everyone supposedly is interested in fostering tribal self-government. A decision in favor of the
Indians would have symbolic importance, and very recent statutes
seem to give some implied recognition by Congress of the continued
Reservation status of the Lake Traverse Region.671 I suspect, however that those very recent statutes come too late.672

The law clerk’s memorandum, dated “11/26/74,” which clearly influenced Justice Blackmun’s own, subsequent draft memorandum, contains
the following parallel passages:
I do not have much to add that is not a repetition of an argument of
the parties. It seems pretty clear to me that broader questions of policy
aside, if the Indians are going to lose any of these reservation cases, this
would be the one. Without recapitulating South Dakota’s arguments
in any great detail, the language of the statute looks pretty hard to get
around. Compare the language of the statute in Mattz—“That all the
lands . . . are hereby declared to be subject to settlement”673—with
Roy L. Stephenson served as a judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit from 1971 until his death in 1982. He had been appointed and confirmed to
the seat vacated by Judge Martin D. Van Oosterhout—Justice Blackmun’s longtime
federal appellate court colleague—when Van Oosterhout assumed senior status.
See History of the Federal Judiciary: Judges—Stephenson, Roy Laverne, Federal
Judicial Center, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/stephenson-roy-laverne; History
of the Federal Judiciary: Judges—Van Oosterhout, Martin Donald, Federal Judicial
Center, https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/van-oosterhout-martin-donald; see also
supra note 668 and accompanying text.
671
See infra notes 677-678 and accompanying text.
672
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 731148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress; see
App. Exhibits 4 & 5, infra pp. 348-49.
673
The surplus land act at issue in Mattz actually provided, in relevant part: “That
all of the lands embraced in what was Klamath River Reservation in the State of
670
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the operative statutory language here: “The Sisseton and Wahpeton
bands . . . hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States
all their claim, right, title, and interest.”674 Mattz clearly contemplates
that some language can be sufficient to effect disestablishment of a
reservation. 412 U.S. at 504.675 The sole argument for the Indians that
this language is insufficient is that it does not contain a reference to
returning the land to the public domain.676 Although one might quesCalifornia . . . are hereby declared to be subject to settlement, entry, and purchase
under the laws of the United States granting homestead rights and authorizing the
sale of mineral, stone, and timber lands . . . .” Act of June 17, 1892, 27 Stat. 52, quoted in
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 495 (1973).
674
This sentence from the law clerk’s memorandum is misleading in that it cuts short
(and thus misrepresents) the relevant “operative statutory language” and does not
include an ellipsis in front of the period to alert the memo’s recipient/reader, i.e.,
Justice Blackmun, to the fact that additional words have been deliberately left out.
The operative language in the ratified 1889 Agreement actually provides as follows:
The Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or Sioux Indians hereby cede,
sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and
interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the limits of the reservation as set
apart to said bands of Indians as aforesaid remaining after the allotments and
additional allotments provided for in article four of this agreement shall have
been made.
Agreement of 1889, art. I, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, 1036
(emphasis added), quoted in DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 445 (1975). The
additional qualifying language that the law clerk’s memo silently omits reveals that what
the Indians agreed to “cede, sell, relinquish, and convey” was not the reservation itself
but only their “claim, right, title, and interest in and to all the unallotted lands within the
limits of the [Lake Traverse] reservation,” a reservation that this very provision exalts
as being “set apart to said bands of Indians” by treaty. Id. (emphases added); see also
Agreement of 1889, ratified by Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, § 26, 26 Stat. 1035, 1036
(emphasis added) (acknowledging that “the Sisseton and Wahpeton bands of Dakota or
Sioux Indians are desirous of disposing of a portion of the land set apart and reserved for
them” by the 1867 Treaty), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 455.
675
Far from suggesting merely “that some language can be sufficient to effect
disestablishment,” Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198,
Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of
Congress (memorandum from law clerk to Justice Blackmun), on page 504 of Mattz,
the Supreme Court actually stated that “clear termination language” in a statute is the
necessary “means by which termination [of a reservation] could be effected.” Mattz,
412 U.S. at 504. The Court wrote:
A second conclusion is inescapable. The presence of allotment provisions in
the 1892 Act cannot be interpreted to mean that the reservation was to be terminated. . . . More significantly, throughout the period from 1871-1892 numerous bills were introduced which expressly provided for the termination of the
reservation and did so in unequivocal terms. Congress was fully aware of the
means by which termination could be effected. But clear termination language
was not employed in the 1892 Act. This being so, we are not inclined to infer an
intent to terminate the reservation.
Id. (footnote omitted). In an appended footnote, the Mattz Court reiterated:
“Congress has used clear language of express termination when that result is desired.”
Id. at 504 n.22; see also supra notes 40-65 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme
Court’s reservation diminishment/disestablishment analysis in Mattz).
676
The absence of any statutory “reference to returning the land to the public
domain” was not, of course, “[t]he sole argument for the Indians,” Harry A. Blackmun
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tion whether searching for that particular verbal formula would not
result in too formalistic an approach, it is clear from the comments of
Congress, particularly Senator Dawes, that Congress did in fact think
that it was returning the land to the public domain. The Indian parties
have been unable to point to anything in the statutory language that
evinces an intent not to disestablish; the best they have been able to
do is point to certain things that are not inconsistent with an intent
to preserve the reservation. Again, there is no need for me to repeat
South Dakota’s arguments in detail. Suffice to say, that although several matters do not seem persuasive to me either way—for example,
balancing the references subsequent to 1891 to the reservation as the
“former reservation” as opposed to “the reservation”—I find the bulk
of South Dakota’s arguments speak for themselves and are much
more convincing.
A somewhat more difficult question is this: given a statute subject to two interpretations that are at least arguable, where do the
equities lie? On the one hand, it seems to me that South Dakota’s
interest in applying its law in an area whose populations is [sic] only
10 per cent Indian is rather substantial. So is the reliance interest of
those non-Indians living in the area, who may well be amazed to find
that they have chosen to live under tribal law.
On the other side of the ledger is the interest in fostering tribal
self-government. In addition, a decision in favor of the Indian parties, I would assume, has symbolic importance that extends beyond
the immediate holding. I confess that I have no real opinions on the
weight to be accorded these considerations, although it does appear
that in Public Laws 93-489 and 491 (appended hereto)677 Congress
has thrown its weight behind recognizing the reservation status of
Lake Traverse.678

At the end of his memo to Justice Blackmun, in a section labeled
“Recommendation,” the law clerk wrote:

Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District
County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress (memorandum from law clerk
to Justice Blackmun), in DeCoteau. See generally, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra
note 153, 1974 WL 186007; Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 132, 1974 WL 186005;
see also supra text accompanying note 672 (showing Justice Blackmun’s listing
numerous arguments asserted in DeCoteau by “[t]he Indian parties, supported by the
SG [i.e., Solicitor General]”).
677
See Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-489, 88 Stat. 1465 (“An Act [t]o declare
that certain federally owned lands are held by the United States in trust for the
Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of the Lake Traverse Indian Reservation in North and
South Dakota”); Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-491, 88 Stat. 1468-69 (“An Act
[t]o authorize the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of the Lake Traverse Reservation
to consolidate its landholdings in North Dakota and South Dakota, and for other
purposes”). Photocopies of both of these Public Laws are included in Justice Blackmun’s
DeCoteau folder at the Library of Congress. See Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/
Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved
from the Library of Congress; see also supra text accompanying notes 671-672.
678
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
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I do not have strong feelings about this one, other than a hope that
you do not get assigned the opinion. Questions of policy, which I do
not feel adequately equipped to evaluate, aside, it seems reasonably
clear that the language and history of the 1891 statute indicate that it
was intended to disestablish the Lake Traverse Reservation. . . .
Probably the most important thing the Court can do in this case is
to indicate that each of these reservation cases must be decided with
careful reference to the statutory language and legislative history. The
opinions of both the Eighth Circuit and the South Dakota Supreme
Court are much too cursory for such a complicated question.679

These revealing memoranda from the Harry A. Blackmun Papers at
the Library of Congress are ironic and disturbing on a number of levels.
As discussed previously, it was Justice Blackmun himself, as author of
the unanimous Mattz v. Arnett opinion,680 who employed an interpretive
methodology in the reservation diminishment/disestablishment inquiry
context that is consonant with, and illustrative of, traditional principles
of Indian law, principles that demand a high degree of certainty before
a court can declare that Congress intended to shrink or eliminate the
boundaries of an Indian reservation.681 Thus, in light of Mattz—and of
Seymour v. Superintendent,682 the only diminishment/disestablishment
case decided by the Supreme Court prior to Mattz, upon which Mattz
itself relied—Blackmun’s ridiculing Mattz for “[giving] a great big boost
to the continued status of a reservation absent clear opposing indications”
and his faulting the Eighth Circuit for “[giving] emphasis to much of what
we said in Mattz”683 seem inexplicable. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit’s faithful deference to Mattz could hardly have seemed more unassailable:
The Mattz case makes clear that Congress, during the legislative
years surrounding the 1891 Act “was fully aware of the means by
which termination could be effected.” Clear language such as that
discussed in Mattz expressing intent to discontinue the Lake Traverse
reservation is nowhere to be found in the 1891 Act here involved.
....
Congress established the Lake Traverse reservation as a “permanent” reservation in 1867. Since that time Congress has not through
clear expression or by innuendo shown an intention to disestablish.
....
. . . We . . . hold that the body of legislative documents concerning the Lake Traverse Indian reservation does not, against the glare
of Seymour and the more recent judicial guidance in [inter alia]
Mattz, . . . demonstrate congressional intention to disestablish the
reservation.684
Id.
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
681
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
682
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
683
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
684
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99, 102 (8th Cir. 1973), rev’d,
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
679
680
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Also alarming is what these memoranda reveal about the willingness of Justice Blackmun, following the advice of a law clerk,685 to
entertain the idea of turning the reservation diminishment/disestablishment inquiry into an exercise in discretionary judicial policymaking.686
Thus, echoing the law clerk’s memo, Blackmun’s memo recites “that
there are some policy matters that the Court might consider” when
deciding whether an Indian reservation continues to exist, such as
(1) “the Indian population” and percentage of “Indian territory” within
a reservation—factors that in DeCoteau are said to weigh “[i]n favor of
the State”—as well as (in the law clerk’s words) (2) “the reliance interest of those non-Indians living in the area, who may well be amazed to
find that they have chosen to live under tribal law.” Apparently, as prescribed in the law clerk’s memo, contemplation of such “[q]uestions of
policy”—a judgment about “where . . . the equities lie”—would take the
place of applying Indian law canons and thus of requiring parties hostile
to “continued reservation status” to come forward with “clear opposing
indications” of congressional intent. Indeed, the advice appears to be that
the burden of proof should be thrust upon litigants who maintain that
reservation status remains intact, as reflected in the law clerk’s grievance
that “[t]he Indian parties have been unable to point to anything in the
statutory language that evinces an intent not to disestablish . . . .”687
Cf. Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers: The First Eyewitness Account of the
Epic Struggles Inside the Supreme Court 6 (1998) (criticizing, after Lazarus’s having
served as a law clerk for Justice Blackmun, the Supreme Court as “a Court where
Justices yield great and excessive power to immature, ideologically driven clerks, who
in turn use that power to manipulate their bosses and the institution they ostensibly
serve”).
686
See Getches, supra note 586, at 1573-74 (“Recently . . . the Court has assumed the
job it formerly conceded to Congress, considering and weighing cases to reach results
comporting with the Justices’ subjective notions of what the Indian jurisdictional
situation ought to be. . . . The Supreme Court has . . . begun . . . abandoning entrenched
principles of Indian law in favor of an approach that bends tribal sovereignty to fit the
Court’s perceptions of non-Indian interests.”); Hedden-Nicely & Leeds, supra note 4,
at 330-31 (quoting Getches, supra note 586, at 1626) (“This is the hallmark of the
subjectivist approach. Ignore the innumerable laws and policies developed by Congress
that support tribal rights and sovereignty and instead laser in on its short-lived but
destructive policies from the Allotment Era by ‘filling gaps in legislation and construing
tribal sovereign powers in accordance with allotment-era goals merely because some
or all of a reservation has been allotted.’ In so doing, the necessary inference is that the
allotment policies were correct and Congress’ policy of self-determination is wrong.”).
687
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress (emphasis
added). Justice Blackmun’s misinformed understanding, see supra notes 673-676 and
accompanying text, of the tribal parties’ arguments in DeCoteau, as well as his apparent
readiness to proceed with deciding reservation diminishment/disestablishment cases
in disregard of traditional Indian law principles, is evident in a list of “Questions”
found among Blackmun’s archived papers that the Justice (and, presumably, his law
clerk) prepared for addressing “[t]o the Indian Parties”:
1. Are you contending that the language of the statute is ambiguous solely
because of the failure of the drafters to use the phrase “public domain?” How
685
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The statement “Roy Stephenson will be upset if this case is
reversed” may indeed simply be an expression of self-effacing “personal
embarrassment” by Justice Blackmun for voting with the DeCoteau
majority, thereby overturning an appellate court decision that had relied
squarely on Supreme Court precedent authored by Blackmun himself.688
Stephenson, the federal judge who wrote that unanimous appellate
decision,689 had previously authored a similar Eighth Circuit decision
upholding the boundaries of an Indian reservation, United States ex rel.
Condon v. Erickson,690 an opinion Blackmun himself had cited approvingly in Mattz.691 A one-page memorandum in the Mattz folder within
Blackmun’s archived papers reveals that Mattz’s citation to Stephenson’s
Condon opinion had come about through the urging of a law clerk, who
wrote, “Judge Stephenson’s opinion is really quite on point, as he engages
in much the same analysis as we do.”692 However, correspondence with
a different federal judge, retrieved from Blackmun’s DeCoteau folder
at the Library of Congress, raises implications beyond mere feelings of
embarrassment.
The correspondence consists of two additional documents from
Justice Blackmun’s DeCoteau folder: a letter addressed to the Justice,
along with Blackmun’s reply. The letter to Blackmun is from Andrew W.
Bogue, the then-sitting judge for the U.S. District Court for the District
of South Dakota.693 On March 6, 1975—three days after DeCoteau was
decided—Judge Bogue wrote:
could the statutory language have been more unambiguous?
2. What do you make of the fact that the other cession agreements were ratified by the same Congress on the same day, and that the discussion concerning
them made no differentiation in terms of the legal effect of the conveyances?
Indeed, what can you make of Senator Dawes’ statement immediately prior to
ratification, referring to all the agreements, that they restored vast amounts of
land “to the public domain?”
3. Do you think that all the 30,000 people who settled in the disputed territory had fair notice and understanding that they were subjecting themselves to
tribal jurisdiction?
4. What can you point to in the statutory language or the legislative history
that is not merely consistent with an intent to retain the reservation, but that
evinces a positive intention that the reservation should survive the 1891 Act?
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
688
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
689
United States ex rel. Feather v. Erickson, 489 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1973), rev’d,
DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
690
United States ex rel. Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1973).
691
See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.23 (1973) (citing United States ex rel.
Condon v. Erickson, 478 F.2d at 689); see also supra note 64.
692
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 160, Folder 71-1182
(Mattz v. Arnett), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
693
See South Dakota Hall of Fame: Legacy Andrew Bogue, https://sdexcellence.org/
Andrew_Bogue_2017 (last visited Aug. 25, 2021) (noting that Judge Bogue “sat on the
federal court bench from 1970 to 2009”).

Of Reservation Boundary Lines

and Judicial

Battle Lines

339

Dear Justice Blackmun:
I have this day read the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of
DeCoteau v. District County Court, in which case the Supreme Court
held that the Sisseton-Wahpeton Reservation of South Dakota was
diminished by the sale of certain unallotted lands.
The purpose of my letter is to commend you and the Supreme
Court for the decision made. I recognize that federal judges should
not appear to be partisan in the outcome of any case, however, I cannot help but feel that this is an area which has been long neglected
and which has caused the Indian and the non-Indian communities of
this state to be somewhat frustrated. The very great number of problems which could arise out of white communities being included in
the reservation caused me many nightmares. The issues of licensing
of liquor stores, attorneys and doctors, as well as issues of taxation
would have glutted our calendar here for years to come. I feel that
the white communities and a great share of the Indian communities
are relieved by your decision.
Please extend my regards to Mrs. Blackmun.
Personal regards,
Andrew W. Bogue694

Justice Blackmun replied to Bogue in a letter dated March 12, 1975:
Dear Andrew:
Thank you for your thoughtfulness in writing as you did on
March 6 concerning No. 73-1148, DeCoteau v. District County Court.
Surely the situation, with the South Dakota court going one way
and the Eighth Circuit another, needed to be resolved. I think the
decision was the correct one, and I am comforted by the fact that
you agree.
I hope all is well in Rapid City and, in fact, throughout the whole
State of South Dakota.695

The circumstances of Judge Bogue’s letter lend credence to the suspicion that his correspondence with Justice Blackmun about DeCoteau
might “appear to be partisan in the outcome of [a] case.”696 At the time he
sent Blackmun his letter praising DeCoteau, review of Bogue’s own decision diminishing an Indian reservation—the Rosebud Sioux Reservation in
South Dakota—was pending in the Eighth Circuit.697 Two years later, that
case would be further reviewed by the Supreme Court itself, culminating
in a ruling that devastated the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and went even farther
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 731148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress; see
App. Exhibit 6, infra p. 350.
695
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 731148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress; see
App. Exhibit 7, infra p. 351.
696
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 731148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress; see
App. Exhibit 6, infra p. 350.
697
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 375 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1974) (decided by
Bogue, J.), aff’d, 521 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1975).
694
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than DeCoteau in fundamentally damaging time-honored principles of
Indian law.698 In March of 1975, when Bogue initiated his correspondence,
Justice Blackmun could have been expected to participate in reviewing
the Rosebud Sioux case—as indeed he ultimately did, joining the majority opinion of Justice William Rehnquist that substantially diminished
the size of the Rosebud Sioux Reservation.699 Evidence that a Supreme
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
See id. at 585-615 (majority opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
White, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.); see also Carole Goldberg, President Nixon’s
Indian Law Legacy: A Counterstory, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1506, 1523 (2016) (noting that
“Justice Blackmun joined the other three Nixon appointees” in Rosebud Sioux Tribe
v. Kneip, a decision that “was decidedly contrary to tribal interests, subtracting three
quarters of the reservation’s 3.2 million acres as defined in an 1889 federal statute,
and leaving 2,000 tribal members outside of tribal jurisdiction”). That the question
of the diminishment of the Rosebud Reservation was on the Justices’ minds when
Judge Bogue initiated his correspondence with Justice Blackmun is evident from an
oral argument colloquy in DeCoteau, involving William F. Day, Jr., special assistant
attorney general of South Dakota, who argued on behalf of respondent District
County Court for the Tenth Judicial District:
QUESTION: What happens, Mr. Day, in a reservation which is clearly and
concededly a reservation—let’s take the Rosebud Reservation in your State.
MR. DAY: Okay.
QUESTION: Now, who has jurisdiction there over civil controversy between
two non-Indians?
....
MR. DAY: The State of South Dakota, your Honor.
. . . [W]e exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians in Todd County, South Dakota,
what we’re claiming to be the Rosebud Indian Reservation.
QUESTION: And you recognize it clearly as a reservation?
MR. DAY: Yes, sir.
QUESTION: Everybody does?
MR. DAY: We do.
QUESTION: Unh-hunm.
QUESTION: Well, historically, there hasn’t been much claim to the contrary,
has there? No one has attempted to cut the States out of that, have they?
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 119, at 44 (No. 73-1148).The Justices’ questioning
South Dakota’s special assistant attorney general regarding the status of the Rosebud
Reservation was no mere coincidence since William F. Day, Jr. had represented the four
South Dakota counties that were among the defendants in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe
lawsuit which precipitated Judge Bogue’s federal district court decision on February 6,
1974—ten months before oral argument in DeCoteau—reducing the size of the Rosebud
Reservation to exclude those counties from its boundaries. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe,
375 F. Supp. at 1066 (showing “William F. Day, Jr., Winner, S.D.” as one of the attorneys
“for defendants”); id. at 1084 (diminishing the reservation and asserting “that the State
of South Dakota can exercise jurisdiction over Indian people in the counties of Gregory,
Tripp, Mellette, and what was Lyman”); see also supra notes 693-698 and accompanying
text. Both Bogue’s Rosebud Sioux Tribe opinion and Day’s brief for the four counties—
coauthored with attorney Tom Tobin, see supra note 106—are component parts of an
appendix respondent District County Court filed in the Supreme Court in DeCoteau.
See 3 App. for Respondent at 69-141, DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975)
(No. 73-1148) (on file with Author) (reprinting Brief for the Four Counties, Rosebud
Sioux Tribe, 375 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1974) (No. CIV 72-4055), and listing William F.
Day, Jr. and Tom Tobin as “ON THE BRIEF”); id. at 143-95, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. 425
698
699
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Court Justice felt “comforted” by one judge’s approval of his judgment
in an Indian law case and that he suffered “personal embarrassment” for
having to disagree with another judge’s decision700 raises disturbing collateral questions about judicial objectivity, integrity, and ethics in a field
of law that is uniquely vulnerable to any weakening of these guardrails.701
These concerns are magnified by the fact that Justice Blackmun’s position
in DeCoteau clearly was the driving force relative to the votes of the other
Justices in the majority. Indeed, with Justice Lewis Powell’s having initially
voted with the dissenters702 and with Justice Potter Stewart’s having stated
that he “agree[d] with HAB,”703 the decision easily could have come out
in favor of acknowledging the Lake Traverse Reservation’s continuing
existence if only Blackmun had remained as faithful to the application of
Indian law principles as he had been when he wrote for a unanimous Court
in Mattz v. Arnett,704 just two years before DeCoteau.705
(No. 73-1148) (reprinting Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 375 F. Supp. 1065 (D.S.D. 1974) (opinion
of Bogue, J.)). See generally EagleWoman, supra note 126, at 664-76 (analyzing and
criticizing “the unceasing attack of South Dakota to gain approval by the highest
federal court in the United States to disrupt and destroy the reservation status of the
Sioux Tribal Nations”). Prior to focusing his legal work on diminishing the Rosebud
Reservation and terminating the Lake Traverse Reservation, Day had served for seven
years as a jurist of the Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court. See Obituaries, Argus Leader,
Jan. 4, 2018, https://www.legacy.com/obituaries/ArgusLeader/obituary.aspx?n=WilliamF-Day&pid=187719174 (“On September 14, 1964, President Cato Valandra of the
Rosebud Sioux Tribe appointed Bill to the office of Judge of the Sioux Tribal Court of
Rosebud, where he served until 1971.”).
700
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box 198, Folder 73-1148
(DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
701
See Adam Crepelle, Lies, Damn Lies, and Federal Indian Law: The Ethics of
Citing Racist Precedent in Contemporary Federal Indian Law, 44 N.Y.U. Rev. L.
& Soc. Change 529, 539 (2021) (footnotes omitted) (“The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct . . . recognizes that a fair and impartial judiciary is essential to the
United States justice system. Accordingly, judges are obligated to ‘strive to maintain
and enhance confidence in the legal system.’ Judges must apply the law impartially
and must avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Any judicial conduct that
undermines the impartiality of a court subverts public confidence in the legal system.”);
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (majority opinion of Blackmun, J.)
(“The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately depends on its reputation for
impartiality and nonpartisanship.”); cf. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public
and Private Life 31 n. (2nd Vintage Books ed. 1999) (1978) (“The function of the
principle of veracity as a foundation [of relations among human beings] is evident
when we think of trust. I can have different kinds of trust: that you will treat me fairly,
that you will have my interests at heart, that you will do me no harm. But if I do not
trust your word, can I have genuine trust in the first three? If there is no confidence in
the truthfulness of others, is there any way to assess their fairness, their intentions to
help or to harm? How, then, can they be trusted? Whatever matters to human beings,
trust is the atmosphere in which it thrives.”).
702
See supra text accompanying note 661.
703
See supra text accompanying note 664.
704
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
705
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun’s position in
DeCoteau contrasts sharply with his arguably ordinary alignment (at least during the
latter part of his Supreme Court career) with the votes and viewpoints of Justices
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III. Conclusion
The doctrine of reservation diminishment/disestablishment originated in 1962 as an application of historical and fundamental Indian law
principles in a particular, newly developing context, one that commanded
the Supreme Court’s attention at a time when Indian tribes were emerging from the tyranny of the so-called “termination” era of federal Indian
law706 and beginning to reassert their autonomy, sovereignty, and right of
self-government in the modern era.707 The Court’s essential adherence
to those principles in Seymour v. Superintendent 708 was carried forward
through its 1973 decision in Mattz v. Arnett.709 That case, like Seymour,
held—unanimously—that legislation dating back to the allotment and
assimilation period of U.S. Indian policy, an oppressive and damaging era
long since repudiated by federal policymakers,710 could not be stretched
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall—both of whom joined Justice William
Douglas’s DeCoteau dissent, see DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 460-68 (1975)
(Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ.)—in Indian law cases.
Cf. Dussias, supra note 55, at 139 (“The frequency with which Justices Brennan and
Marshall joined Justice Blackmun’s opinions, or at least agreed with the approach taken
in his opinion, suggests that Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall shared largely
similar views of Indian law during their common years on the Court. . . . [T]he overall
picture that emerges from examining Justice Blackmun’s opinions is that these three
Justices were generally in agreement with each other on the Indian law issues addressed
in Justice Blackmun’s opinions, or at least in agreement on the basic approach which
should be taken in dealing with such issues.”). But see Goldberg, supra note 699, at
1523 (“[O]nce he was on the [Supreme] Court, Justice Blackmun displayed far more
antagonism toward tribal interests during the era of the four Nixon appointees than
afterwards. Justice Blackmun’s early decisions have a patently anti-tribal cast. . . . While
he was part of the Nixon four, . . . Justice Blackmun largely toed the anti-tribal line.”).
706
For overviews of the termination era, see Cohen’s Handbook § 1.06, supra note 16,
at 84-93; Fletcher § 1.3, supra note 14, at 12-13.
707
See Krakoff, supra note 117, at 1212 (noting that “only since the era of selfdetermination have questions arisen concerning whether allotment-era statutes
(the policies of which have been entirely abandoned) diminished reservation
boundaries”); Royster, supra note 56, at 30 n.147 (“It may be significant that Seymour
was decided as the ravages of the termination era were becoming evident and public
policy was beginning to shift again to protecting tribal autonomy. A Court faced with
immediate evidence of the failure of an assimilationist policy was unlikely to strain
to give effect to a similar policy from an earlier era.”); Goldberg, supra note 699, at
1521-22 (footnote omitted) (“Since the 1960s, as tribes have asserted greater control
over their territories, opposing interests have challenged the reach of reservation
boundaries. These opponents have found ammunition for their challenges in federal
allotment statutes dating back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.”);
cf. Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations 86
(2005) (“[A]s the shock waves of termination rolled through Indian country, Indian
people realized that something had to be done and that they could count upon nobody
save themselves. That realization became a major impetus for the gathering of the
modern tribal sovereignty movement.”).
708
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
709
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); see, e.g., Hanna & Laurence, supra note 354, at 807
(“The first two reservation diminishment cases . . . held for the Indian tribes, mostly
on the basis of the statutory language and history, but with some consideration of the
treatment the reservation received from subsequent Congresses.”).
710
See Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496 n.18 (“The policy of allotment and sale of surplus
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or otherwise manipulated to read as if Congress had intended to shrink
or destroy the boundaries when it merely permitted non-Indians to purchase unallotted lands and reside among the Indians on a reservation.711
However, as this Article’s investigation into the contents of individual Justices’ archived papers has shown, an erosion of those protective
Indian law principles was underway in the early 1970s;712 and in 1975
the Supreme Court issued a devastating decision—DeCoteau v. District
County Court 713—that violated those principles while professing to f ollow
them,714 holding that a congressional act ratifying a tribe’s agreement to
sell unallotted lands abolished the reservation itself,715 a reservation that
reservation land was repudiated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 48 Stat. 984,
now amended and codified as 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq.”).
711
Cf. Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by
Judicial, as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights
Act in Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. Rev. 393, 396 (1995) (footnote omitted) (describing the
reservation diminishment/disestablishment cases as ones in which the Supreme Court
“ponder[s] the question whether an allotment-era statute, opening a reservation for
white settlement, worked a diminishment of the reservation down to the lands allotted
to the tribe and its members, or, on the other hand, left the reservation boundary
intact and merely allowed whites to homestead on the reservation”).
712
See Tweedy, supra note 1, at 751 (“Starting in the mid-1970s . . . the Court began to
conclude that language indicating an intent for a tribe to cede lands unconditionally
to the United States for a sum certain was sufficient to support a judicial inference of
an intent to diminish or disestablish a reservation.”); see also supra notes 58-65 and
accompanying text.
713
DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Ct., 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
714
See Royster, supra note 120, at 307 n.189 (citing DeCoteau as a “diminishment
case in which the Court . . . recited the [Indian law] canons and then refused to apply
them”); supra note 566 and accompanying text; see also Bethany R. Berger, Hope for
Indian Tribes in the U.S. Supreme Court?: Menominee, Nebraska v. Parker, Bryant,
Dollar General . . . and Beyond, 2017 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1901, 1921 (2017) (footnotes
omitted) (citing, inter alia, DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 444) (“Although [the Supreme
Court] has insisted that allotment does not diminish a reservation absent ‘clear and
plain’ evidence of congressional intent, it has repeatedly found diminishment even
though Congress did not actually say the boundaries would change.”).
715
See Frickey, supra note 500, at 1150 (“Standing alone, this language [of the
1891 Act of Congress at issue in DeCoteau] only implies a transfer of Indian title
to the United States. It says nothing about tribal jurisdiction over the lands.”);
see also Memorandum of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 593, at 9,
1974 WL 187467, at *5 (“Nothing in that [1889] agreement shows that the Tribe
intended to give up anything more than beneficial title to some of its land. The natural
understanding by the Tribe would be that it was selling only its property interest in
land, not its right of self-government, particularly in view of the pattern in which
allotments were being made.”); cf. Getches, supra note 586, at 1621 (footnote omitted)
(“When construing legislation opening Indian country to non-Indian occupancy, the
Court has generally resisted diminishing reservation boundaries absent clear evidence
that Congress intended to divest the tribe not only of parcels of land but the power
to govern the area.”); Taylor, supra note 60, at 1182 (footnote omitted) (“Because
every surplus land act had one distinct motivating purpose—to lure white settlers onto
the reservation by offering inexpensive parcels—most of the statutes contained some
form of cession terminology necessary to effectuate the land transfer. A sale of land,
however, does not necessarily concede loss of jurisdictional authority over it.”).
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had been guaranteed by treaty to be the tribe’s “permanent” home.716 It
remained an open question, after the DeCoteau decision, whether the
doctrine of reservation diminishment/disestablishment could be brought
back in line with traditional Indian law principles, or would continue to
devolve along a contrary, inimical trajectory.717
To find out, please stay tuned for the exciting Part 2 of this first
episode of The Indian Law Justice Files . . . .

Treaty of Feb. 19, 1867, art. III, 15 Stat. 505, 506, as amended, 15 Stat. 509 (“[T]here
shall be set apart for the members of said bands . . . the following described lands as a
permanent reservation . . . .”), reprinted in DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 451-52. For discussion
of potential remedies for the Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota people, see EagleWoman,
supra note 104, at 533-38 (advocating for remedial action “[o]n the international level”
in light of the fact that “Indigenous peoples experiencing human rights violations
have demanded that nation-states evolve their human rights standards to provide for
collective rights”); Angelique A. EagleWoman, Re-establishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Oyate’s Reservation Boundaries: Building a Legal Rationale from Current International
Law, 29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 239, 252, 266 (2005) (identifying “the need to regain
federal recognition of the [Lake Traverse] reservation boundaries to restore full
acknowledgement of tribal jurisdiction within those boundaries” and concluding that
“[a]fter the DeCoteau decision, the [Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate] has exhausted judicial
remedies in the United States and international law is the next logical step to regain
its traditional territories as an indigenous nation”); see also Angelique EagleWoman,
It’s time to rectify the 1975 DeCoteau decision, disestablishing the Sisseton-Wahpeton
Reservation, Indian Country Today, July 15, 2020, https://indiancountrytoday.com/
opinion/its-time-to-rectify-the-1975-decoteau-decision-disestablishing-the-sissetonwahpeton-reservation (“It is time to course correct the negative consequences from
the wrongly decided DeCoteau case and wipe away the injustice of that ruling which
continues to be used as a threat over Indian Country. The Sisseton-Wahpeton Dakota
have never relinquished our beautiful Lake Traverse Reservation and we call upon
the U.S. Congress to rectify the 1975 DeCoteau decision as a judicial error, by passing
federal law to re-recognize our reservation boundaries.”).
717
Cf. Tweedy, supra note 1, at 787 (referencing McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452
(2020)) (“[I]f McGirt is any indication, there is a substantial possibility that the Court
may realign itself with the canons of construction in federal Indian law . . . and return to
a principled approach rooted in core doctrine, rather than the pell-mell methodologies
we have too often seen in recent decades.”); Mary Kathryn Nagle, Special McGirt
Issue: Introduction, 56 Tulsa L. Rev. 363, 368 (2021) (“Because of McGirt, today’s
metric of justice will no longer be what white settlers expected, but could not lawfully
secure, more than one hundred years ago. Because of McGirt, when it comes to treaties
and tribal nations, today’s measure of justice will be the law. Nothing less. Nothing
more.”). But see Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486, 2510, 2511, 2521 (2022)
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (observing that in McGirt the Supreme Court was unwilling
“to usurp Congress’s authority and disestablish [the Muscogee Creek Reservation] by
a lawless act of judicial fiat” but decrying the 5 to 4 Castro-Huerta majority opinion
conferring state jurisdiction over an on-reservation crime committed by a non-Indian
against an Indian as an “ahistorical and mistaken statement of Indian law” that “allows
Oklahoma to intrude on a feature of tribal sovereignty recognized since the founding”
and that “surely marks an embarrassing new entry into the anticanon of Indian law”).
716
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Appendix—
Selected Exhibits from the Papers of Supreme Court Justices

Exhibit 1: From the William H. Rehnquist Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material,
Box/Docket No. 38: 71-1182 (Mattz v. Arnett, Director, Department of Fish and
Game), retrieved from the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
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Exhibit 2: From the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material,
Box 116 (“Notes exchanged between justices during court proceedings, 19701993”), retrieved from the Library of Congress.
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Exhibit 3: From the Potter Stewart Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, MS
1367, Box No. 99, Folder No. 862 (DeCoteau, Natural Mother and Next Friend
of Feather v. District Court, No. 73-1148), retrieved from Yale University Library.
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Exhibit 4: From the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box
198, Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library
of Congress.
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Exhibit 5: From the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box
198, Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library
of Congress.
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Exhibit 6: From the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box
198, Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library
of Congress.
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Exhibit 7: From the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Manuscript/Mixed Material, Box
198, Folder 73-1148 (DeCoteau v. District County Ct.), retrieved from the Library
of Congress.

